Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court previously found Defendant guilty of twelve supervised-release violations and sentenced him to a below-Guidelines sentence of 48 months imprisonment. He appealed, and the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). On remand, the district court sentenced Defendant to the same sentence of 48 months imprisonment, even though that sentence now exceeds the high end of the advisory Guidelines range by 21 months. Defendant appealed again, arguing that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Sixth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. The court explained that district courts may consider the seriousness of the violation conduct when determining the sanction for the breach of trust associated with a supervised-release violation. Thus, it was appropriate for the district court to consider Defendant’s violation conduct. Further, the court found that the district court failed to adequately explain its decision to impose consecutive sentences. Also problematic is the court’s failure to explain its decision to increase Defendant’s sentence on Count One from “time served” to 24 months’ imprisonment post-remand. Although the district court was not constrained by its prior decision, the absence of any explanation leaves us to speculate as to the court’s reasoning. This is a reversible error. Moreover, the court concluded that the district court improperly weighed Section 3553(a) factors by placing considerable weight on a couple of factors and no weight on several other factors. This renders the sentence, in this case, substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Andrew Damarr Morris" on Justia Law

Following separate jury trials, Defendants George Oscar Messer (Oscar) and his son Jake Messer (Jake) were each convicted on two counts of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1201(a)(1). They were both sentenced to terms of life imprisonment because of various sentencing enhancements, including one for sexual exploitation. Defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the federal kidnapping statute is (1) an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and (2) unconstitutionally vague. Jake also appealed his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment, and precedent forecloses Defendants’ Commerce Clause and void-for-vagueness arguments. Further, the court held that Jake’s arguments regarding the alleged procedural and substantive unreasonableness of his sentence are unavailing. Specifically, the court wrote that the district court did not clearly err in treating Jake’s federal drug-conspiracy conviction as part of his criminal history rather than as relevant conduct. Further, the court held that the district court properly applied the dangerous-weapon and sexual-exploitation enhancements. Moreover, the court wrote that if the district court erred in applying the ransom-demand enhancement, that error was harmless. Finally, the court explained that a life sentence is an extraordinary punishment. But the court is not permitted to engage in a de novo reweighing of the Section 3553(a) factors. And in the present case, despite the extremity of the sentence, it can find no abuse of discretion by the district court in imposing the sentence recommended by the Guidelines. View "United States v. Jake Messer" on Justia Law

Defendant violated the conditions of release that a district court imposed after it found him not guilty of an alleged crime by reason of insanity. Placing the burden on Defendant, the court found that Williams posed “a substantial risk” of harm to the public and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. At issue is whether Section 4243(g) places the burden of proof on Defendant to show that his continued release would not “create a substantial risk” to the public.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained just as the individual has the burden at every turn up to that point to show he is not a risk to the public (for the affirmative defense, for initial release, for release after a period of commitment, for modification of conditions of release, and for ultimate release), so the individual also has the burden when the same issue returns after a violation of the conditions of release. Moreover, the court permissibly found that Defendant presented a substantial risk to the community, as his behavior and mental condition show. View "United States v. Richard Austin Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner, pro se federal prisoner, moves for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He also moved for default judgment against the government for its alleged untimeliness in responding to his motion.
The Sixth Circuit denied both motions. The court explained that the district court did not run afoul of Castro when it construed Petitioner’s original filings as Section 2255 motions. The court’s order provided Petitioner notice of the recharacterization and gave him an opportunity to amend his filing. The court, it is true, did not expressly warn Petitioner of the consequences of recharacterization. The court instead appointed counsel. No longer pro se, Petitioner moved beyond Castro’s ambit. Further, the court found that even if the transcripts from Petitioner’s sentencing qualify as newly discovered evidence, they do not show his innocence or show that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. View "Curt Russell Cannamela" on Justia Law

Officer Layne pulled VanPelt over for driving a car with an illegal window tint and called for backup. When Officer Bennett responded, Layne informed him that “the plate doesn’t come back to the car” and the “car smells like weed.” While patting VanPelt down, Layne found several baggies of marijuana and one baggie of crack cocaine. With VanPelt in handcuffs, Layne led him toward the police car. VanPelt took off running. Four seconds later, Layne tackled VanPelt to the ground, then stood and attempted to pull VanPelt to his feet, briefly grabbing VanPelt’s hair. VanPelt replied that he could not stand because his hip was broken. Layne released his grip. VanPelt fell back to the ground.VanPelt sued Layne for using excessive force and Detroit for failing to adequately train and supervise Layne, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Layne’s tackle and subsequent attempt to lift VanPelt did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Layne’s use of force throughout the encounter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, even assuming Layne could have stopped VanPelt using a less severe technique. When Layne attempted to lift VanPelt, a reasonable officer would not have known that VanPelt was injured. The record and video did not establish any indication of excessive force nor evidence that Layne had “evil intentions.” View "VanPelt v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

H.K., a high-school student, created a fake Instagram account impersonating one of his teachers. The account was benign at first, but became graphic, harassing, and threatening when two of his friends added their own posts to the account. The posts included statements about sex and violence. News of the account spread. H.K.’s friends tagged teachers in their posts. H.K. eventually decided that the attention was too much and deleted the account. The school traced the account to H.K. and the other two students and imposed an immediate five-day suspension pending further investigation. After concluding the investigation and providing H.K. with an administrative hearing, the school suspended him for 10 days.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in H.K.’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendants had the authority to regulate H.K.’s off-campus speech; the “gross misbehavior” rule the defendants relied on to discipline H.K. was sufficiently definite. The student speech at issue involved serious or severe harassment of three teachers and another student; H.K. bore some responsibility for the speech and the speech substantially disrupted classwork or the defendants reasonably believed the speech would disrupt classwork. View "Kutchinski v. Freeland Community School District" on Justia Law

During the public comment period in a Zoom meeting of the Grand Traverse County Commission on January 20, 2021, MacIntosh expressed her concern about the Commission’s March 2020 invitation to and endorsement of the Proud Boys, a group that has been designated an extremist group and a hate group. She requested that the Commissioners make a public statement condemning the group’s violent behavior. In response, Commissioner Clous produced a high-powered rifle and displayed it to MacIntosh and the viewing audience.MacIntosh sued, alleging that Clous unconstitutionally retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights and that the County had an unconstitutional policy or practice of allowing this kind of First Amendment retaliation. The district court denied his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MacIntosh plausibly alleged that Clous violated MacIntosh’s free speech rights and Sixth Circuit caselaw put him on clear notice that his actions were unconstitutional. The court rejected Clous’s argument that his display of the rifle was not an “adverse action” that would deter a “person of ordinary firmness” from exercising her First Amendment rights. View "MacIntosh v. Clous" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 1994 Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (amended in 2006 and 2011) imposed registration requirements, restrictions on living and working in a school zone, and reporting requirements. Michigan retroactively imposed these obligations, including those contained in the amendments, on offenders convicted before 2006 and 2011. In another suit, the Sixth Circuit held, in 2016, that the retroactive application of SORA amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. While an interim order was in effect, in another suit, Michigan passed a fourth version of SORA, effective on March 24, 2021, removing or modifying provisions that had been declared unconstitutional.In 2021, five Michigan sex offenders filed suit, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. They alleged that the Michigan State Police enforced unconstitutional provisions of SORA from 2006 onwards, including after the previous cases were decided. They alleged that state officials, whom they purported to sue “in their individual capacities,” knew that the invalidated provisions were unconstitutional, but failed to stop their subordinates from enforcing them, noting the governors’ duty under the Michigan Constitution to ensure the faithful execution of federal and state law. The district court dismissed the complaint on various grounds, including sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The plaintiffs fail to state a claim of supervisory liability. They do not plausibly allege that the defendants authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct. View "Does 1-5 v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

In 2011, Gaona fired a gun with the intent to kill a certain individual but accidentally shot and injured a bystander. Gaona pleaded guilty in Michigan state court to assault with intent to murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Gaona was sentenced to two years for the firearm conviction, consecutive to a 17-to-50-year sentence for the assault conviction, based on a PSR which reported three prior misdemeanors, including one stemming from a 2009 incident, for which Gaona was (without the assistance of counsel) convicted of possession of marijuana via plea and sentenced to 30 days’ time served. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his argument that state courts may not rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in enhancing a sentence if that conviction resulted in a sentence of actual imprisonment.The district court denied Gaona’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition on the same sentencing argument but stayed his petition so that he could exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court. The state courts rejected those claims. The federal court then rejected his ineffective assistance claims as he had not filed an amended habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No Supreme Court case clearly establishes that state courts may not, in enhancing a sentence, rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor that resulted in a sentence of time served. View "Gaona v. Brown" on Justia Law

Michigan State Police Officer Lay, stationed about 35 miles from the Indiana state line, noticed a vehicle driving northbound following closely behind another vehicle—a state law infraction. Lay began following the vehicle and ran its plate through a database, which noted that the car had been in Texas, one day before. Lay pulled the vehicle over and approached. Unprompted, the passenger handed over his driver’s license without making eye contact. The driver produced his driver’s license and a car rental agreement. Returning to her cruiser, Lay ran the information through databases and radioed for assistance. The driver’s name came up clean; the passenger was on probation for a prior crime. Meanwhile, Officer Bierema arrived with his drug-detection K-9. Approximately seven minutes into the stop, Lay exited her cruiser to speak with the passenger about his probation status; he was less than forthcoming. Lay requested consent to search the car, which the driver withheld. She then ordered him to stand back while Bierema’s K-9 conducted a sniff of the vehicle’s exterior. The K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs, prompting the officers to search the car. In the back seat, they found two gym bags containing cocaine and methamphetamine.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendants’ motions to suppress, rejecting arguments that the traffic stop was unconstitutionally overlong and that the driver’s arrest was unsupported by probable cause. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law