Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Smith, aged 20, took a cell phone charger. The store manager intercepted him and Smith revealed the open package, with part of the charger removed. Smith refused to stay while the manager called the police. Officers Stoneburner and Knapp interviewed store employees, reviewed a security videotape and went to the Smith house. Smith’s brother met the officers at the door, then went into the house. Stoneburner followed and asked Smith to step outside. Smith, his mother (Donnetta), and his brother complied. Smith denied stealing or cutting the charger and allowed Stoneburner to pat him down. Stoneburner found only a lighter. Stoneburner followed Smith back inside, grabbed Smith by the wrist, and pulled Smith back outside. Stoneburner collided with Donnetta, causing her to hit the side of the house. Stoneburner bent Smith over the railing. Smith stiffened himself. Stoneburner and Knapp each grabbed an arm and pressed his head against the wall as they handcuffed him. Smith pled guilty to disturbing the peace. The Smiths filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Stoneburner unconstitutionally entered their home twice and excessive force. The district court denied qualified immunity on all claims and granted summary judgment in favor of Smith on the second entry into the house. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of immunity. View "Smith v. City of Sturgis" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 2012 Public Act 53 provides: “A public school employer’s use of public school resources to assist a labor organization in collecting dues or service fees from wages of public school employees is a prohibited contribution to the administration of a labor organization,” so that unions must collect their own membership dues from public-school employees, rather than have the schools collect those dues via payroll deductions. The Act does not bar public employers other than schools from collecting membership dues for unions who represent their employees. Unions and union members challenged the Act under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring enforcement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, quoting the Supreme Court: “The First Amendment prohibits government from ‘abridging the freedom of speech’; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.” The court further reasoned that there is a legitimate interest in support of the Act’s classification; the legislature could have concluded that it is more important for the public schools to conserve their limited resources for their core mission than it is for other state and local employers. View "Bailey v. Callaghan" on Justia Law

In two trials, juries in Livingston County, Kentucky convicted Kraus of first-degree rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse involving two mentally delayed women. He is serving a prison sentence of 70 years with a life enhancement. After exhausting direct appeals and pursuing state court motions for post-conviction relief, Kraus filed two pro se petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petitions. Although the district court declined to issue a certificate of appealability, a Rule 34 panel granted Kraus a COA to review a narrow selection of claimed errors. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Kraus’s petitions “highlight serious concerns about his ability to confront the key witnesses at his trials, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and the competency of his counsel at the sentencing phase.” But, despite court orders, the court was not provided with any records of Kraus’s two trials, precluding meaningful review of Kraus’s claims. View "Kraus v. KY Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs allege that Greene performed as an exotic dancer at a 2002 party at Detroit’s mayoral residence and that Mayor Kilpatrick’s wife arrived unexpectedly and assaulted Greene. Months later, Greene was shot to death. Stevenson, initially leading the investigation, claims that rumors indicated that Greene’s death and the incident at the mansion were connected. Other officers told Stevenson that she “might get shot like Tammy.” There was some evidence of a coverup. The case was reassigned to the Cold Case squad, earlier than usual for such a transfer. Stevenson later testified that she was about to pursue leads that would have led to questioning people close to the mayor. Stevenson and others were allegedly transferred to inferior positions without credible explanation. Stevenson’s house was broken into twice, and she repeatedly observed officers near her residence. The Cold Case squad encountered many impediments and the investigation was inactive for years. Greene’s murder has not been solved. The minor children of Greene filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims of conspiracy to deny and denial of access to the courts. The district court entered summary judgment for the city and the mayor. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding exclusion of evidence of the firing of a former deputy chief and of alleged interference with an investigation by the state, and jury instructions concerning the city’s destruction of evidence. View "Flagg v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Local resident Banks told police that on a specified date, he witnessed manufacture of methamphetamine, firearms, and a bomb at Hodge’s home. He observed a person shaking “sports drink bottles that appeared to have a grayish, sandy, sludge in the bottom with liquid and pieces of black chunks floating on the top,” characteristic of a “one pot style methamphetamine cook.” Banks gave a detailed description of a pipe bomb. Hodge claimed it could “blow up the entire house,” showed Banks a firearm that he called an AK-47, and told Banks that, if confronted, he “would shoot every cop that he could.” Officers obtained a warrant and found a pipe bomb, marijuana, prescription drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a rifle. Indicted for possession of an unregistered destructive device, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), and possession of a firearm while unlawfully using a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Hodge moved to suppress, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that statements he made alerting officers to the pipe bomb were obtained through custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. The district court denied the motion. Hodge entered a conditional guilty plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The questioning was permissible because officers had a reasonable belief based on articulable facts that they were in danger. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Three minors told Cincinnati police that Rose had sexually molested them and had shown them pornographic images on a computer in his bedroom. Police obtained a warrant to search Rose’s computers; its front page identified “Kenneth Rose” as the subject, and immediately below, identified the search location as “709 Elberon Av. [sic], Cincinnati, Hamilton County, Ohio.” The warrant described physical attributes of the address, including that the name “Rose” appeared over the doorbell of apartment number one and included a photograph of the property taken from the Hamilton County Auditor’s website. The supporting affidavit summarized the testimony of the three victims, but did not provide Rose’s address. Forensic analysis of a computer seized during the search revealed numerous images of child pornography, with several of Rose engaged in sexual conduct with male minors under the age of 16. Rose entered into a conditional plea agreement, pleading guilty to three counts of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251, preserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss. He was sentenced to 51 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the warrant and an argument that the charged activities were only intrastate. View "United States v. Rose" on Justia Law

Peterson is a prisoner in Michigan’s Iona maximum-security penitentiary, convicted of murder. After a scuffle during an attempt to remove Peterson from his cell, an officer filed a major misconduct report, alleging assault and battery. Peterson appeared at his hearing, heard all the evidence, pled not guilty, provided sworn statements to support his account, called witnesses in his defense, and moved to disqualify the hearing officer for bias. The only evidence that the hearing officer did not permit Peterson to view was the video of the event, exercising his authority under Mich. Comp. Laws 791.252(h), stating that “to allow [the video’s] actual viewing would reveal the limitations and capabilities of the fixed security device.” The hearing officer gave Peterson a detailed description the video, including the time-stamped second of each event. The hearing officer imposed a sentence of 30 days in detention. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging cruel and unusual punishment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that where a disputed issue of fact is resolved at a major misconduct hearing as a necessary part of the hearing’s judgment, it has preclusive effect in collateral litigation brought by the prisoner. View "Peterson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Grigsby, a middle-age man who lived in homeless shelters, was charged with three unarmed bank robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Psychologists conducted examinations and filed reports that diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia and stated that Grigsby was not competent to stand trial. Neither party objected. The court committed Grigsby to custody (18 U.S.C. 4241(d)(1)) to determine whether he could be restored to competency to stand trial. Forensic evaluators concluded that Grigsby did not understand the seriousness of his legal difficulty; lacked ability to assist his lawyer during trial; and was not capable of waiving his constitutional rights rationally or of testifying on his own behalf. Grigsby refused to take oral medication. Because he was not gravely disabled and did not present a danger to himself, others, or the facility, he did not meet the criteria for involuntary medication. The evaluators requested an order authorizing them to inject Grigsby involuntarily with a first-generation antipsychotic drug, (haloperidol (Haldol) or fluphenazine), or a second-generation antipsychotic drug, risperidone, to restore competency. These medications can cause serious side effects. The district court granted an order under Sell v. U.S. (2003). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that special circumstances unique to the case indicate that Grigsby’s liberty interest in avoiding involuntary medication outweighs the government’s interest in prosecution. View "United States v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

Officers responded to a call describing a male yelling for help outside an apartment, followed by a report that a naked male entered a nearby apartment. Approaching, Tieber encountered a naked male, Martin, age 19, running and speaking nonsensically. Martin asked for help, then “jogged away.” Tieber ran and fell on Martin’s back. Semanco dropped his knee into Martin’s side, fell on top of both men, and delivered “compliance body shots.” Martin bit Tieber; Tieber struck Martin’s face. Semanco struck Martin’s face, back, and ribs at least five times. Tieber folded his legs around Martin’s hips and gripped Martin’s chin with his arm. As Tieber and Semanco attempted to secure Martin’s arms, Zimmerman kneeled on Martin’s calves. Officers heard a “gurgling sound.” They rolled an unresponsive Martin onto his side, tried to resuscitate him, and called paramedics. Martin died. The coroner determined that Martin died from an acute psychotic episode with excited delirium due to LSD intoxication and cardiopulmonary arrest. The pathologist who conducted the autopsy noted injuries suggesting asphyxiation. A pathologist hired by Martin’s estate agreed. The department had a use-of-force policy, and a “Positional Asphyxia Policy” that warns that a person, psychotic due to mental illness or drugs or alcohol, is particularly susceptible to death. Two officers said they never considered this policy. In the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Martin v. City of Broadview Heights" on Justia Law

An officer pursued Woods’s speeding car to a parking lot. As Woods began exiting the car, the officer ordered Woods to re-enter the car and place his hands on the wheel. Woods did not comply, but reached toward the passenger side of the car. Concerned that Woods might have a weapon, the officer drew his gun. When Woods complied, the officer lowered his weapon, advised Woods that he had been caught speeding, and asked for identification. Woods provided a false name and said that he did not have identification. The officer waited for backup to arrest Woods for driving without a license. When the officers approached, Woods again reached toward the passenger side. The officers pulled him out of the car. During a pat-down, the officer felt a hard lump in Woods’s pocket and asked “What is in your pocket?” Woods stated twice that he was “bogue,” meaning “in possession of something illegal,” then stated that he had a gun in the car. Through the window, the officer observed what looked like a handgun on the floorboard. He recovered the gun and a bag containing crack cocaine. Woods’s motion to suppress was denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before asking “What is in your pocket?” upon encountering a lump in Woods’s clothing during the course of a lawful pat-down incident to arrest. View "United States v. Wood" on Justia Law