Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Like many Michigan municipalities, Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties, especially since 2008. Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager. Acting under Michigan’s then-existing emergency manager law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of Pontiac’s retired employees and modified severance benefits, including pension benefits, that Pontiac had given retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. The retired employees claim that Schimmel and Pontiac violated their rights under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied the retirees an injunction. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters have since rejected Public Act 4 by referendum, which may have rendered Schimmel’s actions void.The court also questioned whether two-thirds of both houses of the Michigan Legislature voted to make Public Act 4 immediately effective. The court noted that similar issues face many Michigan municipalities. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

In 2007 Hamilton Township imposed impact fees of about $2,100 per lot on developers of residential property. Salt Run, a residential developer, sought to avoid the fees by annexation to the Village of Maineville. Unable to stop the annexation in court, Hamilton Township imposed a lien on the property. Salt Run ultimately defaulted on its loan as a result of funding an escrow so that it could sell the property, despite the lien. Salt Run sued the Township, alleging a takings claim. While the case was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Hamilton Township had no authority to impose the fee. The district court granted judgment in favor of Salt Run on some claims but denied its claim that the lien amounted to an unconstitutional taking. Salt Run appealed that ruling and sought attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Salt Run was not a prevailing party and characterizing the suit as, at most, asserting an improper “collection mechanism.” View "Vill. of Maineville, OH v. Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

In 2006, Shearson, the executive director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, was stopped by U.S. Customs and Borders Protection as she and her daughter were returning from Canada, removed her from her car, handcuffed her, and detained her for about 2-1/2 hours. Shearson claims that an officer swiped her passport and an “armed and dangerous” warning came up. After being allowed to enter the U.S., Shearson filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act for documents related to her detention. Following a suit, she obtained documents indicating that her name returned “an Armed and Dangerous” designation in Customs’ terrorist database and was a positive match to the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File. The FBI declined to discuss the matter and recommended that Shearson use an administrative remedy, the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, 49 U.S.C. 44926. Shearson did not seek redress through that Program, but filed suit claiming due process, First Amendment, Privacy Act, Administrative Procedures Act, and equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Shearson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Jena is a 19-year-old with a genetic disorder that causes physical defects and severe mental disability. She apparently communicates at the level of a child between the ages of five and seven and has the social skills of a child between four and eight. She reportedly told a teacher that her mother, Suzanne, “hit me.” The Oakland County Sheriff’s Department and Adult Protective Services (defendants), part of the Michigan Department of Human Services investigated. APS obtained an order appointing a guardian for Jena and authorizing her removal from the family home to a group foster facility. The family alleges that the defendants gave false testimony that Jena’s father made sexual comments about Jena. Following allegedly assaultive behavior, the probate court entered an order temporarily denying the family contact with Jena. Ultimately, Jena’s father was granted full custody and charges against her mother were dropped. The district court dismissed the family’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the court was the final decision-maker with respect to Jena’s custody. The court rejected substantive and procedural due process claims and a claim of violation of First Amendment right to family association. View "Kolley v. Adult Protective Servs." on Justia Law

In 2004, Ray was convicted on five counts of conduct involving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(1), and 2252(a)(4)(B), and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 180 months, 300 months, and 600 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the district court failed to adequately explain its upward departure from the recommended sentencing guideline range, but noting that the evidence of Ray’s guilt was “overwhelming.” On remand, Ray was sentenced to concurrent terms of 180 month, 300 months, and 360 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court dismissed a pro se motion to vacate the sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, in which Ray argued that there was an illegal search and seizure, because the person who consented to the search of his home lacked authority to do so, and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment without an evidentiary hearing. View "Ray v. United States" on Justia Law

A Juvenile Court standing order provided that social workers had authority to remove and provide temporary emergency care for children at imminent risk of serious physical or emotional harm and to request assistance by law enforcement officers. At a 2002 meeting, social workers determined that exigent circumstances required immediate removal of the children from Nancy’s home. A Temporary Emergency Care Order was completed in consultation with an assistant prosecuting attorney and a supervisor. A social worker, accompanied by police, went to Nancy’s home and took the children into temporary custody, and, the next day, filed a complaint for abuse, neglect, and temporary custody, with a notarized document detailing supporting reasons. A magistrate found that probable cause existed to support removal. In November 2005, Nancy and the children sued the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services, the social workers, and others. In 2010, the district court granted in part and denied in part the social workers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of absolute immunity, denied the social workers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and granted the children partial summary judgment on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to both absolute and qualified immunity. View "Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Nichols, a Tennessee state prisoner awaiting execution, had an “oppressive and forlorn childhood, due to his father’s abuse, his mother’s illness, their poverty, and the church-dominated society into which he was born” in 1960. Nichols graduated high school; he enlisted in the Army in 1981. He was discharged two years early. In 1984, he pled guilty to burglary and assault with attempt to rape. A psychological report found nothing remarkable. He married and had a stable relationship. In 1987 Nichols returned to jail for a prowling conviction and parole violation. He was released and returned to his wife and job. He began disappearing at night. Following rapes or attempted rapes of 12 women (Pulley died as a result) in 1988-1989, police received an anonymous tip identifying Nichols. Police showed photo-arrays to four victims, each of whom identified Nichols immediately. Nichols waived counsel and Miranda rights and videotaped a confession to four rapes. After being allowed to sleep, Nichols confessed to other rapes. Additional victims identified Nichols. Nichols directed a detective to recover the board used to murder Pulley. Nichols’s wife stated that Nichols had confessed to her. A Ph.D. and an M.D. found Nichols competent to stand trial. State courts rejected his appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief. In 2005 DNA testing confirmed Nichols as the source of sperm on Pulley’s clothing. The district court rejected his federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance and multiple procedural arguments. View "Nichols v. Heidle" on Justia Law

Romo was sleeping in the driver’s seat of a parked car, intoxicated, when he was approached by Officer Largen, who arrested Romo for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, based on Largen’s observation of Romo’s having driven the car minutes earlier. Romo claimed that he had not been driving and filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit claiming that Largen violated his constitutional rights and committed several intentional torts. The district court denied Largen’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified-immunity, finding that a jury could disbelieve Largen’s claim that he had seen a very similar car being driven in violation of traffic laws. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that it was bound by the district court’s finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed. View "Romo v. Largen" on Justia Law

In 2001 Fitzpatrick killed his girlfriend, her 12-year-old daughter, and a neighbor. There were questions about his mental health. A pretrial hearing was held because of Fitzpatrick’s confession to his cousin that the devil had made him commit the crimes. The court took no action, based on the statement of the lead investigator that officers had no concerns about competence. After opening statements, in a sidebar, defense counsel stated that Fitzpatrick had indicated his desire to plead guilty and that he recommended against such action. The trial court advised Fitzpatrick of its disinclination to accept a guilty plea. Fitzpatrick insisted that he did not want to wait or to “put his family through this.” When the judge disagreed, Fitzpatrick demanded to be taken out of the courtroom and reiterated that he wanted to stop the trial. Following some discussion of competency and inquiries directed to Fitzpatrick, the court accepted the plea. A panel sentenced him to death. Ohio courts affirmed the convictions and sentence, and denied post-conviction relief. The district court denied petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Fitzpatrick’s statements did not give the trial court reason to believe that he did not understand the consequences of waiving a jury trial and pleading guilty. All three attorneys involved consistently represented that they thought that he was knowingly waiving his rights. View "Fitzpatrick v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Harkness, a reserve Commander in the Navy Chaplain Corps, was denied a promotion to the rank of Captain by an annual selection board. The Secretary of the Navy denied his request to convene a special selection board (SSB) to review that decision. Harkness filed suit, claiming that promotion policies and procedures for chaplains violated the Establishment Clause. The district court dismissed, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies required by 10 U.S.C. 14502(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that non-promoted officers must first petition the Secretary to convene an SSB. The Secretary must weigh certain factors, including whether an administrative error caused the original selection board not actually to consider the officer, or whether a material error caused the original board to mistakenly fail to recommend promotion. If the Secretary determines that an SSB is not warranted, the officer can seek review of that denial in federal court. The language of Harkness’s request apparently challenged only the composition of the board and fell short of giving the Secretary a meaningful opportunity to respond to Harkness’s constitutional contention. View "Harkness v. United States" on Justia Law