Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Richardson was arrested after failing to appear at a child-support enforcement hearing. The judge imposed a sentence of up to 30 days for civil contempt, which could be purged and Richardson released upon payment of $2,500. Two days later, Richardson collapsed in his cell. An overhead camera recorded as officers and medical staff responded. Richardson, lethargic and unbalanced, with blood and saliva coming from his mouth, was trying to stand. The officers told Richardson to “stay down,” pulled Richardson from his cell, and placed him face down on the floor. Despite a jail policy prohibiting placing restrained inmates in a prone position and a medic’s appeal to handcuff Richardson in front, Richardson was handcuffed behind his back and restrained face down. Richardson died after a 22-minute struggle during which he continually stated he could not breathe. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified- and statutory-immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because Richardson was sanctioned outside the criminal context, the Fourteenth Amendment governs. The court rejected an argument that, as long as they acted without reckless or malicious intent, the officers could apply any degree of force. Existing precedent gave notice that it “[w]as unconstitutional” to create asphyxiating conditions by “forcibly restraining an individual in a prone position for a prolonged period” when that individual posed no material threat. Because the finding regarding defendants’ “knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm” was premised on Richardson’s complaints about his inability to breathe, the qualified immunity inquiry was sufficiently individualized. View "Hopper v. Plummer" on Justia Law

An Ohio jury found Hautzenroeder, a high school teacher, guilty of one count of sexual battery involving a student. Although her state court appeals were unsuccessful, the trial court suspended most of her two-year prison sentence and discharged her early from community control. No court could suspend Hautzenroeder’s statutorily-mandated classification as a Tier III sex offender with lifetime reporting requirements, Ohio Rev. Code 2950.01(G)(1)(a), 2950.07(B)(1). Hautzenroeder’s federal habeas petition alleged a due process violation stemming from insufficient evidence supporting her conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction because Hautzenroeder filed it after her period of incarceration and community control expired— she was no longer “in custody.” Changes in Ohio’s registration requirements did not mean that being subject to the requirements would constitute being in custody. View "Hautzenroeder v. DeWine" on Justia Law

An Ohio jury found Hautzenroeder, a high school teacher, guilty of one count of sexual battery involving a student. Although her state court appeals were unsuccessful, the trial court suspended most of her two-year prison sentence and discharged her early from community control. No court could suspend Hautzenroeder’s statutorily-mandated classification as a Tier III sex offender with lifetime reporting requirements, Ohio Rev. Code 2950.01(G)(1)(a), 2950.07(B)(1). Hautzenroeder’s federal habeas petition alleged a due process violation stemming from insufficient evidence supporting her conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction because Hautzenroeder filed it after her period of incarceration and community control expired— she was no longer “in custody.” Changes in Ohio’s registration requirements did not mean that being subject to the requirements would constitute being in custody. View "Hautzenroeder v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Toll was in solitary confinement at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution when he allegedly threw liquid at a correctional officer. The commander decided to extract Toll from his cell. After the cell extraction team (Doss and Horton) removed Toll from his cell, Toll became unresponsive. A doctor pronounced him dead. Toll’s mother, Luna, sued Horton and Doss in their individual capacities for excessive force, and Bell, the warden, for failure to train (42 U.S.C. 1983). In 2013, the district court entered judgments in favor of the defendants. In 2014, the New York Times published an article about the cell extraction team, based on a letter written by a former team member. Based on this new evidence, Luna was granted a new trial. The court declined to award sanctions because the defendants did not act in bad faith in failing to produce the letter and granted summary judgment, rejecting the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order granting a new trial and reversed the summary judgment. Luna acted diligently in requesting discovery responses that should have included the letter, which was material, controlling evidence. Summary judgment was inappropriate because the court granted a completely new trial, requiring a new jury to examine anew all factual disputes; the court should have reviewed all material facts in a light most favorable to Luna. View "Luna v. Bell" on Justia Law

Maben, a Michigan prisoner, was in line for lunch. The server provided Maben with half a serving, dumping out the rest, stating that he “was doing as told.” Before Maben could speak to a supervisor, Thelen, a prison guard, “began yelling,” “shut the fuck up if you wanna eat.” The supervisor “acknowledged the severely inadequate portion,” and gave Maben the full portion. Thelen stated “if you’re going to complain then you’re going to get a misconduct,” then issued Maben a ticket. Maben claimed that he never became disruptive, but has had shortened portions ever since, because of Thelen's retaliation. A hearing officer found Thelen’s statement “more credible” without viewing video footage, Maben was found guilty of creating a disturbance and lost privileges for seven days. The court rejected Maben's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part; factual findings made at Maben’s minor misconduct hearing do not have preclusive effect in federal court. The court declined to adopt the “checkmate doctrine,” which provides that when a prison body finds that a prisoner has committed an actual violation of prison rules and the finding is based on some evidence, it "essentially checkmates" a retaliation claim. Maben introduced sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court affirmed summary judgment on Maben’s official-capacity claim, citing the Eleventh Amendment. View "Maben v. Thelen" on Justia Law

A jury found that the Michigan Department of State Police had retaliated against Mys, a former desk sergeant with the Department, by transferring her from her longtime post in Newaygo, Michigan, to a post in Detroit. Department officials initiated the process that culminated in Sgt. Mys’s transfer shortly after she had filed the second of two complaints alleging sexual assault and sexual harassment by her coworker, Sergeant Miller. Mys was awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Department’s claim that the trial record contains no evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found in Mys’s favor or upon which the jury’s award could be justified. The court noted several misstatements of facts by the Department’s attorney. The Department conceded that the long distance of the Detroit post from Mys’s home made her transfer there an adverse employment action; her supervisor initiated the transfer process with explicit reference to Mys’s complaints, explaining to both his superior and the Human Resources Department that Mys’s transfer was necessary for one reason and one reason only: her sexual-harassment complaints. An “unbroken chain” connects Mys’s supervisor to her transfer. View "Mys v. Michigan Department of State Police" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs submitted a ballot initiative petition proposing to amend the Ohio Constitution by imposing term limits on the justices of the Ohio Supreme Court and requiring that all laws “that apply to the people of the State of Ohio . . . apply equally to the members and employees of the General Assembly.” The single-subject rule, Ohio Rev. Code 3503.062(A), allows initiative petitions to contain only “one proposed law or constitutional amendment,” so the Ohio Ballot Board split the initiative into two initiatives, each containing one proposed constitutional amendment. Plaintiffs challenged the process. Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting an argument that the process was a content-based regulation of core political speech. The Supreme Court has not viewed single-subject rules as inconsistent with the First Amendment and the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected an essentially identical challenge. Ohio’s single-subject rule applies to all petitions, regardless of their substantive messages, and may be justified without reference to the content of any initiative petitions. The rule is intended to prevent voter confusion and "logrolling." Whether Plaintiffs violate Ohio’s single-subject rule depends not on what they say, but simply on where they say it; it is a minimally burdensome and nondiscriminatory regulation. View "Committee to Impose Term Limits on the Ohio Supreme Court v. Ohio Ballot Board" on Justia Law

In 1998, Byerley was found beside the road with her throat slashed. Jordan was convicted for the murder. Prosecutors never told him that a knife found near Byerley's body might have implicated someone else. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Jordan sought post-conviction relief under Brady v. Maryland. The same court vacated Jordan’s conviction in 2011. Jordan was retried and acquitted in 2015. Less than a year later, Jordan sued a Blount County prosecutor, detective, and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages for the Brady violation. The statute of limitations for that claim is one year. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his suit As a general rule, a claim accrues “when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” To obtain relief, the plaintiff must be able to prove the elements of his claim. Analogizing to the tort of malicious prosecution, which requires “termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused,” the court concluded that Brady claim under section 1983 cannot accrue until the criminal proceeding so terminates. Jordan’s criminal proceeding continued after the vacatur of his conviction, ending only upon his acquittal in 2015. His claim did not accrue until then. View "Jordan v. Blount County" on Justia Law

Stephens, born biologically male, worked as a funeral director for a corporation that operates Michigan funeral homes. Stephens was terminated shortly after informing the owner, Rost, that she intended to transition and would represent herself as a woman while at work. The EEOC investigated Stephens’s allegations of sex discrimination and learned that the Funeral Home provided its male public-facing employees with clothing that complied with its dress code while female public-facing employees received no such allowance. The EEOC sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by terminating Stephens’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes and administering a discriminatory clothing policy. The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the EEOC. The Funeral Home engaged in unlawful discrimination against Stephens on the basis of her sex and did not establish that applying Title VII’s proscriptions against sex discrimination would substantially burden Rost’s religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Even if Rost’s religious exercise were substantially burdened, the EEOC has established that enforcing Title VII is the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination against Stephens. The EEOC may bring the clothing claim in this case because an investigation into the clothing-allowance policy was reasonably expected to grow out of the original discrimination charge. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes" on Justia Law

On October 29, 2014, at 4:00 a.m., 13 police officers wearing SWAT gear and face masks blew open the door of the Greers’ West Bloomfield Township home with a shotgun. The officers did not knock or announce their presence. The parents and their daughters were ordered to their knees at gunpoint; officers handcuffed a nephew. The Greers repeatedly asked to see the search warrant, but the officers refused to show it and did not allow the mother to sit with her seven-year-old daughter. Officers stated that they were searching for a “dangerous Russian,” who had evidently resided at the house more than a year before the search. Police found neither the suspect nor any contraband. The Highland Park Police Department, which evidently conducted the search, produced the underlying search warrant in response to the Greers' complaint. The warrant described the Greers’ home and listed controlled substances and items connected to narcotics trafficking as items to be seized. In the Greers’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the officers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity. The complaint states a plausible claim that the officers violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by executing a search warrant on their home in an unreasonable manner. View "Greer v. City of Highland Park" on Justia Law