Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ohio's legislatively-established municipal and county courts possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain civil and criminal matters with the same authority as other common pleas judges. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court employees certified a union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for 136 employees, not including judges. A 2016 collective bargaining agreement was to extend through December 2019 and stated that the court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed the contract, or the employees decertified the union. In 2019, negotiations stalled. In December 2020, the Juvenile Court sought a declaration that the agreements were void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Juvenile Court subsequently treated union members as nonunion employees, decided to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.The union sued in federal court, citing the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union’s Contracts Clause claims against the individual defendants; qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against them under the Takings Clause. View "Laborers' International Union of North America v. Neff" on Justia Law

Zheng became a permanent U.S. resident in 2004. He was a professor at the University of Southern California, Pennsylvania State University, and The Ohio State University and performed research under National Institute of Health (NIH) grants. Zheng had financial and information-sharing ties to Chinese organizations and received grants from the National Natural Science Foundation of China. Including that information on NIH applications would have derailed Zheng’s funding prospects, so Zheng clouded his ties to China. By 2019, the FBI began investigating Zheng. Zheng left for China but federal agents apprehended him in Anchorage.Zheng pleaded guilty to making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3). Rejecting an argument that the research Zheng completed offset the amount of money lost, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 37-46 months and sentenced Zheng to 37 months. On appeal, Zheng argued that his counsel was ineffective by not seeking a downward variance based on Zheng’s immigration status as a deportable alien, which would have an impact on the execution of his sentence. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, noting that the record was inadequate to establish ineffective assistance for the first time on direct appeal. Nothing in the record shows counsel’s reasons for making certain strategic decisions or why he advanced one argument over another. View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law

At the Detroit Detention Center, officers searched Lipford and did not find any contraband. Lipford denied being under the influence of drugs or carrying any medication. At 9:48 p.m., officers placed Lipford in a glass-walled room used to hold multiple detainees awaiting arraignment. Lipford nodded off. He slid to the floor at 11:02 p.m. Lipford laid on the floor motionless until 2:50 a.m. when he was found unresponsive. He was pronounced dead at 3:50 a.m. Hospital staff found cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl, concealed in Lipford’s rectum. The jail’s operating procedures required that officers conduct rounds every 30 minutes; “physically open the cell doors" and ensure that detainees are actually there; and check "that every detainee is living and breathing.” Although Officer Lewis ostensibly made his rounds that night, he did not physically enter the video-arraignment room nor speak with the detainees. Avoiding interaction with detainees was apparently common because detainees would become agitated at officers waking them up.The district court dismissed claims by Lipford’s estate against several defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lewis. The estate did not establish that a reasonable officer in Lewis’s position would have known that Lipford was potentially concealing drugs, subjecting himself to an excessive risk of harm, and that Lewis’s ignoring this risk was objectively reckless. Failure to follow internal policies does not, alone, equal deliberate indifference. View "Hyman v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Based on convictions for cocaine possession and facilitating second-degree murder Bailey was incarcerated until 2005. In 2008, Bailey was convicted for the possession and distribution of crack and powder cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1). Because Bailey had a prior felony drug conviction, he was subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment for the (b)(1)(A) offenses. Bailey was also classified as a career offender, resulting in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. The court imposed a 360-month sentence. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of cocaine base necessary to trigger certain statutory penalties; the 2018 First Step Act allows courts to apply the change retroactively.Bailey sought a reduced sentence, citing his efforts at rehabilitation, his continuous employment during his incarceration, and his incident-free record in custody. The district court denied Bailey’s request, finding that the First Step Act did not affect Bailey’s guideline range as a career offender and that his sentence was already at the bottom of his Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court had the authority to reduce Bailey’s sentence, but neither Act required it to do so; not reducing his sentence was not an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Linda’s daughter, Johnnie Moser, fled to a neighbor’s house one night after Johnnie’s boyfriend (James) physically assaulted Johnnie. The neighbor called the police. Officers Davis and Parton were at the neighbor’s house when Linda approached, visibly upset and worried about her daughter. Parton observed James following behind Linda and moved to arrest him. Linda began shouting that Parton had the wrong man and touched Parton’s arm, despite having been ordered, four times, to sit down. Davis stepped onto the porch, grabbed Linda, took her to the ground, and then pinned her, resulting in a fractured hip and femur. Body-camera footage indicates that Davis could have kneeled on Linda for up to 23 seconds. Linda pleaded guilty to interfering with the arrest of another. Linda sued Davis and the City of Etowah. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Linda, Davis violated her clearly established right to be free from injury-threatening physical force when not actively resisting an arrest. Minimal physical contact does not automatically rise to the level of active resistance. Linda’s subsequent conviction is therefore not determinative of whether Moser actively resisted Parton’s attempt to arrest Ferguson. View "Moser v. Etowah Police Department" on Justia Law

Deputy Johns shot and killed Palma after responding to a 9-1-1 call at Palma's home. Johns knew that there was a dispute about the television and that Palma suffered from mental health issues. Arriving, Johns saw Palma standing outside with his hands in his pockets. Palma did not respond to greetings but began walking toward Johns. Johns repeatedly told Palma to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. Palma did not respond. Johns radioed for backup with “intermediate” priority. Johns warned Palma he would use his taser. Palma did not stop. Johns tased him twice before Palma fell down. As Palma got up, Johns tased him again. Palma walked toward Johns, still not responding to commands. Johns kept retreating; he believed that Palma’s intention was to “perhaps obtain [his] weapon.” Johns pointed his gun at Palma, who did not stop. Johns first shot Palma’s leg. Palma continued to walk toward Johns, who continued shooting until Palma "no longer came towards [him].” Palma never spoke and never reached toward Johns. Palma was unarmed. The encounter lasted eight-10 minutes.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment of qualified immunity. There are genuine disputes of material fact; a reasonable jury could find that Johns used excessive force when he shot at Palma. In cases involving mental health crises, officers should use the least force necessary to subdue the person. View "Palma v. Johns" on Justia Law

Johnson pleaded no contest in Michigan state court to drug crimes. He was sentenced as a habitual offender, at the bottom of his guidelines range. Johnson later sought state post-conviction relief, seeking to withdraw his plea because his trial counsel was ineffective, and seeking resentencing because the judge based his sentence on a fact not admitted or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson sought to compel his trial counsel to produce his case files and sit for an interview with Johnson’s new counsel. That interview apparently never took place, but Johnson secured an affidavit from his trial counsel. Johnson did not file that affidavit (or any other evidence) and did not ask for additional discovery, for a date for an evidentiary hearing, or for a ruling on his motion.Johnson filed a federal habeas petition, acknowledging that the state court had not yet ruled on his motion but asserting that special circumstances existed due to “the inordinate delay.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Any delay was attributable to Johnson, particularly his failure to request a state court evidentiary hearing. Johnson’s case is not the extreme instance in which circumstances beyond his control left him “incapable” of remedying the constitutional violations he alleges. View "Johnson v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Russell was a passenger in a car that the East Cleveland Police stopped and searched. They found two handguns, which resulted in a felon-in-possession charge for Russell. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Russell entered a conditional guilty plea.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction. To assert a Fourth Amendment claim, Russell must have “standing” to challenge the search; normally a car passenger without a possessory interest in the car lacks such standing. The government failed to object to Russell’s lack of standing before the district court and raised the argument for the first time on appeal. Fourth Amendment standing, unlike Article III standing, is not jurisdictional and can be forfeited or waived. The government’s failure to raise the argument below was a forfeiture, not a waiver because the government took no steps to “expressly abandon” its objection. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the government can raise a forfeited argument for the first time on appeal and prevail if it satisfies the plain-error inquiry under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The government satisfied that test. Even if the government did not object, Russell had at least some burden to establish standing. Allowing Russell to benefit from the exclusionary remedy would lead to a rightfully diminished view of the judicial proceeding. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

Tiwari and Sapkota sought to establish a home healthcare company that would focus on serving Nepali-speaking individuals in the Louisville area. Kentucky restricts the number of such companies that may serve each county. When the Commonwealth denied their certificate-of-need application, Tiwari and Sapkota filed suit, claiming that the regulation violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to earn a living, serving only the illegitimate end of protecting incumbent home healthcare companies from competition, and lacking a rational basis.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, upholding the requirement. Economic regulations, even those affecting an individual’s liberty to work in a given area, are subject to “rational basis” review. While expressing skepticism about certificate-of-need laws, the court concluded that a legislator could plausibly believe that the regulation has a rational connection to increasing cost efficiency, improving quality of care, and improving the healthcare infrastructure in place. View "Tiwari v. Friedlander" on Justia Law

Mills and his ex-wife struggled with drug addictions and neglected their four children. The children’s maternal grandparents obtained custody of the children. Around 10:00 p.m. on June 29, 2016, Mills showed up unannounced at their home, picked up his two-year-old daughter and carried her outside, then drove away with the child. The grandparents called the police. Mills ran out of gas, abandoned his vehicle, and walked up the road carrying his daughter. Officers arrived and ordered Mills to stop, but he ignored their commands. Mills fell and released the girl. Officers engaged in a five-minute struggle with Mills, using a taser, striking Mills with a flashlight, kneeing Mills in the face and head, and repeatedly hitting Mills with a baton. An officer eventually shot Mills twice, killing him. According to the officers and bystanders Mills had threatened to harm the officers, fought them with “super-human” strength, and charged at them. One bystander later claimed that the officers brutally beat Mills although Mills did not resist and that they could have easily handcuffed him.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, summary judgment in favor of the officers. The testimonial dispute instead raises a classic jury question. Even accepting the testimony, however, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their initial use of force to recover the child, and the local government is entitled to summary judgment on the federal claim. View "Gambrel v. Knox County" on Justia Law