Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Indicted for rape of an 11-year-old, defendant was convicted of attempted rape, a second-degree felony (O.R.C. 2923.02/2907.02). At the time, statutes included a rebuttable presumption in favor of minimum sentences for second degree felonies (two years) unless the court determined that probation adequately satisfied the purposes of sentencing or supported a longer sentence; trial courts were required, in some cases, to make additional, findings. The trial court found that defendant had served time for a prior conviction, was a sexual predator, and posed the greatest likelihood of recidivism, and imposed a sentence of eight years. While appeal was pending, a 2006 Ohio supreme court case gave courts discretion to impose any sentence within the ranges without making specific findings. On remand, the trial court again imposed a sentence of eight years, finding only that defendant is a sexual predator. After exhausting state remedies, defendant sought habeas corpus asserting that retroactive application of the 2006 decision violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Defendant was always at risk for the eight-year maximum sentence, based on his history. The change in law did not limit the right to appellate review.

Defendant was convicted on 22 counts arising out of his involvement in the distribution of heroin over a four-year period. The district court imposed a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 1,000 grams of heroin, and imposed concurrent sentences for all but two of the other offenses. Consecutive sentences were imposed on each of two convictions for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 924(c)convictions; the admission of certain co-conspirator statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); the allowance of testimony regarding recorded calls to which the witness was not a party; and failure to give a requested jury instruction regarding multiple conspiracies. With respect to sentencing, the court rejected arguments that the notice of enhanced penalties was defective; that it was error to impose consecutive sentences for the 924(c) convictions; and that the sentence of life imprisonment violated double jeopardy and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

Defendant, sentenced to death for the murder of his girlfriend and her two children in 1988, exhausted state remedies. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. The federal district court denied his petition for habeas corpus in 2001; the Sixth Circuit held appeal in abeyance while he exhausted "Atkins" claims in state court. Tennessee courts rejected his claim of mental retardation. The district court also denied an Atkins petition. The Sixth Circuit vacated the decision on the Atkins claim and affirmed on all other claims. On remand, the court must consider the relationship between mental retardation and mental illness and whether defendant displayed deficits in adaptive behavior by the time he was 18. Rejected claims concerned the court's failure to answer jury questions regarding whether defendant could be paroled from a life sentence; ineffective assistance in counsel's failing to object to the prosecution's penalty-phase closing argument that giving a life sentence would reward him for the additional killings of the children and by failing to hire a psychiatrist regarding his mental-health issues; and the court's determination of his competency to stand trial.

After state court rejected his challenge to the constitutionality of the law, defendant pled no contest to sexual battery for engaging in sexual conduct by means of sexual intercourse with his 22-year-old stepdaughter, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.03(A)(5), which makes it a crime to "engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when . . . [t]he offender is the other person's natural or adoptive parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of the other person." He was sentenced to 120 days of incarceration and three years of community control and was classified as a sex offender. State court rejected appeals. The district court denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the state's interest in protecting families.

The city disbanded its dive team because of budget cuts, after which two children drowned. Plaintiff, a fire department employee and member of the disbanded dive team, spoke at a city council meeting, indicating that the budget cuts caused the deaths and would cause more deaths. Plaintiff was ordered to serve unpaid suspension, equivalent to three 24 hour shifts, on grounds of insubordination, malfeasance, misfeasance, dishonesty, failure of good behavior, and conduct unbecoming of an officer. After a grievance hearing the mayor affirmed the suspension, finding that plaintiff’s statements had been false. The district court granted summary judgment for the city. The Sixth Circuit remanded for determination of whether the statements were false; whether any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; whether a reasonable official would have believed any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; and, if necessary, whether plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern outweighed the city’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

Defendant, convicted of several felony offenses in state court and sentenced to a maximum term of 27 years, exhausted state court appeals and filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court five days after the one-year statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. 2254) had run. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of equitable tolling. Although defendant proceeded pro se after his appellate attorney withdrew and did not turn over documents related to the case, and was limited to one law library visit per week, he was not diligent. His lack of access to the trial transcript and lack of notice of the nearly two-month gap between when he submitted his motion for a delayed appeal to the prison mailroom and when that motion was ultimately filed with the Ohio Supreme Court were "unfortunate" but did not excuse the delays.

When defendant was indicted in Tennessee in 2005 for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. 846, 841(b)(1)(A)) he was in custody in Georgia on unrelated charges. The government obtained writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, but because of superseding indictments, defendant's transfer to another county, and misplaced paperwork, defendant did not appear in Tennessee until August 2008. The district court rejected Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial Act claims, but dismissed without prejudice under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act and FRCP 48(b). Defendant pled guilty to a new indictment and was sentenced to 110 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for dismissal. The district court erred by finding that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated; there was no basis for concluding that the government was less than grossly negligent and the court should have presumed prejudice, based on the length of the delay.

Defendant was convicted of intentional murder and of possession of a firearm at the time of the commission of a felony. At sentencing, counsel expressed that defendant, due to long term mental illness, was not responsible for his actions and needed extensive psychiatric treatment. The trial court imposed a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and a two-year sentence for the firearm conviction. The court noted that a clinical report classified defendant as suffering from schizophrenia paranoid type in remission in an individual who displays passive-aggressive tendencies, mal-depression and non-compliance with medical treatment, but concluded that his mental issues did not rise to the level of useable defense. After exhausting state appeals, defendant petitioned for habeas corpus. The district court dismissed, denying a motion for equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether the extraordinary circumstances of his mental illness prevented defendant from diligently pursuing his rights.

After receiving information from a confidential informant concerning cocaine sales, officers obtained a warrant that specified the apartment, the items to be searched for, and a description of a man known as "Little Toe." At the apartment they found drugs, a scale, cash, and two guns. Defendant signed a waiver, admitted to ownership, and, after unsuccessfully moving to suppress, entered a plea of guilty as a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). He was sentenced to six months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The warrant was valid; there was enough information to find probable cause. The informant had supplied accurate information in the past, stated that he had seen a drug sale at the apartment; only five days passed between the tip and the search.

Convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death in 1983, petitioner exhausted Ohio state appeals and collateral attack. After dismissing his first habeas corpus petition, the federal district court granted conditional relief, was overturned by the Sixth Circuit, reopened the petition, and granted relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. At sentencing, counsel's mitigation strategy was to portray petitioner as a good person who lost his temper under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Counsel pursued this strategy despite having available the reports of several court-appointed mental health experts, which hinted at petitioner's difficult upbringing but did not provide specific details about his severely impoverished and abusive childhood. Despite these reports, counsel did not conduct an investigation into petitioner's background or interview any of his family members. Had they done so, there is a reasonable probability that the additional mitigating evidence would have led at least one of the panel judges to vote against the death penalty.