Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Harris went to the store, argued with a clerk, left the store, and entered the laundromat next door where his friend, Henderson, worked. Harris asserts that while he was between the buildings, the clerk came out, pointed a gun, and taunted him with racial slurs. Following Harris’s 911 call, four officers arrived. As shown on bodycams, they expressed disbelief in Harris’s report. The store clerk denied having a gun. The store had at least three surveillance cameras but the officers watched footage from only the front door, although Harris had reported that the incident occurred near the back door. Harris wanted to move forward with his report, believing the footage would corroborate his account. The officers indicated that the video revealed Harris had lied and arrested Harris. No officer took Henderson’s statement. Detective Busch reviewed the police report and passed it to the prosecutor for charging.Harris spent 18 days in jail before being released on bond. Weeks later, the state dropped Harris’s false felony report charge; the store clerks failed to appear. Harris sued the City of Saginaw, the officers, and Busch. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity summary judgment to the officers, the grant of qualified immunity to Busch, and the dismissal of Harris’s failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against the city. There is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the officers arrested Harris without probable cause. View "Harris v. City of Saginaw, Michigan" on Justia Law

Moss purchased cocaine from a DEA informant and was charged with possession with intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Moss’s first attorney moved for an entrapment hearing. Steingold then began representing Moss. At the entrapment hearing, 10 days later, Steingold attested to minimal pre-trial preparation. Moss was the only witness he presented. Steingold requested a continuance to contact witnesses he learned about during Moss’s direct and cross-examination. The court permitted Steingold to contact one witness but denied a continuance. The prosecution presented five witnesses and multiple exhibits. The court denied Moss’s motion to dismiss based on entrapment.At trial, Steingold waived his opening argument, presented no witnesses, and stipulated to the admission of the transcript from the entrapment hearing as substantive evidence. For one of the government’s two witnesses, Steingold did not object during his testimony or conduct any cross-examination. Steingold waived his closing argument. On appeal, Moss unsuccessfully argued that Steingold provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by waiving Moss’s right to a jury trial and stipulating to the admission of the evidence from the entrapment hearing.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order of habeas relief. The state court’s denial of Moss’s ineffective assistance claims under Strickland was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Moss v. Miniard" on Justia Law

Smucker’s is a federal contractor that supplies food items to the federal government. In 2021, by Executive Order, President Biden directed all federal contractors to “ensure that all [their] employees [were] fully vaccinated for COVID-19,” unless such employees were “legally entitled” to health or religious accommodations. The order made contractors “responsible for considering, and dispositioning, such requests for accommodations.” In September 2021, Smucker’s notified its U.S. employees that it would “ask and expect” them to “be fully vaccinated.” A month later, in the face of “deadlines in the federal order,” Smucker’s announced a formal vaccine mandate with exemptions based on “sincerely held religious beliefs.”The plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought religious exemptions, then sued Smucker's under the First Amendment's free-exercise guarantee. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. When Smucker’s denied the exemption requests, it was not a state actor. Smucker’s does not perform a traditional, exclusive public function; it has not acted jointly with the government or entwined itself with it; and the government did not compel it to deny anyone an exemption. That Smucker’s acted in compliance with federal law and that Smucker’s served as a federal contractor, do not by themselves make the company a government actor. View "Ciraci v. J.M. Smucker Co." on Justia Law

The 2020 Horseracing Safety and Integrity Act created a national framework to regulate thoroughbred horseracing, replacing several state regulatory authorities with a private corporation, the Horseracing Authority, the Act’s primary rule-maker. The Authority was not subordinate to the relevant public agency, the Federal Trade Commission, in critical ways. In 2022, the Fifth Circuit declared the Act unconstitutional because it gave “a private entity the last word” on federal law. Congress amended the Act to give the Federal Trade Commission discretion to “abrogate, add to, and modify” any rules that bind the industry, 15 U.S.C. 3053(e).The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit filed by Oklahoma, West Virginia, Louisiana, their racing commissions, and other entities that made the same claims as the Fifth Circuit case. While the challenges are not moot, the Authority is now subordinate to the FTC, which has “pervasive” oversight and control of the Authority’s enforcement activities, just as it does in the rulemaking context. The court rejected a “commandeering” challenge to a provision that requires state authorities to “cooperate and share information” with the Authority or federal agencies for lack of standing and rejected claims that the Act was coercive or punitive. View "State of Oklahoma v. United States" on Justia Law

Jane, a sophomore, reported to Oberlin College’s Title IX office (20 U.S.C. 1681–1688) that she believed her sexual encounters with Doe amounted to sexual misconduct. The office did not inform Doe of the allegations for several weeks and did not investigate. According to Doe, the delay resulted in a failure to preserve exculpatory security-camera footage. Doe alleges that the dearth of information provided to him led him to hire a private investigator. Doe believed that Jane had spoken to other students about the matter and requested that Oberlin protect his privacy. Doe was told that Jane had requested an informal resolution but was later told that Jane had decided to pursue a formal resolution. Doe asserted a retaliation complaint, claiming that the change was prompted by his complaint that Jane was slandering him. Oberlin then provided Doe with the requested reports and complaints.Doe sought a temporary restraining order weeks after learning of Roe’s complaint, before any formal hearing process began, alleging violations of federal due process, Title IX, and state tort laws. Oberlin subsequently officially concluded that Doe had not violated the Sexual Misconduct Policy. The district court dismissed the due process claim with prejudice and dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Although the district court did not follow the appropriate process for an on-the-merits, sua sponte dismissal of Doe’s due process claim, Oberlin is not a state actor subject to federal due process requirements. The court remanded in part; the court was correct to dismiss the remaining claims for lack of ripeness, but subsequent factual developments have ripened the claims. View "Doe v. Oberlin College" on Justia Law

Waide encountered the Lexington police after a shed fire occurred on the property next to his. Although no one suspected Waide of being involved with the fire and there was no evidence of arson, the fire investigator noticed surveillance cameras attached to Waide’s duplex residence and asked Waide to turn over his DVR. When Waide declined, the investigator obtained a warrant to enter Waide’s apartment and retrieve the DVR. When six officers arrived at Waide’s duplex to execute that warrant, their threatened entry and questions about whether Waide had drugs on the premises caused Waide to admit that his apartment contained a small amount of marijuana. This confession led to the issuance of two subsequent warrants to search both units of Waide’s duplex for narcotics–the other unit was occupied by Waide’s mother. The searches yielded a firearm plus large quantities of drugs and money.After the district court denied Waide’s motions to suppress evidence, he entered into a conditional guilty plea to the offense of possessing cocaine and heroin with the intent to distribute the drugs and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The affidavit in support of the DVR warrant lacked reliable evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the shed fire was due to arson or any other criminal activity. The incriminating evidence should be suppressed because it stemmed from the exploitation of the unlawful DVR warrant. View "United States v. Waide" on Justia Law

In 1985, two people were shot to death in rural Garrard County. Haight, who had escaped from jail days earlier, was captured in a nearby cornfield. During a chase, police discovered the victims’ possessions and both handguns used to commit the murders in a stolen truck abandoned by Haight. Haight pled guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s recommendation of a life sentence without parole for 25 years. The court accepted Haight’s plea but sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court vacated. Haight unsuccessfully sought specific enforcement of the plea agreement, was allowed to withdraw his plea, and went to trial. Haight admitted to the murders from the witness stand, claiming that he was suffering from “extreme emotional disturbance” and intoxication. The jury found him guilty of two counts each of intentional murder and first-degree robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Haight’s convictions and death sentence were affirmed. Haight was denied postconviction relief without discovery or an evidentiary hearing.In 2002, Haight sought habeas relief. The district court stayed the federal action. The Kentucky Court of Appeals and Kentucky Supreme Court refused to consider his unexhausted issues. Haight successfully moved to have the now-exhausted issues included in his amended 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which raised 45 grounds. Haight’s motion and application for the appointment of experts and his motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing were denied.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance; upholding the refusals to permit the defense to have Haight examined by a neuropsychologist before sentencing and to appoint medical experts; rejecting challenges to jury instructions and to the exclusion of certain potential jurors; and rejecting arguments concerning the refusal to enforce the plea agreement. Kentucky’s death penalty statute is not facially unconstitutional. View "Haight v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Helphenstine was arrested for drug offenses on April 14 and taken to jail. Around 8:30 p.m. on Sunday, April 16, Helphenstine vomited and was moved to a “detox” cell. A local doctor was contractually obligated to visit the jail once a week. He came on Tuesday nights. Helphenstine’s condition deteriorated. Knowing that the office was closed, deputies faxed the doctor a non-emergency medical request, stating Helphenstine was vomiting and soiling himself, refusing to eat or drink, and had not gotten out of bed for 24 hours. The doctor testified he called the jail and directed that Helphenstine be taken to a hospital but was told that Helphenstine refused. There is no record of these calls. The doctor faxed prescriptions for antiemetics; although it was a Tuesday and although he knew of Helphenstine’s condition, he did not visit the jail. Around midnight, Helphenstine laid on his mat, where he remained. Around 3:30 a.m., Helphenstine was unresponsive; jailers began CPR and called 911. Helphenstine was pronounced dead en route to the hospital.Plaintiff’s experts testified that Helphenstine died either from withdrawal or from severe dehydration caused by withdrawal. Helphenstine’s death certificate lists his cause of death as “acute (fentanyl) and chronic drug abuse,” with the interval between onset and death listed as 6 minutes; fentanyl was present in Helphenstine’s blood. The district court rejected a deliberate indifference claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A jury could conclude that Helphenstine’s death was the result of deliberate indifference by the county and the doctor; the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Helphenstine v. Lewis County" on Justia Law

Officer Hazlewood applied to a Kentucky state judge for a warrant. In his supporting affidavit, Hazlewood stated that a confidential informant (CI) advised Hazlewood that Sanders was selling heroin/fentanyl from a specific apartment. Hazlewood set up two controlled purchases; officers observed Sanders leaving and returning to that apartment. The affidavit contained no information pertaining to the reliability of the CI. With a warrant, officers recovered controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and firearms from the apartment. Sanders was charged with drug and firearm offenses but was not charged with distributing the drugs sold during the controlled purchases.The court denied Sanders's motion for supplemental discovery relating to the controlled buys because disclosure would reveal the CI’s identity and the evidence was not material to the defense. Sanders also moved to suppress all evidence and statements that were obtained when executing the warrant and for a “Franks” hearing to challenge the accuracy of surveillance referenced in the affidavit. The court denied the motions determining that probable cause supported the search warrant or, in the alternative, that the “good faith” exception applied.The Sixth Circuit vacated Sanders’s conviction and 72-month sentence. Few facts supported a nexus between the drug evidence being sought and the apartment that was searched; entering and exiting an apartment, alone, provides no indication of criminal activity at the apartment. The affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe that Sander resided at the apartment. No reasonable officer would believe that the affidavit established probable cause to search the apartment. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Public Service Commission's “fuel adjustment” regulation allows utilities to adjust the rates they charge customers to account for fluctuating fuel costs. Unreasonable charges are disallowed. The Commission considers the price the utility paid for raw materials, like coal. Kentucky utilities are encouraged to buy cheaper coal. Kentucky coal producers, however, pay a severance tax. Compared to states with no severance tax, Kentucky coal is expensive. The Kentucky House of Representatives encouraged the Commission to consider all costs, including fossil fuel-related economic impacts within Kentucky, when analyzing coal purchases under the regulation. The Commission issued a new regulation under which it would artificially discount a utility’s fuel costs by the amount of the severance tax paid to any jurisdiction.Foresight, an Illinois coal producer, challenged the regulation under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. While an appeal was pending, the Commission rescinded the regulation. A subsequent statute required the Commission to evaluate the reasonableness of fuel costs based on the cost of the fuel less any severance tax imposed by any jurisdiction. Foresight sued; the district court again denied the preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit remanded. Foresight is likely to be able to show that the law discriminates against interstate commerce. The Commission proffered no explanation for the statute except that it is designed to nullify the competitive disadvantages created by Kentucky’s severance tax. Illinois coal is worse off as a matter of basic economics and Supreme Court precedent; the law is purposefully discriminatory. View "Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler" on Justia Law