Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1991 Charlene filed a paternity suit naming McCarley as the father of her younger son. McCarley stated that he would kill Charlene before paying support. In January 1992 a neighbor found Charlene dead, with a strap around her neck. Charlene’s children were at home. Three-year-old D.P. repeatedly looked at uniformed officers and stated: “It was him. He hurt mommy.” Days later, in the presence of Charlene’s mother, D.P. stated “Policeman hit my mommy.” A child psychologist elicited similar statements. In 1995, officers made a surprise visit to McCarley’s home on an unrelated matter. In his garage, they saw a deputy sheriff’s jacket and cap; remembering D.P.’s statements, they confiscated the items. After a second trial in 2007, McCarley was convicted for aggravated murder. The district court denied habeas relief, finding “harmless error” in the Ohio court’s unreasonable application of clearly established Sixth Amendment law by allowing a psychologist to read into evidence the testimonial hearsay statements of a three-and-a-half year-old declarant, where the declarant was not subject to prior cross-examination. On remand for further consideration in light of the 2015 Supreme Court decisions, Davis v. Ayala and Kelly v. McCarley, the Sixth Circuit again reversed: even under the appropriate deferential standard of review, the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law and that error was not harmless. View "McCarley v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Jones committed armed robberies in Michigan. Glenn was his appointed attorney. By letter, Jones asked the court to appoint a different attorney, but never requested to represent himself. On the first morning of trial, Jones explained that he was unhappy with his attorney. The court disagreed with Jones’s claim that Glenn was unprepared and denied Jones’s request to represent himself. Jones did not raise the issue again and, represented by counsel, appealed his convictions, unsuccessfully raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to call certain witnesses), insufficiency of the evidence, and cruel and unusual punishment. He did not raise the self-representation issue. Jones then sought relief from judgment, arguing deprivation of: the right to represent himself; effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and due process. The trial court denied Jones’s motion, holding that Jones’s self-representation claim lacked merit, and that Jones could not establish “actual prejudice” to excuse his procedural default. Jones then sought federal habeas relief. The district court held that denial of Jones’s request to represent himself satisfied 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) as an unreasonable application of Faretta and that appellate counsel’s failure to raise the Faretta issue gave Jones “cause” and “prejudice” to excuse procedural default. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Jones cannot get around the procedural default, nor would he prevail on the merits. View "Jones v. Bell" on Justia Law

In 1993, the Patereks, owners of PME, an injection molding company, relocated the business from Macomb County to the Village Armada, after purchasing a former high school auto shop. The Planning Commission issued the required Special Approval Land Use permit (SALU) with restrictions. Over the following years, the Patereks were occasionally in violation of the SALU, obtained modifications, and expanded the business. Paterek became involved in local government and was sometimes at odds with other local politicians, including a planning commissioner. Patereks ultimately filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, after the village declined perform inspections and to issue a certificate of occupancy for a 2013 expansion. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that a jury could reasonably find that defendants retaliated against Patereks for having complained about officials, in violation of the First Amendment; that defendants arbitrarily and capriciously ticketed Patereks, in violation of substantive due process; that defendants, due to their animus against Patereks, subjected PME to disparate treatment, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and that the district court erroneously denied Patereks’ civil contempt motion. View "Paterek v. Village of Armada" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury of an unknown racial composition convicted Ambrose of armed robbery, carjacking, and felony-firearm possession. At jury selection, Ambrose did not object to the racial composition of the venire. In 2002, after Ambrose had exhausted direct appeals, the Grand Rapids Press published a story about a computer glitch in Kent County that had systematically excluded African-Americans from the jury pool for several months. Following these revelations, Ambrose unsuccessfully moved for state post-conviction relief, alleging that his Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section right had been violated. Ambrose then filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, which the district court conditionally granted. The Sixth Circuit remanded for determination of whether there was actual prejudice. The district court subsequently found that Ambrose had sufficiently demonstrated actual prejudice to excuse his procedural default and had established a prima facie violation of his fair-cross-section right. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Ambrose failed to show actual prejudice. “The question is not whether the petitioner missed his chance to stand trial before a more merciful jury panel or a panel with a particular racial balance, but rather whether there is a reasonable probability that a different jury would have reached a different result.” His argument “sounds much like the stereotyping arguments courts have sought to avoid,” View "Ambrose v. Booker" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury convicted Garcia-Dorantes of murder in the second degree and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than the crime of murder. Before his trial started, Garcia-Dorantes failed to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the racial composition of the jury venire. In 2002, the Grand Rapids Press published a story about a computer glitch in the Kent County software that had systematically excluded African-Americans from the jury pool from April 2001 through early 2002. As a result of the article, Garcia-Dorantes included a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claim in his direct appeal, which the state courts denied as procedurally defaulted due to his failure to object to the composition of the jury venire at trial. Garcia-Dorantes then filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The district court found that Garcia-Dorantes had sufficiently demonstrated cause and actual prejudice to excuse his procedural default and had established a prima facie violation of his Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section right. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Garcia-Dorantes v. Warren" on Justia Law

In 2007, a jury convicted Etherton of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. After exhausting both direct and collateral appellate review procedures in Michigan, Etherton timely filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court denied Etherton’s petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and ordered issuance of a writ. Certain claims had been procedurally defaulted: that the anonymous tip presented at trial denied Etherton’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment; that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a witness during closing argument; and that Etherton’s counsel’s failure to object to the anonymous tip, as well as other alleged shortcomings, amounted to prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel. Etherton is entitled to review based on ineffective appellate counsel. Appellate counsel failed to argue that failing to object to the anonymous tip constituted ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because there was a Confrontation Clause violation that resulted in substantial prejudice, there is a reasonable probability that Michigan appellate courts would have found trial counsel constitutionally ineffective. The failure to include that argument was, therefore, prejudicial, and amounted to deficient performance of appellate counsel. It was an unreasonable application of federal law to hold otherwise. View "Etherton v. Rivard" on Justia Law

While Holland was in custody for a parole violation, detectives interviewed Holland about criminal sexual assaults that had occurred in the area. Holland asserted his right to an attorney and the interview ceased. Six days after Holland had requested an attorney—and before one had been provided—police again met with Holland, to discuss the 1991 murder of Lisa Shaw. Holland was to serve as the key prosecution witness at that murder trial, which was scheduled to begin in February 2006. After Holland changed his story regarding Shaw’s murder—a shift that effectively placed him at the scene of the crime—police asked a polygraph examiner to interview Holland. The examiner was instructed to ask only about Shaw’s murder, and nothing else, and to focus on obtaining a witness statement. During the interview, however, Holland confessed that he had killed Shaw and committed several additional crimes. Holland’s statements led to six separate state convictions, all of which employed Holland’s confessions as critical state’s evidence. On federal habeas review, the district court ruled that the confessions were admissible because Holland was not in “Miranda custody” during the January 2006 interviews, and that Holland’s statements were made voluntarily. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, also agreeing that any violation of Holland’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was harmless. View "Holland v. Rivard" on Justia Law

Hayden acted as a confidential informant in a Martin, Tennessee investigation into felons in possession of firearms. Hayden contacted her acquaintance, Taylor; Hayden testified that he told her that he had stolen pistols and a shotgun. Law enforcement wired Hayden’s car with an audio transmitter and gave her controlled funds. Taylor eventually got into Hayden’s vehicle with a disassembled shotgun. Police stopped Hayden’s vehicle and apprehended Taylor. Officers reported they found the shotgun between the seat and the door where Taylor had been sitting. Taylor appealed his conviction and sentence of 262 months, for possession of a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j), and as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the court erred in giving a jury instruction for constructive possession of the firearm, in addition to an actual possession instruction; there was insufficient evidence to convict of possession of a stolen firearm; and sentencing was procedurally unreasonable because the court did not explicitly discuss whether a shorter sentence was warranted because the age at which Taylor would be released would decrease his danger to the community. The Supreme Court’s 2015 holding that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague, did not affect Taylor’s ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Police received a report of a passenger repeatedly striking a female driver on 1-94, with a license plate number. Officers initiated a traffic stop, handcuffed passenger Baynes, and placed him in the patrol vehicle, without incident. The officer claims that he checked the handcuffs to ensure they were not too tight. The driver, Baynes’ girlfriend, eventually admitted that Baynes had hit her. The officers observed a long bruise on her right arm and transported Baynes seven miles to the Macomb County Jail. The time it took is unclear. Baynes testified that he complained that the handcuffs were too tight. Following his release Baynes was diagnosed with “bilateral radial sensory neuropathy from handcuffs.” The deputies acknowledged knowing that right handcuffs could cause nerve damage. Baynes testified that he takes 15 medications for other issues, that told the intake officer that he needed medication, and that he told people he was having difficulty breathing. Baynes later learned that there was mold in the jail. Baynes claimed that his “condition worsened,” after his jail stay. Baynes submitted blood tests, showing abnormal levels of mold. The court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for Baynes’ claim of excessive force. Baynes’ claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need was insufficient to withstand summary judgment. View "Baynes v. Cleland" on Justia Law

His family was told that Benton, a pretrial detainee, died of natural causes in the Lucas County jail in 2004. In 2008, after an FBI investigation, family members discovered that jail employees had disconnected medical equipment while returning him from the hospital after treatment for seizures, beat Benton and sprayed him with chemicals, shoved Benton to a cement floor while he was in handcuffs, held him in a chokehold to the point of unconsciousness, left him to die in his cell, and then engaged in a cover-up with the aid of their Sheriff and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The civil suit was stayed while two officers were criminally prosecuted for their roles in Benton’s death. Both were convicted and sentenced. The district court denied motions by Officer Schmeltz, Sergeant Gray, and Sheriff Telb, that asserted qualified and state statutory immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the need for “expeditious handling” and that even Telb ratified the conduct of his subordinates who violated Benton’s clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights. View "Coley v. Lucas Cnty." on Justia Law