Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The website for InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA states that all employees must annually reaffirm their agreement with IVCF’s Purpose Statement and Doctrinal Basis. The website includes statements that: Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a)) (Title VII), IVCF has the right to, and does, hire only candidates who agree with IVCF’s Purpose and Doctrinal Basis and that the status of [IVCF] as an Equal Opportunity Employer does not prevent the organization from hiring staff based on their religious beliefs so that all staff share the same religious commitment. Conlon began working at IVCF in Michigan in 1986 as a spiritual director, involved in providing religious counsel and prayer. In 2011, she informed IVCF that she was contemplating divorce. IVCF put her on paid (later unpaid) leave. When her marital situation continued to worsen despite counseling efforts, IVCF terminated her employment. After exhausting administrative remedies, Conlon sued IVCF and her supervisors under Title VII and Michigan law, alleging that male employees were treated differently. IVCF claimed ministerial exception to employment laws. The district court dismissed, holding that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred all of Conlon’s claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA" on Justia Law

In 2009, Pontiac Officer Lasseigne shot and killed Craft, a 14-year-old male after responding to a 911 call, reporting males with guns were walking west on Ypsilanti Avenue. Officers testified that Craft ran from Ypsilanti Avenue, drawing a gun, and that he aimed a gun at the officers. The district court rejected several claims in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit filed by Craft’s estate, but denied Lasseigne’s motion for summary judgment, finding that he was not entitled to qualified immunity or governmental immunity under Michigan law because there was a genuine dispute regarding whether Craft was holding the shotgun when he was shot. The court noted that Craft was shot only once, while officer training protocol would call for multiple shots in the face of imminent danger; that still shots from the police video depict Craft pinned–at least to some extent–to the fence; and that the weapon did not have any blood on it, while both the fence and vehicle were splattered with blood. The Sixth Circuit dismissed appeal of the denial of summary judgment, affirmed denial of governmental immunity, and remanded. View "Harris v. Lasseigne" on Justia Law

Former county administrators of elections from eight Tennessee counties in Tennessee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that after the 2008 statewide elections and a shift in the controlling political party in the state assembly, they were ousted from their positions by the defendants, county election commissioners, because of their actual or perceived political party affiliation. The district court held that the statutory position of county administrator of elections in Tennessee is lawfully subject to patronage dismissal under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. All of the identified duties of the administrator that involve policy matters are matters of political concern. Administrators spend a significant portion of time advising the commissioners on how to exercise their statutory policymaking authority, including apprising the commissioners of current laws and changes in the law, assisting in reapportionment matters, preparing the annual budget, and overseeing election operations, and control the lines of communications to the commissioners. View "Peterson v. Dean" on Justia Law

Tanner was convicted of a 1995 robbery and stabbing murder. The appeals court reversed for failure to provide DNA and serology experts. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed. Tanner’s federal habeas petition was dismissed in 2005. Tanner, who is illiterate, then met with a legal assistant and requested a prison certificate of account, for her motion to file in forma pauperis. The assistant received that document on December 5, while Tanner’s unit was on lockdown. The legal assistant scheduled a “call-out” for December 6, so that Tanner could sign and file within the 30-day appeal period (FRAP 4(a)(1)(A)). Tanner told guards that she needed to pick up legal papers, but they refused. On December 8 Tanner signed the notice and delivered it to the mailroom for expedited handling the following day. Her notice was considered filed on December 9, 31 days after entry of judgment. The district judge granted a certificate of appealability on December 23. Tanner’s habeas appeal was docketed on January 9, beyond the last day on which Tanner could request extension of the 30-day period. On January 20, the Sixth Circuit issued a show-cause order. Tanner explained that guards had prevented timely filing. The Sixth Circuit dismissed. In 2007, Tanner filed a civil rights action against the guards. In 2012, a jury awarded damages. Tanner moved for relief under FRCP 60(b)(6), which permits a district court to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment … for . . . any . . . reason.” The court denied the motion, ruling that Rule 4(a)(1) is jurisdictional. The Sixth Circuit reversed, emphasizing that the court will be granting relief “to revive a lost right of appeal,” not granting an extension under Rule 4(a)(5). View "Tanner v. Yukins" on Justia Law

In 1983, Clifton was convicted of grand larceny, found to be a habitual criminal, and sentenced to life in prison. In 2010, Clifton was paroled. Tennessee’s Court Cost Center sent Clifton an invoice for $124 in outstanding court costs. Clifton attempted to pay and contacted the Center to establish a payment plan. Months later, the Board of Probation and Parole issued an arrest warrant, alleging that Clifton had engaged in “intimidating and threatening behavior.” After a hearing, the board recommended parole revocation. His appeal was denied. Although his certiorari petition was timely, the court clerk refused it because Clifton had unpaid court costs. A notice of appeal was returned unfiled for the same reason, referring to costs totaling $1,449; the decision complied with a chancery court Standing Order, which refers to Tenn. Code 41-21-812. Clifton filed a pro se habeas corpus petition. The district court acknowledged Clifton’s contention that he was unfairly prevented from filing his state appeal, but concluded that the claims were procedurally defaulted and that Clifton had not established “cause” and “prejudice” to overcome that default. The Eighth Circuit held that Tennessee may not constitutionally require that prior expenses be paid in full before permitting a prisoner to file a habeas petition challenging the constitutionality of probation revocation. View "Clifton v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Gumm is mentally retarded, with an IQ of approximately 70. He was convicted of the kidnapping, attempted rape, and murder of a 10-year-old and was sentenced to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, and his post-conviction petition was found to lack merit by the Ohio state courts. After he sought federal habeas corpus, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) that persons who are mentally retarded cannot be executed. In a post-Atkins petition, Ohio courts adjudicated Gumm mentally retarded and reduced his sentence to 30 years to life in prison, but rejected non-Atkins claims. On federal habeas review, the court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus on claims that the government failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland; that Gumm received an unfair trial due to improper admission of incendiary prior bad acts evidence; that admission of a psychiatric report violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause; and that the prosecutor’s elicitation of inflammatory testimony and admission of psychiatric reports constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of the conditional writ of habeas corpus based on Gumm’s Brady and prosecutorial misconduct claims. View "Gumm v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Despite the complete absence of physical evidence and Bies’ repeated proclamations of innocence, Bies was convicted and sentenced to death in Ohio state court in 1992 for the kidnapping, assault, and urder of a 10-year-old boy. The case against Bies rested almost entirely upon an unrecorded statement that Bies allegedly made to the police following a prolonged and highly suggestive custodial interrogation. The Ohio courts upheld Bies’ convictions on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings, but vacated Bies’ death sentence after determining that he is intellectually disabled, and that his execution is barred by the Eighth Amendment. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, Bies challenged his convictions and sought a new trial. He claims that the government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady; that the trial court improperly allowed Bies’ custodial statements to be admitted at trial; and that Bies’ attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus based on the Brady violation, and denied relief on the remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the Brady claim, and declined to consider the remaining claims. View "Bies v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

Greco drank wine, drove her car into a ditch, and walked to a nearby gas station where she met EMTs refueling their ambulance. They smelled alcohol on her breath and called the police. Greco ran behind the station. Deputy Clayton arrived with his canine, Diago, other officers, and civilian “ride along,” Stuart. Clayton instructed Diago to track Greco. Clayton claims he was concerned about Greco’s well-being because, despite cold and wet weather, Greco was wearing sandals and a short-sleeved shirt. Clayton thought she might be injured. He announced their presence and entered a “swamp area,” slipped and fell, looked up and heard screaming as Diago bit Greco’s leg. Clayton waited for Greco to stop moving so he could ensure she was weaponless. After “10 to 20 seconds,” Clayton released Diago and summoned the EMTs. Greco claims she ran to “bushes” scared, alone, and needing to pee and was squatting when men approached with a dog, shouting “put your hands on your head.” Clayton “sicked the dog.” She dropped to protect herself, but the dog held on. Stuart agrees that the “woods” were slippery and that Greco was belligerent and on her back kicking the dog. Greco had a thigh injury and filed suit. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, holding that a jury could reasonably believe that Clayton intentionally detained Greco with an unconstitutional level of force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the conflicting claims. View "Greco v. Cnty. of Livingston" on Justia Law

Tyler was involuntarily committed to a mental institution, 28 years ago, for less than one month after allegedly undergoing an emotionally devastating divorce. He sought a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The statute provides: It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Tyler’s complaint validly states a violation of the Second Amendment. The government’s interest in keeping firearms out of the hands of the mentally ill is not sufficiently related to depriving the mentally healthy, who had a distant episode of commitment, of their constitutional rights. The government acknowledged that it currently has no reason to dispute that Tyler is a non-dangerous individual. View "Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Michigan corrections officers must perform several pre-shift and post-shift activities, including “punching a mechanical time clock,” “waiting in line” for security, and “walking to assigned locations.” These activities take place off the clock. Corrections officers and their union filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state law to recover overtime payments, 29 U.S.C. 206, 207; Mich. Comp. Laws 408.414, .414a. The Michigan Department of Corrections successfully moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Without a past (or imminent future) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has no remedial power under Section 5 to authorize private lawsuits against the states; absent permissible Section 5 legislation abrogating the state’s immunity from suit, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain these FLSA claims against the Department of Corrections or to grant a declaratory judgment under Ex parte Young against the Department’s director, to address an alleged ongoing violation of the FLSA. View "Mich. Corrs. Org. v. Mich. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law