Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While in office, Courser, a former Republican member of the Michigan House of Representatives, had an affair with another representative, Gamrat. The defendants were legislative aides assigned to Courser and Gamrat. Worried that he and Gamrat eventually would be caught, Courser concocted a plan to get ahead of the story by sending out an anonymous email to his constituents accusing himself of having an affair with Gamrat, but including outlandish allegations intended to make the story too hard to believe. Courser unsuccessfully attempted to involve one of the defendants in the “controlled burn.” The defendants reported Courser’s affair and misuse of their time for political and personal tasks to higher-ups. In retaliation, Courser directed the House Business Office to them. After they were fired, the defendants unsuccessfully tried to expose the affair to Republican leaders, then went to the Detroit News. Courser resigned and pleaded no contest to willful neglect of duty by a public officer.Courser later sued, alleging that the defendants conspired together and with the Michigan House of Representatives to remove him from office. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all of Courser’s claims: 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985; violation of the Fair and Just Treatment Clause of the Michigan Constitution; computer fraud; libel, slander, and defamation; civil stalking; tortious interference with business relationships; negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress; RICO and RICO conspiracy; intentional interference with or destruction of evidence/spoliation; and conspiracy. View "Courser v. Allard" on Justia Law

Beck claims he was assaulted by other inmates while detained at the Hamblen County, Tennessee jail. He sued Sheriff Jarnagin under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Jarnagin had no direct involvement in Beck’s detention; section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ actions. Beck argued that the overcrowded jail has repeatedly failed minimum standards; that Jarnagin has long known of its failures; and that Jarnagin has been deliberately indifferent to inmate safety. The Tennessee Corrections Institute has identified the jail’s failures in inspection reports that are sent to Jarnagin each year. The court denied Jarnagin qualified immunity on Beck’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, reasoning that pretrial detainees have a clearly established right to be free from a government official’s deliberate indifference to inmate assaults.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Existing precedent would not have clearly signaled to Jarnagin that his responses to the overcrowding problem were so unreasonable as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Beck has no evidence suggesting that Jarnagin had any personal knowledge of Beck’s specific situation Jarnagin did make efforts “to abate” th3 general risk of inmate-on-inmate violence but did not have the power to allocate more taxpayer dollars to the safety problems. The court noted that Beck’s suit against Hamblen County remains viable. View "Beck v. Hamblen County" on Justia Law

The Randolph-Sheppard Act, 20 U.S.C. 107, requires government agencies to set aside certain contracts for sight-challenged vendors. States license the vendors and match them with available contracts. In 2010, Michigan denied Armstrong’s bid for a contract to stock vending machines at highway rest stops. A state ALJ ruled in Armstrong’s favor and recommended that she get priority for the next available facility/location. The state awarded Armstrong an available vending route later that year. Armstrong nonetheless requested federal arbitration, seeking nearly $250,000 in damages to account for delays in getting the license. The arbitrators ruled that Armstrong was wrongfully denied the location she sought and ordered Michigan to immediately assign Armstrong the Grayling vending route but declined to award damages, reasoning that her request was “too speculative.”The district court upheld the arbitration award and rejected Armstrong’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, concluding that the Randolph-Sheppard Act created the sole statutory right to relief under federal law. Michigan subsequently granted her the Grayling license. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The unfavorable arbitration decision was not arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Armstrong may not sue under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to vindicate her rights under the Randolph-Sheppard Act. View "Armstrong v. Michigan Bureau of Services for Blind Persons" on Justia Law

Ouza was arguing with her son, Hassan. Ouza’s daughter, Maysaa called her father, Mohamad. Mohamad went to Ouza’s house, in violation of Ouza's Personal Protection Order. Maysaa called the police. When Officer Dottor arrived, the men were gone. The case report identified Ouza as the “victim” of domestic violence. After Dottor left, Mohamad returned and pushed into the house, causing Ouza to fall. A struggle ensued. The women pushed Mohamad out of the house. Maysaa called 911 and reported that her father was hitting her mother. Dottor and Officer Derwick arrived. Mohamad, standing outside, told a false story that Ouza had attacked him. Dottor placed Ouza under arrest and handcuffed her. Mohamad then said, “I was trespassing. I hit her. ... She was just defending herself.” Ouza alleges that she told Dottor several times that the handcuffs were too tight. Ouza was released from custody the next day. The prosecutor declined to prosecute. Ouza alleges that she continues to suffer physical injury from the excessively tight handcuffing.In Ouza’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with regard to Ouza’s excessive force claim; a ruling that the officers spoiled evidence (audio and video recordings), without a sanction of an adverse inference; and a ruling that the municipality is not liable. The court reversed summary judgment in favor of Dottor with regard to false arrest claims. View "Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights" on Justia Law

Wingate was charged with one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a); two counts of pharmacy robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2118(a); three counts of using or carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Wingate was on parole for second-degree murder at the time of the robberies), 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and one count of conspiracy to commit those crimes, 18 U.S.C. 371. Nearly all of the indicted co-conspirators pleaded guilty. A jury convicted Wingate on all nine counts; he was sentenced to 684 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Wingate subsequently filed a section 2255 motion, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine more of the government’s witnesses and for “failing to move to suppress the identification obtained as a result of a suggestive photo lineup” and that his convictions for bank and pharmacy robbery were improperly classified as crimes of violence under section 924(c). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of those claims. Wingate cannot demonstrate prejudice as a result of his attorney’s purportedly ineffective assistance. The district court was right to conclude that sections 2113(a) and 2118(a) are crimes of violence under section 924(c)’s elements clause. View "Wingate v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1997, Sexton pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated robbery; an Ohio state court judge sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Sexton later argued that Ohio law required a three-judge panel to receive his plea and impose the sentence and that he was not aware of that purported error nor was he told about his right to appeal his sentence. Within 13 months, he wrote to the Ohio Public Defender, which replied with a form that Sexton could use to pursue pro se claims pro se. Two weeks later, Sexton filed a pro se petition to vacate his sentence, focused on Sexton’s co-defendant, who apparently testified against him and received a more lenient sentence. Sexton made assertions that amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition as time-barred and failing to state any claims warranting either relief or an evidentiary hearing.Sexton says that in 2017 he learned, from another inmate, that he should have been sentenced by a three-judge panel. Sexton filed an application for leave to file a delayed appeal with the affidavits from Sexton and the other inmate. Ohio courts denied Sexton’s application. The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal of his federal habeas petition; 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D) made timely Sexton’s claim that he was denied due process and equal protection in 2017 when the Ohio court denied his motion for leave to file a direct appeal. View "Sexton v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs sought to qualify to run as independent candidates for President of the United States in the 2020 election. Ohio law requires them to file a nominating petition with at least 5,000 signatures of qualified Ohio electors by August 5, 2020. Each individual circulating petitions for an independent candidate must sign a statement stating that they witnessed the signature. Other plaintiffs sought to gather signatures to nominate candidates for the November 2020 election and to form the Green Party as a minor political party under Ohio law. To attain that status, the Party must file a party formation petition by June 30, 2020, with signatures collected in person.The plaintiffs’ signature collection efforts were ongoing until the beginning of the pandemic. Ohio began issuing orders that restricted person-to-person contact, first prohibiting gatherings of 100 or more people then limiting gatherings to 50 people. On March 22, the state issued an order requiring Ohioans to stay at home. Each of the orders contained an explicit exception for conduct protected by the First Amendment. On April 30, as the stay-at-home order eased, Ohio continued to prohibit most “public and private gatherings,” but explicitly excepted First Amendment protected speech, including “petition and referendum circulators.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The ballot-access requirements, as applied, are not unconstitutionally burdensome in light of the orders restricting in-person gatherings. View "Hawkins v. DeWine" on Justia Law

After almost 20 years as a Reynoldsburg detective, Tye was charged with a federal drug trafficking offense. While awaiting a preliminary hearing, Tye committed suicide in his cell at the Delaware County Jail. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to Tye’s serious medical need, with state-law claims for wrongful death and survival, the district court denied summary judgment to officers Foley and Wallace, finding that neither was entitled to federal qualified immunity or immunity under Ohio law.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The facts and inferences as found by the district court do not, as a matter of law, show that either officer was aware that Tye posed a “strong likelihood” of attempting suicide. During the intake process, Tye denied any thoughts of suicide, feelings of hopelessness, or history of psychiatric issues. Foley reported no visible signs of distress, noting only that Tye was a “peace officer.” Tye was later seen by a nurse, who ministered her own physical and mental health assessments, and again denied any thoughts of suicide, feelings of hopelessness, or history of psychiatric issues. Tye later met with a mental health clinician, who reported only “[n]ormal [f]inding[s]” with respect to demeanor, mood, thought process, behavior, affect, and cognition. View "Downard v. Martin" on Justia Law

A Michigan jury convicted Stewart of the premeditated murder of his estranged wife, Venus. At trial Stewart’s accomplice testified that Stewart persuaded him to help by claiming that Venus was harming the couple’s children and that, if she ended up killing them, Stewart would go on a “rampage” and “go after her family and the lawyers and prosecutors and jury[.]” Stewart moved for a mistrial based on his accomplice’s testimony about what he had said, arguing that its inflammatory nature prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. A state appellate court rejected Stewart’s due-process challenge.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). A habeas challenge to an evidentiary ruling cannot satisfy section 2254(d)(1) unless the petitioner identifies a Supreme Court case establishing a due process right with regard to the specific kind of evidence at issue. Stewart identifies no Supreme Court holding barring the “specific kind of evidence,” in this case Stewart’s out-of-court statements that allegedly inflamed the jury. The state appellate court reasonably concluded that Spencer’s testimony about Stewart’s statement was not unduly prejudicial. View "Stewart v. Winn" on Justia Law

In 2008, Melara, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. illegally and was removed after being apprehended. In 2016, Melara’s wife and children immigrated legally to the U.S. and became lawful permanent residents. Melara then experienced threats and violence from the MS-13 gang. In 2017, Melara illegally reentered the U.S. The government apprehended him and reinstated his 2008 removal order. An asylum officer found that he had established a reasonable possibility of future torture. An IJ found that Melara was not entitled to relief. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit remanded Melara’s withholding-only case and dismissed his other petitions for review. The BIA reinstated Melara’s appeal.Melara has remained in detention since December 2017. In June 2019, Melara filed a habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2241, seeking either release from detention or a bond hearing before a neutral decision-maker. The district court dismissed Melara’s petition, holding that 8 U.S.C. 1226 does not apply to his detention and under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)'s indefinite-detention standard, his due process claims fail because his removal is reasonably foreseeable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Section 1231(a) provides the authority for detaining aliens in withholding-only proceedings. Because Melara’s removal is reasonably foreseeable, his continued detention does not violate due process under the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis. View "Martinez v. LaRose" on Justia Law