Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death in 1983, petitioner exhausted Ohio state appeals and collateral attack. After dismissing his first habeas corpus petition, the federal district court granted conditional relief, was overturned by the Sixth Circuit, reopened the petition, and granted relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. At sentencing, counsel's mitigation strategy was to portray petitioner as a good person who lost his temper under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Counsel pursued this strategy despite having available the reports of several court-appointed mental health experts, which hinted at petitioner's difficult upbringing but did not provide specific details about his severely impoverished and abusive childhood. Despite these reports, counsel did not conduct an investigation into petitioner's background or interview any of his family members. Had they done so, there is a reasonable probability that the additional mitigating evidence would have led at least one of the panel judges to vote against the death penalty.

Petitioner murdered his three sons as they slept in their home, two days after his wife served him with divorce papers. An Ohio court sentenced him to death. His appeals and collateral challenges in state court were unsuccessful and federal courts denied. habeas corpus. His execution for November 15, 2011. The district court denied his Rule 60(b) motion to reopen his habeas petition and a motion to stay his execution. The Sixth Circuit denied a stay of execution. Petitioner waited too long to file his Rule 60(b) motion and offered no justification for the delay. He has known about the factual underpinnings of his conflict-of-interest and ineffective assistance of counsel arguments since 2006. Those arguments have already been addressed and are barred from further review. Petitioner also cannot overcome the bar on second or successive habeas petitions.

Plaintiffs bred their dogs to each other and advertised 11 puppies for sale. Undercover animal services officers visited on the pretense of interest in the puppies. Without a warrant or consent, officers re-entered the home and took all the dogs, stating that they could confiscate the dogs because plaintiffs did not have a breeder's license and that if more than one dog were unlicensed, they could seize all the animals. Neither adult dog was licensed. Before the dogs were released, the adult dogs were neutered, all had identification microchips inserted, and plaintiffs purchased a breeder's license and paid $1,020.95. Plaintiffs were never provided written notice of alleged ordinance violations. The dogs contracted infections that required expensive veterinary treatment. The district court rejected plaintiffs' state law and constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs were not operating a kennel and were not required to obtain a license for a single litter. The court rejected an argument that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using subterfuge, but found that plaintiffs stated a claim with respect to the second, warrantless entry. Characterizing the release of the dogs as having elements of a shakedown, the court found that plaintiffs stated a claim for procedural due process claims. The court rejected substantive due process and equal protection claims.

During an investigation of home invasions, officers were told that plaintiff's boyfriend was a participant and that property had been taken to plaintiff's apartment. Officers executed a no-knock search. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that an officer had violated the Fourth Amendment, but was entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Even if a disparity between the warrant affidavit and the warrant led to the inclusion of items without the requisite probable cause, a reasonable officer would not have recognized the discrepancy and would have believed that probable cause for the warrant existed. The warrant established probable cause to search and the officer could seize any items that constituted evidence of home invasions. The district court erred in granting qualified immunity on a claim that the warrant was constitutionally deficient because it failed to describe with particularity some of the items to be seized. The warrant listed broad categories of stolen property, providing no basis to distinguish stolen items from plaintiff's personal property, although the officers had additional information about the stolen items that they could have included in the warrant.

After spotting defendant walking at 2:30 a.m. in an area that generates narcotics complaints, an officer ordered him to stop. He complied. Because defendant seemed nervous and was shaking, the officer frisked him and requested permission to search. Defendant agreed and the officer found $1,300 in cash. Defendant's pants had fallen to his thighs and, when the officer pulled out his boxers there was plastic sticking up between his butt cheeks. Defendant tried to run, but officers restrained him and discovered that the plastic contained cocaine. Following his plea of guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, defendant appealed the district court's denial of a motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the police seizure of defendant was neither consensual nor based on reasonable and articulable suspicion. The consent given to search was involuntary and did not purge the taint of the illegal seizure.

Petitioner was charged with first degree murder. During jury selection, in Michigan state court, defense counsel objected that the prosecution was attempting to exclude black jurors, particularly black men. The trial judge inquired and did not find improper exclusion. During the three-day selection process, defense counsel raised a second Batson challenge and the prosecutor lodged her own objection to peremptory strikes by defense. At the end of selection, the judge stated that any problems caused by failure to reseat jurors that had been peremptorily dismissed had been "cured." Convicted and sentenced to life in prison, petitioner obtained a remand for the Michigan Supreme Court. The conviction was ultimately upheld. The federal district court issued a conditional writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a Batson violation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the only reasonable conclusion, from the transcript, was that the trial court did find that two jurors were improperly excluded. The trial court subsequently failed to satisfy its constitutional obligation under Batson.

Defendant, convicted on 11 child-pornography related offenses )18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (d)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1), (a)(5)(B), and (b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2257(f)(4)), was sentenced to 16 years in prison followed by eight years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The warrant, which authorized search and seizure of the entire computer server, was not overbroad. In general,if a computer search is limited to a search for evidence explicitly authorized in the warrant, it is reasonable for the executing officers to open the various types of files located in a computer's hard drive in order to determine whether they contain such evidence.The government provided an indexed list of images and files to the defense, six weeks before trial, and complied with Rule 16. Punishing, through multiple offenses, a defendant who funnels child pornography through different websites is consistent with Congress's intent to halt the dissemination of such images and to stop the sexual abuse of children. While noting "troubling" aspects to the rationale, the court affirmed the below-Guidelines sentence.

Petitioner was convicted of murder in connection with a homosexual encounter and sentenced to death in the 1980s. Ohio courts denied relief. After several remands by the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that defense counsel's failure to obtain an independent mental health expert and reliance on a presentence investigation report could not be the basis for issuing a writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the district court denied the writ. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted and petitioner did not establish that the default should be excused do to fault and prejudice. A "Brady" claim concerning evidence of a psychological report indicating that the murder may have occurred as a result of "homophobic panic," failed in light of other evidence.

Petitioner, convicted in Michigan of aiding and abetting a carjacking and of receiving and concealing stolen property, exhausted state appeals and sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court denied. On rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction and rejecting an argument that trial counsel was ineffective in refusing to call a co-defendant, who had already pled guilty to the actual carjacking, as a witness.

Petitioner, 16 years old at the time, was charged with first-degree murder and firearm possession during a felony after admitting that he was present at the scene of the 1984 murder. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction, so that defendant was tried as an adult. His counsel did not appeal and he was convicted. Evidence included three witnesses who testified that defendant had told them that he killed the victim. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus two years for the gun charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Multiple attempts at collateral relief failed. The district court denied a 2006 petition for habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, that it deemed to be "successive" under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed after finding that the petition was not successive because it followed a remedial appeal ordered on a prior petition. The credibility determination of the trial judge should not be overturned; given the evidence against him, defendant cannot show prejudice.