Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

UK freshman Doe reported two rapes. After the first report, UK’s Title IX Office issued a no-contact order to the male student (John) and investigated. Doe reported subsequent encounters with John. The Office investigated and determined that the no-contact order had not been violated. UK denied Doe's request to ban John from a certain library area. Before the Sexual Misconduct Hearing Panel, Kehrwald, UK’s Dean of Students presented evidence on Doe’s behalf. Doe alleges that Kerhwald failed to adequately represent her interests, failed to object when John’s attorneys actively participated by examining and cross-examining witnesses, and did not introduce evidence of a voicemail that she left on the night of the alleged rape. John’s attorneys successfully argued against its admission. The Sexual Misconduct Appeals Board upheld a finding in John's favor. In the investigation of Doe’s allegations against “James,” the Office also issued a no-contact order but James refused to comply with a request to change his class sections and failed to appear at a hearing. James was dismissed from UK.Doe brought Title IX claims, 20 U.S.C. 1681, arguing that UK’s response caused a hostile educational environment and vulnerability to further harassment and that UK demonstrated deliberate indifference by failing to follow UK’s policies throughout the investigation and hearing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Doe failed to show that UK’s response subjected her to further actionable harassment that caused Title IX injuries. View "Doe v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

In October 2013, Lexington police tracked the source of a child pornography video to a Clark County IP address. Deputy Murray obtained a subpoena and identified Jones as the subscriber associated with the IP address. Murray secured a search warrant for Jones’ address, noting that Jones was not yet a “suspect” and did not necessarily have “possession” of devices connected to child pornography. Murray and others executed the warrant and seized devices. Jones was home alone; after completing the search, officers him to the Sheriff’s Office. Several officers later acknowledged that they knew an individual’s IP address could be hacked by a third party.After Jones was indicted, Murray received forensic testing results that failed to yield a copy of the pornographic video. It is unclear whether the prosecutors or Jones’ public defender were informed. The prosecution continued. In November 2014, the defense commissioned a forensic analysis of Jones’ phone and tablet that also found no evidence of child pornography. Unlike the first report, it reported no evidence that Jones ever used a peer-to-peer file-sharing program. After posting a reduced bond, Jones was released from jail 14 months after his arrest. In April 2015, the charges were dismissed without prejudice, on the Commonwealth’s motion.Jones sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to qualified immunity for Murray but otherwise affirmed. While there was probable cause for Jones' initial arrest. Murray knew by January 2014 that there was no evidence of child pornography on Jones’ devices. Because there is a factual dispute as to whether Murray informed the prosecutors of these results, a genuine issue exists as to whether Murray “knowingly or recklessly” withheld exculpatory evidence. View "Jones v. Clark County" on Justia Law

Stermer was charged with killing her husband by setting him and their house on fire. At trial, the Michigan prosecutor used a fire expert to support its claim but Stermer’s counsel never retained or consulted with an expert. In his closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly branded Stermer a liar, misrepresented her testimony, and disparaged her while bolstering other witnesses. Stermer’s counsel did not object. Stermer was convicted of felony murder in the course of committing arson and was sentenced to life in prison.Stermer sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Stermer’s petition, citing prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the district court improperly held an evidentiary hearing and applied an incorrect standard of review. Even with significant deference under habeas review, Stermer is entitled to a new trial. It was unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the fairness of Stermer’s trial was not irreparably harmed by the prosecutor’s closing. The state’s case was relatively weak, the prosecutor relied heavily on Stermer’s statements and repeatedly called her a liar while misstating her own testimony; Stermer was clearly denied due process. Trial counsel stood by while the prosecutor bolstered the credibility of other witnesses and called her a “diabolical, scheming, manipulative liar and a murderer.” The record clearly establishes that Stermer’s trial counsel was deficient in refusing to call a fire expert. View "Stermer v. Warren" on Justia Law

Rutherford County, Tennessee law enforcement officials raided stores selling legal cannabidiol (CBD) products and arrested their owners. All charges against the owners were eventually dismissed and expunged. Plaintiffs, 17 store owners, alleged violations of their constitutional rights to be free from false arrest, unlawful seizure, and unlawful prosecution, and their right to equal protection. They also alleged a civil conspiracy to violate those rights and attached documents revealing communications between law enforcement officials, expressing doubts about the CBD products’ purported illegality and concerns regarding the planned arrests and raids.The District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney claimed absolute prosecutorial immunity or qualified immunity for their alleged misconduct during the investigation; the sheriff claimed quasi-judicial absolute immunity and qualified immunity for his actions related to the investigation and arrests. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of their motions to dismiss, except with respect to the denial of qualified immunity to the sheriff, concerning equal protection. The facts, taken as true and construed in the plaintiffs’ favor, support the inference that the prosecutors erroneously advised that the plaintiffs were selling illegal CBD products even though the prosecutors knew or should have known that they had no evidence of the products’ illegality. Their actions were objectively unreasonable because their probable cause determinations rested on the inconclusive lab results. The complaint did not establish that the sheriff engaged in selective enforcement. View "Rieves v. Town of Smyrna" on Justia Law

T.R., in the seventh grade, met with the school principal, Gill-Williams. T.R. told Gill-Williams that she had been thinking about suicide for a month, stating. that “things at home like guns and knives" made her "want to hurt herself.” Gill-Williams called a police officer assigned to the school, Olney, who called T.R.’s father, Machan. Machan, at work about 90 minutes away, objected to Olney taking T.R. to the hospital, telling Olney to keep T.R. at the school until he got there. Olney took T.R. to the hospital. An emergency-room nurse conducted a mental-health assessment and concluded that T.R. needed treatment. Although T.R. did not appear intoxicated or disoriented, the physician, Dr. Friedman, ordered a blood draw as part of the standard procedure for a mental evaluation. T.R. resisted the blood draw, which tested negative for drugs. Friedman and other medical staff talked to T.R. about her suicidal thoughts. Machan arrived. After considerable discussion, the hospital released T.R. on a condition that she go to a mental health center. Machan took T.R. there, where they stayed for about 45 minutes.Machan filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Olney qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit held that Olney was entitled to summary judgment. The existence of probable cause to fear that T.R. might hurt herself meant that Olney did not need Machan’s consent to take T.R. to the hospital. Olney did not violate the Fourth Amendment by taking T.R. to the hospital and authorizing the blood draw. View "Machan v. Olney" on Justia Law

Sergeant Faith of the Detroit Fugitive Apprehension Team, tasked with arresting “Marvin Seales a/k/a Roderick Siner,” met Officer Zberkot at a food processing plant. A manager led them to Seales. Seales protested, “You got the wrong guy.” Faith handcuffed Seales and drove him to the precinct. Zberkot drafted a report. Other officers handled the rest of the process. Seales repeatedly told Zberkot that he was innocent and asked Zberkot to check his identification. Seales spent two nights in the precinct. At his arraignment, the judge called People "versus Roderick Siner.” Asked for his name, Seales said “Marvin Seales.” He later thought “I better say, Roderick Siner, I understand these charges” to “get past that point.” Seales spent two weeks in the Wayne County Jail. Seales filed a grievance but signed a medical intake form “Siner” because he wanted to make sure he could get medical attention if needed. No one investigated his claims. At his preliminary examination, the victim stated that Seales was not the man who shot at him. The case was dismissed.Seales sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court rejected claims against Detroit and Wayne County. Zberkot unsuccessfully raised several immunities. The Sixth Circuit rejected Seales’ unlawful arrest claim as a matter of law due to the similarities between Seales and the true suspect but allowed the unlawful detention claim to proceed. A jury awarded Seales $3.5 million. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting its prior decision that there was probable cause to arrest Seales and that Zberkot handled the case for fewer than three hours. View "Seales v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Freeman pleaded guilty to felony murder in 2001. An Ohio trial court sentenced Freeman to 15 years to life imprisonment, followed by post-release control for the maximum period allowable. Freeman failed to appeal. After four unsuccessful motions to withdraw his guilty plea, Freeman collaterally moved in state court to vacate his conviction and sentence in 2015. He argued the sentencing court’s imposition of post-release control was “contrary to law” and that his felony murder conviction was improper because there was no evidence he committed an underlying violent felony. The state appeals court granted Freeman relief in part, agreeing that Ohio law does not provide for post-release control for felony murder and stating that “a sentencing entry that incorrectly imposes postrelease control does not render the entire sentence void. Only that portion of the judgment that improperly imposes postrelease control is void.” On remand, in 2017, the trial court “vacated and replaced, nunc pro tunc” the journal entry from Freeman’s original sentencing, leaving intact its original sentencing journal entry except for the single sentence discussing post-release control. Freeman then filed a 28 U.S.C 2254 petition, challenging his conviction. The district court dismissed Freeman’s petition as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A limited resentencing that results in a better-than-before sentence does not constitute a new “judgment” under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A), which imposes a one-year limitations period for habeas petitions. View "Freeman v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, prohibited “[a]ll mass gatherings,” including faith-based events.” The order excepts “normal operations at airports, bus and train stations, . . . shopping malls,” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores where large numbers of people are present, but maintain appropriate social distancing.” A subsequent order required organizations that are not “life-sustaining” to close. Among the “life-sustaining” exempt entities are laundromats, accounting services, law firms, hardware stores, airlines, mining operations, funeral homes, landscaping businesses, and grocery stores. Religious organizations are not “life-sustaining,” except when they provide “food, shelter, and social services.” Maryville Baptist Church held an Easter service. Some congregants went into the church. Others parked in the church’s parking lot and listened to the service over a loudspeaker. State Police issued notices that their attendance, whether in the church or outdoors, amounted to a criminal act, recorded congregants’ license plate numbers, and sent letters requiring self-quarantine for 14 days. Congregants who attended the Easter service sued, claiming that the orders and their enforcement violated their free-exercise and interstate-travel rights. Two other federal district court cases, challenging the same ban, have resulted in preliminary relief.The Sixth Circuit granted an injunction pending appeal, Despite the lack of anti-religious animus and the legitimate health concerns, orders prohibiting religious gatherings, enforced by police officers telling congregants they violated a criminal law and taking down license plate numbers, will chill worship gatherings. Applying strict scrutiny, the court reasoned that there are many less restrictive ways to address these public health issues. View "Roberts v. Neace" on Justia Law

The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services contracts out most of its fostering and adoption services to private child-placing agencies (CPAs), which perform home evaluations of prospective adoptive and foster parent(s). One CPA, St. Vincent Catholic Charities, shares the religious teachings of the Roman Catholic Church regarding same-sex marriage. It “cannot provide a written recommendation ... endorsing a family situation that would conflict with [its] religious beliefs” so St. Vincent refers out home evaluations for same-sex or unmarried couples to other CPAs. In 2015, Michigan codified this practice. M.C.L. 722.124e(1)(g) provides that “[t]o the fullest extent permitted by state and federal law," a CPA shall not be required to provide any services if those services conflict with, or provide any services under circumstances that conflict with," the CPA’s "sincerely held religious beliefs.”The Dumonts alleged that they were a same-sex couple interested in fostering and adoption, but that St. Vincent refused to assist them with the licensing process because of their sexual orientation. Michigan settled that suit by agreeing to enforce, against CPAs, a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. St. Vincent then claimed that the state violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by directing it to perform its duties in a manner that violates its sincerely held religious beliefs. The district court denied the Dumonts’ motions, seeking intervention. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to permissive intervention. Citing FRCP 24(b)(3), the court held that the Dumonts’ motion was timely, that it presented a common question of law, and that there is little risk of undue delay or prejudice to the existing parties. View "Buck v. Gordon" on Justia Law

At Moody’s trial, the government produced a video of Moody cooking crack on his stove and waving a handgun while he mused about life in “the game” (drug trafficking). The court ruled that most of the video was admissible. Moody then tried to persuade the jury that the video was filmed more than five years before his indictment, putting it outside the statute of limitations. The jury convicted Moody. Due to prior felony drug convictions, Moody received enhanced, mandatory-minimum life sentences on several counts. He appealed on evidentiary grounds relating to the video. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Later, Moody raised new claims on collateral review, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court found each claim meritless; most were also procedurally defaulted. The court authorized Moody to appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating that none of the claims should have been certified. Reasonable jurists could not doubt that the district court properly denied relief on Moody’s claims that he was deprived of his statute-of-limitations defense (violating due process); that the past convictions for his sentencing enhancements were not charged in the indictment or found by the jury; and that his previous lawyers failed to raise the first two claims sooner, violating his right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Moody v. United States" on Justia Law