Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant murdered a rival drug dealer. When he learned that a witness might cooperate with law enforcement, Defendant murdered him too. Federal charges followed. His lawyers negotiated a plea deal under which the government would drop many of the charges, and he would serve 480 to 520 months in prison. Defendant agreed to the plea deal, and the district court imposed a 504-month sentence. Defendant had second thoughts. He moved to vacate his sentence, claiming that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in advising him to accept the plea deal. The district court rejected this contention.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show that his attorney performed deficiently and that he suffered prejudice from the inadequate representation. The court reasoned that given the lack of a single favorable decision at the time, the district court may not have accepted it. Even if the court had done so, “it is not clear how the successful exclusion of” one of 18 charges would have materially improved Defendant’s bargaining position. Yet despite this minimal leverage, Defendant’s counsel secured a plea with a 480-to520-month sentence—a lengthy term, granted, but one that (with good time credit) permits Defendant’s release in his mid-to-late 50s, a meaningful improvement over a guaranteed life sentence. Further, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show prejudice. Finally, the court held that by failing to raise the substantive challenge (or his newly asserted grounds for overcoming procedural default), Defendant doubly forfeited review. View "Terrance Kimbrough v. United States" on Justia Law

Sterling Hotels sued a state elevator inspector (Defendant), asserting several claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Sterling first argued that Defendant violated its right to due process when he sealed Wyndham’s elevators without giving Sterling notice or an opportunity to object. Further, Sterling argued that Defendant engaged in an unconstitutional regulatory taking when he sealed the elevators. Defendant moved to dismiss, in part on qualified immunity grounds. The district court declined to address Defendant’s entitlement to immunity, and Defendant appealed.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that when a deprivation of property “occurs pursuant to an established state procedure”—as Defendant acknowledges it did here—the state must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to respond before the deprivation. Here, Defendant sealed the elevators without providing any advance notice that the elevators should descend to the basement. Thus, Sterling alleged, Defendant failed to provide it with any opportunity to respond to that requirement. That is sufficient to state a due-process claim against Defendant. Further, Defendant’s potential individual liability for a regulatory takings claim was not clearly established when he sealed the elevators. That means Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. View "Sterling Hotels, LLC v. Scott McKay" on Justia Law

The district court previously found Defendant guilty of twelve supervised-release violations and sentenced him to a below-Guidelines sentence of 48 months imprisonment. He appealed, and the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). On remand, the district court sentenced Defendant to the same sentence of 48 months imprisonment, even though that sentence now exceeds the high end of the advisory Guidelines range by 21 months. Defendant appealed again, arguing that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Sixth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. The court explained that district courts may consider the seriousness of the violation conduct when determining the sanction for the breach of trust associated with a supervised-release violation. Thus, it was appropriate for the district court to consider Defendant’s violation conduct. Further, the court found that the district court failed to adequately explain its decision to impose consecutive sentences. Also problematic is the court’s failure to explain its decision to increase Defendant’s sentence on Count One from “time served” to 24 months’ imprisonment post-remand. Although the district court was not constrained by its prior decision, the absence of any explanation leaves us to speculate as to the court’s reasoning. This is a reversible error. Moreover, the court concluded that the district court improperly weighed Section 3553(a) factors by placing considerable weight on a couple of factors and no weight on several other factors. This renders the sentence, in this case, substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Andrew Damarr Morris" on Justia Law

Following separate jury trials, Defendants George Oscar Messer (Oscar) and his son Jake Messer (Jake) were each convicted on two counts of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1201(a)(1). They were both sentenced to terms of life imprisonment because of various sentencing enhancements, including one for sexual exploitation. Defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the federal kidnapping statute is (1) an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and (2) unconstitutionally vague. Jake also appealed his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment, and precedent forecloses Defendants’ Commerce Clause and void-for-vagueness arguments. Further, the court held that Jake’s arguments regarding the alleged procedural and substantive unreasonableness of his sentence are unavailing. Specifically, the court wrote that the district court did not clearly err in treating Jake’s federal drug-conspiracy conviction as part of his criminal history rather than as relevant conduct. Further, the court held that the district court properly applied the dangerous-weapon and sexual-exploitation enhancements. Moreover, the court wrote that if the district court erred in applying the ransom-demand enhancement, that error was harmless. Finally, the court explained that a life sentence is an extraordinary punishment. But the court is not permitted to engage in a de novo reweighing of the Section 3553(a) factors. And in the present case, despite the extremity of the sentence, it can find no abuse of discretion by the district court in imposing the sentence recommended by the Guidelines. View "United States v. Jake Messer" on Justia Law

Defendant violated the conditions of release that a district court imposed after it found him not guilty of an alleged crime by reason of insanity. Placing the burden on Defendant, the court found that Williams posed “a substantial risk” of harm to the public and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. At issue is whether Section 4243(g) places the burden of proof on Defendant to show that his continued release would not “create a substantial risk” to the public.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained just as the individual has the burden at every turn up to that point to show he is not a risk to the public (for the affirmative defense, for initial release, for release after a period of commitment, for modification of conditions of release, and for ultimate release), so the individual also has the burden when the same issue returns after a violation of the conditions of release. Moreover, the court permissibly found that Defendant presented a substantial risk to the community, as his behavior and mental condition show. View "United States v. Richard Austin Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner, pro se federal prisoner, moves for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He also moved for default judgment against the government for its alleged untimeliness in responding to his motion.
The Sixth Circuit denied both motions. The court explained that the district court did not run afoul of Castro when it construed Petitioner’s original filings as Section 2255 motions. The court’s order provided Petitioner notice of the recharacterization and gave him an opportunity to amend his filing. The court, it is true, did not expressly warn Petitioner of the consequences of recharacterization. The court instead appointed counsel. No longer pro se, Petitioner moved beyond Castro’s ambit. Further, the court found that even if the transcripts from Petitioner’s sentencing qualify as newly discovered evidence, they do not show his innocence or show that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. View "Curt Russell Cannamela" on Justia Law

Officer Layne pulled VanPelt over for driving a car with an illegal window tint and called for backup. When Officer Bennett responded, Layne informed him that “the plate doesn’t come back to the car” and the “car smells like weed.” While patting VanPelt down, Layne found several baggies of marijuana and one baggie of crack cocaine. With VanPelt in handcuffs, Layne led him toward the police car. VanPelt took off running. Four seconds later, Layne tackled VanPelt to the ground, then stood and attempted to pull VanPelt to his feet, briefly grabbing VanPelt’s hair. VanPelt replied that he could not stand because his hip was broken. Layne released his grip. VanPelt fell back to the ground.VanPelt sued Layne for using excessive force and Detroit for failing to adequately train and supervise Layne, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Layne’s tackle and subsequent attempt to lift VanPelt did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Layne’s use of force throughout the encounter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, even assuming Layne could have stopped VanPelt using a less severe technique. When Layne attempted to lift VanPelt, a reasonable officer would not have known that VanPelt was injured. The record and video did not establish any indication of excessive force nor evidence that Layne had “evil intentions.” View "VanPelt v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

H.K., a high-school student, created a fake Instagram account impersonating one of his teachers. The account was benign at first, but became graphic, harassing, and threatening when two of his friends added their own posts to the account. The posts included statements about sex and violence. News of the account spread. H.K.’s friends tagged teachers in their posts. H.K. eventually decided that the attention was too much and deleted the account. The school traced the account to H.K. and the other two students and imposed an immediate five-day suspension pending further investigation. After concluding the investigation and providing H.K. with an administrative hearing, the school suspended him for 10 days.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in H.K.’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendants had the authority to regulate H.K.’s off-campus speech; the “gross misbehavior” rule the defendants relied on to discipline H.K. was sufficiently definite. The student speech at issue involved serious or severe harassment of three teachers and another student; H.K. bore some responsibility for the speech and the speech substantially disrupted classwork or the defendants reasonably believed the speech would disrupt classwork. View "Kutchinski v. Freeland Community School District" on Justia Law

During the public comment period in a Zoom meeting of the Grand Traverse County Commission on January 20, 2021, MacIntosh expressed her concern about the Commission’s March 2020 invitation to and endorsement of the Proud Boys, a group that has been designated an extremist group and a hate group. She requested that the Commissioners make a public statement condemning the group’s violent behavior. In response, Commissioner Clous produced a high-powered rifle and displayed it to MacIntosh and the viewing audience.MacIntosh sued, alleging that Clous unconstitutionally retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights and that the County had an unconstitutional policy or practice of allowing this kind of First Amendment retaliation. The district court denied his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MacIntosh plausibly alleged that Clous violated MacIntosh’s free speech rights and Sixth Circuit caselaw put him on clear notice that his actions were unconstitutional. The court rejected Clous’s argument that his display of the rifle was not an “adverse action” that would deter a “person of ordinary firmness” from exercising her First Amendment rights. View "MacIntosh v. Clous" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 1994 Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (amended in 2006 and 2011) imposed registration requirements, restrictions on living and working in a school zone, and reporting requirements. Michigan retroactively imposed these obligations, including those contained in the amendments, on offenders convicted before 2006 and 2011. In another suit, the Sixth Circuit held, in 2016, that the retroactive application of SORA amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. While an interim order was in effect, in another suit, Michigan passed a fourth version of SORA, effective on March 24, 2021, removing or modifying provisions that had been declared unconstitutional.In 2021, five Michigan sex offenders filed suit, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. They alleged that the Michigan State Police enforced unconstitutional provisions of SORA from 2006 onwards, including after the previous cases were decided. They alleged that state officials, whom they purported to sue “in their individual capacities,” knew that the invalidated provisions were unconstitutional, but failed to stop their subordinates from enforcing them, noting the governors’ duty under the Michigan Constitution to ensure the faithful execution of federal and state law. The district court dismissed the complaint on various grounds, including sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The plaintiffs fail to state a claim of supervisory liability. They do not plausibly allege that the defendants authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct. View "Does 1-5 v. Whitmer" on Justia Law