Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Catholic nuns volunteered with the American Red Cross and the Ross County Emergency Management Agency for an extended time, but did not receive compensation or benefits, complete employment-related tax documentation, restrict their schedules, or submit to the control of either organization by other incidents of an agency relationship. They were not promoted by the Red Cross and were terminated as Agency volunteers. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission rejected their complaint for lack of jurisdiction; the EEOC does not provide a Right to Sue Letter following a jurisdictional dismissal. The nuns sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Ohio Civil Rights Act for religious discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their rights of free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection. Finding that the Sisters had not sufficiently alleged state action, the district court dismissed the section 1983 claims, then held that, because they were not employees of either organization, the Sisters could not maintain a claim against them under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A volunteer relationship does not fairly approximate employment and is not covered by Title VII, nor were constitutional rights violated. View "Sister Michael Marie v. Am. Red Cross" on Justia Law

Williams was arrested on non-felony charges of driving with a license suspended for failure to pay a traffic ticket. After Williams paid her ticket and fines, she was instructed to undress and shower in the presence of a corrections officer and two other female detainees, where she was also subjected to a visual body cavity search, and was instructed to bend at the waist and spread her buttocks. While she was bent over, an officer sprayed her with delousing solution all over her naked body, including into her anus. There was no indication that Williams had lice. Williams was released the same day. While her putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether pretrial detainees could be strip searched as a matter of course upon entry into a correctional facility absent individualized suspicion. The district court stayed Williams’s action. In 2012 the Court upheld a blanket strip-search policy. The district court denied a motion to file an amended complaint clarifying that plaintiffs “not only complain about the use of delousing on all detainees, but also about the manner,” particularly spraying delousing agent all over their naked bodies, “specifically aim[ing]” at their genitals,” instead of using less invasive methods, such as permitting detainees to apply the solution. According to the district court, the question was resolved by Florence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the allegations plausibly allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "Williams v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Same-sex couples living in Michigan. Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee successfully challenged a variety of state laws concerning marriage. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court rulings after exploring Supreme Court precedent. None of the theories invoked by plaintiffs--rational basis review; animus; fundamental rights; suspect classifications; evolving meaning--makes the case for constitutionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the founding: in the hands of state voters. The court reasoned that a change in the law may result from the Supreme Court constitutionalizing a new definition of marriage to meet new policy views or by “the traditional arbiters of change—the people.” The court noted that in 11 years, 19 states and the District of Columbia, accounting for nearly 45 percent of the population, have exercised their sovereign powers to expand a definition of marriage that until recently was universal. “When the courts do not let the people resolve new social issues like this one, they perpetuate the idea that the heroes in these change events are judges and lawyers.” View "Love v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Ohio voters can cast a ballot in person on Election Day, or by using absent voter’s ballot procedures, Ohio Rev. Code 3509.01. One can vote by mail or early, in person, at a designated location if a request is timely received. Overseas uniformed military, those subject to disability or confinement, those in unforeseen hospitalization and those confined for a misdemeanor or awaiting trial can submit ballot applications up to 90 days before an election. Boards of elections send teams to obtain the ballots from confined voters. While teams visit nursing homes up to a month before the election, they wait until Election Day to visit the jails: persons jailed after 6:00 P.M. on the Friday before Election Day who are not released in time to vote on Election Day and who have not already voted are unable to vote. If a voter or the voter’s minor child is “confined in a hospital as a result of an accident or unforeseeable medical emergency” an absentee ballot application can be delivered to the board by 3:00 P.M. on Election Day and the ballot can be entrusted to a family member or to a team for delivery. No corresponding provision exists for persons in jail on Election Day. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Voting Rights Act, and the Seventeenth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit instructed the district court to dismiss. The organizational plaintiff did not establish concrete and particularized injury to itself or its members. Even if it could demonstrate Article III standing, it asserts the rights of third parties. Its relationship with the persons whom it seeks to help—unidentified, future late-jailed voters—does not resemble the close relationship of the lawyer-client or doctor-patient relationships recognized by the Supreme Court. View "Fair Elections OH v. Husted" on Justia Law

Following the 2004 murder of Mary Stevenson, an Ohio state-court jury convicted Frazier, of aggravated murder (with two death-penalty specifications), aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, and recommended the death penalty. The judge sentenced him to die by lethal injection. After exhausting his state appeals, Frazier unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that he was ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia (2002), due to his intellectual disability; that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and that Ohio’s lethal-injection regime is unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state courts’ decisions were not contrary to, nor an objectively unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as defined by the United States Supreme Court. Frazier’s substantive Atkins claim remains procedurally defaulted because he did not show by clear and convincing evidence that he is mentally retarded. Under applicable law, the Ohio courts were not objectively unreasonable in rejecting his ineffective-assistance claims, and Frazier’s constitutional challenge to Ohio’s lethal-injection protocol requires the accumulation of evidence in another court. View "Frazier v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Roberson was incarcerated at a Michigan correctional facility. Corrections officer Torres went to Roberson’s cell and ordered Roberson to back up to the cell door to be placed in restraints. When Roberson did not comply, Torres sprayed a chemical agent into the cell. Torres issued Roberson a major-misconduct ticket for his failure to comply with the order. At a subsequent hearing, Roberson claimed that he did not understand Torres’s order because he was asleep when it was given and did not awaken until after Torres deployed gas into his cell. Roberson claimed that, although he had been awake and had refused to come out of his cell earlier, he had subsequently fallen asleep. Roberson ceased to reasonably cooperate with the review process and the hearing officer stated that he was “unconvinced” that the sergeant gave the order to a sleeping prisoner. In Roberson’s civil rights suit, the district court denied Torres qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that a genuine issue exists as to whether Roberson was sleeping at the time he was sprayed and, if so, whether Torres’s actions constituted excessive force, given Roberson’s admission that he was covered from head to toe in his blanket. View "Roberson v. Torres" on Justia Law

After a “buy-bust” operation orchestrated by Dayton police, based on information from a confidential informant, Detective House shot and killed Jordan. Jordan, not the intended target of the bullet, sat in the front passenger seat of a vehicle that, moments before the shot was fired, had been driven into two officers in an attempt to escape. Jordan’s estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that House used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the city failed to train and supervise its employees adequately. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding House’s actions objectively reasonable. The “calculus of reasonableness” allows for the fact that police officers must often “make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” An officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment where, although ultimately wrong in his or her assessment of the circumstances, “a dangerous situation evolved quickly to a safe one before the police officer had a chance to realize the change.” View "Cass v. City of Dayton" on Justia Law

Aspiring Ohio state court judges must run for office and must follow the Code of Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Code limits candidates’ campaign-related speech to help maintain an “independent, fair, and impartial judiciary,” free of “impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” After the Sixth Circuit struck parts of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, Ohio narrowed its Code. As amended, all judicial candidates—incumbents and challengers—are subject to restrictions on direct, personal monetary solicitation; bans on public political party speeches and endorsements of other candidates; and a prohibition on receiving campaign money earlier than 120-days before the primary. Platt, an attorney who wishes to run for Ohio judicial office, wanted to publicly endorse other candidates, directly solicit campaign funds in person, and to receive campaign contributions without the time limitations. Platt sued to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the rules as applied to non-sitting judicial candidates. The district court denied Platt’s request, holding that Platt failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claims and that the requested injunction would cause substantial harm to sitting judicial candidates who would still be subject to the restrictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Platt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Grievances & Discipline" on Justia Law

In 2011, a group of protesters calling themselves “Occupy Nashville” established an around-the-clock presence on the Nashville War Memorial Plaza, with the aim of bringing attention to disparities in wealth and power in the United States. After several weeks of occupying the Plaza, representatives of the protesters sought a meeting with state officials to discuss safety and health concerns that had developed. The state agreed and adopted a new policy that imposed a curfew for the Plaza. Those policies may have been promulgated in derogation of Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Six protesters were later arrested for violating that curfew and brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against state officials, alleging violations of rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Two officials appealed the district court’s ruling that that they were not entitled to qualified immunity and were personally liable for damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state officials are protected by qualified immunity because, regardless of the specifics of Tennessee’s administrative law, the protesters’ claimed First Amendment right to unrestricted 24-hour access to the Plaza is not a clearly established constitutional right. View "Occupy Nashville v. Haslam" on Justia Law

Miller disappeared in 1988. In 1999 interviews of Miller’s associates, Lamp admitted involvement in the disappearance and led police to Miller’s remains, buried in woods near Lamp’s property. Lamp stated that he and Blackston had killed Miller with the help of Simpson. The state charged Blackston with first-degree murder. In exchange for his testimony, the state granted Simpson immunity from prosecution and permitted Lamp to plead guilty to manslaughter. No physical evidence connected Blackston to Miller’s death. The state’s case depended on testimony by Lamp and Simpson and three women friends. Lamp and Simpson described the crime. The defense noted their favorable deals and inconsistencies in their stories. The jury convicted Blackston but the judge reversed because he had misinformed the jury regarding the extent of Simpson’s immunity. Before the second trial, Zantello and Simpson prepared written statements, recanting their testimony. At trial, the judge tired of their erratic behavior, deemed Simpson and Zantello to be “unavailable” and ordered their testimony from the first trial read to the jury. The judge did not allow the recantations to be read to the jury. The testimony of all remaining witnesses was consistent with testimony at the first trial. The second jury convicted Blackston. The Michigan Supreme Court twice reversed the appeals court, finding that it was not error to exclude the recantations or that other evidence rendered any error harmless. A federal district court granted a conditional habeas writ, finding that Blackston’s rights of confrontation and due process were violated. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state unreasonably abridged Blackston’s clearly established federal constitutional right. View "Blackston v. Rapelje" on Justia Law