Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A defendant with a prior felony conviction was found with a firearm while on supervised release, in violation of federal law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms. The conduct leading to the indictment included absconding from supervision and being discovered with a gun, which also violated the terms of his supervised release. He moved to dismiss the federal indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him, relying on recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted the motion to dismiss, finding the relevant federal statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. The district court placed the burden on the government to justify the restriction, considered only the defendant's felony convictions (not his entire criminal record), and did not account for his supervised release status. The government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.While the appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit issued new precedent clarifying the proper standard for reviewing Second Amendment challenges. This precedent shifted the burden to the defendant to show he is not dangerous and required courts to consider the full criminal history and supervised release status. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that the district court had not applied the correct legal standard and that the existing record was insufficient for an individualized dangerousness determination. The appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss, instructing the district court to apply the correct legal standard consistent with current circuit precedent and to provide the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate he is not dangerous. View "United States v. Hostettler" on Justia Law

An agent employed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement supervised participants in an Alternatives-to-Detention program, which allowed him significant discretion over their conditions, such as monitoring protocols and the handling of their passports. The agent engaged in sexual relations with multiple women under his supervision, violating agency policy. After one participant reported his behavior, an investigation revealed further evidence of misconduct, including deleted photos and communications. The agent attempted to impede the investigation by providing lenient supervision to a participant in exchange for her silence. One supervisee accused the agent of sexual assault, testifying to repeated coerced encounters.A jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio convicted the agent on several counts, including depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law, obstructing a sex-trafficking investigation, witness tampering, and destruction of records. The district court sentenced him to 144 months in prison. During trial, the court excused an ill juror during deliberations, which the defendant challenged as an abuse of discretion. He also argued that multiple counts were improperly multiplicitous, raising double jeopardy concerns, and challenged several sentencing enhancements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing the juror due to medical necessity. The appellate court found no plain error regarding multiplicity, as each contested count required proof of distinct elements or conduct. The court also upheld the sentencing enhancements, finding no error in applying an obstruction of justice enhancement to pre-investigation conduct under the amended Sentencing Guidelines, no impermissible double counting, and no error regarding the sentencing guidelines in relation to statutory maximums. The requirement that the defendant register as a sex offender was also affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence in all respects. View "United States v. Golobic" on Justia Law

Two physicians who operated a pain management clinic and laboratory were indicted on multiple federal charges, including conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances, health care fraud, and making false statements relating to health care matters. In exchange for the government dropping the majority of charges, both defendants pled guilty to a single count of making false statements about health care matters. The plea agreements included stipulations that they submitted nearly 3,000 claims to government health benefit programs for unnecessary drug screens, receiving over $166,000 in payments, and contained waivers of their right to appeal the conviction or sentence unless the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio sentenced each defendant to five years of probation, ordered restitution of the full amount defrauded to be paid jointly and severally, and imposed a fine of $125,000 on each. At sentencing, the defendants objected to the fines as procedurally improper, unsupported by the record, and unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected these arguments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the appellate waivers in the plea agreements barred the defendants’ challenges. The court held that the waivers precluded their arguments regarding procedural and substantive unreasonableness of the fines. Regarding the Eighth Amendment claim, the court concluded that, even if not barred, the argument failed because the fines were not grossly disproportional to the stipulated offense conduct, which included the full fraudulent scheme and resulting harm. The court found the fines were well below the statutory maximum and appropriate given the seriousness and scope of the offense. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of the fines. View "United States v. Mukhdomi" on Justia Law

The case centers on a series of lawsuits initiated by an individual against the City of Athens, Tennessee, its officials, and employees, stemming from events related to the City’s annual fireworks show. In 2022, due to COVID-19 precautions, attendance at the show was restricted to City employees and their families. The plaintiff, objecting to the exclusion of the general public, attended the event in protest and began filming, which led to confrontations with City employees and ultimately police involvement. Subsequent disputes, including statements made by City officials regarding settlement negotiations and the cancellation of future fireworks shows, prompted the plaintiff to file multiple lawsuits alleging defamation and First Amendment retaliation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee reviewed the plaintiff’s claims in several cases. It granted summary judgment or dismissed the actions for failure to state a claim, rejected motions to recuse the assigned judges, and, in each case, awarded sanctions and attorneys’ fees to the defendants. The plaintiff and his attorney appealed the sanctions and recusal orders, but not the merits of the underlying claims, which had already been dismissed or affirmed in previous appeals or were unreviewable due to procedural defects. Prior appellate proceedings, including one in which the appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute, precluded reconsideration of the underlying merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed only the sanctions and recusal orders. Applying abuse of discretion and de novo review where appropriate, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court properly denied recusal and correctly imposed sanctions. The appellate court found the plaintiff’s claims were frivolous, often barred by immunity or privilege, and part of a pattern of harassing litigation. The court affirmed the district court’s awards of attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-113, as well as the denial of the recusal motions. View "Whiting v. City of Athens" on Justia Law

Police responded to a domestic violence report in which a woman’s daughter informed emergency responders that her mother’s boyfriend had assaulted her mother and was armed with a gun. Officers were told the suspect’s name, his car model, and that he was armed. Upon arrival, the officers spoke with both the victim and her daughter, who confirmed the assault and that the suspect had threatened the victim with a gun, describing it as “small.” The suspect was seen leaving the apartment building, and despite a canine search and a pat-down after his detention near his orange Dodge, neither he nor the gun was initially located. A search of the car, using the suspect’s keys, revealed a pistol under the front passenger seat.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan reviewed the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun found in the vehicle, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, holding that officers had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime—a gun used in a reported assault—would be found in the defendant’s vehicle based on the information provided by witnesses and police observations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether officers had probable cause for the search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The court held that the officers had a “fair probability” to believe the gun would be in the car, given the eyewitness reports, the absence of the gun on the suspect or in the immediate area, and the fact that the suspect was found in the vehicle. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion, concluding the search was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Four individuals alleged that they owned funds subject to Ohio’s unclaimed property regime and that their funds were set to escheat, or transfer, to the state as of January 1, 2026, due to recent amendments to Ohio’s Unclaimed Funds Act. The Act requires holders of unclaimed funds to remit those funds to the state after a period of dormancy, with additional amendments providing that funds held for ten years or more would escheat to the state, although owners would still have ten additional years to claim an equivalent amount, with interest, less expenses.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against state officials responsible for implementing the Act. They argued that the statutory regime violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and various Ohio laws. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the escheatment of their funds, claiming they received insufficient notice and would suffer irreparable harm. The district court denied the request, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated irreparable harm, particularly since they could still claim the funds from the state after escheatment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable harm because they retained a statutory avenue to recover their funds with interest after escheatment and could seek a monetary judgment if their constitutional claims succeeded. The court further determined that the plaintiffs either had actual notice of their funds or failed to identify specific property at risk, so no likelihood of irreparable harm was shown. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. View "Bleick v. Maxfield" on Justia Law

James Williams, at midnight on New Year’s Day in Canton, Ohio, fired numerous shots into the air from a patio enclosed by a wooden privacy fence as part of a celebratory tradition. Officer Robert Huber, responding to the gunfire, arrived at the scene and witnessed Williams begin a second round of shooting. Without announcing his presence or issuing a warning, Huber shot Williams through the fence, resulting in Williams’s death. Williams’s wife sued Huber and the City of Canton, alleging excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and municipal liability.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio reviewed Huber’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Williams had turned his rifle toward Huber or continued firing into the air, and whether celebratory gunfire was common in Canton at that time. Based on these unresolved factual questions, the district court denied Huber’s motion for summary judgment, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude Huber lacked probable cause to believe Williams posed a threat sufficient to justify deadly force.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Williams’s wife, Huber violated the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force without probable cause to believe Williams posed a threat of serious physical harm. The court further concluded that this violation was clearly established law in an “obvious” case, as no reasonable officer would have believed it permissible to shoot a person committing a misdemeanor—discharging a gun into the air in celebration—without warning or evidence of a threat. View "Williams v. City of Canton" on Justia Law

A company sought to erect a digital billboard in a small Ohio municipality but was prevented from doing so by the local billboard ordinance, which included restrictions on size, location, and type of billboards permitted. The ordinance specifically banned “variable message” (digital) signs and implemented a “cap and replace” rule, allowing new billboards only if older ones were removed. The ordinance also contained several exemptions, including one for “public service” signs, which were allowed to display information like time or weather if not used for advertising.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the municipality, upholding the ordinance against the company’s First Amendment challenges. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that the exemption for public service signs was an unconstitutional, content-based restriction under the First Amendment, but remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the invalid exemption was severable from the rest of the ordinance.On remand, the district court found that the unconstitutional provision could be severed and that the remainder of the ordinance survived intermediate scrutiny, granting judgment again in favor of the municipality. The company appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the public-service exemption was severable under Ohio law, applying the three-part test from Geiger v. Geiger. The court further held that the remaining provisions of the ordinance were content-neutral and survived intermediate scrutiny because they were narrowly tailored to significant governmental interests such as traffic safety and aesthetics. The court also held that the company was not entitled to damages or attorney fees, as it was not a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). View "Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder and robbery of two men in a Kentucky convenience store in 1987. After being identified as a suspect, he confessed to the crimes but later asserted an insanity defense at trial. His mental health was evaluated by state experts, who found him competent and not suffering from a mental illness that would have excused his conduct. At trial, the defense presented testimony from the petitioner and a psychologist, but the jury found him guilty on all counts and recommended the death penalty. The penalty phase included limited mitigation evidence and testimony.Following his conviction and sentencing, the petitioner pursued direct appeals and post-conviction relief in Kentucky state courts, including before the Kentucky Supreme Court, and sought certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, which was denied multiple times. He then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, asserting several constitutional claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions on the insanity defense, and cumulative error. The district court denied relief, but granted certificates of appealability on several issues.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit first held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) is constitutional, rejecting the argument that it unconstitutionally restricts federal habeas review. Applying AEDPA deference, the court found that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the jury instructions and most of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims were neither contrary to nor unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law. Claims not subject to AEDPA deference failed under de novo review because the petitioner could not show prejudice. The cumulative error claim was found to be procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the habeas petition in full. View "Sanders v. Plappert" on Justia Law

Scott Williams was elected to serve on the Addison Community School Board for a six-year term and was chosen by his fellow board members to act as president for one year. During his presidency, Williams had a dispute with a staff member, leading to allegations that he harassed staff and improperly requested confidential information. Following an investigation and resolution drafted by board members, the Board voted to censure Williams and remove him from the presidency. Williams was not informed of the allegations against him before the meeting where his removal was voted upon.Williams filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging, among other claims, a violation of the Fair and Just Treatment clause of the Michigan Constitution and asserting that the school district was liable under respondeat superior. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, including the federal constitutional claims, and denied Williams’s motion for partial summary judgment on his Fair and Just Treatment claim. The district court chose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims after dismissing the federal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court abused its discretion by retaining supplemental jurisdiction over Williams’s Fair and Just Treatment claim. The appellate court found that the state law claim presented a novel and complex issue under Michigan law, particularly because Michigan courts have not yet determined whether a private right of action exists under the Fair and Just Treatment clause. The court held that, given the dismissal of all federal claims and the complexity of the remaining state constitutional issue, the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. As a result, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment on the Fair and Just Treatment claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss this claim without prejudice. View "Williams v. Addison Community Schools" on Justia Law