Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Canton Police received a 911 call from Andrews, who stated that his fiance, White, had physically attacked him. Officers arrested White. Andrews later took White's medications to the jail; a “KOP” policy allows inmates to keep certain drugs for self-administration. During an intake interview, White admitted to attempting to harm herself or commit suicide in the past but said she was not thinking of harming herself or having suicidal thoughts. An R.N. later evaluated White for nearly two hours, reported White’s chief complaints were “anxiety and depression,” and contacted a pharmacy to verify White’s prescriptions. The R.N. claims White did not exhibit any psychotic behavior, suicidal ideation, or psychiatric distress but ordered further evaluation. The next day, White was found on the floor with vomit on her face. She stated repeatedly that she took too many pills. The next day, White died in the hospital. The cause of death was Verapamil toxicity.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. A pretrial detainee does not have an automatic right to a suicide screening. The court rejected an argument that the KOP Policy was deficient because it allows inmates in need of a psychological evaluation to participate before a psychiatrist’s assessment of proper housing. The County had no history of suicides relative to the program, so any purported failure to train its employees in suicide risk assessment did not cause White’s death. View "Andrews v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear issued a COVID-19 order, prohibiting “[a]ll mass gatherings,” including "community, civic, public, leisure, faith-based, or sporting events.” It excepts “normal operations at airports, bus and train stations, . . . shopping malls and centers,” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores where large numbers of people are present, but maintain appropriate social distancing.” A subsequent order required organizations that are not “life-sustaining” to close. Religious organizations are not “life-sustaining,” except in providing “food, shelter, and social services.” Laundromats, accounting services, law firms, hardware stores, and many other entities count as life-sustaining.Maryville held a drive-in Easter service. Congregants parked their cars in the church’s parking lot and listened to a sermon over a loudspeaker. State Police issued notices to the congregants that their attendance amounted to a criminal act, recorded congregants’ license plate numbers, and sent letters, requiring them to self-quarantine for 14 days. The Church filed suit, citing its congregants’ rights under Kentucky’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the U.S. Constitution’s free-exercise guarantee.The Sixth Circuit granted, in part, a request for an injunction. The Church is likely to succeed on its claims, especially with respect to the ban’s application to drive-in services. The treatment of comparable religious and non-religious activities does not suggest the least restrictive way of regulating the churches. The prohibition on attending any worship service inflicts irreparable harm; an injunction appropriately permits religious services with the same risk-minimizing precautions as similar secular activities and enforcement of social-distancing rules. Treatment of similarly situated entities in comparable ways serves public health interests while preserving bedrock free-exercise guarantees. View "Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Cincinnati officers Scott and Moore responded to a reported incident of menacing. Two people alleged that Quandavier had driven by their home that night and threatened to kill them and that Quandavier carried guns. Officer Loreaux identified a vehicle fitting the description. Officers Scott, Moore, Schneider, and Loreaux, standing where the vehicle was parked, heard a voice. Thinking that it was likely Quandavier, they knocked on the exterior door of the residence. It swung open. Three officers entered without a warrant or exigent circumstances. Loreaux remained outside. Neither Scott nor Moore recall announcing their presence or identifying themselves. Inside and upstairs, Scott knocked on a closed door. As it opened, Scott “saw the barrel of a rifle pointed at [her] face.” Moore and Schneider also saw Quandavier “nonchalantly” panning the rifle from left to right. Moore reached for its barrel as Scott fired her weapon. Moore did not instruct Quandavier to drop his rifle nor did Scott issue any commands before firing. Quandavier collapsed. The officers immediately radioed for paramedics. Before the officers applied handcuffs or provided first aid, they heard another voice and conducted a sweep. Quandavier died at the scene without receiving medical attention.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for unlawful entry, excessive force, and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, plus state claims, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred by granting qualified immunity to Scott, Moore, and Schneider on the unlawful entry claim. The court affirmed as to the excessive force, deliberate indifference, and state-law battery claims, and remanded for evaluation of municipal liability and wrongful death claims. View "Hicks v. Scott" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Tennessee issued “shelter-in-place” orders. On April 8, 2020, the Governor ordered that “[a]ll healthcare professionals and healthcare facilities ... postpone surgical and invasive procedures that are elective and non-urgent,” until April 30 in order to preserve personal protective equipment and prevent community spread of COVID-19 through nonessential patient-provider interactions. Elective and non-urgent procedures were defined as those that can be delayed because they are not required to provide life-sustaining treatment, to prevent death or risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily function, or to prevent rapid deterioration or serious adverse consequences to a patient’s physical condition … as reasonably determined by a licensed medical provider. A Tennessee woman may receive a “medication abortion” within 11 weeks from her last menstrual period or a “procedural abortion” within the first 20 weeks (aspiration or dilation and evacuation), subject to a 48-hour waiting period and in-person visitation requirements.On April 17, the district court enjoined Tennessee from enforcing that ban against doctors performing abortion procedures. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging the challenges Tennessee faces in responding to the public health crisis,” but concluding that the “response, in this one respect, unduly curtailed constitutional liberty." The court ordered modification of the injunction so that it prohibits the state from enforcing the ban against plaintiffs to the extent they provide procedural abortions to specific patients, including women who, in the good-faith professional judgment of the provider, will likely be forced to undergo a D&E procedure instead of an aspiration if their procedures are delayed. View "Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery" on Justia Law

In 2007, a jury convicted Brown as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) The Armed Career Criminal Act increases the sentence for felons who possess firearms from a 10-year maximum to a 15-year minimum if the defendant has three prior convictions that qualify as “violent felonies,” 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2), (e). Sixth Circuit precedent (Nance: then treated Brown’s three Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions as violent felonies, so that court upheld his 180-month sentence under the Act. Years later the parties agreed that changes to precedent showed that Brown’s burglary convictions did not qualify as violent felonies. The district court granted Brown relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He was resentenced and released from prison.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision granting Brown relief under section 2255 and remanded for the court to reinstate his original sentence. The court concluded that, following the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Stitt” holding, the Sixth Circuit’s 2007 Nance’s holding that a Tennessee aggravated-burglary conviction categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act “is once again the law of this circuit.” View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Winburn represented himself at his trial for armed robbery, home invasion, and conspiracy. Based on Winburn’s disruptive behavior, the judge removed him from the courtroom and revoked Winburn’s permission to represent himself, then granted a competency evaluation and a mistrial. While Winburn awaited his second trial, the judge permitted Winburn’s stand-by attorney to withdraw because Winburn had sued her and enjoined Winburn from filing complaints or grievances against his new attorney, except to discharge her. Although represented by a new attorney, Winburn moved pro se to dismiss his charges on double jeopardy grounds. The trial judge denied the motion because Winburn’s attorney had not filed it. Winburn filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 challenging his retrial and another section 2241 petition challenging the injunction. The district judges denied both and declined to issue certificates of appealability. Winburn filed a notice of appeal for one petition and sought a certificate of appealability for the other. The Sixth Circuit held that state pretrial detainees proceeding under section 2241 may not appeal without certificates of appealability and granted Winburn a certificate on the injunction claim. A reasonable jurist could conclude that the unusual order was constitutionally infirm. The court denied relief with respect to double jeopardy. Winburn failed to exhaust his state-court remedies by a motion to dismiss. View "Winburn v. Nagy" on Justia Law

Students at several of Detroit’s worst-performing public schools were subject to poor conditions within their classrooms, missing or unqualified teachers, physically dangerous facilities, and inadequate books and materials. In 2016, the plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that these conditions deprive them of a basic minimum education that provides a chance at foundational literacy, in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses. They sought recognition of a fundamental right to a basic education. They argued that the schools they are forced to attend are schools in name only, so the state cannot justify the restriction on their liberty imposed by compulsory attendance. They sued state officials, rather than local entities, based on the state’s general supervision of all public education and the state’s specific interventions in Detroit’s public schools. The state argued that it recently returned control to local officials. The district court found that the state defendants were the proper parties to sue but dismissed the complaint on the merits.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Though the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead their equal protection and compulsory attendance claims, the court reinstated claims that they have been denied a basic minimum education, and have been deprived of access to literacy. Application of the principles in the Supreme Court’s education cases to a substantive due process framework demonstrates that a basic minimum education should be recognized as a fundamental right. View "Gary B. v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

Queen, a Bowling Green firefighter, 2011-2016, was subject to harassment because he is an atheist. According to Queen, he was forced to participate in Bible studies; his co-workers and supervisors badgered him regarding his sexuality and regularly disparaged minorities. In 2012, Queen complained to his supervisor, Rockrohr, who “responded in hostility.” Rockrohr later told Queen that he had discussed the matter with the fire chief and they both believed that Queen “needed to get employment somewhere else.” Queen apologized. Queen’s employment conditions did not improve. Queen was intentionally tripped while retrieving his gear and was regularly subject to disparaging remarks. Stress and anxiety caused Queen to take a leave of absence. While on leave, Queen received many phone calls from his supervisors asking why he was absent.Queen resigned and filed suit under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, alleging hostile work environment based on religion and gender, constructive discharge, retaliation, and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on hostile work environment based on religion and gender and the FMLA claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to the city on the claims for hostile work environment based on religion and for retaliation and denial of qualified immunity to Rockrohr for the retaliation claim. View "Queen v. City of Bowling Green" on Justia Law

A masked gunman attempted to rob a Columbus Ohio restaurant. Employees escaped and flagged down a police officer. A man, matching the robber's description, discarded distinctive clothing items as he ran away. A pocket contained a handgun matching that used in the robbery. Police apprehended Smith nearby. DNA material matching Smith was found on the discarded items. Smith retained attorney Armengau. Detectives connected Smith to earlier restaurant robberies with “a strikingly consistent method of operation.” They requested cell phone records for a phone number that Smith had given to his probation officer; Smith’s phone had been used near and at the approximate time of most of the robberies.Smith was charged with 18 robberies. Smith’s attorney, Armengau, was indicted for sex crimes. The judge handling Smith’s case recused himself. At Smith’s request, Armengau continued to represent Smith; Armengau’s criminal charges were unknown to the jury. Smith received three continuances. During trial, the prosecutors offered a plea deal for 27 years’ imprisonment. Armengau conceded to the court that he did not share the offer because prior discussions with Smith led Armengau to believe that a 27-year sentence would not be accepted. Smith was present and did not object. The prosecutors stated that the offer would remain open. Smith never asked to discuss a plea. The jury convicted Smith for 12 robberies. With prior-offender gun charges, the judge sentenced Smith to 84 years’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, rejecting ineffective assistance and Confrontation Clause claims, based on the Armengau’s stipulation to limit the number of trial witnesses, his failure to communicate the plea offer, and the “conflict” posed by his own criminal charges. View "Smith v. Cook" on Justia Law

In a 2006 Ypsilanti drive-by shooting, two teenagers, inside a mobile home, were killed. Four people, including Tackett, were charged. Tacket was found guilty on two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. After unsuccessful state-court proceedings, Tackett filed a federal habeas corpus petition.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even assuming that Tackett’s gun misfired, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Tackett was guilty of first-degree murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The facts supported an inference of an intent to kill and there was more than enough time for the shooters to take a “second look.” There was evidence that premeditation and deliberation took place during that time. Tackett provided assistance to the other shooters, knowing all the facts known to the shooters. The court rejected Tackett’s argument that he could have been convicted as a principal, or as an aider and abettor and that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a special instruction that they had to unanimously agree as to which of these theories was the basis for their verdict. There was no constitutional problem in the fact that two other defendants were convicted of second-degree murder while Tackett was convicted of first-degree murder. The court also rejected ineffective assistance claims. View "Tackett v. Trierweiler" on Justia Law