Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bullard was charged with trafficking heroin and as a felon in possession of a firearm. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, then entered a plea agreement that recognized that Bullard could face 10 years to life in prison and that Bullard “may be classified as a career offender.” Bullard had a 2003 Arizona conviction for attempting to sell cocaine and a 2013 Ohio conviction for selling drugs. The court determined that Bullard qualified as a career offender, putting his Guidelines range at 292-365 months. Without the enhancement, Bullard’s range would have been 92-115 months. The court varied downward, sentencing Bullard to 140 months. Bullard had agreed that the convictions made him a career offender. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. Bullard then sought habeas relief, arguing that the court misclassified him as a career offender and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorneys failed to challenge this designation. Bullard argued that the Arizona statute criminalized drugs that are not federally controlled and conduct that falls outside the Guidelines’ definition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. If Bullard were sentenced today, he would not be a career offender but he is not on direct review. Bullard’s claim that the court misclassified him, resulting in a higher recommended sentence is not cognizable on section 2255 collateral review. While his ineffective assistance claim is cognizable, Bullard cannot satisfy the Strickland standard. View "Bullard v. United States" on Justia Law

The Detroit Police Department executed a search warrant on McGrew's home. She heard a bang at the door. When she investigated, Detroit Police Officers were standing in her living room, wearing all black. Masks concealed their faces. She could see only their eyes. One officer threw her to the ground, put his knee in her back and handcuffed her. McGrew stated the handcuffs were tight. The officer responded: “[S]hut up, b----, you shouldn’t be so fat.” When she complained again, he responded: “[I]f you don’t shut your f---ing mouth I can blow your head off and nothing can be done.” Officers seized a bag of marijuana and a pistol, which they documented on the search warrant return. They also allegedly seized but did not mention, another gun, diamond earrings, a tablet computer, and a new-in-the-box phone. Days later, McGrew went to the hospital and was diagnosed with musculoskeletal strain in her chest and bruising on her wrist. McGrew sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting excessive force and deliberate indifference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of motions based on qualified immunity and governmental immunity and summary judgment in favor of the Department and the officers on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. McGrew has created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the officers violated her right to be free from excessively tight handcuffing that causes physical injury. McGrew’s right was clearly established at the time. View "McGrew v. Sergeant Duncan" on Justia Law

In 1995, a Memphis restaurant manager was murdered during a closing-time robbery. Saulsberry worked at the restaurant and helped plan the robbery but was not there during the robbery. In his state trial, the judge forbade the jury from considering the murder counts together. Only if the jury found Saulsberry not guilty of premeditated murder could it “proceed to inquire whether [he is] guilty of [either count of felony murder].” The jury convicted Saulsberry of premeditated murder, robbery, and conspiracy. He received a life sentence. The jury did not return a verdict on the two felony murder counts. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Saulsberry’s robbery and conspiracy convictions but reversed the murder conviction. On remand, Saulsberry moved to dismiss the new prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, but the state courts rejected the argument. In 2010, a new jury convicted him of both counts of felony murder. Saulsberry’s direct appeal and applications for state post-conviction relief failed. In 2007, Saulsberry filed an uncounseled habeas petition while awaiting retrial in Tennessee, arguing double jeopardy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. Saulsberry’s jury had no chance to render a verdict on the felony murder counts. There was no mistrial here. That jeopardy can end by another means in another setting does not show an implied acquittal here. View "Saulsberry v. Lee" on Justia Law

Clayton was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for sexually exploiting minors. One minor, J.P. texted her father from Clayton’s house, saying she was being held against her will. Her father called Battle Creek Police. Police and J.P.’s father raced to Clayton’s house. Clayton’s roommate stated J.P. had left. J.P.’s father immediately received another text, alerting him that J.P. was in the house. Officers stormed inside. They found Clayton, loaded guns, brass knuckles, cocaine powder, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. J.P. was traumatized and hysterical. Clayton was arrested.Before questioning him, Detective Sutherland read Clayton his Miranda rights from the Department’s standard form: Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions. If you cannot afford to have a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. Do you understand your rights? Clayton: Yes. Sutherland failed to follow “[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer” with “and to have him/her with you during questioning.”At his third interview, Clayton stated: “Hell yeah I want to f[***]ing talk,” then made a statement and provided the password to unlock his cellphone. Clayton’s DNA was found on J.P.’s body; officers found 37 videos of Clayton engaging in sex acts with minors; videos of him weighing cocaine and holding a firearm; and text messages discussing sex trafficking. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The critical features of Miranda were conveyed to Clayton. Nothing in the words used indicated that counsel’s presence would be restricted during questioning. View "United States v. Clayton" on Justia Law

Endres has Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder; since age six, Endres has taken medication to treat that condition, beginning with Ritalin. Endres began medical school at Northeast Ohio Medical University (NEOMED). Endres passed 14 required classes during his first year at NEOMED, but having stopped taking Ritalin because of side effects, Endres failed one class. NEOMED made Endres repeat the entire first-year curriculum including the classes he had passed. During a test in a class he had already passed, Endres appeared to shift his eyes repeatedly toward another student’s laptop. NEOMED dismissed Endres for cheating. Endres sued, citing procedural due process violations, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The district court dismissed Endres’s complaint as untimely, stating that even if Endres’s due process claim were timely, the NEOMED official is entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the case timely. The statute of limitations did not start until Endres learned that a second panel issued a final, non-appealable decision recommending his dismissal. Endres alleged facts which, taken as true, establish several violations of his procedural due process rights. Because the contours of those rights were not clearly established, the court affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to the official, which immunizes her from damages though not from injunctive relief. View "Endres v. Northeast Ohio Medical University" on Justia Law

Shortly before his high school graduation, 18-year-old Kyle apparently experimented with LSD. The after-effects afflicted him for several days, resulting in his having to be removed from class because of behavioral issues. Kyle’s friend, Collin, checked in on him after school, then went to the police and told them that Kyle needed help and that Kyle was armed and upset with his mother. Four officers went to the house, not knowing that the mother was not actually home with Kyle. Without waiting for a warrant, the officers entered Kyle’s home. He appeared at the foot of the basement stairs, wielding a lawnmower blade. When the officers attempted to subdue Kyle with a taser, he came up the basement stairs swinging. The lawnmower blade struck an officer, who fell back, then shot and killed Kyle. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Calling the case “heart-rending, the court stated that given the circumstances and governing case law, the officers’ entry into Kyle’s home was justified under the exigent-circumstances exception and the use of force did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officer had probable cause to believe that Kyle posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury. View "Baker v. City of Trenton" on Justia Law

Knight was charged with two counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; assault and robbery of a person having control of mail matter, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a); possession of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. 2114(b); use of a firearm during assault and robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a); use of a firearm during kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); carjacking 18 U.S.C. 2119; use of a firearm during carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Knight pled guilty to bank fraud; a jury convicted him on all other counts. The district court sentenced Knight to a total term of 955 months of imprisonment. After exhausting his direct appeals, Knight filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255), claiming that his convictions under 924(c) are invalid because the residual clause of the crime-of-violence definition in section 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of recent Supreme Court holdings. The government conceded that Knight’s kidnapping conviction was not a crime of violence. The Sixth Circuit vacated the related section 924(c) conviction but upheld Knight’s section 924(c) conviction for using a firearm during assault and robbery, which qualifies under the “elements clause” of the definition of a “crime of violence.” View "Knight v. United States" on Justia Law

Sensabaugh, the former head football coach at David Crockett High School in Washington County, Tennessee, made two Facebook posts expressing his concerns about the conditions and practices of schools within the District. The posts included pictures of students. Sensabaugh refused to comply with requests to remove the posts and became aggressive with his supervisors who noted other alleged misconduct, including his use of profane language with students and his requiring a student to practice while injured. He was fired after a guidance meeting where his conduct caused his supervisor to report her concern “that Sensabaugh posed a threat to the safety of the students and staff.” He sued, raising First Amendment retaliation and municipal liability claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no causal connection between Sensabaugh’s Facebook posts and his termination. A thorough independent investigation preceded Sensabaugh’s termination; that investigation concluded that the misconduct allegations were substantiated in full or in part and that the misconduct supported termination. View "Sensabaugh v. Halliburton" on Justia Law

Brintley is blind. To navigate the internet, she uses a screen reader that scans webpages and narrates their contents. The technology struggles with some material, especially pictures and video. With some effort, companies can make their websites fully screen-reader compatible. The credit unions, established under Michigan law, maintain a limited brick-and-mortar presence; both operate websites. Brintley tried to browse these websites but found her screen reader unable to process some of their content. A “tester” of website compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, Brintley sued the credit unions, seeking compensatory and injunctive relief, arguing that the websites were a “service” offered through a “place of public accommodation,” entitling her to the “full and equal enjoyment” of the websites. 42 U.S.C. 12182(a). The district court rejected an argument that Brintley failed to satisfy Article III standing. The Sixth Circuit reversed. To establish standing, Brintley must show that she sustained an injury in fact, that she can trace the injury to the credit unions’ conduct, and that a decision in her favor would redress the injury. Brintley must show an invasion of a “legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” and that affects her in some “personal and individual way.” Brintley lacks eligibility under state law to join either credit union and her complaint does not convey any interest in becoming eligible to do so. View "Brintley v. Belle River Community Credit Union" on Justia Law

Police received a report of a drunk driver, with the vehicle’s license plate number. The database reported the vehicle as stolen. The suspect’s name came back: Powell, who was allegedly “armed and dangerous.” Using the caller’s updates on the vehicle’s location, in minutes three deputies found it stopped on a dirt road with the driver standing outside. The deputies told the driver to get on the ground. He dropped to his knees and put his hands in the air. As the deputies approached, Deputy Stetson instructed the driver to lie down on the ground. The driver yelled back that he would not comply and asked what he had done wrong. Stetson and the driver repeated the conversation nine times, with the driver becoming more belligerent. At one point, the driver reached toward his open truck door but then returned his hands to the air. The driver had three warnings that deputies would tase him if he did not obey. Stetson tased the driver. Deputies then handcuffed him. The driver was not Powell but was the vehicle’s owner, Shanaberg. Powell had allegedly stolen the vehicle months before, but the police later recovered it. The vehicle remained in the stolen-vehicle database. Shanaberg sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Stetson, finding he was entitled to qualified immunity on Shanaberg’s excessive-force claim. Given what Stetson knew, it was objectively reasonable to tase Shanaberg after warning him. View "Shanaberg v. Licking County" on Justia Law