Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Reiner’s convictions arose from a 2011 Macomb County home invasion. Eisenhardt, age 69, was stabbed in the neck; jewelry was taken from her house, including a ring from Eisenhardt’s finger. Eisenhardt survived but suffered declining health after the stabbing and died months later. Police in New York apprehended Reiner days after the incident, on unrelated suspicion of driving a stolen vehicle. At his Michigan murder trial, the court admitted the statements to the police, in which a pawnbroker identified Reiner as having pawned Eisenhardt’s ring. The pawnbroker died before trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Reiner’s conviction, finding the Sixth Amendment error harmless.The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The evidence presented at trial “paints the picture of a circumstantial case lacking physical evidence or eyewitness testimony placing Reiner at the crime scene.” The statements that caused the Sixth Amendment violation were the linchpin of the government’s case, connecting Reiner to the fruits of the crime in a way no other evidence could. Without those statements, the prosecution’s case would have been significantly weaker, such that “grave doubt” exists as to whether their admission had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” View "Reiner v. Woods" on Justia Law

A fifth-grade student, C.T., lit a match during the bus ride home from an Ohio elementary school. The students sat in assigned seats, with the youngest students at the front of the bus. School administrators moved C.T. to the front of the bus, where he sexually assaulted a kindergarten student, Doe, as they rode home from school over several weeks. The bus driver apparently was aware that C.T. had moved across the aisle to sit with Doe but police concluded that the driver was not aware of the assaults. C.T. was expelled. Doe’s parents brought a state-created-danger claim against the School District and five employees.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that no reasonable jury could find that they knowingly exposed Doe to the risk of sexual assault. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating “that the Constitution does not empower federal judges to remedy every situation” that is “heart-wrenching.” Nothing about C.T.’s school record could have put the school employees on notice that C.T. posed a risk of sexually assaulting Doe. The school employees’ responses to the risk also do not show the “callous disregard” or “conscience-shocking” behavior that state-created-danger cases require. Certain employees could have done more in implementing C.T.’s discipline, but their actions did not amount to “callous disregard for the safety” of Doe. View "Doe v. Jackson Local School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

State Trooper King saw Lott’s vehicle slow down on I-75 as it came into view; Lott was driving with “arms locked out.” King interpreted that as a sign of nervousness. King followed Lott for three-fourths of a mile in the left lane while vehicles passed on the right, then pulled Lott over. King stated that he was not going to issue a citation but ran Lott’s driver’s license for outstanding warrants and flagged down Trooper Reams, who had a K-9 in tow. Based on Lott’s nervousness and proximity to the roadway, King asked him to step out of the vehicle. King did not check the warrant search. Lott refused King’s request for consent to search his vehicle. King stated that “we’re going to utilize the K-9.” According to King, Lott responded, “I have a little bit of marijuana in the console.” The K-9 alerted after a “free air sniff.” King located marijuana in the console, then searched the vehicle. In the trunk, King found heroin, other drugs, and money. The Troopers estimated that five-10 minutes elapsed between the stop and the K-9 sniff. Lott was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The traffic stop was initiated constitutionally and was not impermissibly extended. Lott did not dispute that he was impeding traffic; the marijuana admission occurred within the temporal scope of the tasks incident to the traffic stop. View "United States v. Lott" on Justia Law

Detective Shockley, investigating whether methamphetamine was being sold at Alexander's mother's house, learned that Alexander’s driver’s license was suspended. Shockley saw Alexander drive away, stopped him and saw a bank deposit bag on the passenger seat and a safe in the backseat. Shockley arrested Alexander for driving on a suspended license and conducted a search, finding a baggie with methamphetamine residue, drug paraphernalia, and $11,000 in cash. Shockley found 35 grams of methamphetamine in Alexander’s waistband. The SUV was towed. The next day, Shockley obtained a warrant for the safe and discovered a loaded pistol. Days later, Shockley saw Alexander leave the house in a Lincoln and called another officer, who stopped him. Shockley arrested Alexander. After Alexander said, “I don’t care,” Shockley searched the vehicle, and found 113 grams of methamphetamine.Charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, and possession of a firearm as a felon, Alexander unsuccessfully moved to suppress both stops. Classified as a career offender, he was sentenced to 216 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. The inventory search exception did not apply absent evidence of standardized procedures but the inevitable-discovery doctrine salvaged the first search. Alexander consented to the second search. The court vacated the sentence; the government conceded that the case should be remanded for resentencing without the career-offender enhancement. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s father is a Pakistani citizen, previously a legal permanent resident, who was removed from the United States. Plaintiff sought a declaration that his father’s removal was unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff and violated international treaties and a declaration that the interview of Plaintiff and his mother during his father’s removal proceeding was unconstitutional because ICE agents made racially discriminatory comments to Plaintiff and his mother.The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, finding that it did not have jurisdiction over claims brought under the international treaties, which are not self-executing. The court also stated that it “is well-settled that lawfully removing a parent from the United States does not deprive a United States citizen child of a constitutional right.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that it had no information about the removal of Plaintiff’s father. Under 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(9), no federal court has the authority to review” Plaintiff’s father’s order of removal to determine whether Plaintiff’s constitutional rights might render the order of removal invalid; no court would be able to grant the relief that Plaintiff seeks. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review a selective enforcement claim brought by Plaintiff on behalf of his father under 8 U.S.C. 1252(g). View "Butt v. Barr" on Justia Law

A family of two parents and five children alleged that social workers employed by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services violated their Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting the children to warrantless in-school interrogations without reasonable suspicion of child abuse. They also claimed violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights by requiring adherence to a “Prevention Plan,” which constrained the mother’s ability to be alone with her children for approximately two months without any question as to her parental fitness and without any procedural protections.The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims. The law governing in-school interviews by social workers was not clearly established at the time of the relevant conduct. The Fourth Amendment does govern a social worker’s in-school interview of a child pursuant to a child abuse investigation; at a minimum, a social worker must have a reasonable suspicion of child abuse before conducting an in-school interview when no other exception to the warrant requirement applies. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity on the procedural and substantive due process claims. The complaint alleged that the supervision restrictions were imposed for approximately two months after there was no longer any question as to parental fitness without any procedural protections; they abridged the parents’ clearly established right to the companionship and care of their children without arbitrary government interference. View "Schulkers v. Kammer" on Justia Law

Recover Agents went to the home of Jiries and Yasmeen Abu-Joudeh to repossess their car. An altercation ensued. According to Yasmeen, an agent pushed her. The agents say that Jiries asked Yasmeen to get a gun and hit her when she refused. The agents called the police. The Abu-Joudehs moved their car into the garage and shut the door. Capac Police Chief Schneider and Michigan State Trooper Sebring arrived. Yasmeen let the officers into the house. More police cars arrived. One officer, whom Yasmeen called the “third officer,” entered the house and kept her seated. Schneider’s police report suggests that this third officer was Memphis Police Chief Sheets. Yasmeen’s physical description of the third officer fit Sheets. The third officer, with the repossession agents, attempted to pry open the garage's main electric door, then went around to the side door, which one of them opened. The agents loaded the vehicle onto their tow truck and hauled it away.AbuJoudeh filed suit, claiming Sheets broke into the garage, violating his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Sheets submitted an affidavit saying he “did not open Plaintiff’s garage without consent, did not enter Plaintiff’s garage without consent, and did not enter Plaintiff’s vehicle or participate in its repossession.” The district court granted Sheets summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The evidence suggesting that Sheets was the officer who broke into his garage creates a genuine issue of material fact. View "Abu-Joudeh v. Schneider" on Justia Law

Allen was convicted of aggravated robbery and murder for the death of 84-year-old English, whom he knew through a prison ministry. Allen’s thumbprint was found on England’s glasses. Cigarette butts consistent with Allen’s brand and saliva were found in English’s trash. The coroner put English’s time of death between before six a.m. on January 25, 1991. A bus driver remembered picking up Allen near English’s home around six a.m. that day. Allen was sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. State courts denied post-conviction relief.Allen claimed he was denied due process because a juror, Worthington, initially indicated that she was not sure that she could be impartial. Worthington stated her brother had been killed two years earlier, that the man charged with the murder was acquitted, and she did not feel justice was done. The judge asked whether she could reach a verdict based solely on the evidence; Worthington said she could. Allen’s counsel stated that witnesses from the coroner’s office who testified at her brother’s trial would testify at Allen’s trial. Worthington stated that she was a bit anxious but denied that her reaction might substantially impact her ability to concentrate on Allen’s case. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the finding that Worthington was unbiased was supported by her testimony and that the judge could legitimately validate her statements because he saw and heard her.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The determination of whether to seat a juror is an exercise of discretion by the trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply established Supreme Court precedent. View "Allen v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Howse claims Officers Hodous and Middaugh stopped in front of his home in an unmarked vehicle. Middaugh asked Howse if he lived there, got out of the vehicle, and told Howse to put his hands behind his back. Howse disobeyed and began screaming. Howse claims Middaugh grabbed Howse and threw him down. The officers tried to handcuff Howse, who resisted, “stiffening up” his body.The officers claim they saw Howse lingering suspiciously at a house that appeared to be boarded up. Middaugh suspected that Howse might be engaged in criminal activity and, when Middaugh reached the porch, Howse clenched his fists and assumed a fighting stance. The officers allege that Howse struck Hodous in the chest and tried to rip off Middaugh’s flashlight and handcuff case, so Middaugh used a leg sweep to take Howse down to arrest him.Middaugh charged Howse with assaulting a police officer. The stated eventually dismissed the charges. Howse sued the officers and the city, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. It is not clearly established that officers cannot tackle a non-compliant suspect and use additional force if he resists arrest, so the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Howse admitted that he tried to make it difficult for the officers to arrest him, which provided probable cause. View "Howse v. Hodous" on Justia Law

Jones worked as a FedEx security officer, watching an X-ray monitor to detect weapons in packages being loaded on aircraft. Jones failed to detect a weapon. FedEx terminated his employment 12 days later, allegedly because he failed to detect that weapon. According to Jones, an African American, the consequences for failing to detect a weapon were harsher for him and another African American than they were for white officers. Jones filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC on April 25, 2018, 252 days after his termination. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice. Jones filed a Title VII action. FedEx argued that Jones failed to file his race-discrimination charge within 180 days of his termination as required by 42 U.S.C. 2000e5(e). Jones argued that the “filing deadline is extended to 300 calendar days if a state or local agency enforces a law that prohibits employment discrimination on the same basis” and that the Tennessee Human Rights Commission categorically prohibits racial discrimination.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his case, citing the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision, EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Company concerning states that have “fair employment practices agencies” in work-sharing agreements with the EEOC. Jones, a pro se litigant, was excused for not raising that argument before the district court; the court noted that Jones allegedly relied on the EEOC's advice that the 300-day filing period would apply. View "Jones v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law