Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Davis was the Rowan County, Kentucky County Clerk, responsible for issuing marriage licenses. Same-sex marriage offended her religious beliefs; when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, Davis stopped issuing marriage licenses altogether. When plaintiffs, same-sex couples, sought marriage licenses they could not get them. Plaintiffs sued Davis in her individual capacity and in her official capacity, seeking damages. In a different lawsuit, the district court enjoined Davis from refusing to issue marriage licenses. After the injunction, plaintiffs obtained marriage licenses. Before the Sixth Circuit could rule on the injunction, Kentucky legislators changed the law and Davis began to issue licenses without objection. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Davis's appeal of the injunction. Davis then moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that sovereign immunity shielded her from suit in her official capacity and that qualified immunity shielded her from suit in her individual capacity. The Sixth Circuit held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields Davis as an official because, when refusing to issue marriage licenses, she acted on Kentucky’s behalf, not on Rowan County’s behalf. The doctrine of qualified immunity does not shield Davis as an individual; the plaintiffs adequately alleged she violated plaintiffs’ right to marry, which was clearly established when she acted. View "Yates v. Davis" on Justia Law

The day after a controlled buy, Detroit police officer Benitez obtained a warrant to search 12011 Bramell. His affidavit stated that a reliable confidential informant had been at two Burnette addresses and “12011 BRAMELL (the target location) and that a certain drug dealer had been selling cocaine and heroin out of 9542 Burnette for several months. Burnette Street and Bramell are eight miles apart. Benitez could not have simultaneously observed the locations as stated in the affidavit. Detroit police executed the warrant at Bramell, which is owned by Butler, a retiree with no prior convictions or links to drug operations. Officers asked for Butler's ID, which Butler provided; he stated he had a concealed pistol license and was carrying a weapon. Butler was handcuffed. Sergeant Meadows “slammed” him “against the wall.” Butler had sustained a serious neck injury during military service, resulting in a spinal fusion operation and disability-based retirement. The “slam” reinjured him. From the house, the police recovered $3,702 cash, weapons, a bulletproof vest, and ibuprofen pills. The state did not charge Butler, who filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Meadows on the excessive force claim and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to Benitez on the false affidavit claim. Assaulting an unarmed, compliant individual is a clearly-established violation of the Fourth Amendment. Removing alleged falsehoods, Benitez had not personally seen suspicious activity at Bramell but he corroborated what the informant stated about the Burnette addresses. Officers need not corroborate every detail provided by an informant to show the informant’s reliability. Even without personally observing any drug activity at Bramell, Benitez put enough in the affidavit for a magistrate to conclude that the informant—who was correct about everything else—would be right that Bramell was a “stash house.” View "Butler v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 1995, Pike and Slemmer, students at the Knoxville Job Corps Center, had a strained relationship; Pike told Iloilo, that she intended to kill Slemmer. The next day, Iloilo observed Pike and Slemmer together. That night, Pike told Iloilo that she had just killed Slemmer and showed Iloilo a piece of Slemmers’s skull, describing many details about the murder. Pike made similar statements to another student. After Slemmer’s body was found, police quickly discovered Pike’s connection to the crime. Pike waived her Miranda rights and gave a complete statement. At trial, much of Pike’s defense centered on her mental health. A jury convicted Pike of premeditated first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. At a sentencing hearing, Pike’s attorney, Talman, originally intended to rely on the testimony of Dr. McCoy, a mitigation expert; shortly before the hearing, Talman switched his plan and called only Pike’s relatives to testify about Pike’s difficult childhood, and her behavioral problems throughout her adolescence.The jury sentenced Pike to death by electrocution. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. State courts also denied postconviction relief, concluding that Pike’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present alternative expert testimony or additional lay testimony on compelling mitigation in her life history. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her federal habeas petition; the state court’s determination that she is unable to establish prejudice on her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Pike v. Gross" on Justia Law

Vanderhoef crashed his Ford Mustang into Dixon’s vehicle. Dixon, an off-duty, part-time reserve Maryville, Tennessee police officer, responded by holding Vanderhoef and his passengers at gunpoint for about two minutes. Keller let them go after a bystander threatened to call the police. A jury found that Dixon violated Vanderhoef’s Fourth Amendment rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court set aside the jury’s verdict, ruling that Dixon was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law put him on notice that doing what he did was unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The facts presented at trial adequately established a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights to be free from excessive force and unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. At the time of this accident and confrontation, Dixon should have known that pointing his gun at a non-fleeing teenager whom he did not reasonably suspect of any prior crime beyond speeding and reckless driving and holding him at gunpoint for roughly two minutes, violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. View "Vanderhoef v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Boxill worked at Franklin County Municipal Court. Boxill alleges that the defendants, judges and an administrator, formulated a concealed policy that female employees asserting complaints about abusive and discriminatory treatment by judges would be discouraged and intimidated. She claimed that in 2011 O’Grady began making sexist and racist comments and that Brandt was “hostile and intimidating." Boxill reported this to administrators and judges in 2011-2013; “[n]o administrator or Judge acted ... each discouraged [her] from action.” They began removing her responsibilities. A week after others reported O’Grady’s behavior Boxill was demoted. She claims that O’Grady then recruited other judges to monitor her and her staff. The Defendants began bypassing her and going directly to the Caucasian male subordinate. She resigned and later filed suit, alleging that each Defendant retaliated against her in violation of the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1981 and contributed to a hostile work environment. The district court dismissed her claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Boxill offered no plausible, non-conclusory facts to show that O’Grady was aware of her complaints and cannot demonstrate that O’Grady’s adverse actions were motivated by her protected speech. Reversing as to the hostile work environment claim, the court stated Boxill’s complaint plausibly alleged that O’Grady made sexist and racist comments to her and others for years, she reported that behavior, and the harassment was sufficiently severe and/or pervasive that others found it necessary to memorialize their concerns in writing. View "Boxill v. O'Grady" on Justia Law

In 1999, Vowell pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, agreeing that his prior criminal history qualified for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Vowell waived his right to collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, except for claims asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or “that an applicable change in the case law renders the defendant’s conduct ... not a violation of federal law.” Vowell had Tennessee convictions for second-degree burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated burglary, and a 1983 conviction for Georgia burglary. The district court determined that Vowell qualified as an ACCA career offender and sentenced him to 180 months of imprisonment. Vowell did not appeal. In 2016, Vowell filed a section 2255 motion to set aside his sentence, asserting that his 1983 Georgia conviction did not constitute a predicate offense because it was broader than generic burglary and “portions of Georgia’s burglary statute could only have qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA’s now-void residual clause,” citing the Supreme Court’s Johnson and Mathis decisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Vowell’s petition, first holding that Vowell’s appellate waiver did not prohibit him from raising his claims. The court determined that Georgia’s burglary statute was divisible and that because Vowell was convicted of burglarizing a “dwelling house,” Vowell was correctly designated as a career offender. View "Vowell v. United States" on Justia Law

In January 2010, police found Joann’s car alone in a church driveway and thought the driver might be in the water. Police activated a dive team and contacted the Coast Guard. Joann’s daughter reported that Joann had attended Mass and was not answering her phone. In the following weeks, police questioned people who knew Joann, who saw her at Mass, and who were near the lake. Two months later, a fisherman found her body in the Detroit River. A Canadian coroner performed an autopsy and concluded that Joann drowned. A Michigan coroner performed another autopsy and drew the same conclusions, noting that homicide was “less likely” than suicide because Joann had no significant injuries and that an accident seemed “quite unlikely” because Joann had no reason to be near the water. A doctor at the University of Michigan reported drowning as the cause of death with an undetermined manner of death. Police stopped actively investigating Joann’s death, but the case remains open. Joann’s estate believes that an unknown person murdered Joann and that the police knew about the murder before it happened and botched the investigation to protect the killer, who sold the officers alcohol at prices cheaper than Costco. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The court acknowledged some “odd facts” cited by the estate but concluded that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the estate. View "Estate of Romain v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms" on Justia Law

American Islamic Community Center (AICC) unsuccessfully sought zoning permission to build a mosque in Sterling Heights, Michigan. AICC sued, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and the First Amendment. The Department of Justice also investigated. The city negotiated a consent judgment that allowed AICC to build the mosque. At the City Council meeting at which the consent judgment was approved, people voiced concerns about issues such as traffic and noise; others disparaged Islam and AICC. Comments and deliberation were punctuated by audience outbursts. Eventually, Mayor Taylor cleared the chamber of all spectators, except the press. The Council voted to settle the case. A consent judgment was entered. Plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring the consent judgment invalid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The defendants fulfilled their procedural obligations; they considered and made findings on the relevant criteria, such as “parking, traffic and overall size,” before voting. The court upheld limitations on speech imposed during the meeting: the relevance rule and a rule forbidding attacks on people and institutions. The city did not “grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.” View "Youkhanna v. City of Sterling Heights" on Justia Law

Virginia Run Cove is a privately owned Memphis street that offers access to the parking lots of several businesses, including a Planned Parenthood clinic. It is described on county records as “common area” in a commercial development. Brindley sought a preliminary injunction requiring the city to let him stand near the entrance to this clinic and spread his pro-life message. He argued that Virginia Run Cove was a traditional public forum and that his exclusion from the street violated the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court has long held that public streets are traditional public fora. Even when a street is privately owned, it remains a traditional public forum if it looks and functions like a public street. Virginia Run Cove, which connects directly to a busy public thoroughfare, displays no sign of private ownership, and is used by the general public to access many nearby buildings, including the clinic, a gas station, a church, and a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement office, has all the trappings of a public street. View "Brindley v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

In 2003, Clark and Harrington were jointly tried for the Martin murder. The only evidence connecting Clark to the crime was the preliminary testimony of Martin’s neighbor, Stewart. At trial, Stewart would not say what she had seen the day of the murder. The prosecutor asked if she was afraid or nervous; she responded she was not. Stewart agreed that she had been threatened but would not say by whom. The prosecutor attempted to refresh her recollection with her testimony from preliminary examinations, but Stewart would not ratify her earlier statements. The judge declared Stewart unavailable and had her preliminary testimony, including cross-examinations, read to the jury. Clark’s attorney, who had not been counsel of record during the preliminary proceedings, was not permitted to cross-examine Stewart. Clark was found guilty. Stewart has recanted. Clark sought habeas relief, based on an exculpatory affidavit from another purported eyewitness, who states that her father, a city police detective, told her not to report what she had seen. Clark was granted permission to file a second or successive habeas petition in light of the alleged Brady violation. The district court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit reversed. An evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether Clark has made out a Brady violation and whether the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 are satisfied. View "Clark v. Nagy" on Justia Law