Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Russell brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Kentucky Secretary of State, Attorney General, and other state and local officials, alleging that Kentucky Revised Statute 117.235(3), which creates a 300-foot no-political-speech buffer zone around polling locations on election day, violated Russell’s free-speech rights. Russell’s business property is 150 feet from a polling location, with a four-lane highway and guardrails between. Citing the statute, Sheriff’s deputies have removed political signs from his property on previous election days, and the statute’s language prohibits Russell from, on his own property, waving signs and offering campaign literature to passersby. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit granted a partial stay of that injunction, which was issued only days before the 2014 general election, and expedited an appeal. The court then affirmed, holding that it had jurisdiction over the case, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against any of the remaining defendants, and that the statute facially violates the First Amendment because Kentucky failed to carry its burden of showing why it required a no-political-speech zone vastly larger than the Supreme Court has previously upheld. View "Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nonprofit charitable organization, solicits donations of clothing and shoes at unattended, outdoor donation bins for distribution in other countries. It locates bins at businesses that are “easily visible and accessible” with the consent of the owner. Its representatives generally collect donations weekly to avoid bin overflow. Bins are labeled so that people can report if they are full. In 2012, the city did not regulate donation bins. Plaintiff placed bins at a former grocery store and at a gas station. The city sent a letter claiming that they had “been found to create a nuisance as people leave boxes and other refuse around the containers,” denied a request for review, and removed the bins. A year later, the city council enacted a “total prohibition,” exempting the already-operational Lions Club Recycling. The ordinance states a purpose of preventing blight, protecting property values and neighborhood integrity, avoiding creation and maintenance of nuisances and ensuring safe and sanitary maintenance of properties. The Sixth Circuit affirmed entry of a preliminary injunction, finding that operation of bins to solicit and collect charitable donations qualified as protected speech and that the content-based ordinance fails strict scrutiny because it implements an overly broad, prophylactic ban on all bins so the city can avoid hypothetical nuisances or other issues that may arise in the future. View "Planet Aid v. City of St. Johns" on Justia Law

In 2010, the House of Representatives passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), by a vote of 219 to 212, following significant debate over whether PPACA included taxpayer funding for abortion. Driehaus, a Representative from Ohio and an anti-abortion Democrat, was an outspoken advocate of the “no taxpayer funding for abortion in the PPACA” movement, insisting that he would not vote for PPACA without inclusion of the Stupak-Pitts Amendment, expressly forbidding use of taxpayer funds “to pay for any abortion or to cover any part of the costs of any health plan that includes coverage of abortion” except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the life of the mother. Driehaus voted for the PPACA without the Amendment. President Obama later issued Executive Order 13535: “to … ensure that [f]ederal funds are not used for abortion services … consistent with a longstanding [f]ederal statutory restriction … the Hyde Amendment.” Debate continues as to whether PPACA includes federal funding for abortion. SBA, an anti-abortion public-advocacy organization, publicly criticized Driehaus, among other congressmen, for his vote. Driehaus considered SBA’s statement untrue and filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, alleging violation of Ohio Revised Code 3517.21(B) (Unfair Political Campaign Activities). OEC found probable cause of a violation. SBA sued, claiming that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. Driehaus counterclaimed defamation. Staying the other claims, pending agency action, the district court granted summary judgment, holding that associating a political candidate with a mainstream political position, even if false, cannot constitute defamation. The Sixth Circuit Affirmed. View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

Aspiring Ohio state court judges must run for office and must follow the Code of Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Code limits candidates’ campaign-related speech to help maintain an “independent, fair, and impartial judiciary,” free of “impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” After the Sixth Circuit struck parts of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, Ohio narrowed its Code. As amended, all judicial candidates—incumbents and challengers—are subject to restrictions on direct, personal monetary solicitation; bans on public political party speeches and endorsements of other candidates; and a prohibition on receiving campaign money earlier than 120-days before the primary. Platt, an attorney who wishes to run for Ohio judicial office, wanted to publicly endorse other candidates, directly solicit campaign funds in person, and to receive campaign contributions without the time limitations. Platt sued to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the rules as applied to non-sitting judicial candidates. The district court denied Platt’s request, holding that Platt failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claims and that the requested injunction would cause substantial harm to sitting judicial candidates who would still be subject to the restrictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Platt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Grievances & Discipline" on Justia Law

Dearborn hosted the Arab International Festival from 1995 until 2012, welcoming roughly 250,000 people with carnival attractions, entertainment, and international food. The 2012 Festival had 85 vendors, information tables, and booths, including several affiliated with Christian and other groups. Bible Believers attended the 2011 Festival, bearing “Christian signs, banners, and t-shirts” that provoked confrontations. Preparing for the 2012 Festival, their attorney wrote a letter, asserting that the sheriff sided with “the violent Muslims,” that “officers have a duty to protect speakers … from … hostile audiences,” and demanding protection. Counsel responded, stating that the sheriff “owes a duty to the public as a whole and is not required to serve as a security force for the sole benefit of … Believers … cannot protect everyone from the foreseeable consequences that come from speech that is designed and perhaps intended to elicit a potentially negative reaction.” The sheriff claims to have allocated more personnel to the Festival than to “the World Series or the President of the United States.” At the 2012 Festival, Believers displayed messages including “Islam Is A Religion of Blood and Murder.” One carried a severed pig’s head on a stick; others preached, using a megaphone, referring to a “pedophile” prophet. The crowd yelled, threw debris, and shoved a Believer to the ground. Officers detained debris-throwers and attempted to quell the crowd. As the confrontation intensified, Believers continued to preach. Officers reiterated safety concerns. Officers escorted the Believers out. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the county defendants. Finding no constitutional violations, it did not address qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the plan for Festival security was content-neutral and that the Believers were not treated differently than the counter-protestors.View "Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty. " on Justia Law

Dr. Kiser is trained as a general dentist and as an endodontist specializing in root canal procedures. In 2009, the Ohio State Dental Board issued a warning to Kiser for practicing “outside the scope” of his declared specialty, stating, “if you wish to continue to declare yourself as a specialist in endodontics, you must advertise accordingly, and limit your practice per the ADA’s definition. If you would prefer to practice in areas outside the scope of endodontics, you may do so by no longer holding yourself out as a specialist in endodontics. You can be a general dentist, and then advertise and perform specialty services you are qualified to perform, so long as you also state you are a general dentist.” The Board took no further action and declined to answer Kiser’s 2012 inquiry about signage including the terms “endodontist” and “general dentist.” Kiser challenged the regulations as chilling his exercise of First Amendment commercial speech rights. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the Supreme Court decision, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) and finding that Kiser alleged facts demonstrating that he faces a credible threat that the regulations will be enforced against him in the future, so that he has standing to assert his pre-enforcement challenge. View "Kiser v. Reitz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, physicians and Medicaid providers, wanted to support candidates in the 2010 election, but were barred from doing so by Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45, which limits campaign contributions from Medicaid providers. They sued , arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court rejected that position on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding unconstitutionality “clear” and “unavoidable.” The district court then entered a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees and costs (42 U.S.C. 1988) of $665,645.68. A magistrate recommended an award of $454,635.53 in fees and $6,442.03 in costs, with a $100,183 reduction for investigatory work performed before plaintiffs signed a fee agreement; a 25 percent reduction on discovery fees; and a 25 percent reduction on appellate fees. The district court awarded only $128,908.74 in fees and $6,315.00 in costs, drastically cutting hourly rates, striking hours spent on third-party discovery and other miscellaneous matters, and reducing appellate hours by 50 percent. After arriving at its lodestar calculation, the district court further reduced the fees by 35 percent under the Johnson factors. The court expressed concern that “taxpayers will ultimately bear the burden … Plaintiffs are medical doctors presumably abundantly capable of paying for representation” and that “counsel was merely scouring through campaign laws hoping to find an old one … to challenge in the hope of raking in overstated fees.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for recalculation before a different judge. View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law

In 2006, American Copper & Brass received an unsolicited advertisement on one of its facsimile (fax) machines for a product sold by Lake City. The fax had been send by B2B, a “fax-blasting” company employed by Lake City. American filed suit, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227 and sought class-action certification under FRCP 23. B2B, brought in as a third party, failed to appear. The district court granted class certification and entered summary judgment in favor of American. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the approved class definition included individuals who lacked standing to assert TCPA claims, based on the “successfully sent” language in the statute and that the class was not objectively ascertainable. Rule 3.501(A)(5) of the Michigan Court Rules (MCR), which prohibits class actions in TCPA lawsuits, does not apply to TCPA suits in federal court. View "Am. Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Prods, Inc." on Justia Law

America’s largest law school, Thomas M. Cooley, has four Michigan campuses and one in Florida and about 3,500 students. . Anziska was “of counsel” at a New York law firm. On June 8, 2011, under the title “Investigating the Thomas Cooley School of Law,” Anziska posted on the website “JD Underground,” that the firm was investigating law schools for preying on the ignorance of “naive, clueless 22-year-olds. Perhaps one of the worst offenders is the Thomas Cooley School of Law, which grossly inflates its post-graduate employment data and salary information…. students are defaulting on loans at an astounding 41 percent… most likely … will continue to defraud unwitting students unless held civilly accountable. If you have any relevant information or know of anyone who has attended Thomas Cooley … correspondences will be kept strictly confidential.” On June 13, the firm received a cease-and-desist letter from Cooley, claiming that the post was defamatory. On June 15, under the title “Retraction re: Investigating the Thomas Cooley School of Law,” a partner posted on JD Underground that the earlier post “contained certain allegations which may have been couched as fact regarding employment and default data. These statements are hereby retracted.” Meanwhile, Anziska disseminated a draft proposed class action complaint involving 18 former or current Cooley students, containing the same allegations. The complaint became publicly available on the internet. Cooley sued, alleging defamation, tortious interference with business relations, breach of contract, and false light. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Cooley was a limited-purpose public figure and the record would not allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendants published the challenged statements with actual malice.View "Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Kurzon Strauss, LLP" on Justia Law

The Dirty World website enables users to anonymously upload comments, photographs, and video, which Richie selects and publishes along with his own editorial comments. Jones is a Kentucky high school teacher and a member of the cheerleading squad for the Cincinnati Bengals football team. She was the subject of several submissions posted by anonymous users and of editorial remarks posted by Richie, including photographs of Jones and a statement that she “slept with every other Bengal Football player.” Jones requested that the post be removed. Richie declined. A subsequent post alleged that her former boyfriend “tested positive for Chlamydia Infection and Gonorrhea ... sure Sarah also has both ... he brags about doing sarah in … her class room at the school she teaches at DIXIE Heights." Richie's responded to the post: “Why are all high school teachers freaks in the sack?” Jones brought claims of defamation, libel per se, false light, and intentional inflection of emotional distress. The district court rejected arguments that the claims were barred by the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230. A second trial resulted in a verdict for $38,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under the CDA, Richie and Dirty World were neither creators nor developers of the challenged content. Jones’s tort claims are grounded on the statements of another content provider, but sought to impose liability on Dirty World and Richie as if they were the publishers or speakers of those statements. Section 230(c)(1) bars those claims. View "Jones v. Dirty World Entm't" on Justia Law