Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Organizations involved in voter outreach in Tennessee and one individual Tennessee voter sued Tennessee government officials involved in election enforcement, challenging the Tennessee statutory scheme that governs absentee voting. On September 9, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the enforcement of Tenn. Code 2-2-115(b)(7), which prevents individuals who registered to vote by submitting a registration form online or by mail from voting absentee during the first election after they had registered.The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to stay that injunction. Disrupting the new rules at this point would pose a significant risk of harm to the public interest in orderly elections, while there is no substantial harm to defendants in continuing to comply with rules they are currently following. The defendants did not file their appeal of the preliminary injunction until nearly one month after it went into effect. During the period between September 9, the day of issuance of the preliminary injunction, and October 15, the day the plaintiffs’ response was filed, both absentee voting and early in-person voting had begun in Tennessee. View "Memphis A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, prohibited “[a]ll mass gatherings,” including faith-based events.” The order excepts “normal operations at airports, bus and train stations, . . . shopping malls,” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores where large numbers of people are present, but maintain appropriate social distancing.” A subsequent order required organizations that are not “life-sustaining” to close. “Life-sustaining” exempt entities include laundromats, accounting services, law firms, hardware stores, airlines, mining operations, funeral homes, landscaping businesses, and grocery stores. Religious organizations are not “life-sustaining,” except when they provide “food, shelter, and social services.” The order prohibited even drive-in services.Maryville Baptist held an Easter service. Some congregants went into the church. Others parked outside and listened to the service over a loudspeaker. Police issued notices that their attendance, whether in the church or outdoors, amounted to a criminal act, recorded congregants’ license plate numbers, and sent letters requiring self-quarantine for 14 days. Congregants who attended the service sued, claiming that the orders and their enforcement violated their free-exercise and interstate-travel rights.The Sixth Circuit previously granted injunctions pending appeal, reasoning that the treatment of comparable religious and non-religious activities does not suggest the least restrictive way of regulating the churches. The Sixth Circuit later dismissed the appeals. On remand, the district court(s) should consider whether these cases are moot in light of the Governor’s new orders, permitting indoor worship at limited capacity. View "Roberts v. Neace" on Justia Law

A 1998 Kentucky law requires abortion facilities to obtain transfer agreements with local hospitals and transport agreements with local ambulance services, Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 216B.0435; 2017 regulations imposed stricter conditions on the agreements but also allowed successive, 90-day waivers for facilities unable to comply. EMW, at the time, Kentucky’s only licensed abortion facility, challenged the requirements as imposing an undue burden on abortion access. They argued that it had become impossible for them to obtain the required agreements and that the law’s enforcement would leave Kentucky without a licensed abortion facility. The district court found Kentucky’s requirements were facially invalid and permanently enjoined them.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, vacating the injunction. The district court erred in attempting to weigh the benefits of the Kentucky laws against their burdens; a court need only consider whether the laws are reasonably related to a legitimate state interest and whether they impose a substantial obstacle. The laws are reasonably related to a legitimate government end. The court noted that Planned Parenthood received a provisional license for its Louisville facility in 2020 and currently performs abortions. To establish a substantial burden, the plaintiffs had to establish that both EMW and Planned Parenthood would be unable to operate on the basis of waivers even if they could reasonably expect to renew the waiver every 90 days. They failed to make that showing. View "EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander" on Justia Law

Tennessee voters must apply to vote absentee. The county administrator of elections determines whether the voter has established eligibility to vote absentee, and compares the signature of the voter on the request with the signature on the voter’s registration record. Voters who qualify to vote absentee receive a ballot, an inner envelope and an outer envelope, and instructions. The inner envelope has an affidavit; the voter must verify that he is eligible to vote in the election. The ballot must be received no later than when the polls close. Upon receipt by mail of the absentee ballot, the administrator "shall open only the outer envelope and compare the voter’s signature on the [affidavit] with the voter’s signature" on the registration record. If the administrator determines the signatures do not match, the ballot is rejected; the voter is “immediately” notified in writing. Voters who are concerned that their absentee ballot might be rejected may cast a provisional ballot before being notified of a rejection.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the signature verification procedures. The plaintiffs cannot cite with certainty or specification any past erroneous rejection of an absentee ballot; their speculative allegations of harm are insufficient to establish standing. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that anyone whose ballot may be erroneously rejected will ultimately be unable to vote, either absentee or by provisional ballot; there is no evidence that anyone’s constitutional rights are likely to be infringed. View "Memphis A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Hargett" on Justia Law

In 2011, McCormick was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, which carries a 10-year maximum sentence. The district court sentenced McCormick under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), which imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum on defendants with three prior violent felony convictions, citing McCormick’s prior convictions for Kentucky third-degree burglary. Those burglaries occurred during a 16-day period, 19 years earlier, just after McCormick turned 18. The court recognized that McCormick’s offenses did not categorically qualify as ACCA predicates. The district court examined more than the Kentucky statute to conclude that McCormick “pled guilty to each of the essential elements of [generic] burglary.” The court sentenced McCormick to the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum, varying downward. McCormick’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence. The district court incorrectly concluded that McCormick could not bring a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to challenge his illegal sentence based on the Supreme Court's 2016 "Mathis" decision, which explicated the “categorical approach” and requires courts to rely solely on the state statute's text to determine whether past convictions qualify as ACCA predicates where the state statute is divisible and lists alternative factual means by which a defendant can satisfy the listed elements. Based on Mathis, McCormick’s prior convictions no longer qualify as ACCA predicates. The 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) savings clause authorized him to seek relief from his unlawful sentence through a section 2241 petition. View "McCormick v. Butler" on Justia Law

Bennett worked at the Metro Government Emergency Communications Center (ECC) for 16 years. On November 9, 2016, Bennett, a white woman, responded to someone else's comment on her public-facing Facebook profile, using some of the commenter’s words: “Thank god we have more America loving rednecks. Red spread across all America. Even niggaz and latinos voted for trump too!” Bennett identified herself as an employee of Metro, the police department, and ECC in her Facebook profile. A constituent reposted part of Bennett’s statement and commented: If your skin is too dark your call may have just been placed on the back burner. Several employees and an outsider complained to ECC leadership. Bennett failed to show remorse. ECC officials determined that Bennett violated three Civil Service Rules and, after paid administrative leave and a due process hearing, fired her.Bennett sued Metro for First Amendment retaliation. The Sixth Circuit reversed a judgment in favor of Bennett, finding that the district court improperly analyzed the “Pickering” factors. The record indicated that the harmony of the office was disrupted; the court erred in discounting the importance of harmonious relationships at ECC. It is possible that inaction on ECC’s part could have been seen as an endorsement of the speech and impaired future discipline of similar derogatory statements. It is also possible that a damaged relationship with her colleagues could affect the quality and quantity of Bennett's work. Bennett’s comment detracted from ECC's mission. View "Bennett v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

Rudd alleged that his ex-wife abducted their sons with assistance from her attorney (Meyers), during a child custody dispute. Rudd called the police but alleges that they refused to help him because Meyers is married to the city manager. Rudd filed an official complaint with the police department. Rudd claims that officials subsequently helped Meyers obtain an ex parte personal protection order as “leverage” in the custody case, authorized officers to illegally disclose Rudd’s information on the Law Enforcement Information Network, and falsified reports. Rudd prevailed in the custody case. Norton Shores later hired a new police chief, Gale. Rudd thought that Gale might “objectively” address the way that the police had handled his sons’ abduction and filed an official complaint. Gale told Rudd that he would investigate and have the Michigan State Police investigate. Instead, Rudd alleges, Gale gave his complaint to Meyers, the city manager, and the former police chief; never internally investigated; and set up a sham outside investigation. Rudd claims that his complaint triggered retaliatory actions, including an effort to get him jailed.Rudd brought a pro se suit against everyone involved. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his suit. The evidence may confirm Rudd’s allegations or it may disprove them but a court must accept his allegations as true at the pleading stage. View "Rudd v. City of Norton Shores" on Justia Law

Pineda visited a Cincinnati nightclub that used private bouncers and off-duty Hamilton County deputies for parking lot security. Three deputies worked that night, in uniform. Around 2:30 a.m., a fight broke out. Pineda saw individuals arguing with a bouncer near the door and told them to calm down. The bouncer hit Pineda in the face, chipping two teeth. According to Pineda, a deputy who was behind him knocked him unconscious by striking him on the back of the head with his baton. Pineda never identified the culprit. Three of Pineda’s friends generally corroborated his recollection. The deputies claim that they were in different areas and did not witness what happened to Pineda. Pineda’s injuries were significant. At the hospital, an officer wrote a report indicating that Pineda said that a bouncer assaulted him and did not mention a deputy.Pineda sued the deputies and the Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force claim and that the Sheriff “ratified” the excessive force by failing to meaningfully investigate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the claims. Pineda was required to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that each defendant was “personally involved” in the excessive force. Pineda did not identify the deputy who struck him; there was no allegation of a causal connection between the unidentified deputy and any other defendant’s actions. The investigation did not contribute to Pineda’s injury. View "Pineda v. Hamilton County" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services regulates the placement of at-risk children in the Commonwealth’s custody. Father Maloney’s Boys and Girls Haven, a private, non-profit entity, educates, treats, and provides day-to-day care to abused and neglected children at a residential campus. The Commonwealth hired Haven to provide care for neglected children. The Haven hired Howell to work with “horses and youth.” Howell had worked one-on-one with Lester, a Haven resident, for three months. Lester arrived early one day, grabbed Howell, choked her unconscious, dragged her into the bathroom, and sexually assaulted her. Howell, unable to return to work, sued Haven and the Kentucky agency, alleging state-law claims and a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim based on her Fourteenth Amendment interest to be free from unjustified personal intrusions.The district court dismissed the state agency from the case, dismissed the federal claim, and remanded the state-law claims to state court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Haven is not a state actor. Haven houses, educates, and provides day-to-day care to the children but has no power to remove children and place them under appropriate care or in juvenile correctional facilities—the kinds of things state actors traditionally do. Kentucky has not “traditionally and exclusively” performed Haven’s functions, and Haven is not standing in Kentucky’s shoes when offering eleemosynary services. Requiring private actors to follow statutory mandates, even if “extensive,” doesn’t transform them into public servants. View "Howell v. Father Maloney's Boys' Haven" on Justia Law

Freed owed $735.43 in taxes ($1,109.06 with penalties) on his property valued at about $97,000. Freed claims he did not know about the debt because he cannot read well. Gratiot County’s treasurer filed an in-rem action under Michigan's General Property Tax Act (GPTA), In a court-ordered foreclosure, the treasurer sold the property to a third party for $42,000. Freed lost his home and all its equity. Freed sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment.The district court first held that Michigan’s inverse condemnation process did not provide “reasonable, certain, and adequate” remedies and declined to dismiss the suit under the Tax Injunction Act, which tells district courts not to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had" in state court, 28 U.S.C. 1341. The court reasoned that the TIA did not apply to claims seeking to enjoin defendants from keeping the surplus equity and that Freed was not challenging his tax liability nor trying to stop the state from collecting. The TIA applied to claims seeking to enjoin enforcement of the GPTA and declare it unconstitutional but no adequate state court remedy existed. The court used the same reasoning to reject arguments that comity principles compelled dismissal. After discovery, the district court sua sponte dismissed Freed’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, despite recognizing that it was “doubtful” Freed could win in state court. The Supreme Court subsequently overturned the "exhaustion of state remedies" requirement for takings claims.The Sixth Circuit reversed without addressing the merits of Freed’s claims. Neither the TIA nor comity principles forestall Freed’s suit from proceeding in federal court. View "Freed v. Thomas" on Justia Law