Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Five death-row inmates, housed in a maximum-security prison in Kentucky, filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a), which prohibits state and local governments from placing “a substantial burden” on the “religious exercise” of any inmate unless they establish that the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and does so in the “least restrictive” way. They made various claims, some related to requests to practice their Native American faith, some related to a request for clergy visits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that there was a triable issue of fact over whether RLUIPA gives the inmates a right to have access to a sweat lodge for faith-based ceremonies and a triable issue of fact over whether RLUIPA gives the inmates a right to buffalo meat and other traditional foods for a faith-based once-a-year powwow? RLUIPA, however, does not permit inmates to collect money damages from prison officials sued in their individual capacities.View "Haight v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Over several years, Douglas sexually abused the dead bodies of murder victims held at the Hamilton County Morgue. His abuse of a body in 1982 led to a false rape conviction. Douglas’s actions were discovered in 2007 after his DNA was matched to semen found in the bodies. Douglas admitted to the abuse. He was under the influence of alcohol, marijuana, or cocaine every time he abused the bodies. Douglas was supervised by Kersker, the morgue director. Kersker admitted having concerns about Douglas’s tardiness and dependability as early as 1980. A co-worker testified that he often smelled alcohol on Douglas before, during, or after his shift. Douglas testified that his cocaine addiction was so bad by 1992 that he could not perform his duties due to heavy shaking. Douglas’s former wife testified that she called Kersker to complain that Douglas was drinking at work. Kersker hung up on her. Kersker may have known that Douglas was often having sex with live women at the morgue. Kersker knew about a domestic violence charge and DUIs because Douglas requested vacation time for incarceration. Douglas testified that he told Kersker about his suicide attempt, his psychiatric hospital stay, and his alcoholism. Kersker’s supervision of Douglas never changed. Relatives sued Douglas, who was also convicted of gross abuse of a corpse, and his supervisors, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court rejected the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A jury could find that the defendants recklessly and wantonly failed to supervise Douglas despite the known risks he posed to the bodies, so the court properly denied Ohio statutory immunity. The relatives, however, cannot establish a constitutional violation, despite the special nature of their relationship to their deceased relatives.View "Range v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Wershe was 17 years and 10 months old when he was arrested in Detroit and charged with various drug crimes. He was convicted of possession with the intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine, and, in 1988, was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. At sentencing, Wershe was 18 years and 7 months old. In 1992, the Michigan Supreme Court declared the life-without-parole penalty for simple possession unconstitutional. Wershe’s first opportunity for parole was denied in 2003. In 2012, the Parole Board determined that it had no interest in taking action on his case and scheduled Wershe’s next interview for 2017. Wershe brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Michigan Parole Board members, alleging that the parole consideration process did not afford him a meaningful opportunity for release in violation of his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court sua sponte dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Wershe’s due-process claim, but vacated with respect to the Eight Amendment because the district court failed to consider the impact of Wershe’s youth at the time of the crime and his arrest.View "Wershe v. Combs" on Justia Law

On the basis of a cooperating defendant's tip, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) task force set up surveillance along an interstate in eastern Kentucky, hoping to intercept members of a methamphetamine-trafficking operation. Detective Robert Hart, a task force member, found a car suspected of involvement with the operation. The detective trailed the automobile in an unmarked car, radioed a local officer (Adam Ray) and asked Officer Ray to initiate a traffic stop on the basis of a traffic violation. Detective Hart told Officer Ray only that the car was suspected of being linked to a DEA drug investigation. Officer Ray initiated the stop and discovered the Tahoe's driver, Defendant-Appellant, Marcus Adkins, and one passenger, Defendant-Appellant, Courtney Junior Noble. Adkins gave Officer Ray permission to search the car. The officer found several baggies of methamphetamine, a pipe used for smoking drugs, and a handgun on Noble's person. He arrested Noble and Adkins. In addition, the task force used this evidence to obtain a search warrant for a motel room suspected of being a way station for the traffickers. In the room, the task force found Defendant-Appellant Dena Brooks, pills, and a scale for weighing drugs. A grand jury indicted all three on charges of possession with intent to sell methamphetamine and conspiracy to sell methamphetamine; it also indicted Noble on a gun charge. Noble moved to suppress the evidence found as a result of Officer Ray's frisk. Adkins and Brooks joined this motion, which the district court denied in full after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Officer Ray lacked sufficient particularized and objective indicia to believe that Noble was armed and dangerous. As a result, the Court reversed the district court's denial of Noble's motion to suppress, vacated his conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Because the government never objected to, and explicitly waived an argument related to, Adkins's and Brooks' lack of standing to challenge Officer Ray's frisk of Noble, the Court also reversed the district court's denial of their motions to suppress, vacated their convictions, and remanded for further proceedings.View "United States v. Noble" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Marquis Heard of numerous drug and money-laundering offenses after a three-day trial in which Heard represented himself. He argued on appeal to the Sixth Circuit was that the district court was obligated to proceed with a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial. Heard also argued that his decision to represent himself was not voluntary. After review of the district court record, the Sixth Circuit rejected his arguments and affired. View "United States v. Heard" on Justia Law

McMullan and Smith, friends of 30 years, were related by marriage. They were addicts. During a drug-related fight, McMullan snatched a revolver from his wife and pointed the gun one foot from Smith’s chest. The gun fired. Smith later died from the gunshot wound to the chest. When witness McDowell testified at trial, he had a pending cocaine charge. Because McDowell had denied ever using crack cocaine at a preliminary hearing, McMullan’s counsel sought to cross-examine him about the charge to impeach McDowell’s credibility. The trial court denied the request. The court instructed the jury on the first-degree murder charge and on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. McMullan's requested involuntary-manslaughter instruction was denied. Convicted of second-degree murder, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, and as a felon in possession of a firearm, McMullan was determined to be a fourth-felony habitual offender. The court in McDowell’s case granted the government’s motion to downgrade McDowell’s cocaine charge from a felony to a misdemeanor. McMullan’s counsel unsuccessfully sought a new trial because of McDowell’s plea deal. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected arguments relating to the involuntary-manslaughter instruction; counsel’s failure to cross-examine McDowell about the plea bargain; and failure to disclose the plea agreement. The Michigan Supreme Court granted affirmed on the sole issue of the jury instruction was warranted. McMullan unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments relating to the jury instruction and the plea agreement.View "McMullan v. Booker" on Justia Law

After his conviction in Ohio state court for two 1999 murders and the aggravated robbery and kidnapping of one victims, Scott was sentenced to death. Scott unsuccessfully appealed and pursued state court post-conviction remedies, then sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments: that Ohio’s “course-of-conduct” capital specification was unconstitutional as applied; that the trial court erroneously failed to merge two other aggravating specifications, for robbery and kidnapping; that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, by giving erroneous advice about the risks of making an unsworn statement, and by failing to present certain mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of trial; and that Ohio’s method of execution by lethal injection is unconstitutional. Scott did not present his first argument in state court, so it was procedurally defaulted. AEDPA’s stringent standard of review applies to Scott’s second and third claims, and Scott cannot show that the Ohio courts reached a decision that contravened or unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. Scott is currently challenging Ohio’s execution procedures in federal district court, in a separate action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and consideration of this issue is properly confined to that forum. View "Scott v. Houk" on Justia Law

Nationwide, with 32,000 employees in 49 states, has an ERISA employee-benefits plan that provides short-term disability (STD), long-term disability (LTD), and “Your Time” benefits. An employee can receive Your Time benefits for personal reasons, such as vacation or illness. To receive STD benefits, an employee must be “STD Disabled,” which means “a substantial change in medical or physical condition due to a specific illness that prevents an Eligible Associate from working their current position.” Specific rules govern maternity leave. The first five days of paid maternity leave come out of an associate’s Your Time benefits. Thereafter, a new mother is considered STD Disabled and entitled to STD benefits for six weeks following a vaginal delivery, or eight weeks following a cesarean section. Wisconsin’s Family Medical Leave Act requires that employers allow six weeks of unpaid leave following “[t]he birth of an employee’s natural child[.]” The Act’s “substitution provision” requires employers to allow an employee to substitute “paid or unpaid leave of any other type provided by the employer” for the unpaid leave provided by the statute. A Wisconsin Nationwide employee had a baby. She received six weeks of STD benefits under Nationwide’s plan. She then requested an additional period of STD benefits pursuant to the substitution provision. The plan denied the request, finding that she was no longer short-term disabled under the plan. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that, ERISA did not preempt the Wisconsin Act. The district court held that, under the Supremacy Clause, the administrator was required to comply with ERISA rather than the Wisconsin Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Sherfel v. Newson" on Justia Law

McKamey, a private non-profit corporation that contracted with Chattanooga to provide animal-welfare services, received complaints about conditions at United pet store. McKamey employees Walsh and Nicholson discovered animals without water, and with no working air conditioning. Aided by Hurn, they removed animals and business records from the store and proceeded to revoke its pet-dealer permit. United filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the city; McKamey; and the employees, in their individual and official capacities, alleging that removal of its animals and revocation of its permit without a prior hearing violated procedural due process and that the warrantless seizures violated the Fourth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit held that Hurn, acting as a private animal-welfare officer, may not assert qualified immunity as a defense in the personal capacity suit. Walsh and Nicholson, however, acted as both private animal-welfare officers and specially-commissioned city police officers; they are entitled to summary judgment of qualified immunity on the procedural due-process claims based on the seizure of the animals and of the permit. Regarding the Fourth Amendment claims: Walsh and Nicholson are entitled to summary judgment of qualified immunity on claims based on the seizure of the animals. Nicholson is entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on seizure of the business records. Walsh is denied summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of business records. Qualified immunity is not an available defense to an official-capacity suit. View "United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

In 2010, federal prisoner Himmelreich filed a complaint against several defendants, alleging multiple causes of action. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of most of the claims and defendants, but vacated and remanded a claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment based on Himmelreich’s placement in administrative detention for 60 days in 2009, allegedly in retaliation for filing a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and a claim of failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on an assault on Himmelreich by another inmate in 2008. Based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a),and a finding that the Eighth Amendment claim was barred because he had elected to file a claim under the FTCA regarding the assault incident, the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that Himmelreich’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been excused and that the FTCA’s judgment bar does not apply to this case. View "Himmelreich v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law