Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Class Action
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In 2007, Durand filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461 (ERISA) class action against her former employer and the pension plan it sponsors, challenging the projection rate used by the Plan to calculate the lump-sum payment Durand elected to receive after ending her employment at the Company in 2003. The Plan then used a 401(k)-style investment menu to determine the interest earned by members’ hypothetical accounts. Durand alleged that it impermissibly used the 30-year Treasury bond rate instead of the projected rate of return on her investment selections in the “whipsaw” calculation required under pre-2006 law. The Sixth CIrcuit reversed dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants then answered the complaint and raised defenses, including that the claims of putative class members “who received lump-sum distributions after December 31, 2003” were barred due to an amendment to the Plan that took effect after that date. Plaintiffs argued that the 2004 Amendment was an illegal reduction or “cutback” in benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the “cutback” claims were time-barred and did not relate back to the “whipsaw” claim asserted in the original class complaint. View "Durand v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc." on Justia Law

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Diageo distills and ages whiskey in Louisville, resulting in tons of ethanol emissions. Ethanol vapor wafts onto nearby property where the ethanol combines with condensation to propagate whiskey fungus. Ethanol emissions are regulated under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401. Plaintiffs complained to the air pollution control district, which issued a Notice of Violation, finding that Diageo caused and allowed the emission of an air pollutant which crossed its property line causing an injury and nuisance to nearby neighborhoods and the public. Diageo disputed that its operations violated any district regulation. Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint, seeking damages for negligence, nuisance, and trespass, and an injunction. The district court concluded that state common law tort claims were not preempted by the Clean Air Act;” dismissed plaintiffs’ negligence claim on the ground that plaintiffs had not pled facts sufficient to establish that Diageo owed them a duty of care, or that Diageo had breached that duty; and declined to dismiss the remaining causes of action, concluding that plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient to establish nuisance and trespass. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on the Act’s text, the Act’s structure and history, and relevant Supreme Court precedents. View "Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2000 and 2002 the FDA issued warnings to Caraco, a Michigan pharmaceutical manufacturer, stating that failure to correct violations promptly could result in enforcement action without further notice. After follow-ups in 2005, the FDA sought a definitive timeline for corrective actions. The FDA issued notices of objectionable conditions in 2006, 2007, and 2008. A consultant audited Caraco’s facilities and stated that it was “likely that FDA will initiate some form of seizure action.” Caraco executives thought the consultant “alarmist.” Later, the FDA issued a formal warning, determining that Caraco products were adulterated and that its manufacturing, processing, and holding policies did not conform to regulations and noting its poor compliance history. The letter stated that failure to promptly correct the violations could result in legal action without further notice, including seizure. A new consultant warned of likely enforcement action. Caraco followed some of its suggestions. In 2009, Caraco issued a nationwide drug recall, constituting “a situation in which there is a reasonable probability that the use of, or exposure to, a violative product will cause serious adverse health consequences or death.” The FDA filed a complaint, served Caraco, and seized products. Days later, Caraco began a mass layoff, indicating that it did not “reasonably foresee" the FDA action. A certified class of former Caraco employees alleged that Caraco violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. 2101, by failing to provide 60 days notice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the FDA action was not an unforeseeable business circumstance that would excuse WARN Act compliance. View "Calloway v. Caraco Pharma. Lab., Ltd." on Justia Law

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The named plaintiffs purchased Align, Procter & Gamble’s probiotic nutritional supplement, and found that the product did not work as advertised—that it did not promote their digestive health. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of state unfair or deceptive practices statutes because it has not been proven scientifically that Align promotes digestive health for anyone. The district court certified five single-state classes from California, Illinois, Florida, New Hampshire, and North Carolina under FRCP 23(b)(3) comprised of “[a]ll consumers who purchased Align . . . from March 1, 2009, until the date notice is first provided to the Class.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the proposed class to be sufficiently ascertainable; there is significant evidence that Plaintiffs could use traditional models and methods to identify class members. View "Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co." on Justia Law

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Avio claimed that Alfoccino violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3), by hiring B2B to send unsolicited facsimile advertisements to Avio and a class of similarly situated persons. The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and found that Avio could not prove Alfoccino was vicariously liable for B2B’s transmission of the faxes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Avio demonstrated standing. Though the TCPA does not expressly state who has a cause of action to sue under its provisions, its descriptions of prohibited conduct repeatedly refer to the “recipient” of the unsolicited fax, and in enacting the TCPA, Congress noted that such fax advertising “is problematic” because it “shifts some of the costs of advertising from the sender to the recipient” and “occupies the recipient’s facsimile machine so that it is unavailable for legitimate business messages while processing and printing the junk fax.” FCC regulations define “sender” with respect to the TCPA’s prohibition of unsolicited fax advertisements as being “the person or entity on whose behalf a facsimile unsolicited advertisement is sent or whose goods or services are advertised or promoted in the unsolicited advertisement,” indicating that primary, not vicarious liability attaches to Alfoccino. View "Imhoff Inv., LLC v. Alfoccino, Inc." on Justia Law

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Wal-Mart is the country’s largest private employer, operating approximately 3,400 stores and employing more than one million people. In 2001, named plaintiffs filed a putative class action (Dukes) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, on behalf of all former and current female Wal-Mart employees. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed certification of the nationwide class of current Wal-Mart employees under Rule 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate questions of law or fact common to the class. The district court then held that all class members who possessed right-to-sue letters from the EEOC could file suit on or before October 28, 2011. Six unnamed Dukes class members filed suit, alleging individual and putative class claims under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of current and former female employees in Wal-Mart Region 43. . The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The timely filing of a class-action complaint commences suit and tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the putative class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action; the suit is not barred by the earlier litigation. View "Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs receive subsidies for providing home childcare services for low-income families. A union was established and authorized to bargain on their behalf, based on submission of 22,180 valid provider-signed authorization cards out of a possible 40,532 eligible providers. A collective bargaining agreement was executed; the state began deducting union dues and fees from subsidy payments. Plaintiffs filed a purported class-action lawsuit for the return of the money, alleging violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of the proposed class (all Michigan home childcare providers) based on conflict of interest: some members voted for representation and others voted against representation. Plaintiffs proposed a subclass of only providers who did not participate in any election related to union representation. The district court rejected the proposal, stating that it could not assume that all members of the subclass opposed representation and that, even if they did, their reasons were different enough to create conflict within the class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded for further consideration in light of its 2014 decision, Harris v. Quinn, that a similar agency fee provision violated the First Amendment as applied to homecare providers because the providers were not full-fledged state employees. The Court did not address class certification. On remand, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Harris did not affect its class certification decision and affirmed. View "Schlaud v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Posted in: Class Action
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Berera worked at Mesa, a health care organization, as a nurse practitioner, 2011-2013. After Berera’s employment ended, she allegedly discovered that the wages on her W-2 did not reflect the wages that Mesa owed her. Berera sued in state court, asserting a class of current and former employees whom Mesa “forced to pay [Mesa’s] share of payroll taxes and other taxes and withholdings,” that this “forced payment resulted in the employees receiving less money than they earned,” and that Mesa paid employees “less than the wages and overtime compensation to which the employees were entitled.” The complaint contained no additional substantive allegations, but recited an unpaid wages claim under section 337.385 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and claims of conversion and negligence under Kentucky law. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. 3101–3128, which imposes a 7.65% tax on wages to fund Social Security and Medicare, requires parties seeking a refund to file a claim with the IRS before bringing a federal tax refund suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the purported state-law claims are truly FICA claims. View "Berera v. Mesa Med. Grp., PLLC" on Justia Law

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Class representatives sued Kentucky real estate firms, alleging violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by participating in a horizontal conspiracy to fix commissions charged in Kentucky real estate transactions at an anti-competitive rate. The certified class consists of people who sold residential real estate in Kentucky from 2001 to 2005, and used the services of defendants. Several defendants settled. The district court entered summary judgment for remaining defendants, excluding the opinions of plaintiffs’ experts with respect to whether collusion among the defendants was the likely economic explanation of the pricing of commissions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that although the plaintiffs produced a good deal of circumstantial evidence that would support a theory of collusion, the conduct at issue was also consistent with permissible competition. View "Hyland v. HomeServices of America, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2005, in connection with a magnetic resonance imaging procedure (MRI), Decker received a dose of Omniscan, a gadoliniumbased contrast agent manufactured by GEHC. After taking Omniscan, Decker developed Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF). In 2012, the Deckers sued GEHC, as part of a multidistrict litigation (MDL). Before the Deckers’ case, hundreds of similar cases in the MDL involving GEHC had been settled. The Decker case was the first case in the MDL to go to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Deckers on a failure-to-warn claim, awarding $5 million in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the district court judge should have recused himself from the trial and a motion for a new trial; made several erroneous evidentiary rulings, which were applicable to all MDL cases; erroneously denied GEHC’s motion for a new trial because insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict regarding the causation element of the Deckers’ failure-to-warn claim; and erroneously failed to issue two proposed jury instructions. View "Decker v. GE Healthcare Inc." on Justia Law