Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plain-clothes Euclid officers approached Wright’s parked SUV with weapons drawn. Thinking he was being robbed, Wright, an African-American, tried to back up. Officers flashed their badges. Wright stopped the SUV. Officers opened the driver’s door. Wright had no weapon. The officers simultaneously deployed a taser and pepper-sprayed him at point-blank range, while Wright remained seated. Wright had trouble getting out because of a colostomy bag stapled to his abdomen. He was recovering from an operation. The encounter caused bleeding. The officers arrested Wright “arising from a drug investigation,” although they found no drugs on him. Wright was detained for more than nine hours and subjected to an intrusive body scan after the officers knew of Wright’s medical condition. No drug-related charges were ever brought against him.The Sixth Circuit reinstated Wright's civil rights case. Even if the officers had no knowledge of Wright’s medical condition, other facts, construed in Wright’s favor, could support a reasonable juror’s finding that Wright did not actively resist. An officer may not tase a citizen not under arrest merely for failure to follow orders when the officer has no reasonable fear for his safety. With respect to the Monell claim, the evidence includes the Chris Rock video, played during the city's use-of-force training, in which the comedian talks about police misconduct. There was an offensive cartoon in Euclid’s police-training manual, showing an officer in riot gear beating a prone, unarmed civilian with a club, with the caption “protecting and serving the poop out of you.” Wright has sufficient evidence of municipal policy. View "Wright v. City of Euclid" on Justia Law

Detroit police discovered Ralston dead in her home, with multiple stab wounds, plus “defensive-type” cuts and bruises. Ralston was clutching long brown hair, which was never matched to any person. Blood was found throughout Ralston’s house. Days later, police arrested Smith. There was no physical evidence linking Smith to Ralston’s death. Smith’s acquaintances (Dennis and Evans) testified that Smith had confessed to killing a woman “at a safe house” that he had intended to rob. Ralston’s son confirmed that Smith was at the house the night before Ralston's death. Smith was convicted of first-degree felony murder and assault with intent to commit armed robbery. A juror reported that he and others had changed their votes based on a belief that Smith would receive a relatively light sentence for felony murder. The court declined to grant an evidentiary hearing and imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Michigan courts upheld the convictions.Smith returned to state court to (unsuccessfully) seek relief from judgment with an affidavit from Evans’s brother, attesting that he spoke with Evans and Dennis on the day that Smith allegedly confessed, that they said Smith had only said that the police wanted to speak with him, and they thought that they might receive a reward for providing information.The federal district court construed Smith’s habeas claim to be an actual innocence claim and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the state court should have granted a post-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the jury improperly relied on prejudicial information; there was insufficient evidence for conviction; and the courts erred in refusing to consider new evidence of Smith’s innocence. View "Smith v. Nagy" on Justia Law

Inmates housed in the low-security Elkton Correctional Institution, on behalf of themselves and others, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to obtain release from custody to limit their exposure to the COVID-19 virus. They sought to represent all current and future Elkton inmates, including a subclass of inmates who—through age and/or certain medical conditions—were particularly vulnerable to complications, including death, if they contracted COVID-19. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in April 2020, directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to evaluate each subclass member’s eligibility for transfer by any means, including compassionate release, parole or community supervision, transfer furlough, or non-transfer furlough within two weeks; transfer those deemed ineligible for compassionate release to another facility where testing is available and physical distancing is possible; and not allow transferees to return to Elkton until certain conditions were met.The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. While the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241, that section does not permit some of the relief the petitioners sought. The court rejected the BOP’s attempts to classify the claims as “conditions of confinement” claims, subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The district court erred in finding a likelihood of success on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. There was sufficient evidence that the petitioners are “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” but the BOP responded reasonably to the known, serious risks posed by COVID-19. View "Wilson v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2016, Alam pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud for his role in a roughly $8,000,000 Medicare kickback scheme. He received a 101-month sentence. Alam, now 64, suffers from obesity, poorly controlled diabetes, sleep apnea, coronary artery disease, kidney stones, and bladder issues. In March 2020, fearing the health risks created by the COVID-19 pandemic, Alam sent a letter to the prison warden requesting compassionate release. Without waiting for a response, Alam sought emergency relief in federal court. Alam had not complied with the compassionate-release statute’s administrative exhaustion requirement, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A).The district court dismissed Alam’s claims without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The exhaustion requirement serves valuable purposes (there is no other way to ensure orderly processing of applications for early release) and it is mandatory, with no exception. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons did not move for compassionate release and Alam waited just 10 days after the warden’s receipt of his request to file his motion, not the required 30 days. While nothing in the administrative exhaustion requirement clearly limits the court’s jurisdiction, it remains a mandatory condition. View "United States v. Alam" on Justia Law

In a consolidated putative class action based on the Flint Water Crisis, the defendants include government officials from the State of Michigan, the City of Flint, state agencies, and private engineering companies. While government officials like former Governor Snyder and former Treasurer Dillon have been litigating the issue of qualified immunity, discovery against private parties has proceeded.In 2019, the district court granted the government officials’ motions to dismiss claims alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 equal-protection violations, section 1985(3) conspiracy, Michigan’s Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act, section 1983 state-created danger, and gross negligence. The court denied motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ section 1983 bodily-integrity claim on the bases of qualified and absolute immunity,. The court entered a comprehensive case management order.Snyder and Dillon claimed that they cannot be deposed as non-party fact witnesses with respect to other defendants, arguing that they are immune from all discovery until they have exhausted every opportunity for appeal from the denial of their motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit denied Snyder’s and Dillon’s request for a stay of non-party depositions pending resolution of their appeal from the order denying their request for a protective order, and dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, their appeal from the denial of a protective order. View "Waid v. Earley" on Justia Law

In the first trimester of pregnancy, an abortion may be performed by using medication or by using suction to remove the contents of the uterus. Starting around 15 weeks of pregnancy, physicians must use the dilation and evacuation (D&E) method, first dilating the patient’s cervix, and then using instruments and suction to remove the contents of the uterus. Kentucky’s House Bill 454 provides: No person shall intentionally perform or induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion ... [t]hat will result in the bodily dismemberment, crushing, or human vivisection of the unborn child . . . [w]hen the probable post-fertilization age of the unborn child is eleven (11) weeks or greater.” H.B. 454 forbids D&E abortions on “living unborn” fetuses but does not suggest that physicians induce fetal demise before a D&E.Enforcement of the law was stayed pending resolution of a constitutional challenge. The state argued that H.B. 454 simply required individuals seeking a D&E abortion to first undergo a procedure to induce fetal demise by injecting digoxin into the fetus or amniotic sac, by injecting potassium chloride into the fetal heart, or by cutting the umbilical cord. The district court permanently enjoined the enforcement of H.B. 454, finding that it imposed an undue burden on one’s right to elect an abortion prior to viability, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court concluded that none of the identified procedures was a feasible option for inducing fetal demise and, therefore, H.B. 454 effectively banned D&E abortions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The burdens imposed by H.B. 454 dramatically outweigh any benefits. H.B. 454 imposes an undue burden on all of the individuals it restricts; facial relief is appropriate. View "EMW Women's Surgical Center P.S.C. v. Friedlander" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs claimed that Ohio’s COVID-19 restrictions and stay-at-home orders have made it impossibly difficult for them to meet existing requirements for initiatives to secure a place on the November ballot, in violation of their First Amendment rights. An Ohio petition for a referendum must include signatures from 10 percent of the applicable jurisdiction’s electors that voted in the last gubernatorial election, each signature must “be written in ink,” and the initiative’s circulator must witness each signature. The initiative’s proponents must submit these signatures to the Secretary of State 125 days before the election for a constitutional amendment and 110 days before the election for a municipal ordinance. Ohio’s officials postponed the Ohio primary election but declined to further modify state election law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, imposing a new deadline and prescribing the type of signature that the state must accept. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay of the injunction. Ohio’s compelling and well-established interests in administering its ballot initiative regulations outweigh the intermediate burden those regulations place on the plaintiffs. Ohio specifically exempted conduct protected by the First Amendment from its stay-home orders; the court means by which petitioners could obtain signatures. By unilaterally modifying the Ohio Constitution’s ballot initiative regulations, the district court usurped this authority from Ohio electors. View "Thompson v. DeWine" on Justia Law

In 2014-2015, Flint and Michigan state officials caused, sustained, and covered up the poisoning of a community with lead- and legionella-contaminated water after the city began delivering Flint River water to its predominantly poor, African-American residents, knowing that it was not treated for corrosion. Flint residents reported that there was something wrong with the way the water looked, tasted, and smelled and that it was causing rashes. In response, the city treated the water with additional chlorine—exacerbating the corrosion, which contaminated the water with hazardous levels of lead and caused an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease. State and city officials failed to stop the delivery of Flint River water and assured the public that the water was safe, knowing it was not. Flint's children will likely be permanently developmentally stunted. Six years later, corroded pipes still infect the water and poison Flint residents. In a consolidated class action, claiming deliberate indifference to the residents being poisoned in violation of their substantive due process right to bodily integrity, the district court denied motions to dismiss with respect to every defendant except State Treasurer Dillon. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but remanded the issue of whether Dillon should be dismissed in light of recent holdings; Dillon was not Treasurer at the time of the switch to river water . No legitimate government purpose justifies the city and state officials’ actions. View "Waid v. Snyder" on Justia Law

On October 27, 2010, Spears drove Smith and Chandler to Cincinnati to buy drugs. Chandler left the car and returned, stating that “his man was coming.” The men then heard a voice: “Chandler, where’s my money[?]” Smith saw a bearded African American man in his thirties, of average build. Bullets ripped through the side window., hitting Chandler’s spinal cord. Spears rushed Chandler to the hospital, where doctors placed him on life support. Days later, Chandler regained consciousness. He could control movement only in his eyes. Doctors worked out a system of communicating by blinking. Chandler answered questions from his doctors and communicated with Father Seher, a priest and long-time friend. Chandler communicated that he understood his “likelihood of death” and requested Last Rites rather than the Sacrament of the Sick. Chandler later communicated to police that he knew his shooter; he blinked the letter “O.” Police showed him a photo of Woods, a dealer known on the streets as “O.” Chandler confirmed that Woods shot him. Woods had sold Chandler drugs many times. Chandler owed him money; Woods warned Chandler that “something was going to happen.” The shooting happened 100 feet from Woods’ house. Chandler subsequently suffered an aneurysm. On November 12, he died. Police arrested Woods 200 miles away from his home In jail, Woods told his cellmate (an informant) that he shot someone over a drug debt. At trial, the court admitted Chandler’s identification of Woods as a dying declaration. The jury convicted Woods.The Sixth Circuit rejected his habeas petition, rejecting Woods’ claims that the admission of Chandler’s deathbed identification violated the Confrontation Clause and that the state impermissibly struck a black juror based on race. View "Woods v. Cook" on Justia Law

Over a six-week period, Porter robbed nine different Louisville-area businesses, often using a pistol-grip shotgun. Porter eventually pled guilty to nine counts of Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 1951(a). The district court sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisonment, based on the Armed Career Criminal Act. Section 924(c) creates the substantive offense of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence.” Section 924(e) creates a sentencing enhancement for those who possess a firearm after three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” The district court found that both sections applied to Porter because of his convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and three prior convictions for Georgia armed robbery. Since then the Supreme Court has held that the residual clauses in both sections are unconstitutionally vague.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Porter’s sentences. His convictions still qualify as “violent felonies” or “crimes of violence” based solely on the elements clauses in sections 924(c) and 924(e). Georgia armed robbery has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Hobbs Act robbery also qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause. View "Porter v. United States" on Justia Law