Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rutherford County, Tennessee law enforcement officers raided 23 stores selling cannabidiol (CBD) products because they falsely believed that such products were illegal under state law. The charges were dropped; the products were legal under both state and federal law. The shop owners sued the responsible law enforcement agencies, asserting violations of their constitutional rights and conspiracy to violate those rights. All but one of the shop owners ultimately settled. The district court then granted summary judgment to the County and Sheriff Fitzhugh.On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. The plaintiff presented evidence to support a claim of 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil conspiracy. Fitzhugh’s alleged behavior reflects interdependent decision-making with the Smyrna Police Department (SPD) and the DA’s office through the planning and execution of the raids, calculated to achieve an unconstitutional outcome. Although SPD’s raid of the plaintiff’s business was the overt act that directly caused the plaintiff’s alleged injury, holding the county defendants liable for their alleged involvement in the overall plan that led to that raid is the kind of conspiratorial behavior at the heart of section 1983 civil conspiracy claims. A jury could reasonably conclude that there was a “single plan” in which Fitzhugh participated. View "Rieves v. Smyrna, Tennessee" on Justia Law

Nashville passed a “sidewalk ordinance.” To obtain a building permit, an owner must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere.In a challenge to the ordinance under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the landowner plaintiffs asked the court to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted in 1987 to assess conditions on building permits (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission). Nashville argued that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville argued in favor of the application of the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in “Penn Central” (1978). The district court granted Nashville summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the landowners. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. View "Knight v. e Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

Former inmate Morgan, a devout Muslim, sued Michigan prison officials for allegedly violating his free exercise rights by failing to provide him with meals consistent with his religion after he was transferred to a prison that lacked the capacity to produce compliant meals. Morgan filed a grievance with the prison five days after he arrived. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment based on Morgan’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 1997e, which requires prisoners to follow a prison’s grievance procedures before challenging prison conditions in court. The district court held that Morgan’s grievance only covered the failure to provide meals up until the date of the grievance, so Morgan should have filed further grievances as to the alleged free exercise violation.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Morgan already put the prison officials on notice of unconstitutional conduct; requiring repeat grievances for the same course of conduct would exceed the requirements of the Act. At issue here is Morgan’s free exercise claim, which he raised by prison grievance. The facts Morgan has pled along with this claim, including staff laughing at him, are sufficiently ancillary to require no further exhaustion of his claim. View "Morgan v. Trierweiler" on Justia Law

The Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 were enacted to provide all Americans with universal access to telecommunications services. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implemented that mandate by establishing the Universal Service Fund, which now comprises four program mechanisms to “help[] compensate telephone companies or other communications entities for providing access to telecommunications services at reasonable and affordable rates throughout the country, including rural, insular and high costs areas, and to public institutions,” 47 U.S.C. 254. Certain telecommunications carriers must fund these efforts; on a quarterly basis, the FCC publishes the percentage of “interstate and international end-user telecommunications revenue” that covered telecommunications carriers must contribute to the Fund’s programs (the quarterly contribution factor). The Fund is administered by the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC).A group of consumers, a nonprofit organization, and a carrier challenged this statutory arrangement as violating the nondelegation doctrine. They also alleged that the role of a private entity in administering the Fund violates the private-nondelegation doctrine. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Section 254 sufficiently guides the FCC’s discretion; Congress provided an intelligible principle and its delegation does not violate the separation of powers. USAC is subordinate to the FCC and performs ministerial and fact-gathering functions. View "Consumers' Research v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Howell received medical screenings from nurses employed by NaphCare, which contracts with the Jail to provide medical services. Nurses noted his sickle cell disease diagnosis. Howell returned to the medical unit after he started a fight. Video shows Howell repeatedly falling in the hallway. Officers placed Howell in a wheelchair. At the medical sallyport, Howell complained loudly of pain and stated that he could not feel his legs. Howell slid out of the wheelchair and was eventually left on the floor. Nurse Jordan reviewed Howell’s medical chart. Medical staff had previously sent Howell to a hospital for sickle cell pain. Jordan concluded Howell was in pain but was experiencing a psychiatric issue. Around 5:40 p.m., officers placed Howell in a restraint chair, transported Howell to the mental health unit, and placed him in a cell with a small window on its door. At 6:06 p.m., Nurse Arthur checked on Howell, who was still yelling. but decided that he did not need further medical treatment. No NaphCare employee checked on Howell again. Officers checked Howell approximately every 20 minutes by looking through the window, seeing only a side profile. Officers falsified log entries and failed to comply with regulations concerning removal, rotating Howell’s limbs, or providing water or the restroom. At 9:45 p.m., Officers went to remove Howell and found him dead. The coroner determined that Howell died from sickle cell crisis.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Nurse Jordan and Deputy Erwin on deliberate indifference claims; a reasonable jury could find that they recklessly failed to act to mitigate an unjustifiably high risk of harm to Howell that a reasonable official would have recognized. Erwin was not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Howell v. NaphCare, Inc." on Justia Law

White. convicted of four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of attempted murder, two counts of felonious assault, one count of aggravated burglary, three counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of having a weapon while under disability, was sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, White argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney, Armengau, was under indictment in Franklin County, Ohio, for serious criminal offenses and “would have been conflicted over whether to devote time to preparing his own defense or that of his client”; “would have been reluctant to vigorously represent White" for fear of angering the prosecutor; and might have failed to engage in plea-bargaining in White’s case out of a desire to gain a victory over the prosecutor. The Ohio Court of Appeals declined to consider White’s claim because the record lacked necessary facts.In White's federal habeas proceedings, the district court found that Armengau had told White about Armengau’s indictment but White had decided to retain Armengau anyway. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Because White’s claim depends on facts outside the state court record, the Supreme Court’s 2022 "Shinn" decision likely precludes relief. Even considering the new facts introduced in federal habeas court, White’s claim fails. White failed to show that the alleged conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. White and Armengau’s cases were handled by different judges and were prosecuted by different authorities. View "White v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Under the Gun Control Act “it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun,” 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The Act incorporates the definition from the National Firearms Act: “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b).The ATF, which administers both statutes, previously maintained that a bump stock, which drastically increases a gun’s rate of fire, is not a machinegun part. In 2018, after a Las Vegas gunman used bump stocks attached to semiautomatic rifles to kill 58 people and injure roughly 500 in approximately 10 minutes, the ATF reversed its position by promulgating the Rule, giving possessors of bump stocks 90 days to destroy or abandon their bump stocks.Hardin challenged the Rule as exceeding the ATF’s statutory authority. The Sixth Circuit reversed a judgment upholding the Rule, noting the rule of lenity in criminal cases and that Congress could resolve the ambiguity. View "Hardin v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives" on Justia Law

The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) forwarded to the Knoxville Police a CyberTip from Facebook reporting that a 43-year-old male appeared to be using Facebook private messages to entice a 15-year-old female (M.D.) to produce and send child-exploitation images and engage in sexual activity. The CyberTip suggested that they had already engaged in sexual activity and included information matching Tywan Sykes.Charged with enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, section 2251; committing felony offenses involving a minor while required by Tennessee law to register as a sex offender, section 2260A; and knowingly possessing child pornography section 2252A, Sykes filed unsuccessful motions to suppress evidence retrieved from his Facebook account and cell phone. He argued that NCMEC is a government entity and that Facebook had become NCMEC's agent by searching his account and forwarding messages to NCMEC and that the month-and-a-half delay between the seizure of his phone and the execution of the search warrant was unreasonable. The court also partially denied a motion to exclude evidence of his prior sex offenses.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Sykes’s convictions and 45-year sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and erroneously admitted evidence of a past sex-offense conviction; that there was insufficient evidence to convict on all charges; and that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Sykes" on Justia Law

In 2017, the County initiated an administrative tax foreclosure against BSI. The County Board of Revision (BOR) issued its final adjudication of foreclosure in June 2019. Because the County had opted for the alternative right of redemption, BSI had 28 days to pay the taxes before the County took title to the property. Days later, BSI filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which automatically stayed the BOR’s final judgment and 28-day redemption period. The bankruptcy court granted the County relief from the stay on January 17, 2020. The BOR determined that the statutory redemption period expired on January 21, 2020. On January 30, rather than sell the property, the County transferred it to its land bank (Ohio Rev. Code 323.78.1). When a county sells foreclosed property at auction, it may not keep proceeds beyond the taxes the former owner owed; if the county transfers the property to the land bank, “the land becomes ‘free and clear of all impositions and any other liens.’”BSI filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a significant difference between the appraised value of the property and the amount that the County alleged BSI owed meant that the County’s action violated the Takings Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the two-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The limitations period began to run when the redemption period ended on January 21, 2020. If BSI paid its delinquent taxes during that period, the County would have been prohibited from taking the property. View "Beaver Street Investments, LLC v. Summit County, Ohio" on Justia Law

Consumers alleged that Ford cheated on its fuel economy and emissions testing for certain truck models, including the F-150 and Ranger. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. 6201, and its regulations control such testing, the results of which are sent to the EPA. The EPA uses the information to provide fuel economy estimates for labels affixed to new vehicles. The FTC regulates advertising to consumers; Its “Guide Concerning Fuel Economy Advertising for New Vehicles” advises vehicle manufacturers and dealers about disclosing the established fuel economy of a vehicle, as determined by the EPA. The EPA and Department of Justice investigated Ford’s testing and resultsThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the purported class action, which included claims of breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, breach of express warranty, fraud, and unjust enrichment under the laws of every state. The claims are preempted by federal law as they inevitably conflict with the EPA’s regime. The EPA accepted Ford’s testing information and published its own estimate based on that information. The EPA has the authority to approve or reject Ford's figures. The tort claims essentially challenge the EPA’s figures. The EPA must balance several objectives in reaching those figures, and these claims would skew this balance. View "Lloyd v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law