Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A train operated by Norfolk Southern carrying hazardous materials derailed near East Palestine, Ohio, in February 2023. The cleanup released toxic chemicals into the surrounding area, prompting affected residents and businesses to file suit against the railroad and other parties in federal court. These cases were consolidated into a master class action, and after extensive discovery and mediation, Norfolk Southern agreed to a $600 million settlement for the class. The district court for the Northern District of Ohio approved the settlement in September 2024. Five class members objected and appealed, but the district court required them to post an $850,000 appeal bond by January 30, 2025, to cover administrative and taxable costs. The objectors did not pay the bond or offer a lesser amount.After the bond order, the objectors filed a motion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to eliminate or reduce the bond, but did not seek a stay. The Sixth Circuit motions panel explained that, absent a separate notice of appeal, it could only address the bond on a motion to stay, which the objectors expressly disclaimed. The objectors then moved in the district court to extend the time to appeal the bond order, but did so one day after the deadline set by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(A). The district court denied the motion as untimely, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the deadlines for appealing and requesting extensions are jurisdictional and cannot be equitably extended. The court dismissed the objectors’ appeal of the motion to extend for lack of jurisdiction and granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the objectors’ appeals of the settlement for failure to pay the required bond. View "In re E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

A Tennessee resident insured by State Farm had her vehicle declared a total loss after an accident. State Farm calculated the payout for her claim using a valuation method provided by Audatex, which included a “Typical Negotiation Adjustment” (TNA) that reduced the value based on the assumption that used cars typically sell for less than their advertised price. The plaintiff argued that this adjustment did not reflect actual market practices and unfairly reduced the payout, constituting a breach of contract and a violation of Tennessee law. She filed a class action on behalf of similarly situated State Farm policyholders in Tennessee who received payouts calculated with the TNA.After the plaintiff filed suit in Tennessee state court, State Farm removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The district court denied State Farm’s initial summary judgment motion but enforced the policy’s appraisal provision, leading to an appraisal process in which the plaintiff ultimately received a higher payout. State Farm then argued that the plaintiff’s claims were moot or lacked standing because she had been paid the appraised value, but the district court rejected this argument, finding her claims for breach of contract and consequential damages survived. The district court certified a class of Tennessee policyholders who received payouts reduced by the TNA, finding the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 were met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the class certification. The court held that the plaintiff had standing to pursue her claims and that the class satisfied the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, superiority, and ascertainability. The court distinguished its approach from other circuits, emphasizing that common questions about the propriety of the TNA predominated over individualized damages issues. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order certifying the class and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clippinger v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Two students at a private college in Michigan alleged that they were sexually assaulted by fellow students—one incident occurring in an on-campus dormitory and the other in an off-campus apartment. Both students reported the assaults to college officials, who initiated investigations led by outside lawyers. The students claimed that the college’s response was inadequate: one student’s assailant received no additional punishment due to a prior infraction, and the other’s assailant was disciplined but later allowed to rejoin the baseball team. Both students experienced emotional distress and academic or personal setbacks following the incidents.The students filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, asserting state-law claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sex discrimination under Michigan’s civil rights statute, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class. The district court granted the college’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to support any of their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that Michigan law does not impose a general duty on colleges to protect students from criminal acts by third parties, absent a special relationship or foreseeability of imminent harm to identifiable individuals, neither of which was present here. The court also found that the alleged conduct by the college did not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous” required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing either disparate treatment or disparate impact based on sex under Michigan’s civil rights law. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims. View "Chen v. Hillsdale College" on Justia Law

Between 2017 and 2020, a major energy company and its senior executives allegedly orchestrated a large-scale bribery scheme, funneling approximately $60 million to key Ohio political figures and regulators through a network of shell companies and political action committees. In exchange, the company secured favorable legislation (Ohio House Bill 6), which provided substantial financial benefits, including a $2 billion bailout for its nuclear power plants. The scheme was concealed from shareholders and the public, with the company issuing public statements and regulatory filings that failed to disclose the true nature and risks of its political activities. When the bribery was exposed in 2020, the company’s stock and debt securities plummeted, resulting in significant losses for investors.After the scheme was revealed, investors filed multiple class actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which were consolidated. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, specifically section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, claiming that the company and its executives made material misstatements and omissions that artificially inflated the value of its securities. The district court denied motions to dismiss and later certified a class of investors, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, and that their damages methodology satisfied the predominance requirement for class certification.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the class certification order. The court held that the district court erred in applying the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance because the case was primarily based on misrepresentations, not omissions. The Sixth Circuit established a framework for distinguishing between omission- and misrepresentation-based cases and clarified that the Affiliated Ute presumption applies only if a case is primarily based on omissions. The court also found that the district court failed to conduct the required “rigorous analysis” of the plaintiffs’ damages methodology under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. The Sixth Circuit vacated the class certification order to the extent it relied on the Affiliated Ute presumption and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Owens v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Several individuals from five different states purchased ovens with front-mounted burner knobs manufactured by a major appliance company. They allege that these ovens have a defect causing the stovetop burners to turn on unintentionally, sometimes resulting in gas leaks. The plaintiffs claim they were unaware of this defect at the time of purchase, but that the manufacturer had prior knowledge of the issue through consumer complaints sent to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and reviews posted on the company’s website. The plaintiffs assert that, had they known about the defect, they would have paid less for the ovens or not purchased them at all.The plaintiffs filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, alleging violations of federal warranty law, fraud by omission, breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and violations of state consumer protection statutes. The district court found that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, as they alleged a concrete injury, but dismissed all claims for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their state common law fraud and statutory consumer protection claims, while the manufacturer argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because they plausibly alleged economic injury from overpaying for a defective product. The court further held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged the manufacturer’s knowledge of the defect and its safety risks, particularly because the CPSC had sent incident reports directly to the manufacturer. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of most state law fraud and consumer protection claims, except for the Illinois common law fraud claim, which failed for lack of a duty to disclose under Illinois law. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Tapply v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this multi-district products liability suit allege that they purchased defective Chrysler Pacifica minivans from FCA, which were recalled due to a risk of battery explosions. After the recall, plaintiffs filed seven putative class action suits, which were consolidated in the Eastern District of Michigan. During discovery, FCA discovered that some plaintiffs had agreed to arbitration clauses when purchasing their minivans and moved to compel arbitration for those plaintiffs. The district court denied FCA’s motion, finding that FCA had waived its right to arbitrate by moving to dismiss the entire complaint.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied FCA’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that FCA had waived its right to arbitrate by engaging in litigation conduct inconsistent with that right, specifically by moving to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. The district court made this finding sua sponte, without the plaintiffs raising the issue of waiver.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that a party cannot waive its right to arbitration without knowledge of that right. The court found that FCA did not know about the arbitration clauses until it obtained the relevant purchase agreements through discovery. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the district court erred by raising the issue of waiver on its own, violating the principle of party presentation. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court’s decision was clearly erroneous and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Berzanskis v. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit filed by Albert Pickett, Jr., Keyonna Johnson, Jarome Montgomery, Odessa Parks, and Tiniya Shepherd against the City of Cleveland. The plaintiffs, all African American residents of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, allege that Cleveland Water's policy of placing water liens on properties for unpaid water bills disproportionately affects Black homeowners. The water liens, which accumulate penalties and interest, can lead to foreclosure and eviction. The plaintiffs claim that this policy violates the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Ohio Civil Rights Act (OCRA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, creating the "Water Lien Class" under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class includes all Black homeowners or residents in Cuyahoga County who have had a water lien placed on their property by Cleveland Water within the last two years. The district court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and that common questions of law and fact predominated over individual issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's certification order. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue their FHA claim on a disparate-impact theory. The court found that the common question of whether Cleveland's water lien policy disproportionately affects Black homeowners predominated over individual issues, satisfying Rule 23(b)(3). The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive and declaratory relief. The appellate court declined to address the merits of the plaintiffs' FHA claim, focusing solely on the class certification issues. View "Pickett v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Carvin Thomas and Terrell Lawrence, filed a class-action lawsuit against members of the Tennessee Board of Parole, alleging that the use of a computer test, STRONG-R, to determine parole eligibility violated their constitutional right to due process. They claimed that the test produced inaccurate results due to inadequate training of correctional employees and that the results were kept secret, preventing inmates from challenging them effectively. Both plaintiffs experienced changes in their STRONG-R scores without any new negative behavior, leading to parole denials based on these scores.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed the complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The court found that Tennessee’s parole statutes do not confer a protected liberty interest in parole, as they do not create a legitimate expectation of parole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Tennessee’s parole statutes do not sufficiently constrain the Board’s discretion to deny parole, thus not creating a constitutionally recognized entitlement to parole. The court noted that while the plaintiffs identified serious issues with the STRONG-R test, the lack of a protected liberty interest in parole precluded their due process claims. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. View "Thomas v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

A publicly traded company, CoreCivic, which operates private prisons, faced scrutiny after the Bureau of Prisons raised safety and security concerns about its facilities. Following a report by the Department of Justice's Inspector General highlighting higher rates of violence and other issues in CoreCivic's prisons compared to federal ones, the Deputy Attorney General recommended reducing the use of private prisons. This led to a significant drop in CoreCivic's stock price and a subsequent shareholder class action lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, early in the litigation, issued a protective order allowing parties to designate discovery materials as "confidential." This led to many documents being filed under seal. The Nashville Banner intervened, seeking to unseal these documents, but the district court largely maintained the seals, including on 24 deposition transcripts, without providing specific reasons for the nondisclosure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court emphasized the strong presumption of public access to judicial records and the requirement for compelling reasons to justify sealing them. The court found that the district court had not provided specific findings to support the seals and had not narrowly tailored the seals to serve any compelling reasons. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order regarding the deposition transcripts and remanded the case for a prompt decision in accordance with its precedents, requiring the district court to determine if any parts of the transcripts meet the requirements for a seal within 60 days. View "Grae v. Corrections Corp. of Am." on Justia Law

Michael Salazar filed a class action lawsuit against Paramount Global, alleging a violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). Salazar claimed that he subscribed to a 247Sports e-newsletter and watched videos on 247Sports.com while logged into his Facebook account. He alleged that Paramount had installed Facebook’s tracking Pixel on 247Sports.com, which enabled Paramount to track and disclose his video viewing history to Facebook without his consent.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Salazar’s complaint. The court found that Salazar had standing because the alleged disclosure of his video viewing history to Facebook constituted a concrete injury. However, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under the VPPA, concluding that Salazar was not a “consumer” under the Act. The court reasoned that Salazar’s subscription to the 247Sports e-newsletter did not qualify him as a “consumer” because the newsletter was not “audio visual materials.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit agreed that Salazar had standing but held that he did not plausibly allege that he was a “consumer” under the VPPA. The court interpreted the term “goods or services” in the context of the VPPA to mean audio-visual materials, and since Salazar’s newsletter subscription did not involve audio-visual materials, he was not a “consumer” under the Act. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice, as Salazar had not filed a formal motion to amend his complaint. View "Salazar v. Paramount Global" on Justia Law