Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A victim, who knew Daws, told deputies that Daws had crashed a shotgun barrel through a window and charged into his house. Daws thrust the gun in his face, took cash, and warned that if the victim called police, Daws would “come back and kill him.” Officers received a second call and went to another house. The occupant said that Daws and another man had come over asking to hide a weapon. The man turned Daws away. Deputies knew Daws had previous weapons convictions and served time for aggravated burglary after holding a gas station attendant at gunpoint and threatening to kill him. They wore body armor and approached Daws’s rural house, finding his friend outside, confessing on the phone that he and Daws had “done something bad.” Deputies apprehended the man, who told them Daws was inside. Deputies entered through an open door and found Daws asleep. After apprehending him, they performed a protective sweep and found Daws’s shotgun. Daws pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and was sentenced to 210 months, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a public safety exigency justified a warrantless search. View "United States v. Daws" on Justia Law

G.C. began attending school in the Owensboro Public School District as an out-of-district student in 2005. In 2009, G.C. was caught sending text messages in class. School officials confiscated his cell phone and read the text messages. Because this was the last in a series of disciplinary infractions, Superintendent Vick revoked G.C.’s out-of-district status, barring him from attending Owensboro High School. G.C. filed suit, raising federal and state-law claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on a due process claim that G.C. was denied a hearing prior to expulsion as required by Kentucky statute and a Fourth Amendment claim based on the 2009 search, in which G.C. contends that school officials violated his constitutional rights when they read text messages on his phone without the requisite reasonable suspicion. The court affirmed rejection of a Rehabilitation Act claim that the defendants failed to identify G.C. as disabled under section 504. View "Cain v. Owensboro Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

After a Tennessee state court jury convicted Lovins of second-degree murder, the state trial court judge made additional factual findings, employing procedures that the Supreme Court later found unconstitutional, and enhanced Lovins’s sentence from 20 to 23 years based on those findings. After Lovins exhausted state post-conviction procedures, the federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit reversed and conditionally granted the writ unless the state initiates proceedings within 180 days to either reset Lovins’s sentence to the presumptive statutory sentence of 20 years, or provide Lovins a new sentencing hearing under a sentencing procedure that satisfies the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and reasoning that the sentence was enhanced based on facts that were not found by a jury. Lovins’s direct appeal was not final until almost three years after the Blakely decision, and therefore Blakely applies to his case under clearly-established retroactivity rules. View "Lovins v. Parker" on Justia Law

In 1992, Hodges pled guilty to first-degree murder in Tennessee and a jury sentenced him to death. The trial court refused to allow his attorneys to ask prospective jurors whether they could consider a life sentence for a defendant with a prior conviction for murder. The evidence indicated that Hodges planned the killing of a stranger to obtain money to move to Florida. Hodges presented mitigation evidence, claiming he had been raped at age 12, had drug abuse issues, and was raised in an unstable household. State courts upheld the conviction and sentence on appeal and denied Hodges’s petition for post-conviction relief. Hodges petitioned for federal habeas relief, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that state courts reasonably applied federal law in determining that restrictions imposed on voir dire did not interfere with Hodges’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial and in determining that Hodges’s trial counsel were not ineffective for advising Hodges to plead guilty to murder and aggravated robbery. The district court properly denied Hodges’s requests for discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and habeas relief on a claim of juror misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Hodges v. Bell" on Justia Law

In 1997, Howell, then 17, and five friends left Kentucky, taking guns and a rickety car. At a rest stop in Tennessee, Lillelid, approached the group, sharing his religious views. Risner displayed a gun, directed the Lillelid family to their van even though Lillelid offered his keys and wallet. Risner, still armed, Howell, and others rode with the Lillelids to a secluded road where the Lillelids and their children were shot. Only two-year-old Peter survived, but lost an eye. When they were caught in Arizona, the group had the Lillelids’ possessions. All pled guilty in adult court in exchange for withdrawal of death-penalty requests and for certainty about other punishments. Howell received three life sentences without the possibility of parole and 25 years for attempted murder, each to be served consecutively, plus 25 years for especially aggravated kidnapping, 12 years for aggravated kidnapping and four years for theft, to run concurrently. State courts rejected Howell’s post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on her attorney’s failure to insist that she undertake a psychological evaluation The Tennessee Supreme Court held that, although the attorney had performed deficiently, Howell could not show prejudice. The federal district court rejected her habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Howell v. Hodge" on Justia Law

In October 2008, Deputy Kuhn, a black man, stopped Joseph, a white woman for a traffic violation. Joseph falsely reported that Kuhn had raped her during the stop. An internal investigation into the allegation was not closed until January 2009. Several months after the investigation closed, Kuhn requested medical leave based on stress. Kuhn eventually took approximately seven months of paid and unpaid leave that did not end until he was terminated in January 2010. He filed suit against the county, and his superior. Against the county only, Kuhn asserted claims for termination without due process of law, violation of Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 15.361, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Kuhn asserted a claim against his superior only for tortious interference with business expectancy. Against both, Kuhn asserted racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII, and racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2101. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kuhn v. County of Washtenaw" on Justia Law

In sight of Nixon and Greene, Ballinger had an argument with Jones, retrieved a rifle and began shooting, then fled. Two men died of gunshot wounds. There was no physical evidence tying Ballinger to the scene; the prosecution presented testimony by Nixon and Greene. Before trial, defense attorney Jackson filed a list of potential alibi witnesses, which included Krisel. After the government objected to the notice, Jackson withdrew it. The jury convicted Ballinger. Before sentencing, Ballinger argued ineffective assistance due to Jackson’s failure to call Cunningham, claiming that Cunningham was Krisel’s married name and Jackson was aware of her possible testimony. The court denied Ballinger’s motions. Michigan courts rejected appeals. On a habeas corpus petition, the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which Jackson testified that he did not argue alibi because Ballinger admitted committing the murders. Cunningham testified that she was Krisel and was with Ballinger when the crimes were committed, that Jackson never contacted her, but that she never tried to contact authorities. The district court considered that Jackson was later disbarred on an unrelated matter and granted the petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, given that a state court had issued a decision on the merits with respect to the claim. State courts did not violate clearly established federal law in rejecting Ballinger’s ineffective-assistance claim. View "Ballinger v. Preslesnik" on Justia Law

When her car was stopped, Villega, then pregnant, failed to produce a valid driver’s license. At the jail, an agent of the U.S. through Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 287(g) program, 8 U.S.C. 1357(g), determined that Villega was not lawfully in the U.S. A detainer was imposed, so that federal immigration officials would delay action until resolution of pending state charges. Unable to post bond, she was classified as a medium-security inmate because of the detainer and held for two days, until she informed a guard that she was about to have her baby. For transportation, Villega was placed on a stretcher with her wrists handcuffed in front of her body and her legs restrained together. At the hospital, the handcuffs were removed, but one of Villega’s legs remained shackled to the stretcher before and after the birth. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment on her shackling and denial-of-breast-pump claims; a jury awarded $200,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting material factual disputes surrounding whether Villega was shown to be a flight risk, whether officers had any knowledge about a doctor’s no-restraint order, and the conflicting expert testimony about the ill effects of shackling. View "Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law

Moore was convicted in Ohio state court of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. The district court conditionally granted his habeas petition based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and improper jury instructions. The Sixth Circuit reversed and rejected Moore’s additional claims of ineffective assistance for failure to employ a mitigation specialist, of prosecutorial misconduct in presenting testimony by the victim’s father and in making comments about the defense, and concerning police treatment of the then-19-year-old Moore. View "Moore v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

For many years, Warren, Michigan, has put up a winter holiday display in the atrium of its civic center, with a range of secular and religious symbols, including a lighted tree, reindeer, snowmen, a nativity, and a “Winter Welcome” sign. After the city refused to remove the nativity in 2010, the Foundation asked the city to add a sign: “At this season of THE WINTER SOLSTICE may reason prevail. There are no gods, no devils, no angels, No heaven or hell. There is only our natural world, Religion is but Myth and superstition That hardens hearts And enslaves minds…. KEEP THEM SEPARATE”. The city refused. The district court rejected the Foundation’s constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The nativity scene, when accompanied by a collection of secular and seasonal symbols, does not amount to an establishment of religion or an impermissible endorsement of it. View "Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Warren" on Justia Law