Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sunrise operates group homes, places children in foster care, and provides related services for the State of Kentucky, which provides 65% of Sunrise’s revenue. Sunrise describes its mission as “to extend the grace and hope of our loving God to the young people in our care by meeting their physical, emotional and spiritual needs.” Some young people alleged that Sunrise pressured them to become practicing Christians. In 2000, plaintiffs sued, alleging that Kentucky had violated the Establishment Clause by paying Sunrise for services provided to children in state custody. In 2013, the plaintiffs and Kentucky—but not Sunrise—agreed to a settlement that singled out Sunrise for monitoring by the ACLU and the Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Sunrise objected, arguing that it was entitled to a merits adjudication. Over Sunrise’s objection, the district court dismissed the Establishment Clause claim, incorporated the settlement into its dismissal order, and retained jurisdiction to enforce that order. The court held that its dismissal was not a consent decree, notwithstanding its incorporation of the settlement agreement, so that Sunrise could not object to the entry. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of whether the settlement agreement is fair to Sunrise. View "Pedreira v. Sunrise Children's Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

During a 1994 attack on his neighbors, Morris shot and killed the husband, beat and stabbed a teen-aged cousin and raped the wife, who survived. The gun was found underneath Morris’s dresser drawer. After waiving his constitutional rights, Morris gave a statement that on the day of the offense he had purchased and smoked $250 worth of cocaine, had an argument with the husband, waited with his gun, entered the house, shot husband, stabbed cousin, and raped wife. The defense focused on Morris’s history as a good student and employee and his deterioration due to drug use. The jury imposed a death sentence for the cousin’s murder and a sentence life without parole for the husband’s murder. The court imposed a consecutive 25-year sentence for the aggravated rape conviction. After exhausting state remedies, Morris sought federal habeas relief. The district court granted the petition in part, vacating his death sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Morris’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilt phase, but vacated the grant of relief on Morris’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The conclusion of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals that counsel’s performance was not deficient was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. View "Morris v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Fans of the musical group Insane Clown Posse, who call themselves “Juggalos,” frequently display, on person or property, insignia representative of the band. In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center—an informational center operating under the Federal Bureau of Investigation—released a congressionally-mandated report on gang activity that included a section on Juggalos. The report identified Juggalos as a “hybrid gang” and relayed information about criminal activity committed by Juggalo subsets. Juggalos allege that they subsequently suffered violations of their First and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights at the hands of state and local law enforcement officers who were motivated to commit the injuries in question due to the identification of Juggalos as a criminal gang. They filed suit against the Department of Justice and FBI under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The SIxth Circuit reversed dismissal for lack of standing. The Juggalos sufficiently alleged that the reputational harm and chill was caused by the 2011 Report and, where reputational harm and chill will likely be alleviated by the relief sought, redressability exists. View "Parsons v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

In 2004, Akron administered promotional examinations for firefighters for the ranks of Lieutenant and Captain. Akron firefighters who took the examinations, but were not promoted, filed suit, alleging that the promotional process disparately impacted firefighters over the age of 40 in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and Ohio Revised Code 4112.02, .14, and .99 and that the Lieutenant promotional process adversely impacted African-American applicants, and the Captain promotional process adversely impacted Caucasian candidates in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e., and Ohio Revised Code 4112.02(A). A jury found that the two promotional processes adversely impacted applicants over the age of 40, and that the exams and promotional processes were not justified by business necessity. The district court entered an award of back pay of $616,217.75, entered a permanent injunction, and appointed a court monitor. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the liability judgment, reversed the back-pay award, remanded for reassignment to a different district judge and a new trial on the issue of back pay, and modified the order to limit the court monitor’s involvement to one promotional cycle. View "Howe v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

Approximately 60 Grand Traverse County officers converged on Carlson’s house after calls from family members indicated that Carlson, who was armed, was alone in his house, threatening suicide. Hours after their last contact with Carlson, officers broke windows and flooded the house with tear gas, which did not drive Carlson out as intended. Carlson finally reacted, hours later, by shouting and threatening officers in his yard. A sniper, who believed Carlson was preparing to shoot an officer, shot through a window, killing Carlson. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court granted summary judgment to the county and the officers in charge of the operation, who did not seek a warrant to attack Carlson’s house or seize him inside. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The evidence suggested that in the split second of their choosing and without a warrant, the team decided to end hours of tense, quiet waiting by taking the precise action that Carlson described as “the start of the war.” A jury could find the totality of the circumstances made this unreasonable, not just in hindsight, but from the perspective of any reasonable person responsible for rendering aid to an armed and obviously emotionally disturbed person.The court did not grant summary judgment to the sniper, but the Sixth Circuit affirmed a verdict in his favor. View "Carlson v. Fewins" on Justia Law

In 1991 Charlene filed a paternity suit naming McCarley as the father of her younger son. McCarley stated that he would kill Charlene before paying support. In January 1992 a neighbor found Charlene dead, with a strap around her neck. Charlene’s children were at home. Three-year-old D.P. repeatedly looked at uniformed officers and stated: “It was him. He hurt mommy.” Days later, in the presence of Charlene’s mother, D.P. stated “Policeman hit my mommy.” A child psychologist elicited similar statements. In 1995, officers made a surprise visit to McCarley’s home on an unrelated matter. In his garage, they saw a deputy sheriff’s jacket and cap; remembering D.P.’s statements, they confiscated the items. After a second trial in 2007, McCarley was convicted for aggravated murder. The district court denied habeas relief, finding “harmless error” in the Ohio court’s unreasonable application of clearly established Sixth Amendment law by allowing a psychologist to read into evidence the testimonial hearsay statements of a three-and-a-half year-old declarant, where the declarant was not subject to prior cross-examination. On remand for further consideration in light of the 2015 Supreme Court decisions, Davis v. Ayala and Kelly v. McCarley, the Sixth Circuit again reversed: even under the appropriate deferential standard of review, the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law and that error was not harmless. View "McCarley v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Jones committed armed robberies in Michigan. Glenn was his appointed attorney. By letter, Jones asked the court to appoint a different attorney, but never requested to represent himself. On the first morning of trial, Jones explained that he was unhappy with his attorney. The court disagreed with Jones’s claim that Glenn was unprepared and denied Jones’s request to represent himself. Jones did not raise the issue again and, represented by counsel, appealed his convictions, unsuccessfully raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to call certain witnesses), insufficiency of the evidence, and cruel and unusual punishment. He did not raise the self-representation issue. Jones then sought relief from judgment, arguing deprivation of: the right to represent himself; effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and due process. The trial court denied Jones’s motion, holding that Jones’s self-representation claim lacked merit, and that Jones could not establish “actual prejudice” to excuse his procedural default. Jones then sought federal habeas relief. The district court held that denial of Jones’s request to represent himself satisfied 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) as an unreasonable application of Faretta and that appellate counsel’s failure to raise the Faretta issue gave Jones “cause” and “prejudice” to excuse procedural default. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Jones cannot get around the procedural default, nor would he prevail on the merits. View "Jones v. Bell" on Justia Law

In 1993, the Patereks, owners of PME, an injection molding company, relocated the business from Macomb County to the Village Armada, after purchasing a former high school auto shop. The Planning Commission issued the required Special Approval Land Use permit (SALU) with restrictions. Over the following years, the Patereks were occasionally in violation of the SALU, obtained modifications, and expanded the business. Paterek became involved in local government and was sometimes at odds with other local politicians, including a planning commissioner. Patereks ultimately filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, after the village declined perform inspections and to issue a certificate of occupancy for a 2013 expansion. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that a jury could reasonably find that defendants retaliated against Patereks for having complained about officials, in violation of the First Amendment; that defendants arbitrarily and capriciously ticketed Patereks, in violation of substantive due process; that defendants, due to their animus against Patereks, subjected PME to disparate treatment, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and that the district court erroneously denied Patereks’ civil contempt motion. View "Paterek v. Village of Armada" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury of an unknown racial composition convicted Ambrose of armed robbery, carjacking, and felony-firearm possession. At jury selection, Ambrose did not object to the racial composition of the venire. In 2002, after Ambrose had exhausted direct appeals, the Grand Rapids Press published a story about a computer glitch in Kent County that had systematically excluded African-Americans from the jury pool for several months. Following these revelations, Ambrose unsuccessfully moved for state post-conviction relief, alleging that his Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section right had been violated. Ambrose then filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, which the district court conditionally granted. The Sixth Circuit remanded for determination of whether there was actual prejudice. The district court subsequently found that Ambrose had sufficiently demonstrated actual prejudice to excuse his procedural default and had established a prima facie violation of his fair-cross-section right. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Ambrose failed to show actual prejudice. “The question is not whether the petitioner missed his chance to stand trial before a more merciful jury panel or a panel with a particular racial balance, but rather whether there is a reasonable probability that a different jury would have reached a different result.” His argument “sounds much like the stereotyping arguments courts have sought to avoid,” View "Ambrose v. Booker" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury convicted Garcia-Dorantes of murder in the second degree and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than the crime of murder. Before his trial started, Garcia-Dorantes failed to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the racial composition of the jury venire. In 2002, the Grand Rapids Press published a story about a computer glitch in the Kent County software that had systematically excluded African-Americans from the jury pool from April 2001 through early 2002. As a result of the article, Garcia-Dorantes included a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claim in his direct appeal, which the state courts denied as procedurally defaulted due to his failure to object to the composition of the jury venire at trial. Garcia-Dorantes then filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The district court found that Garcia-Dorantes had sufficiently demonstrated cause and actual prejudice to excuse his procedural default and had established a prima facie violation of his Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section right. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Garcia-Dorantes v. Warren" on Justia Law