Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At a bar, Gradisher had three or four beers and a shot of whiskey. Gradisher noticed the outline of a gun in the pocket of a man sitting to his left. Gradisher made a comment, causing a heated exchange. Gradisher went home and drank more beer. Gradisher then called 911 from his cell phone to report the man with the gun. On the first call, he refused to give his name and hung up. The operator called back. Gradisher and the operator got into a heated exchange, causing the operator to hang up, which prompted Gradisher to call 911 twice more, using obscenities. Akron officers went to his residence. Gradisher locked his door. They feared that someone might need help, broke down the door, entered, and found Gradisher under a sheet in his basement. An officer used a taser because Gradisher allegedly resisted arrest. Gradisher was found guilty of improperly using the 911 system. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for excessive force, warrantless entry, malicious prosecution, and common-law torts. The district court rejected all claims. Finding genuine disputes of material facts related to excessive force in tasing Gradisher, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment on those and state-law causes of action for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and gross neglect, but otherwise affirmed. View "Gradisher v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

At a bar, Gradisher had three or four beers and a shot of whiskey. Gradisher noticed the outline of a gun in the pocket of a man sitting to his left. Gradisher made a comment, causing a heated exchange. Gradisher went home and drank more beer. Gradisher then called 911 from his cell phone to report the man with the gun. On the first call, he refused to give his name and hung up. The operator called back. Gradisher and the operator got into a heated exchange, causing the operator to hang up, which prompted Gradisher to call 911 twice more, using obscenities. Akron officers went to his residence. Gradisher locked his door. They feared that someone might need help, broke down the door, entered, and found Gradisher under a sheet in his basement. An officer used a taser because Gradisher allegedly resisted arrest. Gradisher was found guilty of improperly using the 911 system. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for excessive force, warrantless entry, malicious prosecution, and common-law torts. The district court rejected all claims. Finding genuine disputes of material facts related to excessive force in tasing Gradisher, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment on those and state-law causes of action for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and gross neglect, but otherwise affirmed. View "Gradisher v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

Morristown Police stopped a rental vehicle driven by Bah for speeding in a construction zone. During the traffic stop, officers placed Bah under arrest for driving on a suspended license and detained passenger Harvey for “investigatory purposes” after discovering approximately 72 credit, debit, and gift cards in the rental car’s glove compartment and trunk. Bah and Harvey filed motions to suppress evidence of the credit, debit, and gift cards and cell phones found in the car, alleging that the officers had violated their Fourth Amendment rights by: unlawfully searching the rental car; scanning the magnetic strips on numerous credit, debit, and gift cards without first obtaining a warrant; performing a warrantless search of a Blackberry cell phone; and unlawfully detaining Harvey following Bah’s arrest. The district court denied their motions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Harvey did not have standing to contest the search of Bah’s rental vehicle- Harvey was reasonably detained during the traffic stop, the warrantless search of Bah’s Blackberry did not taint the subsequent cell phone searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; and scanning the magnetic strips of credit and gift cards was not a search. View "United States v. Harvey" on Justia Law

In 1985, a Tennessee state jury convicted Wright of two counts of pre-meditated murder in the first degree. Wright was sentenced to life imprisonment for one and sentenced to death for the other. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed Wright’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Three sets of unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings followed. In 1999, Wright sought federal habeas relief with appointed counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial. In 2013, Wright moved from judgment under Rule 60(b), asserting that Martinez, a 2012 Supreme Court decision, changed the law of procedural default such that, if his case were reopened, the court could reach the merits of claims previously dismissed as procedurally defaulted. The court closed the action without prejudice until the Supreme Court’s 2013 issuance of Trevino, and later denied Wright’s renewed Rule motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Rule 60(b)(6) relief is available only in “exceptional or extraordinary circumstances,” and Wright did not demonstrate such circumstances. Neither Martinez nor Trevino sufficiently changed the balance of the factors for consideration under Rule 60(b)(6) to warrant relief. Those decisions were “not a change in the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, but rather an adjustment of an equitable ruling by the Supreme Court as to when federal statutory relief is available.” View "Wright v. Warden, Riverbend Maximum Sec. Inst." on Justia Law

After being released from a Pennsylvania state correctional institution where he had been imprisoned for aggravated assault with a firearm specification and for a separate weapons offense, Lee was a parolee living in Ohio when his parole officer received a tip about “possible weapons going in and out of [Lee’s] apartment.” The next day, officers searched the apartment without a warrant and discovered a firearm. Charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, Lee moved to suppress the evidence from the search. After the district court denied Lee’s motion, he entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 53 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the officers likely lacked reasonable suspicion, Lee’s co-resident admitted them and Lee verbally consented to the search. His parole conditions stipulated that Lee would be subject to warrantless searches, pursuant to the Ohio Code, which allows officers to “search, with or without a warrant,” a parolee’s person, residence, vehicle, or other property if they have “reasonable grounds to believe” that the parolee is violating the law or otherwise not complying with the conditions of parole. Lee signed a copy of the conditions, indicating that he had read and understood them. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

The Yangs listed their building for sale. In February 2011 the restaurant leasing the property closed. The Yangs never sold the building or found another tenant. They continued to pay property taxes. The building was vandalized and started to fail. In October 2011, city officials posted an abandonment notice and mailed a copy to the owner listed in its files. The notice went to the abandoned building and named the previous owner. Nine months later, the city posted a “repair/demolish” notice and sent notices by certified mailing to the property’s address; the notices were returned. After a title search, which identified the Yangs, the city sent certified mail notices to their home in September 2012. Having no response, the city scheduled a November 1 hearing about demotion and sent the Yangs notice by regular mail, with a copy to their realtor. The post office returned as “unclaimed” the certified mailing. The non-certified mailing was not returned. The Yangs did not appear. Demolition was approved. The city mailed another notice to the home address, but got no response. In January 2013, the city razed the building and mailed a $22,500 bill. The Yings claim to remember getting mail that said something about fixing up the building but ignoring it and that they did not receive notice concerning demolition. The Yangs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the city provided all of the notice that was reasonably due. View "Yang v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Two men died in a 2005 shooting in Oaxaca, Mexico. Petitioner, a legal permanent resident of the U.S., where he had lived for more than 15 years was the shooter. Petitioner frequently traveled to Mexico, where his wife and children lived.The town clerk held a meeting. Petitioner’s family and a victim's family signed an agreement, drafted by the court, identifying Petitioner as the person “who committed the homicide” and providing that his family would pay 50,000 pesos to the victim's family. Petitioner’s wife understood “the agreement resolved the case," because the family of the other victim, “never claimed that Avelino committed any crime.” Unbeknownst to Petitioner, a cousin who was not a party to the agreement reported the homicide to the attorney general. Oaxacan authorities issued a warrant on charges of homicide with “unfair advantage." Meanwhile, Petitioner returned to the U.S., and lived openly under his own name. The Mexican government made no effort to locate him or to obtain extradition. In 2012, Mexico cited the “urgency” clause of the extradition treaty to request his arrest. Petitioner, who had obtained citizenship in 2010, was working to obtain permanent resident status for his family. He made several trips to Mexico to meet consular officials. Neither Mexican nor U.S. authorities detained him or informed him of the warrant. Petitioner was arrested in 2013, and certified as extraditable. He unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus, challenging certification of extraditability. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the treaty incorporates the Speedy Trial Clause. View "Martinez v. United States" on Justia Law

On the first day of Hill’s criminal trial, as potential jurors were on their way to the courtroom, Hill stated that he wanted to represent himself. The judge denied the request. A jury convicted Hill of armed robbery and carjacking. As a third-felony habitual offender, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20-40 years for each conviction. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Hill’s self-representation request was not knowingly and intelligently made. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hill’s right to self-representation was not violated because his request was untimely and disruptive. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. The district court denied Hill’s timely habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act to reduce delays and to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed denial of defendant’s request as “not timely” because “granting the request at that moment would have disrupted, unduly inconvenienced, and burdened the administration of the court’s business.” A judge may fairly infer that a defendant’s last-minute decision to represent himself would cause delay. Under these circumstances, upholding of the trial court’s factual determination was debatable in light of the whole record and not unreasonable. View "Hill v. Curtin" on Justia Law

In 1989 Williams was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. After filing direct appeals and seeking post-conviction relief in state and federal courts, Williams filed a post-conviction petition in state court, based on the Supreme Court’s “Atkins” decision, arguing that he is ineligible for the death penalty because he is intellectually disabled. Ohio courts rejected Williams’s petition. The district court denied Williams’s federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for issuance of a conditional writ, finding the state court’s application of law with regard to whether Williams is intellectually disabled under Atkins was contrary to clearly established Federal law. The court noted refusal to consider past evidence of intellectual disability in determining whether Williams has significantly sub-average mental functioning and adaptive skills limitations. There was no basis for the Ohio Court of Appeals to have assumed, as it apparently did, that most low childhood IQ scores are the result of developmental delays. View "Williams v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Tennessee previously recognized only statewide political parties as automatically entitled to have their candidates identified on the ballot by their party affiliation. In 2011, the state created a new designation, “recognized minor party,” for any group that successfully filed a petition conforming to requirements established by the coordinator of elections, bearing, at minimum the signatures of registered voters equal to at least 2.5% of the total number of votes cast for gubernatorial candidates in the most recent election of governor, Tenn. Code 2-1-104(a)(24). In 2012, Tennessee again amended its statutes, requiring recognized minor parties to satisfy specific requirements to maintain their status as a recognized minor party beyond the current election year. Two minor parties filed suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for plaintiffs’ on an equal-protection challenge to the ballot-retention statute, and on a First Amendment challenge to a loyalty oath requirement. The court concluded that the entirety of the statute is not invalid and vacated summary judgment on plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges to a section that simply requires a party’s rules of operation to be filed with the Tennessee Secretary of State and is unrelated to the loyalty oath requirement. View "Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett" on Justia Law