Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007, a jury convicted Etherton of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. After exhausting both direct and collateral appellate review procedures in Michigan, Etherton timely filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court denied Etherton’s petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and ordered issuance of a writ. Certain claims had been procedurally defaulted: that the anonymous tip presented at trial denied Etherton’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment; that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a witness during closing argument; and that Etherton’s counsel’s failure to object to the anonymous tip, as well as other alleged shortcomings, amounted to prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel. Etherton is entitled to review based on ineffective appellate counsel. Appellate counsel failed to argue that failing to object to the anonymous tip constituted ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because there was a Confrontation Clause violation that resulted in substantial prejudice, there is a reasonable probability that Michigan appellate courts would have found trial counsel constitutionally ineffective. The failure to include that argument was, therefore, prejudicial, and amounted to deficient performance of appellate counsel. It was an unreasonable application of federal law to hold otherwise. View "Etherton v. Rivard" on Justia Law

In 2006, Shelton pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. His conviction became final in 2009, and four years later he moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that the 2013 Supreme Court holding, Descamps v. United States, made his sentence invalid. The government did not file a response. Without notifying Shelton or asking him to show cause, the district court on its own initiative dismissed the motion as untimely. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Before acting on its own initiative, a district court “must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.” The district court dismissed Shelton’s motion at the Rule 4(b) “screening” stage of the section 2255 proceedings, before the government had filed any response, but the notice requirement applies to section 2254 petitions and section 2255 motions and to sua sponte dismissals that occur during the Rule 4 screening process. View "Shelton v. United States" on Justia Law

Federal law generally bars both state-convicted and federally-convicted felons from possessing firearms, unless their civil rights have been “restored” under the law of the convicting jurisdiction. Congress has rendered inoperative the federal statutory provision directly addressing the lifting of the firearms disability based on a felony conviction. Walker, a federal felon residing in Tennessee, asserted that his Tennessee restoration of rights, in conjunction with federal statutory and constitutional provisions, leads to the conclusion that federal law has restored his rights sufficient to lift the disability. Walker argued that the relevant civil rights for firearm-disability-lifting purposes were the right to vote, the right to serve on a jury, and the right to hold government office. When these rights are restored at the state level, he argued, federal law in various ways permits the exercise of the same three civil rights at the federal level, thus meeting the federal statutory standard. The district court and Sixth Circuit rejected the argument, stating that neither Walker’s right to vote nor his right to seek and hold public office have been restored under federal law; those rights were subject to state law. View "Walker v. United States" on Justia Law

Ohio state inmate Jackson continually violated the terms of his parole. Facing up to 26 years behind bars, he filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition in 2013. Jackson filed two more habeas petitions in 2015, but the district court classified them as second or successive and transferred them to the Sixth Circuit. Jackson filed unsuccessful “motion[s] for relief from” the judgments asking the district court to reconsider the transfer orders. The Sixth Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss, noting that Jackson appealed the denial of his motion for relief from the transfer order, not the transfer order itself. .When a district court transfers a second-or-successive habeas petition, the case travels from one court to another, so that the transferring court loses jurisdiction and the other court gains The district court lost jurisdiction over Jackson’s habeas petitions when each petition was physically transferred to the Sixth Circuit, so it lacked jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s motions. View "Jackson v. Sloan" on Justia Law

While Holland was in custody for a parole violation, detectives interviewed Holland about criminal sexual assaults that had occurred in the area. Holland asserted his right to an attorney and the interview ceased. Six days after Holland had requested an attorney—and before one had been provided—police again met with Holland, to discuss the 1991 murder of Lisa Shaw. Holland was to serve as the key prosecution witness at that murder trial, which was scheduled to begin in February 2006. After Holland changed his story regarding Shaw’s murder—a shift that effectively placed him at the scene of the crime—police asked a polygraph examiner to interview Holland. The examiner was instructed to ask only about Shaw’s murder, and nothing else, and to focus on obtaining a witness statement. During the interview, however, Holland confessed that he had killed Shaw and committed several additional crimes. Holland’s statements led to six separate state convictions, all of which employed Holland’s confessions as critical state’s evidence. On federal habeas review, the district court ruled that the confessions were admissible because Holland was not in “Miranda custody” during the January 2006 interviews, and that Holland’s statements were made voluntarily. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, also agreeing that any violation of Holland’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was harmless. View "Holland v. Rivard" on Justia Law

Police received a report of a passenger repeatedly striking a female driver on 1-94, with a license plate number. Officers initiated a traffic stop, handcuffed passenger Baynes, and placed him in the patrol vehicle, without incident. The officer claims that he checked the handcuffs to ensure they were not too tight. The driver, Baynes’ girlfriend, eventually admitted that Baynes had hit her. The officers observed a long bruise on her right arm and transported Baynes seven miles to the Macomb County Jail. The time it took is unclear. Baynes testified that he complained that the handcuffs were too tight. Following his release Baynes was diagnosed with “bilateral radial sensory neuropathy from handcuffs.” The deputies acknowledged knowing that right handcuffs could cause nerve damage. Baynes testified that he takes 15 medications for other issues, that told the intake officer that he needed medication, and that he told people he was having difficulty breathing. Baynes later learned that there was mold in the jail. Baynes claimed that his “condition worsened,” after his jail stay. Baynes submitted blood tests, showing abnormal levels of mold. The court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for Baynes’ claim of excessive force. Baynes’ claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need was insufficient to withstand summary judgment. View "Baynes v. Cleland" on Justia Law

His family was told that Benton, a pretrial detainee, died of natural causes in the Lucas County jail in 2004. In 2008, after an FBI investigation, family members discovered that jail employees had disconnected medical equipment while returning him from the hospital after treatment for seizures, beat Benton and sprayed him with chemicals, shoved Benton to a cement floor while he was in handcuffs, held him in a chokehold to the point of unconsciousness, left him to die in his cell, and then engaged in a cover-up with the aid of their Sheriff and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The civil suit was stayed while two officers were criminally prosecuted for their roles in Benton’s death. Both were convicted and sentenced. The district court denied motions by Officer Schmeltz, Sergeant Gray, and Sheriff Telb, that asserted qualified and state statutory immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the need for “expeditious handling” and that even Telb ratified the conduct of his subordinates who violated Benton’s clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights. View "Coley v. Lucas Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2000, Davis was engaged to Jennifer, who had an eight-month old son, Caine. Davis was not Caine’s father. On January 27, Davis was at Jennifer’s apartment. Caine was fussy. Davis grew frustrated and pushed Caine across the floor. Later, Jennifer left Davis to watch Caine. When she called to ask about Caine, Davis said that something was wrong. Chilton asked a friend to check on Caine. Her friend found Caine limp. His pulse was weak and erratic, his eyes were rolled back and he was not breathing. Caine was airlifted to Vanderbilt Medical Center where doctors found three complex skull fractures, massive internal bleeding, retinal bleeding in both eyes, and a torn membrane between the lip and the gums. Caine died. Davis insisted he had not dropped Caine and claimed to have no idea how he was injured. Outside a neighbor’s apartment, police found a bag containing a wet washcloth and Caine’s shirt. Davis admitted that he had used the rag to wipe blood out of Caine’s mouth. At trial, in contrast to his previous claims, Davis testified that he had dropped Caine accidentally. A medical expert testified that Caine’s injuries were consistent with that testimony; he eventually lost his medical license for misleading testimony in other trials. All of the doctors who had treated Caine testified that his death could not have been an accident. Following a mistrial, Davis was unable to find an expert willing to take the case. The jury convicted him of felony murder and aggravated child abuse. Davis exhausted state remedies The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his petition for federal habeas relief in which he argued ineffective assistance. View "Davis v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Keys was convicted in 2005 of second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery, and assault with the intent to rob while armed. Due in part to his “habitual offender” status, the Michigan state court sentenced Keys to life in prison for the murder and conspiracy charges and to 12 to 25 years of imprisonment for the assault charge (to be served concurrently). Following the exhaustion of his state-court remedies, Keys filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, rejecting arguments that the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to support convictions for second-degree murder and assault with the intent to rob while armed; that Keys’ due process rights were violated when the jury panel viewed him in shackles during voir dire; and that Keys’ counsel on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective for failing to fully investigate and raise the shackling claim. View "Keys v.Booker" on Justia Law

The facts are based on video footage and Officer Byrd’s deposition. Byrd was on bicycle patrol in Elsmere, Kentucky, at 1:00 a.m. A Finish Line Bar employee approached, concerned about a man (Godawa) in the parking lot. Godawa got into a vehicle and drove around the parking lot. Byrd approached and saw a beer in the cup holder. Godawa stated that his driver’s license was not with him; declined to take a sobriety test; provided identifying information; admitted that he had consumed alcohol; then agreed to a field sobriety test. Byrd went to his bicycle to request backup. Godawa started his vehicle and began to back out of the parking spot, hitting the bicycle. Byrd yelled “Stop” multiple times, and had his gun drawn as he ran to the front of Godawa’s car. Byrd and Godawa’s car apparently came into contact—how it happened is disputed. Byrd got up and ran alongside the vehicle before shooting through the rear passenger-side window, hitting Godawa. Godawa drove away, turned around, and drove back. Byrd was in the middle of Dixie Highway with his gun drawn. He observed that Godawa was “slumped over.” Godawa’s vehicle struck a utility pole. Godawa subsequently died from the gunshot wound. The court dismissed the estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Byrd was not entitled to qualified immunity. A genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding the circumstances of Byrd’s impact with Godawa’s vehicle; a reasonable juror could conclude that Byrd’s use of deadly force violated Godawa’s clearly established constitutional rights. View "Godawa v. Byrd" on Justia Law