Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Deputy Gillispie, on patrol in Wellston, Michigan, saw Carpenter’s truck. Gillispie knew Carpenter from prior encounters involving Carpenter driving with a suspended license. Gillispie knew Carpenter’s history of drunk driving and resisting arrest. Gillispie pulled Carpenter over, calling for backup. Two dash-cam videos recorded as Gillispie approached and informed Carpenter that he was under arrest for driving with a suspended license. Carpenter appeared “highly agitated,” but voluntarily exited the truck. Gillispie instructed Carpenter to put his hands on the truck. Carpenter did not comply. Gillispie grabbed Carpenter’s right arm. Carpenter swung his arm back—admittedly trying to prevent handcuffing. Gillispie attempted to grab Carpenter’s left arm to place it in handcuffs. Carpenter again swung his arm in Gillispie’s direction. Gillispie did not let go. Carpenter did not comply. Gillispie performed a knee strike. Carpenter still did not comply. Bielski yelled “relax, or else you’re gonna get tasered.” Deputy Bielski tased Carpenter. The officers handcuffed him and escorted him to the cruiser. They did not use any force after they subdued Carpenter, who later pled guilty to driving with a suspended license. Carpenter sued, claiming excessive force. The officers unsuccessfully sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. When an arrestee actively resists arrest the police can constitutionally use a taser or a knee strike to subdue him. View "Rudlaff v. Gillispie" on Justia Law

Woolbright was convicted of wanton murder, receiving stolen property with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and first degree possession of and trafficking a controlled substance. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. In 2006, Woolbright filed a pro se motion to vacate. Appointed counsel did not file a supplemental memorandum but requested leave for Woolbright to file one himself. The trial court found that no evidentiary hearing was required and denied the petition. New counsel was appointed on appeal. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. Woolbright filed a pro se federal habeas corpus petition, alleging seven instances of ineffective assistance that were not adjudicated on the merits in state court, including claims not raised in the 2006 petition or appeal: trial counsel’s failure to: interview exculpatory witnesses; object to prosecutorial misconduct during sentencing; investigate the ownership of a second gun found at the scene; and make a double jeopardy objection to charges of both possession and trafficking. Additional claims concerning counsel’s failure to: prepare a defense to receiving stolen property or object to an improper jury instruction on that charge; move for a directed verdict on grounds that the jury verdict was not unanimous; and object to the jury instruction on wanton murder were raised in the 2006 petition but not raised on appeal. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to vacate the certificate of appealability; affirmed denial with respect to claims raised in the 2006 petition; but reversed with respect to the claims not raised. View "Woolbright v. Crews" on Justia Law

In 1986, 23-year-old West and 17-year-old Martin drove to the home of 15-year-old Sheila, who had rebuffed Martin’s advances. They murdered Sheila and her mother. Sheila was raped and suffered 17 stab wounds, including 14 torture-type cuts, inflicted while she was alive. Police arrested the two. West’s parents hired McConnell for $10,000; the court appointed co-counsel. West admitted that he was present during the crime but denied harming either victim. He testified that Martin threatened his life and forced him to rape Sheila. A jury convicted West of first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, and larceny, and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected his appeal. The state court rejected his petition for post-conviction relief, interpreting his ineffective assistance claims, relating to McConnell’s handling of information that West’s parents abused him, as conflict-of-interest claims. West filed his federal section 2254 petition. The district court dismissed; the Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, West sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). The Sixth Circuit dismissed because West had not set forth grounds warranting a successive habeas petition. In 2013, West filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, arguing that, under the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Martinez, the ineffectiveness of his state post-conviction counsel excused the procedural default of that claim. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Martinez, (expanded by Trevino (2013)), applies to Tennessee cases, but did not apply to West’s conflict-of-interest claim, which was defaulted at the state post-conviction appellate proceeding, rather than initial-review proceeding. View "West v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Lee was transferred to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) following his conviction for criminal sexual conduct involving adult male victims. Lee claims that while at MDOC’s Reception Center for intake, correctional officers harassed him about being homosexual and made comments in front of other inmates encouraging sexual advances. Lee alleged that COs failed to act when Lee requested protection from inmates who were pursuing him. Lee claimed that he complained about staff harassment and being pursued for sex to mental health professionals, but was, nonetheless raped in his cell by unidentified inmates. Lee alleged that he went to the officer’s desk after being assaulted, asked to speak with a mental health professional, and that an unknown CO refused to give him a grievance form. Lee alleged that he submitted a “substitute grievance” on prisoner stationery. Defendants had no record of receiving this substitute grievance. Lee’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 action was filed about three years later. After the Sixth Circuit held that, as a private employee under contract, the MDOC psychiatrist was not entitled to qualified immunity, the district court found that Lee had not submitted the substitute grievance in 2007, and rejected his claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Lee v. Willey" on Justia Law

The Richland County Sheriff’s Office launched Operation Turnaround after a 2004 drug-related death and recruited Bray as a confidential informant to make undercover buys from suspected drug traffickers. DEA Agents joined the investigation and registered Bray as a DEA informant. On the basis of Bray’s controlled buys, they arrested and charged more than 20 individuals, including Webb and Price, with violating federal criminal drug laws. Later, Bray, in jail for an unrelated drug-related killing, disclosed that Lucas conspired with him to frame innocent individuals, including Webb and Price. The Department of Justice discovered that several targets, including Webb and Price, did not participate in the charged drug deals. Bray had used stand-ins to participate in the drug deals and then falsely identified each. Bray later testified that he acted on his own, but the government concluded that law-enforcement supported Bray’s false identifications by knowingly making false reports and testimony and by covering up. The district court dismissed civil rights claims by Webb and Price. The Sixth Circuit reversed a decision that Price lacked standing because he had pleaded guilty to other drug crimes and dismissal of specific malicious-prosecution, false-arrest, fabrication-of-evidence, and federal conspiracy claims. False-arrest and trespass claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act are time barred, but the court remanded state-law and remaining FTCA claims. View "Price v. Lucas" on Justia Law

The Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) received an anonymous tip that certain harness-racing drivers were fixing races in concert with known gamblers. At a hearing, the drivers asserted their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions. The state suspended their licenses to work in horse racing because for failure to comply with the conditions precedent for occupational licensing, as outlined in R431.1035, which provides that a license applicant, “shall cooperate in every way” during an investigation. The MGCB would not lift the exclusion orders unless the drivers answered questions without legal representation. The drivers unsuccessfully applied for 2011-2013 licenses, then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the district court granted MGCB summary judgment, finding that that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims for money damages against MGCB and its officials and that the MGCB was entitled to qualified immunity because the drivers failed to identify the violation of a constitutional right. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, but reversed with respect to due-process claims about the exclusions and self-incrimination claims, and remanded three issues: did the drivers request hearings on their exclusions, did their self-incrimination and due-process claims involve clearly established rights, and, if so, should an officer in the MGCB’s position have known about those rights? View "Moody v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd." on Justia Law

In 2005, Henderson, Kentucky required, “every person or business entity engaged in any business, trade, occupation, or profession” within city limits to pay 1% of its previous year’s net profits for the privilege of doing business there. The net-profits calculation depends on information reported on IRS forms. Because the 2005 law and federal tax law recognize fiscal year filers, while a previous municipal tax was based on the calendar year, the city decided to transition by taxing fiscal-year taxpayers by reference to their 2006 returns alone, essentially forgiving some tax liability. Phillips, a certified public accountant, assailed the tax before the city council and while advising his clients. Phillips did not pay his $500 bill and was convicted of a misdemeanor for failure to file. A state appellate court threw out the conviction. Phillips sued in federal court for violations of his rights to procedural due process and equal protection. The district court rejected both claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Phillips suffered no loss of property; Phillips never paid the tax. The city has not tried to collect by civil action, nor has it revoked Phillips’ license. The Constitution does not prohibit all differential enforcement of municipal laws. Administrative convenience alone can justify a tax-related distinction. View "Phillips v. McCollom" on Justia Law

The Jefferson County, Tennessee, school board, facing a budget shortfall, abolished its alternative school and contracted for its students to be educated in a program at a private, Christian school (Kingswood). The County students were exclusively within Kingswood’s day program, which did not feature deliberate religious instruction and has been recognized by the Tennessee Senate as a model alternative-school program. They were taught by state-licensed teachers and regularly met with licensed counselors. The school building did not include any religious symbols or messages. Day students were not required to pray, observe a “moment of silence,” or engage in any religious or spiritual activity. Students were required to submit a weekly form—signed by parents—that contained a quote from the Gospel of Luke: “Jesus . . . said, Suffer little children to come unto me….” Report cards contained the same Biblical text. The Kingswood website and newsletter contained some religious references. No County student or parent complained about any of Kingswood’s religious references. Teachers who lost their jobs in the abolition of the original alternative school sued, asserting an Establishment Clause violation. The district court awarded damages and an injunction. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the action involved a secular legislative purpose, did not give rise to a governmental endorsement of religion, and did not entail an excessive entanglement between the government and religion. View "Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of School Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Jerry and Linda’s niece, Whitney, often stayed overnight with them and accompanied them on camping trips. When Whitney was 12 years old, the couple divorced. Linda told Whitney’s parents that Linda’s daughter-in-law had accused Jerry of making sexual advances and that Linda was concerned about Whitney. Questioned, Whitney said that Jerry had done something to her. At retrial, Whitney testified about sexual touching and remembered that Jerry exposed himself in front of her. Linda admitted she had never seen Jerry act inappropriately toward Whitney. Andrea testified that she spent the night at Jerry’s home, that Jerry came into her room at night, and exposed himself and touched her. Andrea acknowledged inconsistencies in her testimony between the two trials but explained that she had tried to forget the experience. Jerry denied the accusations. The prosecutor and defense counsel fought openly, often making side comments. Jerry was convicted of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct but not guilty of assault with intent to commit second-degree criminal sexual conduct. His conviction was affirmed; Michigan courts also rejected his collateral attack. Jerry filed an unsuccessful habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims concerning suppressed evidence consisting of a police report with notes from Andrea’s interview and hand-written notes from Andrea’s therapist that would have demonstrated inconsistencies in Andrea’s testimony. Jerry did not establish that the state court’s resolution of his prosecutorial misconduct claims was an unreasonable application of federal law. View "Bales v. Bell" on Justia Law

McGowan is a Michigan prisoner, serving a sentence of 195-480 months for drug trafficking and firearms offenses, and a 24-month sentence for a felony firearm offense. The district court ordered habeas relief, finding that McGowan received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. The state appealed, arguing that court failed to give required deference to the contrary ruling of the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit agreed and vacated. McGowan said he understood when he rejected the prosecution’s pre-trial offer; the trial court later rejected McGowan’s assertion that he was led to believe the estimated 45-to-93-month range would apply even if the jury found him guilty on all counts, not just if he accepted the offer. McGowan’s supposed misunderstanding is directly contrary to what his counsel told him on the record. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ affirmance was duly explained and has not been shown to be based on an unreasonable determination of facts or on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The district court erroneously concluded that prejudice was established by the simple fact that McGowan received a more severe sentence as a result of the verdict than he would have received had he pled guilty. View "McGowan v. Burt" on Justia Law