Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A publicly traded company, CoreCivic, which operates private prisons, faced scrutiny after the Bureau of Prisons raised safety and security concerns about its facilities. Following a report by the Department of Justice's Inspector General highlighting higher rates of violence and other issues in CoreCivic's prisons compared to federal ones, the Deputy Attorney General recommended reducing the use of private prisons. This led to a significant drop in CoreCivic's stock price and a subsequent shareholder class action lawsuit.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, early in the litigation, issued a protective order allowing parties to designate discovery materials as "confidential." This led to many documents being filed under seal. The Nashville Banner intervened, seeking to unseal these documents, but the district court largely maintained the seals, including on 24 deposition transcripts, without providing specific reasons for the nondisclosure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court emphasized the strong presumption of public access to judicial records and the requirement for compelling reasons to justify sealing them. The court found that the district court had not provided specific findings to support the seals and had not narrowly tailored the seals to serve any compelling reasons. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order regarding the deposition transcripts and remanded the case for a prompt decision in accordance with its precedents, requiring the district court to determine if any parts of the transcripts meet the requirements for a seal within 60 days. View "Grae v. Corrections Corp. of Am." on Justia Law

Michael Salazar filed a class action lawsuit against Paramount Global, alleging a violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). Salazar claimed that he subscribed to a 247Sports e-newsletter and watched videos on 247Sports.com while logged into his Facebook account. He alleged that Paramount had installed Facebook’s tracking Pixel on 247Sports.com, which enabled Paramount to track and disclose his video viewing history to Facebook without his consent.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Salazar’s complaint. The court found that Salazar had standing because the alleged disclosure of his video viewing history to Facebook constituted a concrete injury. However, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under the VPPA, concluding that Salazar was not a “consumer” under the Act. The court reasoned that Salazar’s subscription to the 247Sports e-newsletter did not qualify him as a “consumer” because the newsletter was not “audio visual materials.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit agreed that Salazar had standing but held that he did not plausibly allege that he was a “consumer” under the VPPA. The court interpreted the term “goods or services” in the context of the VPPA to mean audio-visual materials, and since Salazar’s newsletter subscription did not involve audio-visual materials, he was not a “consumer” under the Act. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice, as Salazar had not filed a formal motion to amend his complaint. View "Salazar v. Paramount Global" on Justia Law

A certified class of Ohio landowners alleged that a Colorado-based mining company, Antero Resources Corporation, underpaid them $10 million in natural gas royalties. The landowners claimed that Antero improperly deducted costs for processing and fractionation from their royalties. Antero counterclaimed, seeking authority to deduct additional costs related to gathering, dehydrating, compressing, and transporting the unrefined natural gas. The district court certified the class, denied Antero's motion for summary judgment, granted the landowners' motion, and entered a final judgment after the parties stipulated damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the landowners, finding that Antero improperly deducted processing and fractionation costs from the royalties. The court determined that these costs were necessary to transform the gas into marketable form and thus could not be deducted under the lease agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Antero could not deduct the costs of processing and fractionation from the landowners' royalties. The court found that the lease agreement's Market Enhancement Clause allowed deductions only for costs that enhanced the value of already marketable products, not for costs required to make the products marketable. The court concluded that the gas products first became marketable after processing and fractionation, and thus, these costs were not deductible. The court also noted that the Fourth Circuit had reached a similar conclusion in a related case involving the same defendant and lease terms. View "The Grissoms, LLC v. Antero Resources Corp." on Justia Law

Lynwood Pickens worked for Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions from 2018 to 2019, inspecting pipes at a natural-gas export terminal in Texas. He was paid $100 per hour but was guaranteed a weekly salary of $800, equivalent to eight hours of work. For any hours worked beyond the initial eight, he received additional hourly compensation. Pickens regularly worked over 50 hours per week but did not receive overtime pay, as Hamilton-Ryker classified him as a salaried employee exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).Pickens sued Hamilton-Ryker in 2020, claiming he was a non-exempt hourly worker entitled to overtime pay. Fourteen coworkers joined the lawsuit. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment to Hamilton-Ryker, classifying Pickens as a salaried employee under the FLSA and dismissing the claims of his coworkers for not being "similarly situated."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Pickens was not paid on a salary basis as defined by the FLSA regulations. The court emphasized that a true salary must cover a regular workweek, not just a portion of it. Since Pickens' guaranteed pay only covered eight hours, not his usual 52-hour workweek, he did not meet the salary basis test. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the determination of the collective action status and the claims of Pickens' coworkers to the district court. View "Pickens v. Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions" on Justia Law

Gina Burt filed a lawsuit against Playtika, Ltd. and Playtika Holding Corporation in Tennessee state court, seeking to recover alleged gambling losses incurred by Tennessee residents who played Playtika’s online games. Burt's claim was based on Tennessee Code Ann. § 29-19-105, which allows recovery of gambling losses. Playtika removed the case to federal court, invoking jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and traditional diversity jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee remanded the case to state court. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because Burt’s suit was not a “class action” under CAFA, and the losses of the Tennessee players could not be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy requirement for traditional diversity jurisdiction. Playtika appealed the remand order under CAFA’s expedited removal appeal provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s remand order. The appellate court held that Burt lacked Article III standing to proceed in federal court because she did not allege that she personally suffered any gambling loss. The court found that Burt’s claim to recover losses on behalf of other Tennessee residents did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. Additionally, the court rejected Burt’s argument that she had standing under a qui tam theory, concluding that Tennessee Code Ann. § 29-19-105 is not a qui tam statute. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to remand the case to state court. View "Burt v. Playtika, Ltd." on Justia Law

Bradley Patton was arrested in Rutherford County, Tennessee, and charged with drug and firearm offenses. He posted bail multiple times, but his bail was eventually increased to $126,000. Under local rules, because his bail exceeded $75,000, he had to prove in a hearing that the bail money was not derived from criminal activities. Patton filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court, claiming that this local rule violated his due-process and Eighth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Patton's claims, ruling that they were moot because he had been released from pretrial custody and there was no ongoing harm. The court also found that Patton could not rely on the putative class's standing to preserve his claims and rejected his argument that the claims were capable of repetition yet evading review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Patton's claims fell within the "inherently transitory" exception to mootness for class-action claims. The court noted that pretrial detention is inherently temporary and that other class members would likely suffer the same injury. The court also found that the district court's decision to reserve the deadline for filing a motion for class certification meant that Patton should not be penalized for not filing such a motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Patton v. Fitzhugh" on Justia Law

A group of car owners from ten states sued Nissan, alleging that certain models equipped with automatic electronic braking systems had a defect causing "phantom activations" at inappropriate times, such as at railroad crossings or in parking garages. The plaintiffs claimed this defect breached warranties, constituted fraud, violated consumer protection statutes, and unjustly enriched Nissan. They sought to certify ten statewide classes of owners or lessees of the affected models.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee certified the ten classes under Civil Rule 23(b)(3), finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated common questions of law or fact. Nissan appealed, arguing that the classes did not meet the requirements for certification, particularly due to differences in the software updates that had been applied to the braking systems over time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court had not conducted a rigorous analysis of the commonality requirement. The appellate court noted that the district court failed to consider the material differences in the software updates and how these differences might affect the existence of a common defect. Additionally, the district court did not analyze the elements of each state law claim to determine whether they could be resolved with common answers.The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's certification of the classes and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court emphasized the need for a detailed examination of the elements of each claim and the impact of the software updates on the alleged defect. The court also held that the district court must perform a Daubert analysis to ensure the reliability of the plaintiffs' expert testimony, which was critical to establishing the commonality of the defect across the different models and software versions. View "IN RE: NISSAN NORTH AMERICA,INC. LITIGATION" on Justia Law

Wayne County foreclosed on Tonya Bowles's property to satisfy her tax debt and sold it, keeping the surplus proceeds. Bowles filed a § 1983 lawsuit against the county and its treasurer, seeking to recover the surplus and to certify a class of similarly affected former property owners. The district court certified the class without discovery, relying on a similar case's decision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan certified the class in 2022. However, subsequent legal developments, including decisions in Fox v. Saginaw County and other cases, highlighted the need for a rigorous analysis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. These decisions emphasized the necessity of proving, rather than merely alleging, compliance with Rule 23's requirements and questioned the manageability of class actions in takings cases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court did not conduct the required rigorous analysis of Rule 23's requirements. The court noted that the district court relied on an incomplete record and did not address several critical issues, such as the calculation of damages, potential unique defenses, and the role of third-party lienholders. Additionally, the court highlighted that Bowles's proposed class definition included claims for surplus equity, which are unmanageable in class actions and not permissible under recent case law.The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court instructed the district court to conduct a thorough analysis of Rule 23's requirements, considering recent legal developments and ensuring that Bowles can prove numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority. The court emphasized the need for a complete evidentiary record and a detailed forecast of how the litigation would proceed as a class action. View "Bowles v. Sabree" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs from twenty-six states sought class certification in their lawsuit against General Motors, LLC (GM) for alleged defects in the 8L45 and 8L90 transmissions of vehicles purchased between 2015 and 2019. Plaintiffs experienced "shudder" and shift quality issues that persisted despite repairs. GM argued that the class lacked standing and that individualized issues would predominate over common issues in the class-action suit.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan determined that the Plaintiffs had standing and could satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, thus certifying the class. GM appealed, claiming the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the Plaintiffs had standing, as they alleged overpayment for defective products, which suffices for Article III standing. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, as the common questions of law and fact predominated over individualized issues. The court addressed GM's arguments regarding state laws requiring manifest defects, reliance, causation, and merchantability, concluding that these issues did not preclude class certification. The court also held that GM had waived its right to arbitration by engaging in litigation and seeking dispositive rulings on the merits.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's class certification, allowing the class-action lawsuit against GM to proceed. View "Speerly v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a protective order issued by the district court, barring Visser and Associates, PLLC (“Visser”) from communicating with potential class members in a putative class action. The case originated from a claim by Wayside Church that Van Buren County had violated the federal Constitution’s Takings Clause by foreclosing on its property to satisfy a tax debt and then selling the property for a higher amount without refunding the difference. The case was revived in federal court following the Supreme Court's overruling of a previous decision that required such claims to be pursued in state court.The district court preliminarily approved a proposed class action settlement between the plaintiffs and defendant counties. Around the same time, Visser began sending solicitation letters to property owners who it thought might have takings claims against counties in the Western District of Michigan. The district court issued a show-cause order, finding that Visser’s solicitation letters did not cross the line from permissible solicitation to misleading, improper communication with potential class members. However, the court was not satisfied with Visser’s explanation for why it had sent solicitation letters to named plaintiffs who were already represented by class counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's protective order. The court found that Visser had violated ethical rules by soliciting named plaintiffs and misleading the court. The court also found that Visser had continued to solicit potential class members after the district court had preliminarily approved the class settlement. The court concluded that Visser's conduct posed a serious threat to the fairness of the litigation process and the administration of justice generally. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective order. View "Wayside Church v. Van Buren County" on Justia Law