Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1998-2010, Dimora served as one of three Cuyahoga County Commissioners. An FBI investigation revealed that Dimora had received over $250,000 in gifts from individuals with business before the County, including home renovations, trips to Las Vegas, and encounters with prostitutes. Dimora had used his position to help with the awarding of County contracts, hiring, the results of at least one County election, and civil litigation outcomes. Dimora’s “influence” ranged from casting formal votes as Commissioner to pressuring other officials.Dimora was charged with Hobbs Act offenses, bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, making false statements on tax returns, conspiracy to commit mail fraud and honest services mail fraud, conspiracy to commit bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and honest services wire fraud, RICO conspiracy, mail fraud, conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstructing a federal investigation. A jury convicted Dimora on 33 counts. The Sixth Circuit upheld the jury instructions defining “official acts” as having “fairly trace[d] the line between permissible gifts and impermissible bribes.” A ruling that state ethics reports were inadmissible hearsay was harmless in light of “overwhelming evidence.”In its 2016 “McDonnell” decision, the Supreme Court gave a narrow construction to a key element included within several of Dimora’s offenses. The term “official acts” does not include “setting up a meeting, calling another public official, or hosting an event.” Official acts are limited to “formal exercise[s] of governmental power.” Dimora petitioned to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sixth Circuit vacated a denial of relief. The court declined to decide whether the instructional error was harmless with respect to most of the counts or whether the “cumulative effect” of instructional and evidentiary errors entitles Dimora to relief. View "Dimora v. United States" on Justia Law

Faisal Khalaf, Ph.D., who is of Lebanese descent, sued Ford, his former employer, and his former supervisors under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. He claimed that he was subjected to a hostile work environment because of his race or national origin and that the defendants illegally retaliated against him, after he engaged in protected activities, by demoting him, placing him on a “Performance Enhancement Plan” (PEP), and terminating his employment. For the collective actions of all the defendants, the jury awarded Khalaf $1.7 million in pension and retirement losses and $100,000 in emotional-distress damages. For the actions of Ford only, the jury awarded $15 million punitive damages, which the court reduced to $300,000.The Sixth Circuit reversed, directing the district court to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. There was insufficient evidence of a hostile work environment. Clear communication skills are a fundamental skillset required of managerial positions across the U.S., and such ability was a part of Khalaf’s specific role; there is no basis to infer that comments about his English language skills were motivated by discriminatory animus. There is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a connection between Khalaf’s complaint against his supervisors and the imposition of the PEP. Khalaf was not actually terminated He was given the choice of taking another position and decided not to do so. View "Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 144 years of the Kentucky Derby, only one horse to cross the finish line first had been disqualified. No winning horse had ever been disqualified for misconduct during the race itself. In 2019, at the 145th Derby, “Maximum Security,” the horse that finished first, was not declared the winner. He would come in last, based on the stewards’ call that Maximum Security committed fouls by impeding the progress of other horses. His owners, the Wests, were not awarded the Derby Trophy, an approximate $1.5 million purse, and potentially far greater financial benefits from owning a stallion that won the Derby.They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the individual stewards, the individual members of the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, an independent state agency, and the Commission, claiming that the regulation that gave the stewards authority to disqualify Maximum Security is unconstitutionally vague.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The decision to disqualify Maximum Security was not a “final order[] of an agency” under KRS 13B.140(1) and is not subject to judicial review. The owners had no constitutionally-protected right. Kentucky law provides that “the conduct of horse racing, or the participation in any way in horse racing, . . . is a privilege and not a personal right; and ... may be granted or denied by the racing commission or its duly approved representatives.” View "West v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission" on Justia Law

Duval, a special education teacher in the Lansing district, was under the supervision of Bacon until 2011. Several teachers reported Duval’s physical abuse of students. Bacon apparently did not address those reports. When Bacon retired. Robinson became principal. Upon Robinson’s arrival, the school’s union representative presented her with a full envelope of statements regarding Duvall’s mistreatment of students and women. After additional reports, Robinson referred the complaint to HR and requested an investigation by the District’s Director of Public Safety. Reports had been made to the Lansing police; employees of the Community Mental Health Authority and Guardianship Services made additional reports. Following a “firestorm” of complaints, and a brief suspension Duval was transferred to the Gardner school. The reports of abuse continued.In 2014, C.G., who has autism spectrum disorder, was a student at Gardner. Duvall allegedly abused C.G. by throwing him into furniture and kicking him in response to minor misbehavior. The Lansing police department charged Duval with child abuse. Duval resigned.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of C.G.’s right to bodily integrity under the Due Process Clause, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against several supervisory employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed. There is sufficient evidence of a direct chain of causation between the “deliberate indifference” of the supervisors and C.G.’s abuse. View "Garza v. Lansing School District" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Judicial Drug Task Force and the Drug Enforcement Administration investigated Abdalla for suspected narcotics trafficking. The Tennessee judge who signed the warrant permitting officers to search Abdalla’s residence on New Hope Road only had jurisdiction in DeKalb County but the warrant, in one place, listed an address on Carey Road in Trousdale County. This error resulted from the officer using a previous warrant as a template and failing to erase all vestiges of that document. Abdalla argued that a warrant cannot be valid if it contains a mismatch between the residence in the authorization section and the residence that the police searched and that a judge’s failure to notice an address outside his jurisdiction in a warrant’s authorization section demands the inference that the judge impermissibly rubber-stamped the warrant. The affidavit supporting the warrant listed the correct address and county at the top of the first page; the warrant itself directed officers to the correct address by providing step-by-step directions along with a detailed description of Abdalla’s residence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, Abdallah’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, and his 168-month sentence. The warrant’s singular incorrect address posed almost no chance of a mistaken search. Despite the government’s irregular mistake, this clerical error case demands the usual result for technical mistakes that threaten no constitutional harm. View "United States v. Abdalla" on Justia Law

In 1993, Willman was convicted for violating a Michigan sexual assault law. He served 10 years in prison and completed parole. Willman registered on Michigan’s sex offender registry. Congress, in 2006, passed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901 to “make more uniform" a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration systems, that had resulted in an estimated 100,000 sex offenders becoming missing or lost. SORNA “made it a federal crime for a sex offender who meets certain requirements to ‘knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration’” Willman challenged the Michigan law and SORNA. The district court dismissed the Michigan defendants and directed them to not enforce the 2006 and 2011 amendments to Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act against Willman. The court declared that the duration of Willman’s registration under Michigan law had ended and that he should be removed from that registry. The court later dismissed the federal claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A sex offender’s obligations under SORNA are independent of any duties under state law. The court rejected Willman’s arguments that SORNA is unconstitutional as an ex post facto law, as double jeopardy, as violating the Fifth Amendment, as cruel and unusual punishment, as overbroad and vague, as violating his privacy rights, and as violating his right to travel. View "Willman v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Lowe, born in 1958, worked for Walbro for 41 years and was promoted several times, becoming the Cass City facility Area Manager in 2014. Cass City evolved from producing carburetors to focus on blow molding and robotics. In 2016, Walbro hired 35-year-old Davidson as General Manager. Davidson testified that Lowe’s understanding of robotics and blow molding was limited, so Lowe relied heavily on two subordinates for equipment maintenance. Davidson removed those subordinates from reporting to Lowe. Lowe was left managing only one portion of the building and conducting general facility maintenance. Lowe alleges that Davidson made several disparaging statements about Lowe’s age. In 2018, Walbro hired Rard as Senior Human Resources Manager. Rard testified that she noticed that Lowe was serving as the Area Manager but had only a few janitors reporting to him. She recommended that Lowe’s position be eliminated. Rard also testified that she received complaints about Lowe engaging in bullying, vulgarity, and sexual innuendoes. Walbro terminated Lowe.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, Lowe’s age discrimination claims under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Davidson’s age-related remarks could lead a reasonable jury to find that Walbro acted on a predisposition to discriminate on the basis of age. Lowe raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the animus was a but-for cause of his termination. Walbro has not demonstrated as a matter of law that it would have terminated Lowe regardless of any age-related animus. View "Lowe v. Walbro LLC" on Justia Law

The Marietta Education Association serves as the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district’s employees. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME (2018), Thompson sued the Association and the Marietta Board of Education, arguing that Ohio’s scheme of exclusive public-sector union representation violates the First Amendment. Under Ohio law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for all public employees in a bargaining unit upon proof that a majority of the bargaining unit’s members wish to be represented by the union, Ohio Rev. Code 4117.05(A)(1). Public employers are then prohibited from bargaining with individual employees and other labor organizations. Ohio law sets a broad scope for collective-bargaining negotiations. Thompson is not a member of the Association. She objects to its policies but because the union has been designated as her bargaining unit’s “exclusive representative,” the union has a statutory right to represent her. Thompson argued that Ohio’s system of exclusive public-sector bargaining violates her First Amendment rights.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ohio’s take-it-or-leave-it system is in direct conflict with the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Janus v. AFSCME (2018). In deciding Janus, however, the Court did not overrule Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight (1984). Which directly controls the outcome of this case. View "Thompson v. Marietta Education Association" on Justia Law

In 1984, two 17-year-old Caucasian students were car-jacked, sodomized, robbed, and murdered by Taylor and Wade, both African-Americans. A witness picked Wade from a line-up. Wade confessed, naming Taylor as the sole shooter. Convicted, Wade received a life sentence. Taylor’s trial began in 1986, before "Batson," The controlling law about racial animus in peremptory challenges was "Swain." In selecting Taylor’s jury, the prosecutor had nine peremptory challenges; he used four to strike African-Americans, leaving only one African-American on the jury after Taylor’s counsel removed an African-American woman with a peremptory challenge. Taylor’s counsel raised a fair-cross-section challenge. The prosecutor responded, “almost incoherently.” The court rejected the challenge, stating: “I believe the issue being addressed ... [Batson] as to whether it is permissible to exercise your peremptory strikes whichever way you wish to. I don’t know, but the record is clear as to what has been done in this case.” The prosecutor presented overwhelming evidence of Taylor’s guilt. The judge found Wade unavailable to testify pending his direct appeal and allowed the prosecutor to play Wade’s tape-recorded police statement. The jury convicted Taylor. The court sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Taylor’s Batson and Confrontation Clause claims. On collateral attack, Taylor also raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Based on Taylor’s limited argument, the prosecutor’s otherwise non-discriminatory conduct, and the absence of an indisputable pattern of discriminatory strikes, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s denial of Taylor’s Batson claim was not necessarily an unreasonable application of Batson. Even if evidence that Taylor produced at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing had been presented at trial, Taylor could not have prevailed on a Swain claim, so his counsel was not ineffective for failing to produce that evidence. Any Sixth Amendment error was harmless. View "Taylor v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Hepatitis C is a contagious, progressive virus that can lead to cirrhosis of the liver, liver cancer, and ultimately death. There is no vaccine for hepatitis C. Doctors previously treated the virus using interferons; that treatment brought little success and severe side effects. In 2011, the FDA approved new direct-acting antivirals that halt the progress of hepatitis C and eventually cause the virus to disappear. In 2015, the cost of a single course of treatment using direct-acting antivirals was $80,000-$189,000. By the time of trial, those prices was $13,000-$32,000.A 2016 policy specified that the Tennessee Department of Corrections would provide the antivirals only to infected inmates with severe liver scarring. By 2019, approximately 4,740 of Tennessee's 21,000 inmates had hepatitis. Under a 2019 guidance, every new inmate is tested for hepatitis C. Inmates who test positive undergo a baseline evaluation; an advisory committee of healthcare professionals evaluates each infected inmate and determines his course of treatment. The guidance establishes criteria that make antivirals available to “individuals [who] are at higher risk for complications or disease progression," includes a series of procedural steps for local providers, and provides for continuous care and monitoring of infected inmates, regardless of their treatment plan.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of inmates' claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The 2019 guidance showed reasonable medical judgment to care for the class of infected inmates. While the best course of action might be to treat all infected inmates with antivirals, the defendant could not spend more than was allocated and had repeatedly sought budget increases. View "Atkins v. Parker" on Justia Law