Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, American Copper & Brass received an unsolicited advertisement on one of its facsimile (fax) machines for a product sold by Lake City. The fax had been send by B2B, a “fax-blasting” company employed by Lake City. American filed suit, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227 and sought class-action certification under FRCP 23. B2B, brought in as a third party, failed to appear. The district court granted class certification and entered summary judgment in favor of American. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the approved class definition included individuals who lacked standing to assert TCPA claims, based on the “successfully sent” language in the statute and that the class was not objectively ascertainable. Rule 3.501(A)(5) of the Michigan Court Rules (MCR), which prohibits class actions in TCPA lawsuits, does not apply to TCPA suits in federal court. View "Am. Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Prods, Inc." on Justia Law

A purported class action alleged that Beachwood Hair Clinic violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, by disseminating more than 37,000 unsolicited fax advertisements in 2005 and 2006. Facing more than $18 million in statutory damages, Beachwood and its insurer, Acuity, agreed to a $4-million class settlement with the Ohio-based class representative, Siding. The settlement stipulated that separate litigation between Acuity and Siding would resolve a $2-million coverage dispute under Beachwood’s policy. Siding sought a declaratory judgment under Beachwood’s policy. The district court granted summary judgment to Acuity denying coverage. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that Siding did not establish diversity jurisdiction, which requires an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Unable to identify a singular interest exceeding $75,000 in the remaining $2-million coverage dispute, Siding sought to aggregate its interest with putative class members to satisfy that requirement, or to have the court consider the value of the policy dispute from Acuity’s perspective: $2 million. Acuity suggested ancillary jurisdiction via the settlement judgment in the underlying class action. The court rejected all arguments. View "Siding & Insulation Co. v. Acuity Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The flea-and-tick “spot-on products” at issue claim that their active ingredient works by topical application to a pet’s skin rather than through the pet’s bloodstream. According to the manufacturers, after the product is applied to one area, it disperses over the rest of the pet’s body within one day because it collects in the oil glands and natural oils spread the product over the surface of the pet’s skin and “wick” the product over the hair. The plaintiffs alleged false advertising based on statements that the products are self-dispersing and cover the entire surface of the pet’s body when applied in a single spot; that they are effective for one month and require monthly applications to continue to work; that they do not enter the bloodstream; and that they are waterproof and effective after shampooing, swimming, and exposure to rain or sunlight. The district court repeatedly referred to a one-issue case: whether the product covers the pet’s entire body with a single application. The case management order stated that the manufacturers would bear the initial burden to produce studies that substantiated their claims; the plaintiffs would then have to refute the studies, “or these cases will be dismissed.” The manufacturers objected. The plaintiffs argued that the plan would save time, effort, and money. The manufacturers submitted studies. The plaintiffs’ response included information provided by one plaintiff and his adolescent son and an independent examination of whether translocation occurred that detected the product’s active ingredient in a dog’s bloodstream. The district court concluded that the manufacturers’ studies substantiated their claims and denied all of plaintiffs’ discovery requests, except a request for consumer complaints, then granted the manufacturers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The doctrines of waiver and invited error precluded challenges to the case management plan. View "Simms v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Hilltop hired Huffman and others to review the files of mortgage loans originated by PNC Bank to determine whether lawful procedures were followed during foreclosure and other proceedings. Until the end of their employment in January 2013, they regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not compensated at the overtime rate because Hilltop classified them as independent contractors. Each employment relationship was governed by a now-expired contract, including an arbitration clause and a survival clause. The clauses listed in the survival clause correspond to ones detailing services essential to the job, the term of employment, compensation, termination, and confidentiality; it did not list the arbitration clause. The workers filed a purported class action. The district court denied Hilltop’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that omission of the arbitration clause from the survival clause constituted a “clear implication” that the parties intended the arbitration clause to expire with the agreement. Sixth Circuit precedent indicates that the parties must proceed in arbitration on an individual basis. View "Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC" on Justia Law

Crockett’s former law firm subscribed to a LexisNexis legal research plan that allowed unlimited access to certain databases for a flat fee. Subscribers could access other databases for an additional fee. According to Crockett, LexisNexis indicated that a warning sign would display before a subscriber used a database outside the plan. Years after subscribing, Crockett complained that his firm was being charged additional fees without any warning that it was using a database outside the Plan. LexisNexis insisted on payment of the additional fees. The firm dissolved. Crockett’s new firm entered into a LexisNexis subscription agreement, materially identical to the earlier plan; it contains an arbitration clause. Crockett filed an arbitration demand against LexisNexis on behalf of two putative classes. One class comprised law firms that were charged additional fees. The other comprised clients onto whom such fees were passed. The demand sought damages of more than $500 million. LexisNexis sought a federal court declaration that the agreement did not authorize class arbitration. The district court granted LexisNexis summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. “The idea that the arbitration agreement … reflects the intent of anyone but LexisNexis is the purest legal fiction,” but the one-sided adhesive nature of the clause and the absence of a class-action right do not render it unenforceable. The court observed that Westlaw’s contract lacks any arbitration clause.View "Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

Suits consolidated under 28 U.S.C. 1407 alleged antitrust violations of price fixing and dividing markets by the manufactures of cooling compressors. The district court dismissed the claims of some of the indirect-buyer plaintiffs and declined to enter a final judgment under Civil Rule 54(b) or to certify an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the order did not amount to a “final” decision from which the dismissed plaintiffs may appeal. When a single action involves multiple claims or multiple parties, a ruling that disposes of only some claims or only some parties is ordinarily not “final;” the rule is not different for consolidated multi-district cases. View "In re: Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

In 2010, P&G began marketing Pampers disposable diapers with “Dry Max technology.” Two months later, the Consumer Product Safety Commission began investigating whether the diapers caused severe diaper rash. The district court consolidated several law suits. In August 2010, the CPSC and Health Canada released reports, finding no connection between the diapers and diaper rash. Despite a pending motion to dismiss and before any formal discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement, under which they agreed to seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(2), so that absent class members could not opt out. P&G agreed: to reinstate a refund program; to add to its label a sentence suggesting that consumers consult Pampers.com or call; to add basic diaper rash information to its website; and to contribute $300,000 to a pediatric resident training program and $100,000 to fund a program “in the area of skin health.” Named plaintiffs would release all of their Pampers-related claims and receive $1000 “per affected child.” Unnamed class members would not receive any award, would benefit only from the one-box refund, but would release “equitable” claims against P&G, and be permanently barred from future class actions against P&G. Class counsel would receive $2.73 million. The district court certified the class. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the per-child payments provided a disincentive for named plaintiffs to care about the adequacy of relief afforded unnamed class members. View "Greenberg v. Procter & Gamble Co." on Justia Law

Hrivnak filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p, and Ohio consumer-protection law, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1345.01–.99, 4165.01–04, seeking statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages exceeding $25,000, and injunctive and declaratory relief. The suit was based on the conduct of debt management companies and a law firm in dunning hi on credit card debts. The defendants made an offer of judgment of $7,000 plus costs and attorney’s fees, under Civil Rule 68. Hrivnak rejected the offer. The district court rejected the defendants’ claim that the offer rendered the suit moot. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing defendants’ argument as asserting that claims with little to no chance of success should be dismissed as moot whenever they are mixed in with promising claims that a defendant offers to compensate in full. View "Hrivnak v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

Davis sued Cintas, individually and on behalf of a class of female job applicants denied employment as entry-level sales representatives, alleging that Cintas’s hiring practices led to gender discrimination, in violation of Title VII, and caused Cintas to reject her application for employment twice. The district court denied Davis’s motion for class certification and granted summary judgment for Cintas. The Sixth Circuit affirmed both denial of class certification and the entry of summary judgment on her individual disparate-treatment claim arising in 2004 and her disparate-impact claim. The court reversed with respect to a disparate-treatment claim arising in 2003, noting that she was at least as qualified as the male candidates at that time. View "Davis v. Cintas Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs receive subsidies from Michigan’s Child Development and Care Program for providing home childcare services for low-income families. Following creation of the Home Based Child Care Council, a union was established and authorized to bargain on their behalf, based on submission of 22,180 valid provider-signed authorization cards out of a possible 40,532 eligible providers. The union and the Council entered into a collective bargaining agreement and the state began deducting union dues and fees from the subsidy payments. Plaintiffs sought to file a class-action lawsuit for the return of the money, collected allegedly in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of plaintiffs’ proposed class (all home childcare providers in Michigan) based on conflict of interest: some members voted for union representation and others voted against representation. Plaintiffs attempted to cure by proposing a subclass of only providers who did not participate in any election related to union representation. The district court rejected the proposal, finding that it could not assume that all members of the subclass opposed representation and that, even if all members of the proposed subclass did oppose representation, their reasons for opposition were different enough to create conflict within the class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Schlaud v. Snyder" on Justia Law