Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tennessee law enforcement was alerted to a drug distribution operation and executed a search warrant that resulted in the seizure of over 200 grams of pure meth. Agents executed additional warrants and intercepted phone calls. Twelve individuals, including Reed and Brown, were charged with conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute, at least 50 grams of meth. According to trial testimony by the law-enforcement agents, Brown and Reed both admitted to purchasing meth on numerous occasions and named several others. Four co-conspirators testified at trial. The parties agreed, and the judge confirmed, that Brown should not be mentioned during testimony to avoid the possibility of incriminating him. An officer read directly from his report, inadvertently mentioning Brown before stopping midsentence. Brown’s counsel made no objection. A joint stipulation was entered regarding the quantity and purity of the meth seized from various codefendants. No meth was seized from either Brown or Reed, who asked the district court to instruct the jury that “a conspiracy requires more than just a buyer-seller relationship.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Brown and Reed but vacated their 360-month sentences. The defendants’ request for a buyer-seller jury instruction was appropriately denied. The district court procedurally erred when calculating the defendants’ Guidelines ranges; it provided no basis to conclude that at least 4.5 kilograms of the meth distributed was actual meth. View "Reed v. United States" on Justia Law

Ohlinger, booked into the jail (SEORJ) as a pretrial detainee for burglary, reported a history of bipolar disorder and depression and that she used intravenous heroin daily. She indicated no history of seizures and reported no signs of physical trauma or illness. In the following days, Ohlinger did not report any medical problems. On June 25, at 6:57 a.m., Ohlinger, walking in the common area, appeared to become disoriented and fell off a bench. Officers Lowery and Jarvis responded. Nurse Gray found no evidence to support inmates’ statements that Ohlinger had a seizure and hit her head. She was returned to her cell. At 7:07 a.m., Lowery and Jarvis responded to a call and, seeing Ohlinger had urinated on herself, escorted Ohlinger to the medical unit. Gray again examined Ohlinger. Lowery and Jarvis returned Ohlinger to her cell to await a blood test. At 9:12 a.m., an inmate discovered Ohlinger, unresponsive. Gray used a portable defibrillator and began CPR. At 9:28 a.m., paramedics transported Ohlinger to the hospital, where she died. An autopsy identified the cause of death as seizure activity due to a subarachnoid hemorrhage and subdural hematoma of undetermined etiology. There was no evidence of skull fracture or contusions.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment to Gray, Lowery, and Jarvis. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to Gray and otherwise affirmed. A reasonable jury could find that Gray acted recklessly, not negligently, in the face of unjustifiably high risk to Ohlinger’s health. Gray’s observations of Ohlinger, information provided by other jail officials and inmates, and SEORJ’s policies should have led Gray to seek care from a doctor or hospital. View "Mercer v. Athens County, Ohio" on Justia Law

Spectrum contracts with Michigan to house children who are ordered to be detained in facilities “similar to a prison setting.” The children are completely restricted in their movements. The state requires Spectrum to monitor them on a 24/7 basis. A court ordered the detention of 15-year-old Quintana at Spectrum’s facility on August 24, 2018. Quintana struggled with depression, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping, among other things. On September 11, 2018, Quintana took his life while alone in his bedroom. No one checked his room in the 45 minutes between the last time he was seen alive and when his body was found, violating a contractual requirement that Spectrum conduct “eye-on checks” every 15 minutes when the children are “outside of the direct supervision of staff.” Spectrum had a policy or custom of skipping many eye-on checks and falsifying supervision logs to reflect that the checks had been performed.Quintana’s estate sued Spectrum under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Spectrum functioned as a state actor and violated Quintana’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissed the dismissal of the suit. The complaint contains adequate facts to establish that Spectrum is a state actor. Spectrum was allegedly engaged in a public function similar to a correctional institution, a traditionally exclusive state function. View "Nugent v. Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services" on Justia Law

McCormick pled guilty without a plea agreement to offenses involving drugs or guns. He received a below-Guidelines sentence and did not appeal. Ten months later, he moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his attorney performed ineffectively by failing to file a notice of appeal.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Review of an attorney's conduct is “highly deferential.” The district court’s finding that McCormick did not instruct counsel to file an appeal is “plausible on the record as a whole.” McCormick acknowledged telling his counsel that he wanted to appeal only if he lost at trial, or if he “didn’t feel like [he] was treated fairly” at sentencing. Neither condition was met. Counsel testified that McCormick expressed frustration with his sentence but never told him to file an appeal. The district court had to decide between two plausible stories, so its choice could not have been clearly erroneous. The court rejected McCormick’s claim that counsel was ineffective for consulting him before sentencing rather than after and was required to repeat his advice after sentencing. The Constitution does not impose any such obligation. The court’s colloquy ensured that the defendant understood his rights. McCormick may have expected an appeal, but the government did not promise that and did not breach its agreement. View "McCormick v. United States" on Justia Law

Officer Zolnai, responding to a call, passed a parked, running Chevy Malibu. The driver, Morgan, “appeared to be passed out.” After assisting the caller, Zolnai drove back and again noticed the seemingly passed-out occupant in the Malibu. Suspecting an overdose or intoxication, Zolnai parked and turned on his body camera. He did not turn on the squad’s flashing lights. Zolnai noticed a civilian, potentially in the path of the vehicle. In his experience, intoxicated individuals might “hit the gas” if startled. Without first trying to arouse Morgan, Zolnai opened the car door and asked if Morgan was okay. Morgan's response was “groggy.” Zolnai asked Morgan for “ID.” Morgan moved his hand between the seat and the console. Worried that Morgan might be reaching for a firearm, Zolnai asked him to step out. Morgan refused. A struggle followed. Morgan reached for a cardboard box in the passenger seat. Other officers arrived. They eventually handcuffed Morgan. In searching Morgan, they found plastic bags containing fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine, and a semi-automatic pistol in the cardboard box.The district court denied Morgan’s motion to suppress, citing the community-caretaking doctrine. Morgan conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute, and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Zolnai violated the Fourth Amendment when he seized and eventually searched Morgan by unreasonably opening his car door without warning in the absence of any exigency. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Christian Identity, a religion that is “explicitly racist,” believes that Caucasians are “God’s chosen people.” After the Michigan Department of Corrections refused to recognize Christian Identity as a religion for purposes of its prison system, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (RLUIPA). The district court affirmed the denial. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs satisfied the first two parts of the three-part RLUIPA test, but remanded for the Department to sustain its “heavy burden” under a strict scrutiny analysis to show that its refusal to recognize Christian Identity as a religion furthered a compelling governmental interest, and that its denial was the least restrictive means of furthering such a compelling interest. On remand, the district court concluded that the Department met its burden.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Department failed to satisfy its burden of showing that its denial of recognition was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Alternatives, other than simply accepting or rejecting recognition, were available and included in the Department’s policies, but were never considered. Christian Identity was not designated as a security threat group and there was testimony that Christian Identity advocated for nonviolence and would permit non-Caucasians to attend its services. The Department presented evidence regarding Christian Identity as a whole, but not concerning the plaintiffs. Without an individualized inquiry, the decision-making process was deficient. View "Fox v. Washington" on Justia Law

Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit murder, 18 U.S.C. 1958; using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death, sections 924(c), (j); and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered Amaya to pay a statutorily required “special assessment” of $100 per count of conviction, section 3013(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Years later, Amaya filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence on count two, arguing that after the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” holding, his murder conspiracy charge was no longer a valid predicate crime of violence for his 924(c) conviction. The district court invoked the “concurrent sentence doctrine” and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; 28 U.S.C. 2255 limits its reach to “prisoner[s] in custody ... claiming the right to be released.” Only prisoners who claim a right to be released from custody may challenge their sentences. Even if his motion were successful, Amaya would still be in custody on the two unchallenged life sentences and the $100 special assessment attached to Amaya’s challenged conviction did not warrant section 2255 review. View "Amaya v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2017, Corridore was convicted of sexually abusing his granddaughter. He was sentenced to 19 months to 15 years in prison and became subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) via a permanent ankle bracelet and sex offender registration under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). By the time he filed a habeas petition in federal district court, he had been released from prison and discharged from parole. The district court dismissed the petition, explaining that Corridore was no longer in custody and therefore could not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Corridore’s arguments that he is subject to lifetime sex-offender registration and electronic monitoring—requirements that he says satisfy the custody requirement. The collateral consequences of a conviction are not sufficient to render an individual “in custody” for the purposes of a habeas attack. The issue is whether a petitioner’s movement is limited because of direct government control and therefore amounts to a severe restraint on liberty. The LEM and SORA requirements, even combined, do not qualify. View "Corridore v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant murdered a rival drug dealer. When he learned that a witness might cooperate with law enforcement, Defendant murdered him too. Federal charges followed. His lawyers negotiated a plea deal under which the government would drop many of the charges, and he would serve 480 to 520 months in prison. Defendant agreed to the plea deal, and the district court imposed a 504-month sentence. Defendant had second thoughts. He moved to vacate his sentence, claiming that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in advising him to accept the plea deal. The district court rejected this contention.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show that his attorney performed deficiently and that he suffered prejudice from the inadequate representation. The court reasoned that given the lack of a single favorable decision at the time, the district court may not have accepted it. Even if the court had done so, “it is not clear how the successful exclusion of” one of 18 charges would have materially improved Defendant’s bargaining position. Yet despite this minimal leverage, Defendant’s counsel secured a plea with a 480-to520-month sentence—a lengthy term, granted, but one that (with good time credit) permits Defendant’s release in his mid-to-late 50s, a meaningful improvement over a guaranteed life sentence. Further, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show prejudice. Finally, the court held that by failing to raise the substantive challenge (or his newly asserted grounds for overcoming procedural default), Defendant doubly forfeited review. View "Terrance Kimbrough v. United States" on Justia Law

Sterling Hotels sued a state elevator inspector (Defendant), asserting several claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Sterling first argued that Defendant violated its right to due process when he sealed Wyndham’s elevators without giving Sterling notice or an opportunity to object. Further, Sterling argued that Defendant engaged in an unconstitutional regulatory taking when he sealed the elevators. Defendant moved to dismiss, in part on qualified immunity grounds. The district court declined to address Defendant’s entitlement to immunity, and Defendant appealed.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that when a deprivation of property “occurs pursuant to an established state procedure”—as Defendant acknowledges it did here—the state must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to respond before the deprivation. Here, Defendant sealed the elevators without providing any advance notice that the elevators should descend to the basement. Thus, Sterling alleged, Defendant failed to provide it with any opportunity to respond to that requirement. That is sufficient to state a due-process claim against Defendant. Further, Defendant’s potential individual liability for a regulatory takings claim was not clearly established when he sealed the elevators. That means Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. View "Sterling Hotels, LLC v. Scott McKay" on Justia Law