Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Caudill and Goforth broke into White’s home and beat her to death with a hammer when she refused to give them money to buy drugs. After ransacking her home, they loaded her body in the trunk of her car, drove to an empty field, doused the car with gasoline, and set it on fire. A Kentucky jury convicted the two of murder, robbery, burglary, arson, and tampering with evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Caudill’s convictions and death sentence and denied collateral relief. The district court denied Caudill’s federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state courts reasonably rejected her Batson claim and that her lawyers did not provide ineffective assistance by choosing not to call additional witnesses during the penalty phase. Caudill’s claim made too much of Batson’s “sensitive” inquiry language. The Supreme Court has never directed courts to make detailed findings or to solicit the defense attorney’s views before ruling on a Batson motion. Caudill’s jury selection lasted several days. The judge was there the entire time. He observed the demeanor of the jurors and heard their answers. He listened to the prosecutor’s questions, watched the strikes, and considered the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations. The state judge could have explained more fully why those explanations convinced him that no discrimination was involved but the ruling did not violate clearly established law. View "Caudill v. Conover" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion brought by Ohio death-row inmates to enjoin their pending executions. The inmates claimed that Ohio’s midazolam-based, three-drug execution protocol presents a constitutionally unacceptable risk of pain and suffering. The court found that they had not established “likelihood of success on the merits.” The plaintiffs have “fallen well short” of proving a risk that Ohio’s execution protocol is sure or very likely to cause serious pain and needless suffering. Psychological pain or mental suffering cannot, alone, make a method of execution unconstitutional; Ohio is not required to prove midazolam’s effectiveness in rendering an inmate impervious to the pain from the two injections that follow. Nor did the inmates identify an available, feasible, and readily implemented alternative that will significantly reduce the risk of pain. View "In re: Ohio Execution Protocol Litig." on Justia Law

Black was convicted of conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and escape or attempted escape from custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). He was sentenced to an effective term of life in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Black unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Black then moved for relief under FRCP 60(b). The district court determined that his grounds for relief were second or successive claims under section 2255 and transferred them to the Sixth Circuit, which denied relief. The transferred grounds raise successive claims. Black’s arguments that the district court “applied the wrong standard” to his arguments about counsel’s conflicts of interest and ineffective assistance are "prototypical attacks" on the court's previous resolution. His claim that the Assistant U.S. Attorney “perpetrated fraud on the Court” does not question “the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Black did not argue that the allegedly fraudulent conduct at trial s tainted the assessment of his habeas petition. Because Black presented these claims in a prior application, they “shall be dismissed,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1). Black did not cite “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court” or “newly discovered evidence” that would establish that “no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty.” View "In re: Black" on Justia Law

Crabbs, acquitted of voluntary manslaughter but subjected to a DNA swab before his release, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim alleging that the local police violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches. He died before the case could be resolved. Crabbs’s mother and the personal representative of his estate moved to substitute as a party. The district court found that Crabbs’s death extinguished his claim and dismissed the case. The Sixth Circuit reversed. No federal statute or rule says anything about the survivorship of section 1983 claims, but Crabbs’s action qualifies as a “cause[] of action for . . . injuries to the person” under the Ohio survivorship statute and, therefore, outlasts his death. . View "Crabbs v. Scott" on Justia Law

Crabbs, acquitted of voluntary manslaughter but subjected to a DNA swab before his release, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim alleging that the local police violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches. He died before the case could be resolved. Crabbs’s mother and the personal representative of his estate moved to substitute as a party. The district court found that Crabbs’s death extinguished his claim and dismissed the case. The Sixth Circuit reversed. No federal statute or rule says anything about the survivorship of section 1983 claims, but Crabbs’s action qualifies as a “cause[] of action for . . . injuries to the person” under the Ohio survivorship statute and, therefore, outlasts his death. . View "Crabbs v. Scott" on Justia Law

Lee pleaded guilty to three crimes in Tennessee state court, served his sentences, and was released from state custody in 1998. While serving time in federal prison for a subsequent crime, 20 years later, Lee sought permission to file a second 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition attacking his state convictions. The Sixth Circuit denied his motions. Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over Lee’s petition regardless of whether he can meet sections 2244(b)’s requirements. Section 2254(a), authorizing district courts to entertain state prisoners’ habeas petitions expressly limits their jurisdiction to petitions filed by persons “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Lee is no longer in custody, nor on supervised release, pursuant to the state judgment he seeks to attack. That Lee’s state convictions resulted in an enhanced federal sentence does not affect that analysis. View "In re: Lee" on Justia Law

Miller was sentenced to death for a 1981 murder. A psychiatrist who examined Miller twice found him competent to stand trial and opined that Miller was not insane at the time of the murder. The court denied Miller’s request to appoint a psychiatrist to assist at trial. His sentence was upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his section 2254 habeas petition, considering only the denial of state funds for an independent mental-health expert during the guilt phase of Miller’s trial and a challenge to the jury instructions. Seeking to revisit his ineffective-assistance claim, previously found to have been procedurally defaulted, under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez (2012) and Trevino (2013), Miller unsuccessfully moved for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b)(6). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Supreme Court rulings allow a prisoner to show cause to excuse an otherwise-defaulted ineffective assistance claim by presenting a substantial claim, showing that state law required him to bring that claim during an initial-review post-conviction proceeding, and showing that he received either no assistance or ineffective assistance during that initial state post-conviction proceeding. Given the uncertainty of establishing prejudice, his claim is not “unquestionably meritorious” and he has not presented a clear case of ineffective assistance that overcomes other relevant equitable factors, especially Miller’s lack of diligence in raising his Martinez claim. View "Miller v. Mays" on Justia Law

Downs pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. On August 2, 2010, the court orally pronounced a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, then the mandatory-minimum. The next day, the President signed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced to five the mandatory minimum sentence for Downs's crime. On August 16, 2010, the court entered judgment in Downs’s case. In 2012, the Supreme Court held that the Act applied to defendants sentenced after August 3, 2010. Downs moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that he was not “sentenced” until the district court entered its judgment. The district court and Sixth Circuit disagreed. The law uniformly treats the date of the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence as the date of sentencing. While his co-defendants had later hearings and were sentenced under the Act, a court needs” legal grounds, not just equitable ones,” to apply the Act. Downs’s counsel was not constitutionally incompetent; the Act said nothing about having any retroactive effect. District courts are generally bound by the sentences they orally pronounce, so a motion for reconsideration would have been futile, as would a direct appeal. View "Downs v. United States" on Justia Law

Stimmel tried to purchase a firearm at a Walmart store in 2002. The store rejected Stimmel’s offer because a mandatory national background check revealed that he had been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence in 1997. Stimmel has not been convicted of another crime. Federal law prohibits domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). He unsuccessfully appealed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and challenged the law in district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. The law survives intermediate scrutiny and does not unconstitutionally burden Stimmel’s Second Amendment rights. The court noted “the growing consensus of our sister circuits that have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the domestic violence misdemeanant restriction to firearms possession.” The record contains sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude that disarming domestic violence misdemeanants is substantially related to the government’s compelling interest of preventing gun violence and, particularly, domestic gun violence. View "Stimmel v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Ferndale Officer Jaklic stopped Latits for turning the wrong way onto a divided boulevard after midnight. Latits opened his glove box to retrieve his registration. Jaklic testified that he saw bags that he suspected to contain marijuana, which Latits attempted to move. A dashboard video shows that Jaklic pointed his gun at the ground for about 30 seconds, then pointed it, point-blank. Jaklic broadcast that he was pursuing a fleeing vehicle. Three officers joined the chase. Department policy prohibits more than two cars from pursuing a fleeing car without special permission. Latits can be seen steering away from Jaklic’s car in a vacant parking lot but Jaklic broadcast that Latits “tried to ram my vehicle,” Latits fled, entering a highway. The chase continued through two red lights in an uninhabited area. Officer Wurm twice collided with Latits’s car, causing Latits to lose control. Phillips rammed Latits’s car, which stopped, then slowly moved forward. Latits’s and Jaklic’s cars collided at low speed. Phillips ran toward Latits’s car from behind. Latits started reversing away with Phillips following; gunshots are heard on the recording. Phillips could see that no cars or persons were immediately behind Latits. Latits, struck by three bullets, died. Less than four minutes passed from Latits driving away from Jaklic until the shooting. Phillips violated multiple department procedures and was terminated. In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, the court granted Phillips summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Phillips’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment, but then-existing precedent did not clearly establish the objective unreasonableness under these circumstances; Phillips is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Latits v. Phillips" on Justia Law