Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The government introduced evidence of defendant's prior sale of cocaine during his trial on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, (18 U.S.C. 922(g)), possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)), and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in holding that the prior acts evidence was admitted for the proper purpose of establishing specific intent; determined that its probative value was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect, based on the evidence and the defense; and gave two strong cautionary instructions to the jury. Any error would be harmless in light of the "wealth" of alternative evidence, including defendant's own statements. The sentence of 420 months was appropriate, in light of the defendant's history.

Defendant entered a guilty plea to knowingly receiving child pornography and knowingly possessing the same child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252A) and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 120 and 240 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, first holding that a double jeopardy claim was not waived by the plea agreement. The offense of knowingly receiving child pornography includes all of the elements of the lesser-included offense of possessing the same child pornography and Congress did not explicitly require multiple punishments. Simply ordering that the sentences run concurrently would be an insufficient remedy.

Petitioner-Appellant Arthur Vanwinkle pled guilty to federal theft and conspiracy charges in exchange for the government dismissal of more serious offenses. The district court sentenced Petitioner to over 120 months' imprisonment. Instead of appealing his plea or sentence, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his sentence, challenging the plea and sentence on constitutional grounds. A federal magistrate denied his motion, holding that Petitioner had no bases to challenge his plea or sentence. The district court adopted the magistrate's findings in their entirety, but noted that "reasonable jurists could disagree" with how the court handled Petitioner's legal sufficiency claim. The court granted Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability on that one claim, and the Sixth Circuit granted this review. The Court found that Petitioner's plea "serve[d] as an admission that he is not innocent of the crimes charged." The Court reasoned that because Petitioner's argument that the same evidence he failed to object to at trial was now legally insufficient he could not challenge his sentence and plea now. The Court affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's motion.

While serving a sentence for planting a pipe-bomb that killed his stepfather, the defendant mailed a letter containing a substance purported to be anthrax to the judge who denied his habeas corpus petition. After representing himself at trial, he was convicted of mailing a threatening communication to a federal judge (18 U.S.C. 876). The district court did not obtain a presentence report and conducted the sentencing hearing by video conference because of concerns that the defendant would be difficult to control. The defendant and his appointed counsel did not object. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that the letter amounted to a threat even though the danger from anthrax is immediate, not in the future, but vacated the sentence. Although the video conference worked well, it is not a substitute for physical presence; the government did not establish that the error was harmless. The district court also erred in relying on the defendantâs waiver of a presentence report, absent a finding that a report was not necessary. The record indicated that the defendant knowingly waived the right to counsel at trial and the court was not required to provide him with funds to purchase non-prison clothing for trial.

The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to charges under 18 U.S.C. 2252 of possessing and receiving child pornography, then appealed denial of a motion to suppress photographs and videos that were discovered on his laptop computer during a consent search of his residence for controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and other material or records pertaining to narcotics. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The âknock and talkâ procedure is a legitimate investigative technique for obtaining a suspectâs consent to a search and the defendant did voluntarily consent. The officer told the college-educated defendant that he could refuse consent or stop the search and the defendant knew that the police had enough evidence to get a warrant. The search of the computer and external drive were within the scope of the consent; the defendant did not object or withdraw consent during the search. The computer was searched after marijuana was found and for the purpose of finding information about the defendantâs marijuana growing operation.

The district court declared an amendment to Kentucky Revised Statutes Sect. 393.060 unconstitutional. The amendment shortens the period for presumption of abandonment on travelerâs checks from 15 to seven years, accelerating the date at which the issuer must remit outstanding funds to the state. The company claims that the amendment limits its ability to earn interest by investing unclaimed funds. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, applying the "rational basis" test. Although the legislative history did not reflect it, the court the court considered the state's "rational claim" that the amendment was intended to facilitate its legitimate interest in assuming control of abandoned property. The court declined to invalidate the amendment simply because it may be unwise to deviate from the 15-year presumptive abandonment period of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, followed by 48 states. The court remanded for consideration of other constitutional claims.

Following a guilty plea to charges arising out of a 1999 armed robbery, the Ohio court sentenced the petitioner to an agreed-upon statutorily mandated term of imprisonment of at least 18 years for murder, with a firearm specification, and felonious assault. State courts declined to consider an appeal, filed six years after the conviction, challenging the voluntariness of the plea. The federal district court rejected a habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the delay in filing the state appeal amounted to procedural default. Although the state courts have wide discretion with respect to timeliness, failure to comply with a state procedural rule can bar federal habeas corpus review. In this case, the petitioner gave no reason for the six-year delay.

The district court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus to an inmate serving 18 years to life for complicity in a drug-related murder. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Ohio court's determination that the inmate was not denied effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations was not contrary to clearly established federal law. The inmate exhausted state remedies as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, and did not default her claim by failing to present it in a separate post-conviction proceeding in the trial court, as the Ohio Court of Appeals advised her to do. The court made a determination on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim, regardless of its procedural suggestion. It was not unreasonable for the court to hold that the evidence did not establish a reasonable probability that the inmate would have accepted a plea offer if her counsel had told her that she could be convicted of complicity.

The defendant was sentenced to death for murder. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Ohio state courts reasonably rejected constitutional claims. The Eighth Amendment does not preclude a defendant waiving his right to present mitigating evidence in a death penalty case or require that such a waiver be knowing and voluntary, although the Ohio court found that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right. The record supported the decision not to hold a competency hearing. A recorded re-enactment of dog-tracking between the victim's house and the defendant's home did not deny the defendant fundamental fairness. Decisions made by defense counsel were not objectively unreasonable and the defendant did not show that he was prejudiced by those decisions.

Officers responding to an accident smelled raw marijuana and were told that occupants of the vehicle had removed items and carried them up the off-ramp, showing no concern for the driver. The officers observed that the items were being placed into a vehicle owned by the defendant. A canine unit was called and alerted to the defendant's car, at the top of the ramp. The defendant stated that the officers could search the car, helped them open the hood, then grabbed a towel-wrapped gun from under the hood and ran. The Sixth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the district court properly refused to suppress the gun. There was no detention before the dog sniffed the car, which was in a public place, so there was no need for reasonable suspicion to justify use of the canine, although the officers did have reasonable bases for suspicion. The court refused to vacate a portion of the plea agreement under which the defendant waived his interest in the gun, the car, and a computer in the car; the defendant did not establish improper coercion.