Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs obtained a home loan and granted a mortgage that was eventually assigned to Bank of America (BOA). Plaintiffs defaulted in 2007. In 2011, plaintiffs received a letter explaining the right to seek a loan modification. Plaintiffs sought assistance from NMCA; met with BOA’s counsel; provided information and forms prepared with help from NMCA; and were offered reduced payments for a three-month trial period. If all trial period payments were timely, the loan would be permanently modified. Plaintiffs allege that they made the three payments, but did not receive any further information, and that BOA returned two payments. BOA offered plaintiffs a permanent loan modification, instructing plaintiffs to execute and return a loan modification agreement. Plaintiffs do not allege that they returned the agreement. BOA never received the documents. BOA sent a letter informing them that because they were in default and had not accepted the modification agreement, a nonjudicial foreclosure would proceed. Notice was published. The property was sold at a sheriff’s sale. BOA purchased the property, and executed a quitclaim deed to Federal National Mortgage Association, which filed a possession action after the redemption period expired. Six months later, plaintiffs sued, claiming Quiet Title; violations of due process rights; and illegal/improper foreclosure and sheriff’s sale. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Michigan foreclosure procedure does not violate due process. View "Garcia v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nonprofit charitable organization, solicits donations of clothing and shoes at unattended, outdoor donation bins for distribution in other countries. It locates bins at businesses that are “easily visible and accessible” with the consent of the owner. Its representatives generally collect donations weekly to avoid bin overflow. Bins are labeled so that people can report if they are full. In 2012, the city did not regulate donation bins. Plaintiff placed bins at a former grocery store and at a gas station. The city sent a letter claiming that they had “been found to create a nuisance as people leave boxes and other refuse around the containers,” denied a request for review, and removed the bins. A year later, the city council enacted a “total prohibition,” exempting the already-operational Lions Club Recycling. The ordinance states a purpose of preventing blight, protecting property values and neighborhood integrity, avoiding creation and maintenance of nuisances and ensuring safe and sanitary maintenance of properties. The Sixth Circuit affirmed entry of a preliminary injunction, finding that operation of bins to solicit and collect charitable donations qualified as protected speech and that the content-based ordinance fails strict scrutiny because it implements an overly broad, prophylactic ban on all bins so the city can avoid hypothetical nuisances or other issues that may arise in the future. View "Planet Aid v. City of St. Johns" on Justia Law

An officer stopped a rental car, in which Winters was the passenger, for speeding. The occupants’ nervous behavior, inconsistent, implausible travel plans, and suspicious rental arrangement led the officer to believe that they might be trafficking contraband. After he issued a warning ticket, the officer extended the stop for four minutes to retrieve his drug-detection dog from his cruiser, deploying his dog 24 minutes after the stop was initiated. The dog alerted to narcotics. Searching the vehicle, the officer discovered heroin in Winters’s bag on the seat. Winters was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin. He entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal denial of his suppression motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the officer unreasonably extended the stop and that the 2013 Supreme Court decision, Florida v. Jardines established that a dog sniff must be justified by probable cause, not mere reasonable suspicion. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified extending the stop. The Jardines decision is premised on special protections accorded to the home and does not alter the analysis for traffic stops. The officer was entitled to reasonably rely on binding precedent, that the use of a drug-detection dog during a lawful traffic stop does not require probable cause. View "United States v. Winters" on Justia Law

Painesville Police Department Officers, initially responding to a noise issue, entered the Nall apartment and tasered Mr. Nall for a total of 26 seconds. During the tasering, Nall began foaming at the mouth, stopped breathing, and went into cardiac arrest. He was rushed to a hospital, where he remained for two weeks. As a result of his cardiac arrest, Nall suffers from anoxic brain injury—injury to the brain due to lack of oxygen—and his mental functioning remains greatly impaired. Both Nalls were charged with disorderly conduct as a result of the incident, though charges were later dropped. The Nalls sued, alleging several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and several state law claims against the Officers. The Officers unsuccessfully sought summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for the federal claims and immunity under Ohio state law for the state law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Warrantless entries based on the emergency aid exception require both the potential for injury to the officers or others and the need for swift action. Whether the facts of this case meet those criteria cannot be answered on summary judgment because the pertinent facts are in dispute. View "Goodwin v. City of Painesville" on Justia Law

In 2010, the House of Representatives passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), by a vote of 219 to 212, following significant debate over whether PPACA included taxpayer funding for abortion. Driehaus, a Representative from Ohio and an anti-abortion Democrat, was an outspoken advocate of the “no taxpayer funding for abortion in the PPACA” movement, insisting that he would not vote for PPACA without inclusion of the Stupak-Pitts Amendment, expressly forbidding use of taxpayer funds “to pay for any abortion or to cover any part of the costs of any health plan that includes coverage of abortion” except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the life of the mother. Driehaus voted for the PPACA without the Amendment. President Obama later issued Executive Order 13535: “to … ensure that [f]ederal funds are not used for abortion services … consistent with a longstanding [f]ederal statutory restriction … the Hyde Amendment.” Debate continues as to whether PPACA includes federal funding for abortion. SBA, an anti-abortion public-advocacy organization, publicly criticized Driehaus, among other congressmen, for his vote. Driehaus considered SBA’s statement untrue and filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, alleging violation of Ohio Revised Code 3517.21(B) (Unfair Political Campaign Activities). OEC found probable cause of a violation. SBA sued, claiming that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. Driehaus counterclaimed defamation. Staying the other claims, pending agency action, the district court granted summary judgment, holding that associating a political candidate with a mainstream political position, even if false, cannot constitute defamation. The Sixth Circuit Affirmed. View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

In 2009, a rape suspect (Bynum) led Columbus, Ohio police officers on a highway car chase before crossing the median, accelerating the wrong way, and ramming head-on into a semitrailer. Officers surrounded his car and fatally shot Bynum after he reached down into the car, despite police commands to “show his hands,” and then clasped his hands into a shooting posture, pointing them at the officers. The officers fired 80 shots and did not recover a gun from Bynum’s car. Bynum’s mother sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Bynum’s conduct gave the officers probable cause to believe that he had a gun and posed a threat of serious physical harm. The officers knew from police radio that Bynum was wanted on serious charges and was potentially armed; they were told he had a concealed-carry permit. That Bynum was actually unarmed and did not have a permit is irrelevant; what matters is the reasonableness of the officers’ belief as they “did not and could not have known” otherwise. The officers also knew Bynum was determined to avoid arrest, even at the expense of others’ safety and his own life. View "Pollard v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

Wesley, an elementary school counselor and behavioral specialist, was accused of sexual abuse of a seven-year-old boy. The child had a history of psychiatric problems. A social worker contacted her friend, Rigney, a Covington Police Officer, rather than going through normal channels. They extensively interviewed other children, but none corroborated the allegations; a medical examination did not corroborate the allegations. Wesley was terminated. Wesley had unsuccessfully attempted to talk with Rigney. Nor was he interviewed by the social worker, who decided that the allegations had been substantiated and sent that finding to the school and the teacher licensing board. Wesley appealed; 84 days after the initial allegations and 10 days after learning of the negative medical examination, Rigney sought a warrant. Deputies arrested Wesley. The child and his mother refused to cooperate. Charges were dismissed. A hearing officer reversed the finding of substantiated abuse. Wesley filed a civil rights lawsuit against Rigney. The district court dismissed false arrest, outrage, and negligent investigation claims, finding that probable cause supported the arrest and that Rigney was qualifiedly immune, and granted Rigney summary judgment on Wesley’s retaliatory arrest claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Rigney waited almost three months before seeking a warrant and omitted from her application material facts demonstrating the unreliability of the allegations, undermining the existence of probable cause. View "Wesley v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Based on confusing statements overheard by a 911 operator, officers pulled over Brown, ordered her out of her car at gunpoint, threw her to the ground, handcuffed her, and detained her in handcuffs for approximately 10 minutes. Brown sued three officers who seized her, and others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourth Amendment for unreasonable seizure and excessive force and under Michigan state law for assault and battery. The district court denied qualified and governmental immunity to the officers, concluding that, while the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown, the stop ripened into an unlawful arrest. The court held that the officers used excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Brown’s testimony reflects a degree of force against a compliant subject that was clearly established as excessive well before the officers seized her. Taking Brown’s version of events as true, the officers threw her onto the ground, despite the fact that she was clearly afraid and cooperating with their orders. A jury could find that this behavior “shows such indifference to whether harm w[ould] result as to be equal to a willingness that harm w[ould] result.” View "Brown v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 1997, Louisville police discovered the bodies of two people in their apartment. The male victim had nine stab wounds. The pregnant female victim died as a result of manual strangulation and was stabbed after she was dead. Wheeler, ultimately convicted of the murders, changed his story several times. He eventually admitted being in the apartment on that night, after the male victim was stabbed, but claimed that the assailant was inside the apartment and that he and that person fought, resulting in his wounds. The Sixth Circuit held that a writ of habeas corpus must issue as to the death sentence because the trial court erroneously struck from the jury Kovatch, an eligible juror who may have been in favor of sparing Wheeler’s life. The court, after examination of Kovatch, found him not to be “problematic” as a juror but one who “could consider the entire range” of penalties. The next day the court excused him because the judge mistakenly remembered him saying he would not consider the death penalty. As a matter of procedural fairness in administering the death penalty, the Supreme Court has observed, the for-cause exclusion of an otherwise-eligible juror unnecessarily narrows the cross-section of venire members required under the Sixth Amendment. View "Wheeler v. Simpson" on Justia Law

When police officers executed a search warrant at a Dayton residence, they found Burney, several handguns, and several ounces of crack cocaine inside. Convicted of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute it, Burney challenged the warrant underlying the search as not supported by probable cause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The affidavit supporting the warrant provided several strong indications that the residence was used as a stash house by a drug trafficking operation, and that the house had been unoccupied for more than eight months when Burney, a repeat drug convict, moved in a few weeks before officers obtained the warrant. Because the warrant affidavit presented sufficient evidence tying the property, if not Burney himself, to an ongoing drug trafficking and money laundering operation, and because that evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficiently reliable, the district court properly denied Burney’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Burney" on Justia Law