Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, serving a non-parolable life sentence in a Michigan prison, sued the parole board (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming that its change in policies concerning when it recommends commutation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Both the former and current policies give the parole board complete discretion in deciding whether to recommend commutation of a prisoner’s sentence to the governor. Commutation is left entirely to the discretion of the governor and plaintiff did not allege facts sufficient to show a significant risk of an increased prison term because of the changes in policies.

Defendant was convicted in Tennessee in 1998 of especially aggravated robbery and state courts upheld his conviction. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse an African-American prospective juror The conclusion that the prosecutor provided legally sufficient, race-neutral reasons for striking the individual and application of a sole-motivation standard, rather than a per se approach or mixed-motive standard, were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established legal principles. Defendant's claim that he felt he had no choice but to represent himself because he was unhappy with his appointed counsel is not a basis for granting habeas corpus; the court reasonably concluded that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

Husband and wife married in 1996, when husband was a training officer at a juvenile correctional facility and wife was working as the youth-services administrator at the same facility. In 2005 husband was terminated, after a disciplinary incident. He was later reinstated. Wife was subsequently demoted. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Defendants appealed the district court's partial denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs' right of intimate association was clearly established long before husband was terminated and wife was demoted and transferred; it was objectively reasonable to require defendants to be aware of and observe the constitutional right. There was sufficient evidence that defendants were substantially motivated by wife's marriage in removing her from her position. Defendants did not present sufficient evidence that wife would have been demoted and transferred absent her protected association.

Plaintiffs a pro-life, non-profit corporation engaged in anti-abortion activities, including publicity campaigns, and an individual, challenged government policies that, they allege, target individuals defendants deem to be "rightwing extremists" for disfavored treatment. The district court dismissed claims under the First and Fifth Amendments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that despite many conclusory and irrelevant allegations, plaintiffs did not identify any policy aimed at their constitutionally-protected rights. Plaintiffs did not address affirmative conduct undertaken by defendants, did not allege any time, place, or manner restrictions imposed on speech, did not allege that they were taxed or punished for First Amendment activities, did not allege any prior restraint on protected, and did not allege any form of retaliation for exercise of protected speech on identified occasions. There was no plausible evidence of disparate treatment

The inmate, serving a life sentence for first-degree murder and carrying a gun while attempting to commit a felony, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation, conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and violations of state law. He claims that defendants improperly rejected his incoming mail and filed two false misconduct reports against him after his success in an earlier retaliation suit. The district court dismissed most of the claims as unexhausted, and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to exhaustion, but reversed summary judgment on a retaliation claim because the inmate had not received requested discovery materials. The inmate was required to file individual grievances challenging all but one of the mail rejections; the state was not on notice of an ongoing problem because the rejections were based on different policies. Michigan’s rules provide that the only avenue for challenging major misconduct reports is a hearing, which the inmate did not request.

Defendant, a police officer, noticed a Tahoe that looked like a Michigan State Police vehicle and suspected that it was being used for impersonation of a law-enforcement officer. After state police advised that it was not theirs, defendant parked behind the vehicle, and approached plaintiff. Plaintiff stated that that he was a security guard, had a concealed-carry permit, and owned a handgun that was on the seat. Defendant handcuffed plaintiff. A check disclosed a warrant for plaintiff's arrest. Plaintiff was in custody for two hours before it was determined that the warrant was for another individual. The district court granted the city summary judgment on claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but held that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiff was not seized at the initial encounter or was subjected to a brief, reasonable "Terry" stop. A reasonable person would have felt free to continue walking after defendant's vehicle was parked behind the Tahoe; defendant neither displayed a weapon, nor touched plaintiff and did not use language or a tone of voice compelling compliance. The use of handcuffs and detention were justified because defendant was in a threatening situation. Failure to loosen the cuffs did not constitute excessive force.

The Sixth Circuit remanded the 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus case to the district court for factual development of an Ohio death-row inmate's claim that Ohio’s lethal-injection procedures violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court rejected the warden's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the inmate's claim was cognizable only under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Sentenced to death for a 1992r aggravated murder, petitioner was denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. First noting that petitioner failed to timely raise the issue in state court, the court rejected a claim of ineffective assistance for failing to file a motion to suppress the fruits of an illegal stop and arrest. Based on an in-person report of criminal activity, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the petitioner and perform a pat-down. The Ohio Supreme Court found a statement, "I think I need a lawyer," was not an unambiguous request for counsel; even if the holding was incorrect, the evidence showed that the petitioner voluntarily reinitiated communication. The trial court conducted adequate inquiry before denying a motion to substitute counsel after the guilt phase of the trial. Petitioner did not establish ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase. Rejecting a "Brady" claim, the court stated that petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of a different result if the material at issue had been disclosed. The court also rejected a challenge to jury instructions concerning sentencing.

Proposal 2, a successful voter-initiated amendment to the Michigan Constitution, became effective in 2006 and prohibited public colleges from granting "preferential treatment to[] any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin." The district court entered summary judgment upholding Proposal 2. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and applying strict scrutiny because the enactment changed the governmental decision-making process for determinations with a racial focus. Proposal 2 targets a program that "inures primarily to the benefit of the minority" and reorders the political process in Michigan in such a way as to place "special burdens" on racial minorities. Admissions committees are political decision-making bodies and the Proposal is more than a mere repeal of desegregation laws. The court noted the procedural obstacles that would be faced by minorities favoring race-based admissions.

Defendant, convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) appealed denial of a motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that under the totality of the circumstances, officers’ suspicions that the defendant was armed and a danger to them was reasonable. The detention and search occurred at a location where officers had been recently informed that a black man was selling drugs; defendant initially approached the officers in a calm way, but his demeanor subsequently changed once he realized they were police; defendant acted nervously, "like a deer at headlights;" defendant turned away from the officers as if to leave; and defendant frantically dug his hands into his pockets and would not remove them.