Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lee, a public-school teacher, was required to either join the union or pay fair-share fees as a non-member because the collective bargaining agreement between the school district and the union included a fair-share clause. Lee paid fair-share fees. Anticipating that the Supreme Court would overrule its precedent endorsing fair-share fees (Abood), Lee filed a putative class action, asserting that the union and state actors had violated her constitutional rights by imposing compulsory fair-share fees as a condition of employment. She sought a declaration that provisions of Ohio law were unconstitutional and damages. Two days later, the Supreme Court issued its "Janus" decision, reasoning that fair-share fees resulted in non-members being “forced to subsidize a union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities,” thereby violating the free speech rights of non-members. Lee dismissed her claims against the state officials and the school district. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the union. The union, as a private actor sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, was entitled to rely on its good faith in following existing Ohio law and Supreme Court precedent. The state-law conversion count failed to state a plausible claim for relief. View "Lee v. Ohio Education Association" on Justia Law

In 1974, a clerk was killed at a store near Toledo. According to Bailey, he entered the store, robbed the cash register at gunpoint, then shot the clerk in the neck and head. The Ohio Parole Board described the crime differently: Bailey entered the store, robbed Cannon, forced him to the ground, “told him . . . exactly what he was planning on doing,” placed the gun to the back of his head and shot him “execution-style” because “he was in need of money and ... the only way he was going to be successful was to kill all witnesses.” In 2014, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Ohio prisoners had a right to a factually accurate parole record. Bailey challenged the Board’s version of events. Bailey ordered a transcript to show that trial testimony contradicted the Board's description and moved to correct his parole record. The Board and state courts denied his request. Bailey sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging due process violations by the Board’s refusal to investigate and correct inaccuracies in its description of his crime. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. Bailey is in custody but does not purport to be in custody in violation of federal law. Bailey cannot argue that, but for the allegedly inaccurate description, the Board would grant him parole. View "Bailey v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Robinson was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Under Michigan’s complex sentencing scheme, the judge sentenced Robinson as a fourth habitual offender to “concurrent terms of 47-1/2 to 120 years’ imprisonment for the assault and felon-in-possession convictions, to be served consecutive to two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.” The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed; the Michigan Supreme Court denied review. Robinson then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. On appeal, Robinson argued that Supreme Court and state decisions postdating his sentencing have established that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment.The Sixth Circuit vacated. Robinson’s sentencing claim undoubtedly has merit; the Supreme Court’s Alleyne decision clearly established the unconstitutionality of Michigan’s sentencing regime. However, Robinson did not “fairly present” his sentencing claim to the Michigan Supreme Court and failed to exhaust that claim in state court. On remand, the district court should decide whether to dismiss Robinson’s sentencing claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust or to stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while Robinson returns to state court to exhaust that claim. Stay and abeyance is appropriate only “when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court” and when the claims are not “plainly meritless.” View "Robinson v. Horton" on Justia Law

Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for his role in a drive-by shooting outside a Detroit nightclub. The trial was marked by outbursts, threats toward witnesses, and offensive language by witnesses, spectators, and counsel. After a particularly contentious incident involving a witness and defense counsel, the court took protective action, temporarily closing the courtroom to spectators before reopening it a few days later. On direct appeal, and in this habeas proceeding, Williams argued that the temporary closure violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Williams’s trial counsel failed to object to the closure, so Williams defaulted his public trial claim in the state proceeding. He has not overcome that failure by showing that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective, which might otherwise constitute cause and prejudice excusing the default. Regardless of whether closing the courtroom was an error, Williams cannot establish that his defense was prejudiced by the closure. The vast majority of his trial took place in an open setting, transcripts were made available from the limited sessions that took place behind closed doors, and the closure had no discernable effect on the judge, counsel, or jury. Nor did the temporary closure “lead to basic unfairness.” View "Williams v. Burt" on Justia Law

A cat was clawing Barton's daughter in the yard. Intending to “scare it away,” Barton shot a BB gun at their trampoline’s legs, several feet from the cat. Barton yelled to Porter, three doors down, “the next cat that I see in my yard will be a dead one.” Barton had previously complained to animal control that Porter fed stray cats. Barton returned to his work. Porter called 911 and said that Barton had told her that “your grey cat ... got shot in the head.” She said she did not know if it was a BB gun and admitted she had not seen the injured cat and that the cat could not have been hers. The dispatcher broadcast: a woman said that her neighbor was “shooting cats” and that she was not sure what type of weapon was used. Animal Control arrived and spoke to Barton, who refused to come outside or provide identification. He explained that he had shot at a trampoline with a BB gun to scare the cat. The officer saw neither weapons nor injured cats.Minutes later, eight officers arrived, produced weapons, and “surrounded” Barton’s house. Barton passed his identification through the door. Moments later, “fearing that [Barton] was grabbing a gun,” Officer Vann “ripped [their] screen door off [and barged] into [their] house.” Vann “threw [Barton] up against the counter.” Other officers followed. Vann handcuffed Barton, then “shoved” Barton down his steps and into a patrol car. At the station, Barton was strip-searched while handcuffed to the wall above his head despite complaints of shoulder injury. Three hours later, Barton was released on a $500 cash bond. The charge was dismissed.Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Barton alleged illegal entry, unreasonable arrest and prosecution, excessive force, and First Amendment retaliation. The court granted Vann summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Warrantless entry into a home without an exception to the warrant requirement violated clearly established law. A phone call reporting criminal activity, without corroboration, does not provide probable cause for an arrest. A reasonable jury could find that Vann’s actions violated Barton’s right to be free from excessive force during the arrest and that Vann used excessive force after arresting Barton. View "Barton v. Martin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Michigan inmates adhere to a religion called Christian Identity. Plaintiffs believe that their religion requires the observance of seven “Biblical Holy Days,” weekly group worship on the Sabbath, baptism by full-body immersion, and that Caucasians not mix with other races “in marriage and worship” and that people of different races not cohabitate. In other areas of life, plaintiffs apparently have no objection to interacting with people of other races. Plaintiffs contend they cannot engage in group worship because the Department of Corrections does not recognize Christian Identity as a religion. While they are allowed to attend the services of other religions that have been recognized, they do not because of the differences between Christian Identity and other faiths. One inmate believes that not being baptized “affects [his] salvation of [his] eternal soul." The district court rejected a challenged under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (RLUIPA).The Sixth Circuit reversed. The sincerity of the plaintiffs’ beliefs is not at issue. Under RLUIPA’s second step, the plaintiffs have established that the policy substantially burdens their exercise of religion. At step three, the burden shifts to the Department to prove that the imposition of the substantial burden on plaintiffs’ religious exercise was “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and that it used “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” The district court made no findings on those questions. View "Fox v. Washington" on Justia Law

At 11:53, Tennessee Highway Troopers stopped Hernandez for speeding and ran a warrant-check Hernandez and Betancourt, the front seat passenger and the car's owner. The check came back negative at 11:59. Troopers were denied consent to search the car. At 12:13, Troopers searched the names of all four occupants of the car through a more comprehensive database. A K-9 unit arrived at 12:17. The dog sniffed the outside of the car, alerting to the odor of drugs. The dog did not alert again when allowed into the car. After checking with their supervisor, Troopers manually searched the car and found re-encoded gift cards and suspected amphetamines. The car's occupants were arrested and held for months before all charges were dropped. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court granted the Troopers qualified immunity on the car search based on caselaw existing at that time. A jury found that the car stop was not impermissibly prolonged. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs have not met the high burden of showing that the verdict was unreasonable as a matter of law. A reasonable jury could have concluded that, because the dog's first search was not sufficiently thorough, it did not dissipate the probable cause justifying a second search. At the time, a reasonable officer would not have been on notice that the dog’s failure to alert again to the car's interior was the kind of new information that dissipated the probable cause provided by its initial alert. View "Hernandez v. Boles" on Justia Law

Richardson participated in a series of Detroit-area armed robberies in 2010. In 2013, Richardson was convicted of five counts of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, five counts of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, section 922(g). The district court sentenced Richardson to 1,494 months in prison. Richardson twice successfully persuaded the Supreme Court to vacate Sixth Circuit judgments affirming his conviction and sentence. The Court remanded for consideration of whether an intervening the Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) residual clause was invalid or the First Step Act of 2018 affected his section 924(c) conviction. The Sixth Circuit again affirmed Richardson’s conviction. Johnson had no effect on Richardson’s conviction for aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery; that conviction satisfies ACCA’s elements clause, so the residual clause is irrelevant. The court also affirmed his sentence. Richardson cannot benefit from the First Step Act because the district court resentenced him more than one year before the Act became law. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Officers Chalkley and Weber responded to a call that a potentially intoxicated white male was eating out of a dumpster. They did not see anyone by the dumpsters but spotted Jones, the only white male in the area, talking to women in the parking lot. Weber requested that Jones approach. According to the officers, Jones first ran but eventually approached with his hands in his pockets. A struggle occurred during a pat-down; the officers took Jones to the ground. Jones resisted and attempted to reach for Chalkley’s holstered firearm. The officers placed their weight on Jones and struck Jones. Officer Mitchell arrived during the pat-down. Weber tasered Jones. Jones claims he was heading home after buying food and that he kept his hands visible and offered no resistance, although he struggled to breathe as his face was pressed against the concrete. Weber transported Jones to a hospital and completed forms to have Jones involuntarily committed for psychiatric evaluation. One of the women seen talking to Jones before the incident denied that she saw Jones resist. Jones was acquitted of assault on a peace officer, obstructing official business, and resisting arrest.Jones filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. An affidavit from another woman contradicted the officers. The court granted the summary judgment to the city and the officers’ supervisor but denied immunity to the individual officers. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The district court largely assessed the officers’ conduct collectively, without distinguishing between their individual acts. Officers Chalkley and Weber were properly denied immunity but Mitchell arrived after Jones was detained. Mitchell’s actions, taken in view of the circumstances apparent to her at that time, were not objectively unreasonable. View "Jones v. City of Elyria" on Justia Law

In 2011, Manners pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(3), and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C 924(c). In 2016, Manners moved to vacate his 138-month sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision, arguing that his section 924(c) conviction could not be based on the statute’s residual clause because Johnson invalidated a similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act and his predicate offense did not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, so this offense could not fall under section 924(c)(3)’s elements clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Manners’s motion. The Supreme Court remanded in light of its 2018 holding, Sessions v. Dimaya, that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. 16 was unconstitutionally vague and subsequently expressly determined that 924(c)(3)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. On remand, the Sixth Circuit again affirmed. Manners’s predicate offense is a “crime of violence” under 924(c)(3)’s elements clause. The court employed a “categorical approach” and found 18 U.S.C. 1959(a) divisible, setting forth the separate offense of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering. The dangerous weapon element of 1959(a)(3) elevates even a minimal type of assault into “violent force” sufficient to qualify as a “crime of violence.” View "Manners v. United States" on Justia Law