Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs receive subsidies for providing home childcare services for low-income families. A union was established and authorized to bargain on their behalf, based on submission of 22,180 valid provider-signed authorization cards out of a possible 40,532 eligible providers. A collective bargaining agreement was executed; the state began deducting union dues and fees from subsidy payments. Plaintiffs filed a purported class-action lawsuit for the return of the money, alleging violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of the proposed class (all Michigan home childcare providers) based on conflict of interest: some members voted for representation and others voted against representation. Plaintiffs proposed a subclass of only providers who did not participate in any election related to union representation. The district court rejected the proposal, stating that it could not assume that all members of the subclass opposed representation and that, even if they did, their reasons were different enough to create conflict within the class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded for further consideration in light of its 2014 decision, Harris v. Quinn, that a similar agency fee provision violated the First Amendment as applied to homecare providers because the providers were not full-fledged state employees. The Court did not address class certification. On remand, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Harris did not affect its class certification decision and affirmed. View "Schlaud v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Berera worked at Mesa, a health care organization, as a nurse practitioner, 2011-2013. After Berera’s employment ended, she allegedly discovered that the wages on her W-2 did not reflect the wages that Mesa owed her. Berera sued in state court, asserting a class of current and former employees whom Mesa “forced to pay [Mesa’s] share of payroll taxes and other taxes and withholdings,” that this “forced payment resulted in the employees receiving less money than they earned,” and that Mesa paid employees “less than the wages and overtime compensation to which the employees were entitled.” The complaint contained no additional substantive allegations, but recited an unpaid wages claim under section 337.385 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and claims of conversion and negligence under Kentucky law. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. 3101–3128, which imposes a 7.65% tax on wages to fund Social Security and Medicare, requires parties seeking a refund to file a claim with the IRS before bringing a federal tax refund suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the purported state-law claims are truly FICA claims. View "Berera v. Mesa Med. Grp., PLLC" on Justia Law

Class representatives sued Kentucky real estate firms, alleging violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by participating in a horizontal conspiracy to fix commissions charged in Kentucky real estate transactions at an anti-competitive rate. The certified class consists of people who sold residential real estate in Kentucky from 2001 to 2005, and used the services of defendants. Several defendants settled. The district court entered summary judgment for remaining defendants, excluding the opinions of plaintiffs’ experts with respect to whether collusion among the defendants was the likely economic explanation of the pricing of commissions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that although the plaintiffs produced a good deal of circumstantial evidence that would support a theory of collusion, the conduct at issue was also consistent with permissible competition. View "Hyland v. HomeServices of America, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, in connection with a magnetic resonance imaging procedure (MRI), Decker received a dose of Omniscan, a gadoliniumbased contrast agent manufactured by GEHC. After taking Omniscan, Decker developed Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF). In 2012, the Deckers sued GEHC, as part of a multidistrict litigation (MDL). Before the Deckers’ case, hundreds of similar cases in the MDL involving GEHC had been settled. The Decker case was the first case in the MDL to go to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Deckers on a failure-to-warn claim, awarding $5 million in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court judge should have recused himself from the trial and a motion for a new trial; made several erroneous evidentiary rulings, which were applicable to all MDL cases; erroneously denied GEHC’s motion for a new trial because insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict regarding the causation element of the Deckers’ failure-to-warn claim; and erroneously failed to issue two proposed jury instructions. View "Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc." on Justia Law

KeHE, a Naperville food distributor, assigns each of its “sales representatives” several stores of large chain retailers. The representatives are responsible for stocking shelves at their assigned stores and for reordering merchandise when a store is low on any KeHE products. In 2012, KeHE discharged several representatives as part of restructuring. Four of them sued, claiming that KeHE had failed to pay them overtime wages required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and seeking to certify a collective action. KeHE argued that many of the discharged employees had waived their right to participate in a collective action in their separation agreements, and that they are exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA as “outside sales employees.” The district court upheld the validity of the waivers and certified a collective action consisting only of employees who had not signed or had modified their agreements. The district court then granted summary judgment for KeHE, holding that all of the plaintiffs were outside sales employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court erred with respect to the outside-sales-exemption issue and erred in excluding from the collective action those who had signed the waivers. View "Killion v. KeHE Distrib., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2006, American Copper & Brass received an unsolicited advertisement on one of its facsimile (fax) machines for a product sold by Lake City. The fax had been send by B2B, a “fax-blasting” company employed by Lake City. American filed suit, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227 and sought class-action certification under FRCP 23. B2B, brought in as a third party, failed to appear. The district court granted class certification and entered summary judgment in favor of American. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the approved class definition included individuals who lacked standing to assert TCPA claims, based on the “successfully sent” language in the statute and that the class was not objectively ascertainable. Rule 3.501(A)(5) of the Michigan Court Rules (MCR), which prohibits class actions in TCPA lawsuits, does not apply to TCPA suits in federal court. View "Am. Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Prods, Inc." on Justia Law

A purported class action alleged that Beachwood Hair Clinic violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, by disseminating more than 37,000 unsolicited fax advertisements in 2005 and 2006. Facing more than $18 million in statutory damages, Beachwood and its insurer, Acuity, agreed to a $4-million class settlement with the Ohio-based class representative, Siding. The settlement stipulated that separate litigation between Acuity and Siding would resolve a $2-million coverage dispute under Beachwood’s policy. Siding sought a declaratory judgment under Beachwood’s policy. The district court granted summary judgment to Acuity denying coverage. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that Siding did not establish diversity jurisdiction, which requires an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Unable to identify a singular interest exceeding $75,000 in the remaining $2-million coverage dispute, Siding sought to aggregate its interest with putative class members to satisfy that requirement, or to have the court consider the value of the policy dispute from Acuity’s perspective: $2 million. Acuity suggested ancillary jurisdiction via the settlement judgment in the underlying class action. The court rejected all arguments. View "Siding & Insulation Co. v. Acuity Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The flea-and-tick “spot-on products” at issue claim that their active ingredient works by topical application to a pet’s skin rather than through the pet’s bloodstream. According to the manufacturers, after the product is applied to one area, it disperses over the rest of the pet’s body within one day because it collects in the oil glands and natural oils spread the product over the surface of the pet’s skin and “wick” the product over the hair. The plaintiffs alleged false advertising based on statements that the products are self-dispersing and cover the entire surface of the pet’s body when applied in a single spot; that they are effective for one month and require monthly applications to continue to work; that they do not enter the bloodstream; and that they are waterproof and effective after shampooing, swimming, and exposure to rain or sunlight. The district court repeatedly referred to a one-issue case: whether the product covers the pet’s entire body with a single application. The case management order stated that the manufacturers would bear the initial burden to produce studies that substantiated their claims; the plaintiffs would then have to refute the studies, “or these cases will be dismissed.” The manufacturers objected. The plaintiffs argued that the plan would save time, effort, and money. The manufacturers submitted studies. The plaintiffs’ response included information provided by one plaintiff and his adolescent son and an independent examination of whether translocation occurred that detected the product’s active ingredient in a dog’s bloodstream. The district court concluded that the manufacturers’ studies substantiated their claims and denied all of plaintiffs’ discovery requests, except a request for consumer complaints, then granted the manufacturers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The doctrines of waiver and invited error precluded challenges to the case management plan. View "Simms v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Hilltop hired Huffman and others to review the files of mortgage loans originated by PNC Bank to determine whether lawful procedures were followed during foreclosure and other proceedings. Until the end of their employment in January 2013, they regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not compensated at the overtime rate because Hilltop classified them as independent contractors. Each employment relationship was governed by a now-expired contract, including an arbitration clause and a survival clause. The clauses listed in the survival clause correspond to ones detailing services essential to the job, the term of employment, compensation, termination, and confidentiality; it did not list the arbitration clause. The workers filed a purported class action. The district court denied Hilltop’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that omission of the arbitration clause from the survival clause constituted a “clear implication” that the parties intended the arbitration clause to expire with the agreement. Sixth Circuit precedent indicates that the parties must proceed in arbitration on an individual basis. View "Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC" on Justia Law

Crockett’s former law firm subscribed to a LexisNexis legal research plan that allowed unlimited access to certain databases for a flat fee. Subscribers could access other databases for an additional fee. According to Crockett, LexisNexis indicated that a warning sign would display before a subscriber used a database outside the plan. Years after subscribing, Crockett complained that his firm was being charged additional fees without any warning that it was using a database outside the Plan. LexisNexis insisted on payment of the additional fees. The firm dissolved. Crockett’s new firm entered into a LexisNexis subscription agreement, materially identical to the earlier plan; it contains an arbitration clause. Crockett filed an arbitration demand against LexisNexis on behalf of two putative classes. One class comprised law firms that were charged additional fees. The other comprised clients onto whom such fees were passed. The demand sought damages of more than $500 million. LexisNexis sought a federal court declaration that the agreement did not authorize class arbitration. The district court granted LexisNexis summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “The idea that the arbitration agreement … reflects the intent of anyone but LexisNexis is the purest legal fiction,” but the one-sided adhesive nature of the clause and the absence of a class-action right do not render it unenforceable. The court observed that Westlaw’s contract lacks any arbitration clause.View "Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett" on Justia Law