Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An attorney who chaired the Davidson County Election Commission was also employed at a law firm that represented the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The Election Commission became involved in a dispute over whether a citizen-initiated tax-repeal referendum should be placed on the ballot, a measure opposed by the city government and certain city council members. The attorney, acting as commission chair, supported certifying the referendum. Following pressure from city officials, including a council member who threatened to withdraw city business from the law firm if the attorney continued supporting the referendum, the law firm terminated the attorney’s employment after he refused to change his position.The attorney filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, asserting violations of his First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other claims. The district court denied motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity filed by both the council member and the law firm. The court concluded that the council member’s alleged conduct violated clearly established First Amendment law and that the law firm, as a private entity, was not entitled to qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that both the council member and the law firm were eligible to assert qualified immunity due to their public functions in this context. The court held that the council member was not entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint plausibly alleged he violated clearly established First Amendment rights by causing the attorney’s firing due to protected speech. However, the court found that the law firm was entitled to qualified immunity, as there was no clearly established law prohibiting a law firm from firing an employee in response to client pressure under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for the council member, reversed as to the law firm, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeLanis v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted by a Michigan state jury of first-degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and felony firearm. The homicide occurred in a Detroit neighborhood known for drug trafficking, where the victim was found with multiple gunshot wounds and no physical evidence tying any individual to the crime. Two witnesses, both local drug dealers, initially denied knowledge of the shooting but later identified the petitioner as the shooter after being arrested on unrelated charges. Their trial testimony was the primary evidence against the petitioner, as there was no physical evidence or eyewitness identification from the scene.Following his conviction, the petitioner pursued direct appeals and post-conviction relief through the Michigan courts, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Those efforts were unsuccessful. He then filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied. Years later, he sought state court relief again, now relying on an affidavit from another individual who claimed to have witnessed the murder and identified a different perpetrator. The state trial court rejected this new evidence as unreliable and insufficient to overcome procedural barriers, and subsequent appeals in the state courts were denied. The petitioner returned to federal court with a second habeas petition, presenting affidavits including recantations and new claims of innocence. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the petition, finding it untimely and failing to meet the stringent requirements for successive habeas petitions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It agreed that the petitioner did not satisfy the gatekeeping requirements for successive petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B), nor did he establish grounds for equitable tolling based on actual innocence. The Sixth Circuit held that the new affidavits presented were unreliable and would not clearly and convincingly prevent any reasonable juror from convicting the petitioner. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the habeas petition. View "Houston v. Tanner" on Justia Law

A resident of University Heights, Ohio, who practices Orthodox Judaism, sought to use his home for group prayer sessions due to religious obligations and restrictions on travel during the Sabbath. After inviting neighbors to participate in these gatherings, a neighbor complained to city officials, prompting the city’s law director to send a cease-and-desist letter, warning that using the home as a place of religious assembly violated local zoning laws. The resident then applied for a special use permit to operate a house of worship but withdrew his application before the city’s Planning Commission could reach a decision, stating he did not wish to operate a house of worship as defined by the ordinance. Despite withdrawing, he later filed a federal lawsuit against the city and several officials, alleging violations of federal and state law, including constitutional and statutory claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the city and its officials. The court found that the plaintiff’s claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Ohio Constitution were unripe because there was no final decision by the relevant local authorities regarding the application of the zoning ordinance to his property. The court also rejected his Fourth Amendment and Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act) claims on the merits and declined supplemental jurisdiction over a state public records claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that most of the plaintiff’s claims were unripe because he withdrew his application before any final decision was made by the city’s zoning authorities, and thus there was no concrete dispute for federal review. The court also held that his facial challenges to the ordinance were forfeited and, in any event, failed as a matter of law. The court further concluded that the Fourth Amendment and FACE Act claims failed on the merits and found no abuse of discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. View "Daniel Grand v. City of University Heights, Ohio" on Justia Law

California Palms Addiction Recovery Campus, Inc., an Ohio rehabilitation center, and its owner, Sebastian Rucci, became the subjects of a federal criminal investigation in 2021. Pursuant to ex parte warrants issued by a magistrate judge, the FBI seized $603,902.89 from their accounts. Shortly thereafter, state agencies revoked the facility’s provider certification and terminated its Medicaid agreement. The plaintiffs filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, seeking the return of the seized funds and disclosure of the affidavits used to obtain the warrants, alleging constitutional defects and asserting a right to inspect the affidavits under the Fourth Amendment.The Government moved to stay the civil action, indicating its intent to pursue a civil forfeiture proceeding regarding the seized funds. After initiating the forfeiture case, the Government moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ civil action, arguing that the statutory forfeiture process provided the appropriate remedy. The district court stayed the civil action pending resolution of the forfeiture case. In September 2024, the Government voluntarily dismissed the forfeiture proceeding and returned the funds with interest to the plaintiffs. The district court then ordered the plaintiffs to show cause why the civil action should not be dismissed as moot. Despite the plaintiffs’ argument that their claim for disclosure of the warrant affidavits remained unresolved, the district court dismissed the entire action as moot, reasoning that the plaintiffs had received the relief sought.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, while the claim for return of funds was moot, the claim for disclosure of the warrant affidavits was not. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal of the affidavit disclosure claim and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the existence of a live controversy over the disclosure request precluded dismissal for mootness. View "California Palms v. United States" on Justia Law

A police dispatcher who worked for a Michigan city alleged that she and other female dispatchers were required to conduct searches of female arrestees, even when female officers were available, exposing them to health and safety risks. The department did not have a similar policy for male dispatchers. In 2020, the dispatcher and several colleagues filed a lawsuit alleging sex discrimination. Eleven days after filing, the dispatcher became the subject of an Internal Affairs investigation, which ultimately led to her termination for violating department policy by using a case-management system for personal reasons. She later settled with the department, resulting in her reinstatement with a demotion, suspension, and loss of promotion eligibility.Following these events, the dispatcher filed a second lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, claiming that the city and its police commissioner retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights by filing the original lawsuit. She also brought a claim under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the city on the retaliation claim, finding no municipal liability, but denied summary judgment to the commissioner in his individual capacity, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. The commissioner appealed, asserting qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the dispatcher alleged legally cognizable adverse actions and that her right to be free from retaliation for protected speech was clearly established. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the commissioner and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction over factual disputes. The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the state-law claims. View "DeVooght v. City of Warren" on Justia Law

The defendant was apprehended after two separate incidents in which he was found in possession of firearms and drugs. In the first incident, after a car accident, he attempted to dissuade the other driver from calling the police due to the presence of contraband in his vehicle, then fled but was quickly caught. In the second incident, a traffic stop led to the discovery of additional firearms, ammunition, and drugs. He was charged with two counts of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and pleaded guilty.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky calculated his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines as twenty-two, based in part on a prior Kentucky conviction for second-degree manslaughter, which the court classified as a “crime of violence.” The defendant did not object to this calculation at sentencing and was sentenced to 145 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether Kentucky’s second-degree manslaughter qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines, applying plain error review because the issue was not raised below. The court held that the Kentucky statute’s “wantonness” mens rea is functionally equivalent to “recklessness” as defined in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), and does not meet the standard for a “crime of violence,” which requires purposeful or knowing conduct. The court found that the district court’s reliance on this conviction to enhance the sentence was plain error, affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and undermined the fairness of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Tooley" on Justia Law

Officers investigating a drug trafficking ring observed Devin Long engaging in several suspected drug transactions, including controlled buys involving other individuals. Surveillance revealed Long’s repeated visits to known stash houses and his own registered residence, where officers witnessed activity consistent with drug dealing. Based on these observations and information from a confidential source, officers obtained a warrant to search Long’s home. The search uncovered illegal drugs, firearms, and related paraphernalia, leading to Long’s indictment on federal drug and firearm charges.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio reviewed Long’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his home, which argued that the affidavit supporting the search warrant failed to establish a sufficient nexus between his alleged criminal activity and the residence. The district court denied the motion, finding that the affidavit provided probable cause for the search. Long subsequently pleaded guilty to four charges but preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether the search warrant for Long’s home was supported by probable cause. Applying a deferential standard to the issuing magistrate judge’s determination, the Sixth Circuit held that the affidavit established both that Long’s home was his residence and that he was engaged in ongoing drug trafficking. The court further found that even a single drug transaction observed outside Long’s home provided an independent basis for probable cause. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Long’s motion to suppress, concluding that the warrant was properly issued under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

Two middle school students in Michigan wore sweatshirts displaying the phrase “Let’s Go Brandon” to school, intending to express disapproval of then-President Joe Biden. School administrators asked the students to remove the sweatshirts, interpreting the phrase as a euphemism for a vulgar anti-Biden chant. The students complied but, through their mother, later sued the school district and two administrators, alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the school district and administrators. The court found that the school’s dress code permitted the prohibition of apparel reasonably interpreted as profane or vulgar, and that the administrators’ interpretation of the phrase as vulgar was reasonable. The court concluded that the students’ constitutional rights were not violated, and dismissed all claims with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that school administrators may prohibit student speech that is reasonably understood as vulgar, even if the speech is political in nature and uses euphemism rather than explicit profanity. The court found that the administrators’ interpretation of “Let’s Go Brandon” as vulgar was reasonable given its widely understood meaning. The court further held that, under Supreme Court precedent, the school’s interest in prohibiting vulgar speech outweighs the student’s interest in political expression in this context. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the school district and administrators. View "B. A. v. Tri-County Area Schools" on Justia Law

A billboard company sought to erect a sign in a Michigan township, but its application was denied because the proposed billboard did not comply with local height and size restrictions. Instead of appealing the denial or seeking a variance, the company filed a federal lawsuit challenging the township’s sign ordinance on First Amendment grounds, including claims that the ordinance imposed content-based restrictions, constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint, and was unconstitutionally vague. The company did not challenge the height and size restrictions themselves. The township’s ordinance only allowed billboards in certain industrial zones adjacent to interstate freeways, but, according to the company, no such zones existed in the township.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the township, finding the company lacked standing because its alleged injuries were not caused by the challenged provisions and would not be redressed by a favorable decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the company failed to meet the requirements for standing on any of its claims.Subsequently, the company filed a new lawsuit in the same district court, again alleging that the ordinance was a prior restraint on speech. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that res judicata (claim preclusion) barred the action. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that issue preclusion, not claim preclusion, applied. The court concluded that issue preclusion barred the company from relitigating its prior-restraint claim based on its earlier application, but did not bar claims based on new facts—specifically, the company’s allegation that it was self-censoring and not applying for any billboards due to the ordinance’s discretionary variance process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the new factual allegations. View "Outdoor One Communications LLC v. Charter Twp. of Canton, Mich." on Justia Law

A sixth-grade student with behavioral disabilities, X.M., attended Mount Pleasant Public Schools under an Individualized Education Plan that allowed him to use a breakroom to manage stress. In the fall of 2021, after a student reported that X.M. had brought a gun to school, school officials, including special-education teacher Jason Russell, searched X.M.’s locker and questioned him, but found nothing. The next day, after X.M. made a comment about not having his gun at school, officials again searched his belongings. According to X.M., Russell then ordered him to pull down his trousers and lift his shirt in a search for a gun. Days later, after X.M. was suspended for violence, he claimed Russell locked him in the breakroom for over 20 minutes.Cheyenne Johnson, X.M.’s mother, sued Russell, the school district, and other officials, alleging violations of X.M.’s constitutional rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to all defendants except Russell, denying him qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims. The district court found that disputed facts—specifically, whether Russell conducted a strip search and locked X.M. in the breakroom—required a jury’s determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The court held that, even accepting X.M.’s version of events, Russell did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that Russell’s search was justified at its inception and not clearly excessive in scope given the suspicion of a gun. It also concluded that it was not clearly established that locking a student in a breakroom for 20 minutes under these circumstances constituted an unreasonable seizure. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims against Russell. View "Johnson v. Mount Pleasant Public Schools" on Justia Law