Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1986, Harrison was charged with second-degree murder and carrying a firearm during commission of a felony, but was convicted of reckless use of a firearm resulting in death (a lesser-included Misdemeanor) and felony-firearm. Harrison received consecutive sentences, although, under Michigan law, the crimes were subject to concurrent sentencing only. Released in 1990, Harrison committed another firearm offense in 1991, was convicted, and returned to prison. On collateral review of the first conviction, the Michigan Court of Appeals held, in 2008, that Harrison had been improperly sentenced and ordered issuance of a corrected judgment. Harrison sued the state and other defendants, seeking damages and reduction of a subsequent, unrelated prison sentence that he was still serving. The district court dismissed, holding that some defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment; that claims against the remaining defendants were time-barred; and that a claim concerning the failure to commute his 1991 sentence was noncognizable. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding no error in the rulings on sovereign immunity and commutation, but holding that Harrison’s claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is not time-barred. View "Harrison v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

Toledo police officers, near a shopping center with few stores and in an area with many complaints of robberies, thefts, drug activity, and loitering, noticed a group of people, not going in or out of stores, but remaining together without any visible purpose. They also noticed a man on a bicycle, who rode across the parking lot. Jeter arrived on a bicycle, but was not a member of the group, nor was he the individual seen traversing the parking lot; he entered a store and purchased a snack and bottled water. Exiting the store, he consumed the snack, placed his water on his bicycle, and then began to leave just as officers arrived to “saturate” the plaza and prevent anyone from leaving. TPD implements this “bum rush” tactic “every couple weeks” in areas of suspected criminal activity, to get “more gun[s] off the street” or “more person[s] with outstanding warrants.” Thinking he was the person they had seen earlier, officers stopped Jeter, who ran. When officers caught Jeter, they found a handgun. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Jeter pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion. His advisory Guidelines range was 30 to 37 months. The district court sentenced Jeter to 45 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Jeter" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Adult-Oriented Establishment Registration Act of 1998 is a county-option state law to address deleterious secondary effects associated with adult-oriented businesses, including crime, spread of venereal disease, and decreased property values. Adult-oriented establishments that are subject to the Act, and their employees, must obtain licenses. The Act prohibits nudity, certain sexual activities, touching of certain anatomical areas, all physical contact during performances, sale or consumption of alcohol on the premises; it requires that all performances occur on a stage at least 18 inches above floor level with all performers at least six feet away from customers and other performers. Shelby County adopted the Act in 2007. Owners of adult establishments challenged the ordinance. Following denial of a preliminary injunction, the district court granted summary judgment upholding the law, except with respect to a claim of facial invalidity attacking the reasonableness of coverage of establishments featuring “briefly attired” dancers. The court then rejected that challenge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting First Amendment challenges. View "Entm't Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty." on Justia Law

Mendoza drove a truck from North Carolina to Tennessee with Tavera as a passenger. The truck contained construction equipment. A large quantity of methamphetamine was hidden under nails. The truck was stopped after being followed as part of a sting operation. At trial, Tavera, a roofer, testified that he did not know about the drugs and that he thought he was going to Tennessee to view a construction project. Tavera was convicted of participating in a methamphetamine drug conspiracy and sentenced to 186 months of imprisonment. He subsequently learned that days before the trial Mendoza had participated in plea negotiations in which he told Taylor, the prosecution’s trial lawyer, that Tavera had no knowledge of the drug conspiracy. Mendoza later pled guilty and changed his story. Tavera filed an appeal and a year later moved for a new trial in the district court. The district court has not ruled on the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated the conviction, based on the “Brady” violation, calling the case “not close,” and recommended that the U.S. Attorney’s office conduct an investigation of why the prosecutorial error occurred. View "United States v. Tavera" on Justia Law

Janosek owns a business that makes welded ring products. The business uses water to cool hydraulics used in the process. In or before 1999 Janosek installed closed loop water chillers that he hoped would recapture the water and significantly decrease water consumption. Instead of seeing a decrease in his water bills, Janosek continued to pay in excess of $150,000 a year until 2002, when the bills dropped to between $10,000 and $25,000 a year. Janosek suspected that he had been over-charged based on the Cleveland Water Department practice of estimating water consumption. Cleveland’s Moral Claims Commission, established to consider monetary claims that Cleveland is not legally obligated to pay, held a hearing, without notifying Janosek, and denied the claim. The district court dismissed Janosek’s case, finding that claims of unjust enrichment, taking without just compensation, and negligence were barred by the statute of limitations, and that a due process claim concerning the lack of notice failed because Janosek had not identified a valid property interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Any legitimate property interest that Janosek had in the overpayments lapsed with the running of the limitations period. View "Janosek v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Federal agents tracked Rivas from Texas to Memphis, suspecting he might be trafficking drugs. Rivas later met defendants and the three drove around Memphis in multiple vehicles before arriving at a warehouse. One of the vehicles was a tractor-trailer. The tractor was registered to Rivas. When agents moved in to investigate, defendants complied, but Rivas fled. While a search for Rivas was ongoing, a narcotics dog alerted the officers to the presence of controlled substances in the trailer. The agents later recovered, among other things, one ton of marijuana under the floor of the trailer. In the prosecution that followed, the district court ruled that defendants were unlawfully detained and, as a remedy, suppressed the marijuana evidence as to them, but not as to Rivas, whom it found was lawfully seized. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the recovered evidence was not the product of defendants’ detention, so, lawful or not, suppression was not warranted. Given the officers’ reasonable suspicion that Rivas was using the tractor-trailer to traffic drugs and their knowledge that Rivas owned the tractor, they had authority to detain the vehicle at least briefly. View "United States v. Figuerdo-Diaz" on Justia Law

The Michigan Department of Corrections agreed to house LaFountain at Lakeland in exchange for dismissal of his lawsuits. LaFountain wanted assignment to Lakeland to enable family visits and avoid further retaliation from Muskegon correctional officers. After the transfer, LaFountain filed new grievances, alleging selective enforcement of housing-unit rules based on race. He was transferred back to Muskegon. When LaFountain arrived at Muskegon, his typewriter was missing. He filed another grievance. At Muskegon, he was assigned to a cell with Riley, a mentally ill prisoner. Riley threatened LaFountain and kept him awake with lights and noise. LaFountain filed a grievance, alleging retaliation. After Riley threatened LaFountain’s life, LaFountain refused to remain in his cell and spent eight days in segregations. Each new shift ordered LaFountain to continue celling with Riley. Every time that he refused, the officers cited LaFountain for major misconduct, causing forfeiture of 770 days of good-time credits. The district court reviewed his civil rights suit under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and dismissed it, 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) & 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of certain of the retaliation claims based on the transfer to Muskegon, the typewriter damage, and the cell assignment. View "LaFountain v. Harry" on Justia Law

In 2005 the Blewetts were convicted of crack cocaine offenses and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 10 years each under the 100-to-1 crack cocaine law, based on the quantity of crack cocaine possessed. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 as implemented by new sentencing guidelines, has substantially reduced crack cocaine sentences, including the mandatory minimum sentences, 21 U.S.C. 841(b). If the Blewetts were sentenced today, they would not be subject to a statutory minimum because the quantity of crack involved falls below the threshold for any statutory minimum. The district court denied retroactive resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)2 and 28 U.S.C. 994(u)3. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the old 100-to-1 crack cocaine ratio has led to the mass incarceration of thousands of nonviolent prisoners under a law widely acknowledged as racially discriminatory; thousands of inmates, most black, languish in prison under the old, discredited ratio because the Fair Sentencing Act was not made explicitly retroactive by Congress. Judicial perpetuation of the discriminatory mandatory minimum crack sentences for those defendants sentenced under the old crack sentencing law would violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "United States v. Blewitt" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Michigan legislature enacted laws that barred sexually oriented businesses from displaying signs on the premises that contained more than “words or numbers,” Mich. Comp. Laws 125.2833; and imposed similar restrictions on off-site billboards, Mich. Comp. Laws 252.318a. In response to a First Amendment challenge, the district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement. The state stipulated to a final judgment declaring both laws facially unconstitutional and permanently enjoining enforcement. Two months later, Platinum, represented by the same attorney who had won the first lawsuits, sued the same defendants, challenging the same laws on the same free speech grounds. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The legal possibility that “this Governor or this Attorney General will enforce these laws in the face of these injunctions is: zero.” Platinum Sports has no cognizable theory of injury. View "Platinum Sports Ltd. v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Smith, aged 20, took a cell phone charger. The store manager intercepted him and Smith revealed the open package, with part of the charger removed. Smith refused to stay while the manager called the police. Officers Stoneburner and Knapp interviewed store employees, reviewed a security videotape and went to the Smith house. Smith’s brother met the officers at the door, then went into the house. Stoneburner followed and asked Smith to step outside. Smith, his mother (Donnetta), and his brother complied. Smith denied stealing or cutting the charger and allowed Stoneburner to pat him down. Stoneburner found only a lighter. Stoneburner followed Smith back inside, grabbed Smith by the wrist, and pulled Smith back outside. Stoneburner collided with Donnetta, causing her to hit the side of the house. Stoneburner bent Smith over the railing. Smith stiffened himself. Stoneburner and Knapp each grabbed an arm and pressed his head against the wall as they handcuffed him. Smith pled guilty to disturbing the peace. The Smiths filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Stoneburner unconstitutionally entered their home twice and excessive force. The district court denied qualified immunity on all claims and granted summary judgment in favor of Smith on the second entry into the house. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of immunity. View "Smith v. City of Sturgis" on Justia Law