Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Davis was engaged to Jennifer, who had an eight-month old son, Caine. Davis was not Caine’s father. On January 27, Davis was at Jennifer’s apartment. Caine was fussy. Davis grew frustrated and pushed Caine across the floor. Later, Jennifer left Davis to watch Caine. When she called to ask about Caine, Davis said that something was wrong. Chilton asked a friend to check on Caine. Her friend found Caine limp. His pulse was weak and erratic, his eyes were rolled back and he was not breathing. Caine was airlifted to Vanderbilt Medical Center where doctors found three complex skull fractures, massive internal bleeding, retinal bleeding in both eyes, and a torn membrane between the lip and the gums. Caine died. Davis insisted he had not dropped Caine and claimed to have no idea how he was injured. Outside a neighbor’s apartment, police found a bag containing a wet washcloth and Caine’s shirt. Davis admitted that he had used the rag to wipe blood out of Caine’s mouth. At trial, in contrast to his previous claims, Davis testified that he had dropped Caine accidentally. A medical expert testified that Caine’s injuries were consistent with that testimony; he eventually lost his medical license for misleading testimony in other trials. All of the doctors who had treated Caine testified that his death could not have been an accident. Following a mistrial, Davis was unable to find an expert willing to take the case. The jury convicted him of felony murder and aggravated child abuse. Davis exhausted state remedies The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his petition for federal habeas relief in which he argued ineffective assistance. View "Davis v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Keys was convicted in 2005 of second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery, and assault with the intent to rob while armed. Due in part to his “habitual offender” status, the Michigan state court sentenced Keys to life in prison for the murder and conspiracy charges and to 12 to 25 years of imprisonment for the assault charge (to be served concurrently). Following the exhaustion of his state-court remedies, Keys filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, rejecting arguments that the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to support convictions for second-degree murder and assault with the intent to rob while armed; that Keys’ due process rights were violated when the jury panel viewed him in shackles during voir dire; and that Keys’ counsel on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective for failing to fully investigate and raise the shackling claim. View "Keys v.Booker" on Justia Law

The facts are based on video footage and Officer Byrd’s deposition. Byrd was on bicycle patrol in Elsmere, Kentucky, at 1:00 a.m. A Finish Line Bar employee approached, concerned about a man (Godawa) in the parking lot. Godawa got into a vehicle and drove around the parking lot. Byrd approached and saw a beer in the cup holder. Godawa stated that his driver’s license was not with him; declined to take a sobriety test; provided identifying information; admitted that he had consumed alcohol; then agreed to a field sobriety test. Byrd went to his bicycle to request backup. Godawa started his vehicle and began to back out of the parking spot, hitting the bicycle. Byrd yelled “Stop” multiple times, and had his gun drawn as he ran to the front of Godawa’s car. Byrd and Godawa’s car apparently came into contact—how it happened is disputed. Byrd got up and ran alongside the vehicle before shooting through the rear passenger-side window, hitting Godawa. Godawa drove away, turned around, and drove back. Byrd was in the middle of Dixie Highway with his gun drawn. He observed that Godawa was “slumped over.” Godawa’s vehicle struck a utility pole. Godawa subsequently died from the gunshot wound. The court dismissed the estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Byrd was not entitled to qualified immunity. A genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding the circumstances of Byrd’s impact with Godawa’s vehicle; a reasonable juror could conclude that Byrd’s use of deadly force violated Godawa’s clearly established constitutional rights. View "Godawa v. Byrd" on Justia Law

Kindl’s breathalyzer test revealed a blood alcohol level of .053. She was arrested for violating a condition of probation that she refrain from alcohol use. The video recording of her booking shows Kindl stating that she “might have a little alcohol withdrawal.” Kindl was placed in cell one, which was subject to video (not sound) monitoring and direct visual observation by the front desk. After an uneventful afternoon, Kindl’s condition deteriorated. At 7:46 p.m., the video shows her body jerking dramatically in an apparent seizure. Around 8 p.m., Kindl tried to communicate with the officers. She knocked on the window four different times, repeatedly calling out. Kindl eventually spoke to two officers, stating that she had urinated on herself and that she was concerned about delirium tremens. According to the officers, she stated that she did not currently have symptoms. Kindl lay back down, intermittently experiencing convulsions, and calling out. At 11:53 p.m., she experienced a violent 40-second seizure. She did not move again. Six hours later, Kindl’s body was discovered. A pathologist determined that Kindl died of delirium tremens. Both officers testified that they were aware that alcohol withdrawal could be a serious condition, but that they never saw Kindl in physical distress. The court ruled that 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims of deliberate indifference, gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress could proceed against the officers, dismissed other claims, and denied the officers’ claims to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal, noting disputed facts. View "Kindl v. City of Berkley" on Justia Law

In 1993, Muslim inmates seized control of cellblock “L” at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, took guards hostage and locked inmates considered “snitches” into cells in the L–6 section. The Muslim inmates maintained control of unit L–6 while the Aryan Brotherhood and the Black Gangster Disciples controlled other units within L–Block. LaMar an SOCF inmate serving a sentence for a 1989 murder conviction, was not a Muslim, did not plan or participate in the prison takeover and was in the prison recreation yard when the riot began. LaMar and other inmates negotiated with the Muslim inmates and beat to death five inmates, identified as “snitches,” in exchange for access to the yard. Convicted, LaMar received death sentences for four of the killings and a life sentence for the fifth. After exhausting state remedies, LaMar’s federal habeas petition was rejected. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the state withheld favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland; that the state trial court denied LaMar due process by refusing to sever one count from the remaining charges; that there was insufficient evidence for one of the capital sentencing aggravators; and that he was denied due process by prosecutorial misconduct. View "LaMar v. Houk" on Justia Law

Three-month-old Jiyen was killed when 11 shots were fired into his home in a drive-by shooting. Prosecution witnesses testified to overhearing Drummond discussing a retribution for the death of a fellow gang member, seeing Drummond with an assault rifle 15 minutes before the fatal shots were fired, and to hearing Drummond say that “he didn’t meant [sic] to kill the baby.” A search of Drummond’s house yielded ammunition consistent with the shooting and items tying him to the gang. During trial, the court twice closed the courtroom, once stating that witnesses felt threatened by some of the spectators. A jury found Drummond guilty; the trial court sentenced Drummond to death. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed on direct appeal. State courts denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court granted habeas corpus, holding that the court violated Drummond’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed, but later reversed, distinguishing Supreme Court precedent that involved a full courtroom closure, while Drummond had a partial closing. For a partial closing, the court must balance the interests. The Ohio courts applied that principle reasonably, in the capacious sense of “reasonable” as used for purposes of the habeas statute. View "Drummond v. Houk" on Justia Law

Anderson’s daughter, C.A., suffers from disabilities that affect her ability to walk and balance independently. A miniature horse enables her to play and get exercise in her backyard without adult assistance. Anderson first acquired a horse in 2010. In 2013, the city passed an ordinance banning horses from residential property and prosecuted Anderson for violating it. Anderson claimed that the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601, entitle her to keep the horse as C.A.'s service animal. The Hamilton County Municipal Court found Anderson guilty. Anderson sued. The district court granted the city summary judgment, finding Anderson’s claims barred by claim and issue preclusion stemming from her Municipal Court conviction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because fact-finding procedures available in a municipal court criminal proceeding differ substantially from those available in a civil proceeding, Anderson’s conviction has no preclusive effect on this lawsuit. While there is no evidence that the city’s actions were motivated by discriminatory intent against C.A. or had a disparate impact on disabled individuals, there are significant factual disputes regarding whether the ADA or FHAA require the city to permit Anderson to keep her miniature horse at her house. View "Anderson v. City of Blue Ash" on Justia Law

Clay, diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, spoke on the phone with his caseworker, who called Hazel Park Police to report that Clay told her he planned to commit suicide and that Clay had attempted suicide in the past and had been repeatedly hospitalized. Officer Emmi and paramedics were dispatched. Clay was found hiding in a minivan in the driveway. He got into the ambulance voluntarily and walked to the emergency department and was placed in a curtained-off area without handcuffs and without incident. Clay would not put on the hospital gown. He was taken to the floor and handcuffed. At some point Emmi used his Taser on Clay’s back, Clay was lifted and restrained to a hospital bed. He tested positive for cocaine and marijuana. Emmi claims that Clay tried to leave after being told to put the gown on, that he was “flailing,” and was placed in restraints only after Emmi warned him that a Taser would be applied. In Clay’s action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the Fourth Amendment applied because the force was used in the context of a seizure, and that Emmi was not entitled to qualified immunity because there was a genuine dispute of material fact about the amount of force used. View "Clay v. Emmi" on Justia Law

The American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan sent letters enclosed in sealed envelopes to 25 inmates at the Livingston County Jail that were marked “Legal Mail,” included the name and bar number of a Michigan attorney, and offered legal assistance regarding the Jail’s mail policy. The Jail’s written mail policy requires that all mail except “bona-fide legal mail” must be on 4x6 inch postcards; “legal mail,” on the other hand, may be sent in a sealed envelope and is generally not opened outside the inmate’s presence. The Jail did not deliver the ACLU’s letters to the inmates, nor did the Jail inform the ACLU or the inmates that the mail was not delivered. The ACLU filed suit, arguing that the Jail’s policies violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and obtained a preliminary injunction, requiring the Defendants to deliver the letters. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Jail’s argument that legal mail does not include mail from an attorney if the mail neither contains privileged content nor implicates an attorney-client relationship. View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Livingston Cnty." on Justia Law

DiLuzio, owned Yorkville buildings that burned under suspicious circumstances. Fire Chief Klubert led the firefighting and coordinated with Mayor DiFilippo on a decision to demolish part of a building immediately, without inspection or formal decision. Klubert and DiFilippo ordered Officer Davis to find DiLuzio and bring him to a meeting. At that meeting, DiLuzio insisted the buildings could be repaired. DiFilippo ordered Nemeth to demolish most of the south building, but left part intact, even though it had suffered the worst damage. Days later, Police Chief Morelli (on orders from DiFilippo) approached DiLuzio’s son with a low-ball offer from an anonymous investor, to purchase the property “as is.” DiLuzio declined. Morelli approached DiLuzio with another offer months later. DiLuzio declined again. Morelli, Klubert, and DiFilippo began to issue citations, threatening $600 per day fines. The Village dismissed the first citation, which included false statements about inspections and authorizations. Morelli falsified a State Fire Marshall citation threatening $1,000 per day fines. The Village then passed a criminal ordinance concerning unkempt properties. Morelli charged DiLuzio, falsely notarizing his own signature. DiLuzio filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.summary judgment for defendants on some claims, but denied qualified immunity to DiFilippo and Klubert on the due process claim concerning demolition; to Morelli and Davis on substantive due process claims; and to Nemeth because he was not a state actor. View "DiLuzio v. Village of Yorkville" on Justia Law