Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Commercial Law
United States v. Huntington Nat’l Bank
Principals of Cybercos defrauded lending institutions out of more than $100 million in loan. In 2002, Huntington granted Cyberco a multi-million-dollar line of credit, and Cyberco granted Huntington a continuing security interest and lien in all of Cyberco's personal property, including deposit accounts. After discovering the fraud, the government seized approximately $4 million in Cyberco assets, including $705,168.60 from a Huntington Bank Account. Cyberco principals were charged in a criminal indictment with conspiring to violate federal laws relating to bank fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. Count 10 issued forfeiture allegations against individuals regarding Cyberco assets, including the Account. In their plea agreements, defendants agreed to forfeit any interest they possessed in the assets or funds. The district court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture with regard to the assets, including the Account. Huntington filed a claim, asserting ownership interest in the forfeited Account. The district court found that Huntington did not have a legal claim. On remand, the district court again denied the claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A party who takes a security interest in property, tangible or intangible, in exchange for value, can be a bona fide purchaser for value of that property interest under 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(6)(B). View "United States v. Huntington Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law
In re: Pierce
In 2007, Debtor purchased a manufactured home, borrowing the funds from Creditor and granting a security interest. Creditor filed an application for first title and a title lien statement in Whitley County, Kentucky. The seller of the manufactured home is located in Whitley County. Debtor resided at the time in Laurel County, Kentucky. Later, the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet issued a Certificate of Title for the Manufactured Home showing the lien as being filed in Whitley County. In 2010, Debtor filed his voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The Chapter 7 Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding. The Bankruptcy Court avoided the lien, 11 U.S.C. 544. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The statute requires that title lien statements be filed in the county of the debtor’s residence even if the initial application for certificate of title or registration is filed in another county under KRS 186A.120(2)(a).
View "In re: Pierce" on Justia Law
Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo North America, Inc.
Maker's Mark sued Jose Cuervo for trademark infringement, based on Cuervo's use of red dripping wax seal on bottles of premium tequila. The district court found that the Maker's Mark trademark was valid, rejecting an argument of "functionality" under 15 U.S.C. 1065, and had been infringed. The court entered an injunction, but denied damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court traced the history of bourbon whiskey and noted that Maker's Mark and its use of a red dripping wax seal, a registered trademark since 1958, occupy a central place in the modern story of bourbon. The majority of the factors indicate a possibility of "confusion of sponsorship" trademark infringement: strength of the trademark, relatedness of the goods, similarity, and marketing channels. Whether there was actual confusion was a neutral factor.
Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp.
The named plaintiffs are Ohio residents who purchased front-loading washing machines manufactured by defendant. Within months after their purchases, the plaintiffs noticed the smell of mold or mildew emanating from the machines and from laundry washed in the machines. One plaintiff found mold growing on the sides of the detergent dispenser, another saw mold growing on the rubber door seal, despite allowing the machine doors to stand open. They filed suit, alleging tortious breach of warranty, negligent design, and negligent failure to warn. The district court certified a class comprised of Ohio residents who purchased one of the specified machines in Ohio primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and not for resale (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification, with proof of damages reserved for individual determination. Plaintiffs’ proof established numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. Common questions predominate over individual ones and class action is a superior method to adjudicate the claims.
Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj
Plaintiffs are among the world’s largest purchasers of air conditioning and refrigeration copper tubing. Defendants imported ACR copper into the U.S. In 2003 the Commission of the European Communities found that defendants and other conspired on prices targets and other terms for industrial tubes and allocated customers and market shares in violation of European law. The findings did not identify any conspiratorial agreements with respect to U.S. markets. In 2004, another EC decision found violation in the market for plumbing tubes. Plaintiff claimed that the European conspiracy was also directed at the U.S. market for ACR industrial tubes, violating the Sherman Act and the Tennessee Trade Practices Act. Two similar cases, involving different plaintiffs, had been dismissed. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the complaint adequately stated a claim under the Sherman Act and was not barred by the Act's limitations period, 15 U.S.C. 15b and that the court had personal jurisdiction. The fact that the complaint borrows its substance from the EC decision and then builds on the EC’s findings does not render its allegations any less valid.
Salling v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc.
Plaintiff rented a car, drove 64 miles in one day, refilled the fuel tank, and returned the car to the same location from which he rented the car. In addition to rental and other fees that he does not dispute, he was charged a $13.99 fuel service fee that he challenged by filing a putative class action, claiming breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Defendant claimed that, because plaintiff drove fewer than 75 miles during the rental period, to avoid the charge he was required to return the car with a full fuel tank and to submit a receipt. The district court dismissed, finding that the contract was not ambiguous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the voluntary payment doctrine.
VIBO Corp., Inc. v. Conway
A 1998 settlement (MSA), between states and large tobacco companies (OPMs) included incentives for non-parties to join, but OPMs retained the most favorable payment terms. The MSA permitted states to enact statutes requiring nonparticipants to make deposits into escrows to be held for 25 years, in case a state obtained a future judgment against that nonparticipant. The MSA ensured that OPMs retained favored treatment over other participants. Plaintiff entered the market in 2000, as a nonparticipant, paying into state escrow accounts. As escrow payments became more burdensome, Plaintiff joined the MSA after negotiating a back-payment and future payments. During negotiations, defendants denied Plaintiff information about payment reductions granted to grandfathered companies. Plaintiff, unhappy with the disparate treatment and unable to meet its obligations, was unable to negotiate better terms because of an MSA provision that would entitle other participants to more favorable terms if such terms were granted to a late-joiner. Plaintiff sued tobacco manufacturers and attorneys general, alleging antitrust (15 U.S.C. 1, 3 (a)) and constitutional violations. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Manufacturer defendants were immunized under the Noerr-Pennington and state-action doctrines. Plaintiff's waivers were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, regardless of representations made during negotiations.
Conn v. Zakharov
Defendant, a Russian citizen, attended graduate school and owns real property, vehicles, and bank accounts in Ohio. He spends some time in Ohio each year, ranging from 40 days in 2007 to a total of 17 days in 2008–2009. He visits under a tourist visa and does not have an Ohio driver's license. After going to Russia to take part in a business venture with defendant, plaintiff filed suit in Ohio. The contract had no connection to the state. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that defendant was not served with process in a manner that automatically confers personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that notions of fair play and substantial justice weigh against jurisdiction in Ohio. The court quoted a Russian proverb, “If you’re afraid of wolves, don’t go into the forest” that could be read, “If you’re afraid of the Russian legal system, don't do business in Russia.”
Dickson v. Countrywide Home Loans
Plaintiff filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and successfully sought to avoid a lien on her manufactured home held by defendant. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The mortgage did not originally cover the manufactured home, which was personal property until 2007,when a state court entered an in rem judgment and order of sale converting it to an improvement to real property. After that, the home was covered by the mortgage. The conversion, unlike the mortgage, was involuntary as to the plaintiff, so she had standing under 11 U.S.C. 522(h) to avoid the lien.
EA Mgmt. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.
Plaintiff sued the bank after it refused to honor cashier's checks it thought he had obtained by fraud. One check, for $100,000, had previously bounced, another was a starter check for $80,000 and was dated five months earlier. The bank had communication with plaintiff's former employer, indicating fraud. The district court granted summary judgment to the bank. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in Michigan, the bank's actions were lawful even absent any finding of fraud. The checks were not supported by consideration, plaintiff was not a person entitled to enforce the instruments, and plaintiff was not harmed.