Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dustin Booth, who had a history of stable employment and no prior mental health issues, began exhibiting signs of severe mental illness in early 2022 after changes in his substance use. His erratic behavior escalated over several days, culminating in a violent incident at home and a lengthy standoff with police after he barricaded himself inside his house. Booth’s wife repeatedly sought police intervention, expressing concerns that he was a danger to himself and others, and noted his access to firearms. After attempts to calm Booth and persuade him to leave his house, he eventually left with a friend, taking a gun with him. Police stopped the vehicle, leading to a confrontation in which Booth brandished the firearm and was fatally shot by officers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the defendants on all federal claims. The district court held that the proposed accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—that officers should have used de-escalation techniques—was unreasonable due to the safety risks posed by Booth. The court further found that the officers’ actions during the traffic stop and subsequent use of force, including the deployment of a police dog and takedown maneuver, were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.Upon review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit held that, as a matter of law, the ADA did not require officers to accommodate Booth’s disability in the face of objective safety risks. Additionally, the court found the officers had probable cause for a mental-health seizure and acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment in both the stop and use of force. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Booth v. Lazzara" on Justia Law

In 1989, a man committed a brutal murder at a Kentucky laundromat, killing a 61-year-old employee after she asked him to leave. After his arrest, he was charged with several crimes, including murder. Five years later, he pleaded guilty to all charges. He sought to have a judge, rather than a jury, decide his sentence, hoping for a more favorable outcome due to the nature of his crimes. After a series of legal maneuvers and a failed attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, a judge ultimately sentenced him to death, despite the presentation of significant mitigating evidence about his abusive childhood and mental health struggles.On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed both his conviction and sentence, rejecting his arguments that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that the sentencing court had failed to consider all mitigating evidence. The court found that while the trial court’s plea colloquy did not specifically enumerate every right waived by pleading guilty, it was sufficient to show that the defendant understood the consequences. The court also concluded that the sentencing judge had considered all mitigating evidence, even if he found it unpersuasive.After exhausting state postconviction remedies, the petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, raising multiple grounds for relief. The district court denied relief and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted a limited certificate and reviewed two claims de novo: whether the plea was knowing and voluntary, and whether the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence.The Sixth Circuit held that the Kentucky Supreme Court had not unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in either respect. The record affirmatively demonstrated the petitioner’s understanding of his rights, and the sentencing court’s consideration of mitigation evidence was constitutionally adequate. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Johnson v. Plappert" on Justia Law

A former elected county prosecutor in Kentucky’s 21st Judicial Circuit was charged with Honest Services Wire Fraud, violations of the Travel Act, and Federal Program Bribery. The charges stemmed from an arrangement with a young woman, M.H., who repeatedly faced legal troubles. Evidence showed that the prosecutor agreed to help her with matters such as getting warrants withdrawn, charges reduced, and release from jail, in exchange for sexual acts and explicit images. The FBI discovered the scheme, leading to federal prosecution. At trial, the government presented incriminating text messages, testimony from M.H., and law enforcement, while the defendant claimed he did not solicit images and that M.H. was assisting in investigations—a claim disproved by evidence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky oversaw the jury trial, which resulted in convictions on all counts. The court sentenced the defendant to 41 months in prison and imposed supervised release conditions, including refraining from excessive alcohol use. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant challenged the exclusion of certain testimony about Kentucky law, sufficiency of the evidence on several elements, the federal funding nexus for the bribery charge, the supervised release condition, and the sentencing court’s refusal to consider “collateral consequences.”The Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate constitutional rights in excluding expert legal opinion testimony and that the jury was properly instructed on the meaning of “official acts.” The court found overwhelming evidence supporting the verdict, including proof of a quid pro quo and an interstate nexus. The federal funding requirement was satisfied by evidence that the state received sufficient funds. The supervised release condition and sentencing decisions were not plainly erroneous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Goldy" on Justia Law

Jason Florence, while on supervised release for a prior federal child pornography conviction, was found in possession of a smartphone containing child pornography during an unscheduled home visit by his probation officer. The conditions of his supervised release prohibited him from possessing such devices without his probation officer's knowledge. A forensic analysis of the confiscated phone revealed over one hundred images and two videos of child pornography, some accessed shortly before the search. Florence admitted ownership of the phone and provided its passcode, and other evidence linked him to the device and the illicit materials.This case was tried before the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The parties stipulated to Florence’s prior convictions and the terms of his supervised release. After a two-day trial, a jury convicted Florence of possessing child pornography and found that the material depicted minors under 12 years old. At sentencing, the district court determined that Florence’s prior conviction triggered a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2), and imposed a life term of supervised release. Florence objected, arguing that Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights required the jury to find the fact of his prior conviction, and he challenged the admission of his probation officer’s credibility testimony and the reasonableness of his sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not err in finding the fact of Florence’s prior conviction and applying the mandatory minimum, citing the narrow exception in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, which allows a judge to find the fact of a prior conviction. The court found any error in admitting the probation officer’s credibility testimony harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Finally, the Sixth Circuit held that the life term of supervised release was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Florence" on Justia Law

On the evening of Black Friday in 2021, two employees at a T-Mobile store in Columbus, Ohio were robbed at gunpoint by a masked individual who forced them into a back room, demanded phones and money, and sprayed them with mace before fleeing. Unbeknownst to the robber, a bait phone with a GPS tracker was included among the stolen items, allowing police to quickly locate and apprehend him after a high-speed chase. The suspect, Kevin Daniels, was arrested and, after waiving his Miranda rights during interrogation, admitted to the crime. A search of his vehicle found the stolen goods, a gun, and the disguise used in the robbery.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio presided over Daniels’s trial. He was indicted on three counts: Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and felon-in-possession of a firearm. After a jury convicted him on all counts, the district court calculated a sentencing guidelines range of 78 to 97 months for the robbery and possession offenses, and imposed the mandatory minimum 7-year sentence for the firearm offense, resulting in a total sentence of 181 months. Daniels raised various pretrial and sentencing challenges, including suppression of statements, issues with counsel, discovery violations, and objections to guideline enhancements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Daniels’s appeal, which included constitutional, evidentiary, instructional, and sentencing claims. The court held that Daniels knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying substitution of counsel, and that there was no reversible error related to discovery or jury instructions. The court also affirmed the application of the physical-restraint and bodily-injury enhancements, and found no error in the calculation of Daniels’s criminal history score. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Daniels" on Justia Law

HRT Enterprises owned an 11.8-acre parcel adjacent to Detroit’s Coleman A. Young International Airport, with about 20 percent of the property falling within a regulated runway “visibility zone” that restricted development. Over time, the City of Detroit acquired other properties in a nearby area for airport compliance but did not purchase HRT’s. By late 2008, HRT’s property had become vacant and vandalized, and HRT alleged it could no longer use, lease, or sell the property due to City actions and regulatory restrictions.HRT first sued the City in Michigan state court in 2002, alleging inverse condemnation, but the jury found for the City; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In 2008, HRT sued in federal court, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the action without prejudice because HRT had not exhausted state remedies. HRT then filed a second state suit in 2009, which was dismissed on res judicata grounds; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. HRT did not seek further review.In 2012, HRT filed the present action in federal court, alleging a de facto taking under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the City’s preclusion arguments, granted summary judgment to HRT on liability, and held that a taking had occurred, leaving the date for the jury. A first jury found the taking occurred in 2009 and awarded $4.25 million; the court ordered remittitur to $2 million, then a second jury, after a new trial, awarded $1.97 million.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that HRT’s claim was ripe, not barred by claim or issue preclusion, that the district court properly granted summary judgment on liability, and that its remittitur decision was not an abuse of discretion. View "HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

HRT Enterprises pursued a takings claim against the City of Detroit after losing a jury verdict in state court in 2005. Subsequently, HRT filed suit in federal court in 2008, alleging a post-2005 violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the federal action, citing the requirement from Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), to exhaust state remedies first. HRT then returned to state court, where its claim was dismissed on claim preclusion grounds, a decision affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. After the state court denied compensation, HRT initiated a federal § 1983 action in 2012. The case was stayed when the City filed for bankruptcy, prompting HRT to participate in bankruptcy proceedings to protect its compensation rights. Ultimately, the bankruptcy court excepted HRT’s takings claim from discharge, allowing the federal case to proceed. After two jury trials, the district court entered judgment for HRT in September 2023.Following its success, HRT moved for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, presenting billing records that included work from related state and bankruptcy proceedings. The district court applied a 33% discount to the claimed hours due to commingled and poorly described entries, set an average hourly rate, and awarded $720,486.25, which included expert witness fees. Both parties appealed aspects of the fee award to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred by concluding it had no discretion to award fees for work performed in the related state-court and bankruptcy proceedings, as such fees are recoverable when the work is necessary to advance the federal litigation. The court also found the district court erred in awarding expert witness fees under § 1988(c) in a § 1983 action, as the statute does not authorize such fees for § 1983 claims. The appellate court vacated the fee award and remanded for recalculation consistent with its opinion. View "HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

A research scientist who had worked for over a decade at a public university in Ohio coauthored several well-regarded articles during her tenure. After she left the university for a new position, allegations of research misconduct surfaced regarding some of her publications. The university convened an investigative committee, as required by federal regulations due to its receipt of federal funding. The committee found that she had committed research misconduct and recommended barring her from future university employment, retracting or correcting certain articles, and reported its findings to relevant journals and her current employer. The scientist alleged that the committee deviated from standard investigatory procedures, failed to provide exculpatory evidence, and did not require proof of intent or recklessness.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed her complaint, which had sought equitable relief under federal and state law. The court held that sovereign immunity shielded the university’s Board of Trustees and the officials sued in their official capacities from most claims. It found several claims time-barred and determined that the remaining constitutional claims, including due process and equal protection, failed on the merits. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against individuals in their personal capacities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that sovereign immunity barred all claims against the Board of Trustees and all state-law claims against the officials in their official capacities. As to the remaining federal due process claims, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to identify a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the stigma-plus doctrine and that the alleged conduct—even if malicious or in violation of confidentiality regulations—did not amount to conscience-shocking behavior under substantive due process standards. View "Pichiorri v. Burghes" on Justia Law

Luther Poynter was incarcerated at the Barren County Detention Center in Kentucky for contempt of court related to unpaid child support. After a brief period in COVID-19 observation, he was moved to a general-population cell with two other detainees, Scotty Wix and Timothy Guess. Both Wix and Guess had extensive histories of violent behavior and multiple documented assaults against other detainees while in the facility. Shortly after Poynter entered the cell, Guess and Wix attacked him without apparent provocation, causing a traumatic brain injury and lasting physical impairment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky reviewed the case after Poynter, through his guardian, sued the jailer and Barren County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the county, concluding there was insufficient evidence of a constitutional violation or municipal liability, and held that Poynter had not shown he was placed at a substantial risk of harm or that reasonable steps were not taken to abate that risk.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Poynter had presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Barren County had a custom of failing to properly classify detainees with violent histories, recklessly disregarded a known risk, and that this failure caused Poynter’s injuries. The Sixth Circuit clarified that municipal liability can attach even without identifying a specific individual as the violator, so long as the unconstitutional harm resulted from a municipal policy or custom. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Poynter v. Bennett" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are mental health counselors who provide “talk therapy” services, including counseling to minors, guided by their Catholic faith. Their services consist exclusively of spoken words, and they do not use physical or aversive techniques. Some of their clients, including minors with parental consent, seek counseling to address issues related to gender identity or sexual orientation, such as wanting to align their gender identity with their biological sex or to reduce same-sex attraction in accordance with their religious beliefs. The plaintiffs assert an ethical and religious duty to help clients pursue such goals if requested.In 2023, Michigan enacted laws forbidding licensed therapists from engaging in “conversion therapy” with minors, defined as efforts to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity, but specifically permitting counseling that assists with gender transition. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, seeking a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of these laws, arguing that the prohibition restricts their speech based on its content and viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the counseling in question was conduct, not speech, for constitutional purposes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing and disagreed with the district court’s characterization of the therapy as conduct rather than speech. The court held that the Michigan law is a content- and viewpoint-based restriction on speech and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. The court determined that the State did not demonstrate a sufficient justification for the restriction, and that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for prompt entry of an injunction preventing enforcement of the law during the case. View "Catholic Charities of Jackson v. Whitmer" on Justia Law