Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2014, a jury convicted Nassiri of the second-degree murder of his wife. In 2018, Nassiri filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. A magistrate determined that Nassiri’s limitations period expired on February 28, 2018—one day before his petition was submitted. Nassiri’s counsel had not recognized the petition’s untimeliness before submission and did not make any arguments in the petition about why his delay should be excused. The magistrate concluded that equitable tolling was not warranted. Nassiri’s objection to the magistrate’s report was prepared by the same counsel responsible for his untimely filing. Counsel explained that she had used a mechanical device, which wrongly indicated that the deadline was March 1, 2018. Counsel argued that she was “seriously negligent” when she “failed to use an alternative method ... after the Petitioner himself questioned the accuracy" of the deadline.” The district court denied the petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). The court acknowledged that Nassiri’s counsel was “ineffective,” but concluded that her ineffectiveness did not merit tolling because counsel had not “abandoned” Nassiri.The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded to allow Nassiri an opportunity to develop and present his equitable tolling argument anew, while represented by unconflicted counsel. There is some evidence that Nassiri’s attorney did not present the “full picture” of her misconduct to the district court, so jurists of reason could debate whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. View "xNassiri v. Mackie" on Justia Law

Kesterson, a Kent State student-athlete, told her coach, Linder, that Linder’s son had raped her. Linder, a mandatory reporter under Kent State’s Title IX policy, never notified anyone. Linder stopped calling Kesterson by her nickname; chastised her in front of another coach for becoming emotional; removed Kesterson from her starting shortstop position and limited her playing time; and required Kesterson to attend events at the Linder home, where her accused rapist lived. Kenderson subsequently told other Kent State employees about the alleged rape, but none reported it. The university learned about the assault two years later when Kesterson made a complaint to the school’s Title IX office. An investigation led to Linder’s resignation. Kesterson sued Kent State, Linder, and another coach citing the free-speech retaliation protections of the First Amendment, her equal-protection rights, and Title IX. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A reasonable coach would have known at the time Linder acted that she could not retaliate against a student-athlete for reporting a sexual assault. Rejecting the Title IX claim, the court stated that Kent State’s employees’ failure to follow policy did not amount to deliberate indifference by the school. View "Kesterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

Trice entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, reserving the right to challenge the warrant issued to search his apartment. Officers had entered the common area of his apartment building and placed a camera disguised as a smoke detector on the wall across the hallway from the door of his unit. The camera was equipped with a motion detector and set to activate whenever the door to his apartment opened. The camera made several videos of Trice entering and exiting; the information was used in an affidavit in support of the search warrant. Law enforcement executed the warrant and seized drugs and other paraphernalia consistent with distribution.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting his Fourth Amendment arguments as “squarely foreclosed by two lines of authority.” Trice had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment’s unlocked common hallway where the camera recorded the footage. Law enforcement may use video to record what police could have seen from a publicly accessible location. The camera captured nothing beyond the fact of Trice’s entry and exit into the apartment and did not provide law enforcement any information they could not have learned through ordinary visual surveillance. View "United States v. Trice" on Justia Law

Carusone was convicted of felony murder exclusively on the theory—as the prosecution repeatedly emphasized in its closing argument at trial—that Carusone “plunged [a] knife into the victim’s heart.” That theory, as the state court of appeals later found, was “plainly discredit[ed]” by medical records that the state admits it wrongfully suppressed before trial. Those undisclosed hospital records contained a doctor’s affidavit that the victim “died as a result of cardiac arrest brought about by the combined effects of multiple drugs and alcohol and by heavy stress and exertion following a physical confrontation.” The state court of appeals denied Carusone relief.The Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief. The state court “plainly misapplied the governing Supreme Court precedent,” in Brady v. Maryland and Kyles v. Whitley, when it held that the undisclosed evidence does not undermine confidence in the verdict. The reasoning of the court of appeals amounted to speculation that a jury would go further than any expert did, and find that “stress” from the stab wounds was a proximate cause of the victim’s death. View "Carusone v. Warden, North Central Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

While incarcerated for a Kentucky state conviction, Dotson was convicted, in 1999, of federal crimes and sentenced to 322 months of imprisonment to run consecutively to his Kentucky sentence. The following year Dotson, still incarcerated in Kentucky, was convicted in a Georgia state court and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. In 2004, Kentucky paroled Dotson into custody in Georgia. In 2011, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) declined to designate the Georgia prison as the place where Dotson would serve his federal sentence. Dotson filed an unsuccessful habeas corpus action. In 2019, Georgia released Dotson to federal custody. Dotson sought to have the time he spent in custody in Georgia credited to his federal sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. With respect to the transfer to Georgia, the federal government is permitted to waive its primary jurisdiction in favor of a state. Dotson’s argument that the BOP should have designated Georgia as his place of federal imprisonment is essentially an argument that his federal sentence should run concurrently with his Georgia sentence; 18 U.S.C. 3621(b) authorizes the BOP to designate a federal prisoner’s place of imprisonment, which effectively resolves whether sentences are served concurrently or consecutively; when the federal court is silent, the BOP decides. The BOP properly consulted the federal sentencing judge and considered the other pertinent factors including the seriousness of the offenses and Dotson’s criminal history. View "Dotson v. Kizziah" on Justia Law

In 2008, after being denied tenure, George filed a discrimination lawsuit against Youngstown State University and was reinstated as part of a settlement agreement. As soon as the university’s obligations under the agreement expired, it declined to renew George’s contract and terminated his employment as a professor. George applied to several other positions within the university but was rejected. He then filed employment discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.Following discovery, the district court granted YSU summary judgment, finding that George either failed to show causation, failed to show he was qualified for the job, or failed to show that YSU’s claimed reasons for firing (or not hiring) him were pretextual. The court also dismissed one of George’s failure-to-hire claims— which arose after this lawsuit was filed—based on an administrative exhaustion requirement. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to George reveals a genuine dispute of material fact as to each of the claims and the district court further erred in enforcing the administrative exhaustion requirement because the defendants expressly waived it below. View "George v. Youngstown State University" on Justia Law

Federal prison officials seized one of Callahan’s paintings and some mail-order photos on the ground that they violated the prison’s rules against possessing sexually explicit materials. After filing internal grievances without success, Callahan sued for money damages and other relief under the First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech. The district court declined to create an implied cause of action, often called a Bivens claim, under the First Amendment for Callahan’s claim.The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the Supreme Court has not recognized a new Bivens action in 40 years and has repeatedly declined to do so. The Court has rejected the Bivens inclination that a private right of action exists when Congress is silent and has adopted the opposite approach in statutory and constitutional cases. The Court has even cut back on the three constitutional claims once covered and has never recognized a Bivens action for any First Amendment right. The court noted that Callahan is in prison based on serious child pornography convictions. His lawsuit challenges the prison’s determination that his painting project and pictures were sexually explicit enough to increase the risks of harassment of female personnel and disorder among prisoners. View "Callahan v. Federal Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

Weser and Goodson met while working with an animal rescue organization, Loudon County Friends of Animals (LCFOA). Weser allowed LCFORA to use her farm as a cat-rescue facility. After Weser and Goodson had a falling out, LCFOA ceased its operations on Weser’s farm. On November 7, 2016, 12 of LCFOA’s cats and kittens remained on Weser’s property. Weser put the animals in a large crate, drove to Goodson’s house, and placed the crate on Goodson’s driveway. Goodson responded by calling Loudon County 911, causing Deputy Anderson and another officer to be sent to the scene. Anderson arrested Weser for criminal trespass. The charge was later dismissed.Weser’s suit against Anderson and Goodson was rejected on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to all claims against Goodson and as to the malicious prosecution claims against Deputy Anderson. The court vacated as to the state-law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment against Anderson, with instructions that the district court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to those claims. The court noted that Tennessee law is unclear regarding situations in which an officer had probable cause to believe that an individual had committed a criminal offense, but not an arrestable offense. View "Weser v. Goodson" on Justia Law

Koger, an inmate of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), is a practicing Rastafarian. Between 2006 and 2018, Koger made several religious-practice accommodation requests, including requests to grow his dreadlocks, keep a religious diet, observe fasts, and commune with other Rastafarians. Alleging that ODRC’s responses were inadequate, Koger brought these claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several ODRC officials. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Koger has not shown that the prison’s grooming policy, which provides for an individualized determination of whether an inmate’s hair is “searchable,” prevents him from growing his locks naturally and, therefore, cannot “demonstrate that [the] prison policy substantially burdens [his] religious practice.” It is not clear that ODRC denied Koger the ability to commune with fellow Rastafarians. The court reversed in part. The defendants did not present any government interest to justify the denial of Koger’s religious diet requests. Koger sufficiently alleged equal protection violations. View "Koger v. Mohr" on Justia Law

Proponents of a criminal-justice reform initiative that they seek to place on the ballot for the 2020 Michigan general election sued state officials, who continued to strictly enforce the signature requirement for initiatives even after Governor Whitmer issued an order requiring most Michigan residents to remain in their homes as part of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Finding that the combination of the stay-at-home order and the signature requirement violates the First Amendment by creating a severe restriction on their access to the ballot, the district court enjoined the strict enforcement of the signature requirement. The court rejected a proposed compromise that included a several-weeks extension of the filing deadline.The Sixth Circuit declined to issue an emergency stay pending appeal. With respect to the burden imposed on the Plaintiffs’ access to the ballot, the restrictions at issue are identical to those previously found to be severe. The Defendants failed to show a likelihood that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting the proposed remedy of extending the petition deadline by, at most, 35 days. The court took “no position on the merits.” View "SawariMedia, LLC v. Whitmer" on Justia Law