Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shelby County Deputy Lane responded to a hit-and-run call. People at the scene told Lane to follow Studdard, who was walking away along the road and had slit his wrists. Lane turned his motorcycle around and rode after Studdard. Studdard ignored Lane’s request to stop and turned toward Lane, displaying what appeared to be a knife. Lane saw Studdard’s bloody wrists. Lane continued to follow Studdard and called for backup, noting that Studdard had a knife and had slit his wrists. Three deputies parked their vehicles north of Studdard, seeking to block his path forward; Lane followed from the south. They exited their vehicles and displayed firearms. Studdard halted. They directed Studdard to drop the knife. Studdard stood still, knife in hand. An officer said that they would shoot if Studdard did not drop the weapon. Studdard raised the knife to his throat and began “swaying.” “Almost immediately,” two deputies opened fire. Studdard fell. Reed kicked the knife out of Studdard’s hand. The officers administered aid. Studdard died in the hospital due to complications from the gunshot wounds. In his wife’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the officer’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. To justify lethal force, an officer must have probable cause to believe the suspect presents an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others. Officers may not shoot an uncooperative individual when he presents an immediate risk to himself but not to others . View "Studdard v. Shelby County" on Justia Law

In 2004, O’Neal was convicted in state court of the second-degree murder of Shelby, who was shot at a gas station. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to 36-80 years in prison. At trial, O’Neal argued that Hickman had shot Shelby. Over O’Neal’s objections, the court excluded Hickman’s jailhouse confession to another inmate and Shelby’s statement to a police officer at the hospital where he died, identifying Hickman as the shooter. The statement was also overheard by a nurse. Hickman had pleaded guilty to manslaughter, which carried a sentence of 3-15 years' imprisonment, in exchange for his testimony at O’Neal’s murder trial. The district court granted O’Neal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the state’s argument that the Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably determined that the erroneous exclusion of the statements was harmless. The district court properly granted relief based on the exclusion of the jailhouse statement because of its potentially profound impact on jurors, particularly when added to the already considerable admitted evidence indicating that Hickman, not O’Neal, was the shooter. Had the hospital identification been admitted, it would have joined an impressive array of evidence that Hickman was the shooter. View "O'Neal v. Balcarcel" on Justia Law

A 911 caller reported that two men had approached and tried to break into her parked car. Officers were dispatched. Because there was fresh snow, the officers followed a trail of snowprints to the Coffey home. Outside the home, Coffey’s father, David, told the officers that Coffey and Jerrell were inside. David claims he never gave them permission to enter the home. The officers claim that David did consent. The officers entered and found Coffey, asleep on a loveseat. David says that the officers tried to wake Coffey by poking him in the chest. An officer then punched Coffey in the face and yelled, “stop resisting.” Officers flipped him onto his stomach and handcuffed him. Coffey says he did not resist but that the officers used his face to open the storm door as they dragged him out of the house, leaving him with injuries. The officers claim that Coffey, fought, kicked two officers, and pulled his arms away. Coffey was acquitted of assaulting a police officer. Coffey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, The officers sought summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit agreed that there existed material disputes of fact over whether the officers unlawfully entered Coffey’s home, whether they used excessive force when arresting Coffey, and whether the officers influenced or participated in the decision to prosecute Coffey for assaulting a police officer. View "Coffey v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Hubbell worked as a FedEx parcel sorter. She alleges that her manager told her she should accept a demotion because “females are better suited to administrative roles and males are better suited to leadership roles,” repeatedly disciplined her, then eventually demoted her from her position as lead parcel sorter based on her sex. She also alleges that FedEx retaliated against her for filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and for filing a lawsuit by unfairly disciplining her, not allowing her to earn extra pay by clocking in early or clocking out late, and closely surveilling her. Eventually, she was fired. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding in favor of Hubbell on her Title VII retaliation claim and the reduction of her attorney’s fees from the requested amount. A reasonable factfinder could find that several of the actions Hubbell testified about would be sufficient, on their own or in combination, to dissuade a reasonable worker from filing or pursuing an EEOC complaint. A reasonable factfinder could also find that some or all these acts were taken in retaliation for Hubbell’s EEOC complaints. A reasonable factfinder could determine that, despite its formal anti-discrimination policy, FedEx did not engage in good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. View "Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc." on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Petitioner raised two issues regarding whether the interrogating officer mislead him to believe that he did not have a right under the Fifth Amendment to have counsel present during interrogation and misstated the availability of a defense attorney in the county where Mitchell was interrogated, and whether the officer provided Miranda warnings to petitioner in "mid-stream," in violation of Supreme Court precedent. The court held that, although the manner in which the officer interacted with petitioner regarding the right to counsel was troubling, the Michigan Supreme Court's decision—that the Miranda warnings, considered as a whole, adequately advised petitioner of his rights—was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Mitchell v. MacLaren" on Justia Law

Hennessee pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government sought an enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act, section 924(e)(1) based on Hennessee’s three prior convictions for violent felonies. Hennessee objected that the government could not prove that two of his prior offenses were committed on different occasions. The district court agreed with Hennessee, finding that Sixth Circuit precedent precluded its review of non-elemental facts when conducting the different-occasions analysis. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing with the ACCA enhancement. A sentencing court may consider non-elemental facts such as times, locations, and victims in documents described in the Supreme Court’s “Shepard” decision when conducting the different-occasions analysis. The facts of Hennessee’s prior convictions—as established in Shepard-approved documents—indicate that he committed those violent felonies on occasions different from one another. The government proved that Hennessee’s prior convictions qualify him for a sentence enhancement as an armed career criminal. View "United States v. Hennessee" on Justia Law

Owens covered his estranged wife’s nose and mouth with duct tape, hogtied her arms and legs behind her back, and left her alone in a shed to die. A Tennessee jury convicted Owens in 2003 of second-degree murder. The trial judge increased Owens’s sentence to 24 years, based in part on the judge’s finding that a sentencing enhancement was warranted for “exceptional cruelty.” Owens sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the Sixth Amendment required the jury, rather than the judge, to make that finding. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, finding that the state court’s error was harmless. Under Supreme Court precedent, the verdict alone did not authorize Owens’s sentence. There is, however, little doubt that, if asked, the jury would have made the requisite finding that Owens’ actions amounted to “psychological abuse or torture,” and reflected his “calculated indifference toward [her] suffering.” View "Owens v. Parris" on Justia Law

Novak created a “farcical Facebook account” that looked like the Parma Police Department’s official page. The page was up for 12 hours and published posts including a recruitment advertisement that “strongly encourag[ed] minorities to not apply.” and an advertisement for a “Pedophile Reform" event. Some of its about 100 followers thought it was funny. Others were angry or confused and called the police station. The Department posted a warning on its official Facebook page. Novak reposted that warning on his page, to “deepen his satire.” Novak deleted “pedantic comments” on his page explaining that the page was fake, The Department contacted Facebook requesting that the page be shut down and informed local news outlets. Novak deleted his creation. Based on a search warrant and subpoena, Facebook disclosed that Novak was behind the fake. The police obtained warrants to search Novak’s apartment and to arrest him, stating that Novak unlawfully impaired the department’s functions. Novak responded that, other than 12 minutes of phone calls, the police department suffered no disruption. Novak was acquitted, then sued, alleging violations of his constitutional and statutory rights. The district court dismissed in part, with 26 claims remaining. The Sixth Circuit granted the officers qualified immunity on claims related to anonymous speech, censorship in a public forum, and the right to receive speech were dismissed. View "Novak v. City of Parma" on Justia Law

In 1996, Montgomery was sexually assaulted and murdered in her Kalkaska, Michigan home. Months later, 22-year-old Peterson was in jail on an unrelated charge. Another inmate informed officers that Peterson had made an incriminating statement about the Montgomery crime. Peterson claims that he suffered from brain damage, mental illness, and severe depression, was on suicide watch, and that the defendants knew of Peterson’s disabilities. Peterson initially denied involvement, but after nine interrogations and several polygraph examinations, Peterson confessed. A week later, DNA results showed that Peterson’s DNA was not a match for a vaginal semen sample. Peterson was convicted. In 2013, Peterson’s attorneys obtained new DNA test results that excluded Peterson as a contributor to a previously-inconclusive sample from the victim’s shirt. Peterson’s conviction was vacated in 2014. Peterson filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers each raised qualified immunity, arguing Peterson was collaterally estopped from relitigating the voluntariness of his confession, which the Michigan trial court had determined was admissible. The district court rejected that argument and denied the defendants qualified immunity, absolute witness immunity, and governmental immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to two officers but reversed with respect to one officer, who was not alleged to have participated in the interrogations. The court reversed the decision to deny governmental immunity to the county. The state court ruling regarding the confession was vacated with the conviction. View "Peterson v. Heymes" on Justia Law

A 2004 Ohio statute regulated the "off-label" prescription of mifepristone (RU-486), which is commonly used in conjunction with misoprostol, to induce first-trimester abortions without surgery. Planned Parenthood challenged the statute under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction “insofar as it prohibits unconstitutional applications of the [statute].” In 2006, the district court entered a permanent injunction. After the Ohio Supreme Court answered certified questions, the Sixth Circuit remanded for a determination regarding the injunction’s scope. In 2011, the district court clarified that the statute was enjoined only as it applied to instances where the health of the patient was at risk and denied broader relief, leaving one remaining claim. In 2016, the FDA amended its approval and label for mifepristone, authorizing the off-label uses at issue. The statute remains in force, requiring physicians to prescribe medication abortion according to the FDA’s updated approval. Planned Parenthood sought $10,365.35 to cover costs for litigation on the merits and attorneys’ fees at 2016 rates to offset lost interest. Using this rate, the requested fees for the preliminary injunction litigation totaled $372,164.63. The district court granted that request, finding the requested hours and rates reasonable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Planned Parenthood does not properly qualify as a “prevailing party” because its relief was narrow and preliminary; that the court erred in refusing to apply a blanket fee reduction based on the degree of success; and that the court erred in applying 2016 rates rather than 2006 rates The court properly engaged in a contextual, case-specific review, considered the aims of section 1988, and adequately explained its rationale. View "Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region v. DeWine" on Justia Law