Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of murdering a man and raping his daughter, setting their house on fire, and related offenses. At the mitigation hearing, his parents testified about an unpleasant childhood, but defense counsel did not present evidence of "horrific" conditions in records from Children’s Services and in affidavits from his siblings, including evidence of rape, incest, and sexual abuse, or present evidence of petitioner's attempt to help his younger sister. A psychiatric consultant, employed despite the fact that he was not a trained mitigation specialist, advised the attorneys to obtain those records, but they did not do so, nor did they prepare witnesses to testify. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel at the mitigation hearing and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus vacating the death sentence, unless the State of Ohio begins a new mitigation hearing within 180 days. Despite gruesome crime, there is a reasonable probability that, had the three-judge panel heard the true horror of petitioner's childhood, at least one of the judges would not have sentenced him to death; the Ohio court's conclusion to the contrary was unreasonable,

Police investigated an airplane landing at an unstaffed airport in Jackson, Tennessee at 9:00 p.m., approached the plane, and asked three occupants for identification. A warrant check came up clean. The officers returned the identifications, chatted with the men for 10-15 minutes, and asked for consent to search the plane. The pilots refused, nervously, according to the officers, climbed back into the plane, and flew to Nashville, where local police discovered 70 kilograms of cocaine hidden in the plane. The district court suppressed the officers' account of what happened at the Jackson airport. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The evidence was not the product of an illegal seizure, so the exclusionary rule does not apply. Defendants' contact with police was relatively short in duration and non-threatening and defendants did not establish any causative link between the alleged police misconduct and the evidentiary discovery.

Larry Gibbs was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and was sentenced as a career offender to thirty years' imprisonment. Later, Gibbs filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that a prior state conviction for narcotics possession had been improperly assessed as a predicate trafficking offense under federal sentencing guidelines. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that Gibbs's failure to raise this claim during his direct appeal constituted a procedural default. Gibbs subsequently filed a motion to set aside the Court's judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), claiming that his procedural default should be excused because (1) he was "actually innocent" of the sentence he received, and (2) the claim he pursued was unavailable during his direct appeal. The district court denied Gibbs's motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Gibbs's argument was available to him on direct appeal, his procedural default was not excused; and (2) because a court could have reasonably believed a thirty-year sentence was appropriate in this case, Gibbs could not rely on "actual innocence" to excuse his procedural default.

The executor of the estate's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims that decedent was killed while riding a motorcycle across an empty field, in the middle of the night, after a low-speed chase, when a deputy intentionally rammed that motorcycle. The district court held that the deputy's actions, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, violated decedent's clearly established constitutional rights, precluding qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.

In 2005 petitioner was convicted, under Michigan law, of felony murder for his role in the robbery, fire, and homicide at a gun shop. He had initially invoked his right to counsel, after which an officer made a remark about the possibility of the death penalty. A day later, petitioner stated that he had planned the crime. The trial court refused to suppress the statement. After exhausting state appeals, petitioner was denied habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254) by the district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court decision, that the death penalty statement did amount to an impermissible interrogation and that the coercive effect of this interrogation had subsided by the next morning, so that petitioner had validly waived his right to counsel before giving his statement, did not reflect an unreasonable application of relevant Supreme Court precedent. The court noted that it is not clear that the death-penalty comment qualified as the functional equivalent of interrogation, as opposed to a type of "subtle compulsion" to cooperate that is not foreclosed by precedent.

Defendant was discharged from the U.S. Army due to a personality disorder. He was later charged under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. 3261(a), and sentenced, by a federal district court, to life in prison for participating in a sexual assault and multiple murders while stationed in Iraq. Co-conspirators, still on active duty and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 802(a)(1), were tried by courts-martial and each sentenced to between 90 and 110 years imprisonment; they are eligible for parole in ten years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first noting that Iraq could not prosecute the defendant and that prosecution in the U.S. did not violate international law. The Army completed a valid discharge of defendant, so that he was no longer subject to courts-martial. His trial under MEJA did not violate the separation-of-powers principle or his due process or equal protection rights. Defendant was no longer similarly situated with his co-conspirators when charges were filed.

The district court denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254) by an Ohio death row prisoner, convicted of two 1992 murders. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a claim that he could not make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial because the jail doctor had him taking an anti-psychotic drug. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a substance abuse expert, any such evidence would have been cumulative. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence from defendant's upbringing, the rationale for not presenting the materials is consistent with concerns about some of the damaging elements that might have been introduced. The decision not to suppress defendant's confession, even though he was in drug and alcohol withdrawal at the time, was reasonable.

After exhausting state appeals from his conviction for crimes including felony murder, defendant unsuccessfully petitioned the district court for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial. A claim that defendant was required to walk in front of the jury in shackles was procedurally defaulted and defendant did not demonstrate prejudice that would excuse the default. A claim that failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel was also defaulted.Defendant failed to allege any facts sufficient to make out an access-to-courts violation in regard to his prison's law library.

Defendant admitted to participating in the 1984 robbery and to shooting husband (who survived), but claimed not to have shot wife. He entered a plea of guilty to aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder. At a penalty hearing, defendant argued that he had participated in the plot only under the influence of Wesley, who shot wife. The panel sentenced defendant to death. When Wesley was tried, the state presented evidence that he, not defendant, was the principal offender in the murder. Wesley was sentenced to life imprisonment with possibility of parole after 20 years. Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea or vacate the death sentence was rejected. The Sixth Circuit's 2004 grant of habeas corpus was remanded by the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit again remanded with instructions that the district court issue a conditional writ of habeas corpus unless the state holds a new sentencing hearing within 90 days. Defendant's due process rights were violated by arguments leaving the impression with that he was the principal offender in the murder, even though the state had evidence and a belief that Wesley was actually the triggerman. It is likely that the panel would not have imposed a death had the state not persisted in its efforts.

Plaintiff, an inmate, failed to stand during a head-count and was pulled from his cell, handcuffed, and placed in an observation cell for more than 12 hours with his hands restrained behind his back. He claims that he missed a meal and was unable to push a button for water or pull down his pants to use the toilet; his requests for mental health services went unanswered. The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the facility and 11 employees on grounds of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the institution had waived its defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity by failing to properly raise it. Claims for monetary damages from employees in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but claims for declaratory and injunctive relief may proceed. Defendants had fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional and the alleged facts were sufficient to find that the force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm and that defendants disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.