Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Although not technically enrolled at the University of Kentucky, Doe hoped to attend the University and was enrolled at a Kentucky community college that allows its students to transfer credits to the University and enroll in the University through a simpler application process. Doe lived in the University’s residence halls, paid fees directly to the University for housing, board, the student government association, student activities, access to the student center, a student health plan, technology, access to the recreation center, and student affairs. Doe alleges that a student enrolled at the University raped her on October 2, 2014. She reported the rape to the University’s police department. Over the course of 30 months, the University held four disciplinary hearings. The alleged perpetrator was found responsible for the rape at the first three hearings. The University’s appeal board overturned the decisions based on procedural deficiencies. At the fourth hearing, the alleged perpetrator was found not responsible.Doe dropped out of her classes and sued, asserting that the University’s deliberate indifference to her alleged sexual assault violated Title IX, 20 U.S.C.1681. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims. Doe has sufficiently shown that there remain genuine disputes as to whether the University denied her the benefit of an “education program or activity,” and has standing. View "Doe v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

Less than an hour after a Brown County, Ohio jail officer was captured on video yelling in Goldson’s ear, “I’d like to break your fucking neck right now,” multiple correctional officers apparently discovered Goldson hanging by his neck from a bedsheet tied to the sprinkler escutcheon in his cell, in what the officers now characterize as a suicide. Goldson’s sister claims that Goldson’s hanging was staged. The district court acknowledged that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Goldson was capable of hanging himself, mainly due to the physical layout of the cell and Goldson’s physical characteristics but nonetheless granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence as to a specific theory of how Goldson died. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, reinstating claims against two correctional officers relating to Goldson’s death. The court affirmed with respect to other defendants and claims. View "Bard v. Brown County" on Justia Law

In 2000, Lisa was found dead in her driveway. Investigators focused on McCary, Halvorson’s former boyfriend. After hearing of a $10,000 reward, Woodfork alleged that McCary had paid him and England to murder Lisa. Woodfork wore a wire, allowing the police to record a conversation between him and England. England complained about McCary’s not having paid him in full and made threats. Police subsequently brought England to the station for questioning, telling him that he had been recorded. England stated, “go on and lock me up then and call my lawyer … I don’t know what you’re talking about.” The interrogation continued. England ultimately admitted that he was present at the murder but claimed only to have punched Lisa, which knocked her down, and that he attempted to talk McCary out of further violence. He claimed that Lisa was alive when they departed the scene. The prosecution’s theory was that the two planned to make it appear that Lisa was accidentally run over by her own truck and that they knocked her to the ground, accelerated the truck backward, and broke her windpipe. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed England’s conviction and life sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting arguments that the trial court erroneously admitted his confession, that improper admission of hearsay statements from the deceased victim was erroneously deemed harmless error, and that the prosecution suppressed evidence in violation of Brady. View "England v. Hart" on Justia Law

In 1978, McKillop was brutally murdered. In 2006, Lolley, McKillop’s former neighbor, told police that Cooper had confessed to killing McKillop. On March 3, 2010, after multiple interviews and while in custody, Cooper admitted that he had witnessed McKillop’s murder and that he knew who had tied him up and shot him, but denied that he had done it., declaring: “I’m not saying no more.” He accused the detectives of having already concluded that he was the murderer and made statements indicative of his desire to be arraigned. The questioning did not stop. Finally, Cooper admitted that he and Bollis forced McKillop to the floor, where McKiddie shot McKillop in the head. Although the trial court declined to suppress the March 3 statements, the prosecutor agreed not to use proof from that interview affirmatively. However, during his questioning of the officer who conducted the interview, defense counsel referenced certain statements made by Cooper at the March 3 interview and moved for the interview’s admission into evidence.Cooper was convicted of first-degree felony murder and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the Michigan court found that Cooper had waived any challenge to the admission of his statements from the March 3 interview under Michigan’s invited-error doctrine. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Cooper’s petition for federal habeas relief. The Michigan trial court’s admission of the confession was not an error that rose to the level of actual prejudice. View "Cooper v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Euclid Officers Rhodes and Catalani were dispatched to check on a “suspicious” vehicle in a residential area near a school. Stewart was sleeping in the car. Catalani shined his flashlight through the windows and saw indications of marijuana and alcohol. The officers did not turn on their dashboard camera, belt microphones, nor their vehicle’s overhead lights. Stewart woke up and started the car. Neither officer announced himself as a police officer. The officers attempted to remove Stewart from the car; Rhodes got into the car. Stewart drove away within the speed limit. Rhodes attempted to gain control of the gearshift and the keys while striking Stewart in the head. Rhodes eventually deployed his taser and pulled the trigger six times. The car came to a stop. Rhodes did not try to leave the car. Stewart then continued driving. When the car stopped, Rhodes fired two shots into Stewart’s torso. According to Rhodes, Stewart attempted to “punch” him. Rhodes shot Stewart three additional times. Stewart died from his wounds; 59 seconds elapsed from the time Catalani advised dispatch that Stewart was fleeing to the time he reported shots fired.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as barred by qualified immunity but reversed the dismissal of state law claims. Regardless of whether a constitutional violation occurred, the contours of the right were not clearly established in these circumstances. Few cases have ever considered the danger faced by an officer inside a fleeing suspect’s vehicle and at what point it justifies the use of deadly force. Violation of Stewart's rights cannot be the “known or obvious consequence” disregarded by the city through its training program. Statutory immunity under Ohio law is distinct from federal qualified immunity. View "Stewart v. City of Euclid" on Justia Law

Castro-White, age 23, was found dead in his bedroom with signs of an opiate overdose. The Lorain Police Department retraced Castro-White’s final hours and identified Davis as the dealer who sold the drugs that killed Castro-White. Davis had sold the drug to Castro-White's friends, who had shared the drugs. Davis received a life sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) which imposes a mandatory life sentence if a defendant with a prior felony drug conviction distributes an illegal substance and death results from its use.The Sixth Circuit rejected Davis' argument that the enhancement does not apply because he did not sell drugs directly to Castro-White. The enhancement’s text does not require such a buyer-seller relationship with the victim. The court also rejected Davis’s other evidentiary and instructional claims.The court remanded because the government conceded that the warrant that allowed the police to search Davis’ home and seize his cellphone lacked probable cause. The government claimed that the affiant gave additional unrecorded oral testimony to establish probable cause in front of the state magistrate who issued the warrant. The Fourth Amendment does not mandate recorded testimony, so the court allowed the government to offer evidence of this additional testimony in an evidentiary hearing on remand. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Pirkel committed 17 crimes in 2007. He was suicidal when he was arrested. Pirkel expressed reservations about entering a plea; he was given 90 minutes to read police reports. When the court reconvened, Pirkel pleaded no contest to all of the charges except criminal sexual conduct and accosting a minor, which were dismissed. Pirkel stated that he understood the plea agreement and that no one had threatened him or promised him anything. Before sentencing, Pirkel sent the judge a letter expressing concerns with his representation and his plea. The court would not allow Pirkel to withdraw his plea, refused to appoint new attorneys, and sentenced Pirkel to 20-50 years’ imprisonment for assault with intent to murder,Pirkel's appointed appellate counsel, Ujlaky, advised Pirkel that he “found no issue of even colorable merit to pursue.” The judge who had presided over Pirkel’s plea and sentencing allowed Ujlaky to withdraw and declined to appoint new counsel. Michigan courts declined to hear his delayed pro se appeal. Pirkel filed a federal habeas petition. The district court found that Pirkel failed to exhaust several claims and denied relief on the other claims.The Sixth Circuit appointed counsel and allowed Pirkel to proceed on claims that his plea was rendered involuntary by ineffective assistance of trial counsel; that appellate counsel performed ineffectively; that the court violated Pirkel’s constitutional rights by allowing appellate counsel to withdraw; and that any exhaustion defense was waived. The court then reversed the denial of relief. The Michigan trial court failed to conduct its own review of the merits of Pirkel’s appeal before allowing counsel to withdraw based on a conclusory statement. The Constitution requires more. The Michigan courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. Pirkel is entitled to a new first-tier appeal in the Michigan courts View "Pirkel v. Burton" on Justia Law

Wofford was found guilty of a 1993 murder in a Michigan court following the removal and replacement of a juror. While that juror was holding out against conviction at the time, the judge removed her for misconduct: she had violated his instructions not to discuss the case with anyone other than her fellow jurors by hiring a lawyer to address the court about tensions in the jury room. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Wofford’s conviction under a state precedent on juror removal.A federal district court granted Wofford’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that decision not entitled to deference under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, because the Michigan court had overlooked Wofford’s Sixth Amendment claims and the removal of the juror violated Wofford’s Sixth Amendment rights.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The 2020 Supreme Court decision, “Ramos,” held that the right not to have a juror removed due to the juror’s opinions on the merits of the case is contained in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a “trial by an impartial jury.” Michigan did not overlook Wofford’s Sixth Amendment claims. While the juror was a holdout, she was not removed for this reason, but because of her misconduct. The Michigan court was free to require a showing of an actual constitutional violation and clearly, if implicitly, did so. View "Wofford v. Woods" on Justia Law

Adopted in 2019, Ohio Revised Code 1349.05(B) states: No health care practitioner, with the intent to obtain professional employment for the health care practitioner, shall directly contact in person, by telephone, or by electronic means any party to a motor vehicle accident, any victim of a crime, or any witness to a motor vehicle accident or crime until thirty days after the date of the motor vehicle accident or crime. Any communication to obtain professional employment shall be sent via the United States postal service. Subsection (C) provides the same restrictions but with regard to the agents of health care practitioners. The plaintiffs provide chiropractic services; one plaintiff is a referral service that identifies and contacts prospective patients for health care providers. The plaintiffs claim that they “all rely upon advertising and marketing techniques that permit prompt contact with victims of motor vehicle and pedestrian accidents.” They alleged that the statute violates their constitutional rights to free speech and equal protection. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in denying relief. The plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their free speech and equal protection claims; “strong” precedents foreclosed the plaintiffs’ challenges. View "First Choice Chiropractic, LLC v. DeWine" on Justia Law

A.F., age 14, reported to police that she was being blackmailed by a user on the messaging application Kik. The perpetrator had obtained nude photographs from her phone and was threatening to release the images if she did not send additional nude photographs. Oakland County, Michigan, deputies investigated her claims but disregarded the fact that the blackmailer used the Kik username “anonymousfl” rather than “anonymous”—a separate Kik username associated with Tlapanco, a New York resident. As a result, NYPD officers working with Oakland County Deputy Elges, searched Tlapanco’s apartment, seized his electronic devices, arrested him, and detained him in New York for two weeks before extraditing him to Michigan. He was detained at the Oakland County jail for another three weeks before the charges were dismissed.Tlapanco sued the deputies and Oakland County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Elges unlawfully searched his apartment, caused his false arrest, and prosecuted him; Deputy McCabe unlawfully seized, searched, and copied his electronic devices before returning them; and Oakland County is liable for failure to train or because of McCabe’s decisions as a purported county policymaker. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to McCabe and Oakland County but reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Elges on Tlapanco’s Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution claims. View "Tlapanco v. Elges" on Justia Law