Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While employed at an insurance company, Huff used customer information to obtain credit cards, and, with the help a teenager, cell phone contracts, resulting in loss of more than $350,000. Huff pleaded guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371; identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7); and access device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2). The plea agreement stipulated that the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual applied, calculated an offense level of 22, and agreed that no other adjustments applied. There was no upward adjustment for abuse of a position of trust or for use of a minor. The pre-sentence report included upward adjustment for abuse of trust, adjustment for more than 10 victims, and adjustment for use of a minor: a net offense level of 25 after acceptance of responsibility. Huff’s criminal history included prior offenses for forgery theft and attempted misuse of a credit card with concurrent sentences. The district court used the 2006 manual, applied the abuse of trust enhancement and imposed concurrent 60-month prison terms. Huff’s attorney allegedly stated that the judge would be unhappy if reversed and would impose a sentence substantially greater than originally imposed. Huff dismissed an appeal. Huff later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that an evidentiary hearing was necessary on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "Huff v. United States" on Justia Law

Inmate Santiago, complaining of severe pain and a rash, was seen by Dr.Mosher on January 31. Mosher prescribed Tylenol for pain and antibiotics to treat what she thought might be Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The next day Dr. Ringle diagnosed erythema nodosum (EN), an uncomfortable but non-dangerous skin inflammation that typically disappears in about six weeks but may recur. EN has no known cure. Ringle prescribed an anti-inflammatory and an antibiotic. Four days later, Santiago was transferred to OSU Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with EN and arthralgias, a severe joint-pain condition, and prescribed an anti-ulcer agent and a different anti-inflammatory. Santiago was seen on February 20 by an OSU dermatologist, who recommended a topical steroid, compression hose, and SSKI, which may help treat EN but is not standard treatment. Each day, February 22- 25, Santiago asked prison nursing staff about the treatments. Staff denied knowledge until, on the 25th, nurses found Santiago’s unsigned chart on Ringle’s desk. Ringle had been on vacation. Mosher signed the order on February 27. Santiago received the topical steroid on February 29 and compression stockings on March 10. Santiago waited longer for the SSKI, which is a non-formulary drug. The district court rejected Santiago’s suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) based on the delays. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Santiago did not prove that the delay caused a serious medical need or deliberate indifference.View "Santiago v. Ringle" on Justia Law

Letters sent between LaDeau and his incarcerated brother, David, came to the attention of authorities. The letters, written in code, allegedly communicated ways to obtain and conceal child pornography. Investigators executed a search warrant at LaDeau’s residence and discovered flash drives containing child pornography. LaDeau was indicted for possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(A), which carried a sentencing range of zero to 10 years’ imprisonment. LaDeau moved to suppress inculpatory statements and evidence seized from his home, claiming that officers had interviewed him in a hospital while he was attending to his wife and improperly coerced his responses by threatening to inform his wife about their investigation moments before she underwent life-threatening surgery. The court granted the motion; there was no longer any admissible evidence that LaDeau had possessed child pornography. Five days before the scheduled trial the government obtained a superseding indictment, adding David as a codefendant and charging both with conspiracy to receive child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2), which carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, based on evidence that had been in its possession since before the initial indictment. A charge of conspiracy to possess would not have carried the same mandatory sentence. The district court held that the charging decision warranted a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, because there was a realistic likelihood of retaliation for the successful suppression motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Ladeau" on Justia Law

Phillips was indicted in 2004 on charged that he had travelled to Thailand and knowingly engaged in illicit sexual conduct (18 U.S.C. 2423(f), 2246) with a minor male, not yet 16 years of age, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423(c), the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act). Phillips pleaded guilty to the single count and was sentenced to 37 months in prison, followed by lifetime supervised release. Phillips was released from prison in 2007, violated several terms of his supervised release, and was sentenced to an additional 30 months. Released from his second incarceration in 2010, he unsuccessfully moved to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that PROTECT, which punishes “[e]ngaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places,” applied only to individuals who both traveled in foreign commerce and engaged in illicit sexual conduct after its enactment and that his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto clause. The district court found the motion time-barred and procedurally defaulted, noting that the illicit sexual conduct (not the travel) occurred after the enactment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the “actual innocence exception,” to the limitations period should be applied only in case of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The exception cannot be so broadly defined as to be premised upon changes in statutory interpretation of the term “travels.” View "Phillips v. United States" on Justia Law

Burgess was pulled over for speeding and found to be under the influence of alcohol and a prescription drug. After failing sobriety tests, Burgess was arrested for DUI. His resistance caused officers to perform a “takedown,” a tackle to the ground, to place him in handcuffs. Burgess did not suffer any apparent injuries at the scene. Burgess’ disruptive behavior continued during transport. Upon his arrival at the jail, officers attempted to search him and also performed a takedown. The parties dispute whether Burgess was noncompliant and the effect of the takedown. Burgess asserts that he woke several hours later, with pain in his face and head, and a broken tooth. Burgess signed a “Medical Screening Form,” indicating that he had “no visible signs of trauma or illness,” and “no other medical/physical conditions of which the Jail should be aware.” After release, Burgess admitted himself into a hospital where CT scans revealed fractures that required surgery. The district court dismissed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims of excessive force, failure to intervene, and deliberate indifference, and found the defendants entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The right to be free from excessive force during booking was clearly established so that the claim should have been reviewed for reasonableness. Material facts are also in dispute on the negligence, assault, battery, loss of consortium, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and spoliation of evidence claims. View "Burgess v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Selby is serving a life sentence for murder, a two-year sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and a sentence for attempted escape from prison. Michigan prison authorities confined Selby in administrative segregation for almost 13 years based on a determination that he posed a serious escape risk. Selby served most of those years in a maximum security facility. Correction officials released Selby into the general prison population about 18 months after he filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he had been confined in segregation and denied access to worship services without meaningful review and in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the RLUIPA claim, but held that summary judgment was not appropriate on the due process claim. There were material disputes of fact, including whether Selby’s four misconduct reports over 10 years supported the decision to retain him in administrative segregation, whether the decision to override his qualification for a lower security classification in 2010 was warranted, and whether the aging escape history justified continued restraint in administrative segregation. View "Selby v. Caruso" on Justia Law

In 1997, the Miami Township police department fired Sergeant Young for allegedly forcing sex on a woman while on the job; the termination was overturned by an arbitrator. The arbitrator concluded that the department had not proven its allegations, noting that DNA samples from the scene did not match Young, that Young and his accuser had been in a relationship, and that the accuser had a history that cast doubt on her credibility. In 2010, the newspaper published the statement “Young had sex with a woman while on the job” in an article about the suspension of another officer. Young sued for defamation and obtained a $100,000 verdict. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide that the editor knew that the accusation was probably false and published it regardless. View "Young v. Gannett Satellite Info.Network, Inc." on Justia Law

Clark was shot and killed outside of his Detroit home. Months later, Peoples, Powell, and Harris, were arrested after leading police on a chase in a stolen Jaguar. According to the report written by an officer who witnessed the crash that ended the chase, Harris was the driver. Police found the gun used to kill Clark on the driver’s side floor of the Jaguar. Only Peoples was tried for murder. The only evidence connecting him to the crime was the gun and the testimony of Powell and Harris, that Peoples was the driver and was sitting closest to the gun, which Peoples owned, and that Peoples told them about killing Clark. Both received lower sentences on car theft charges because of their cooperation. Defense counsel did not cross-examine them on those points and did not call police officers to testify about who was driving the car. Peoples received a sentence of life imprisonment. He exhausted state remedies. The district court denied his habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit partially reversed, holding that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to impeach the credibility of the witnesses based on known false testimony; the state court’s determination to the contrary was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.View "Peoples v. Lafler" on Justia Law

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, collectively, the Affordable Care Act require that most businesses employing 50 or more individuals provide female employees with health-insurance coverage that includes, at no cost to the employee, “such additional preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration.” 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4). Those guidelines require plans to cover “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity.” Eden Foods, Inc., and Potter sought an injunction to prevent federal agencies from enforcing that mandate against them. They contend that offering such contraceptive services to the employees of Eden Foods would substantially burden the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and contravene protections under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb–2000bb-4 (RFRA). The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A for-profit corporation is not a “person” capable of religious exercise as intended by RFRA and individual shareholders/owners of a corporation have no standing to challenge provisions of laws that the corporation must obey. View "Eden Foods, Inc v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Under the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the district court denied pauper status to Coleman-Bey in his civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, although one of his previous dismissals was still on appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Counting a third dismissal still on appeal as a strike does not lead to the anomalous conclusion that the third dismissal was itself precluded from being appealed by the three-strikes rule. Each of the three civil cases that Coleman-Bey filed while incarcerated counts as a strike under the PLRA. View "Coleman v. Tollefson" on Justia Law