Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wood wore a shirt bearing the words “Fuck the Police” to the county fair. According to Wood, police officers ordered him to leave and escorted him from the fairgrounds because of his shirt. While leaving, Wood made several coarse insults directed to the police and the fairground’s administrator. The officers then arrested Wood for disorderly conduct. After the charges were dismissed, Wood filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the officers, alleging false arrest and retaliation. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity on the false arrest claim and insufficient evidence of retaliation.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Wood’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. With respect to the retaliation claim, the court held that a reasonable jury could conclude the officers were motivated to surround Wood and require him to leave in part because of his shirt. While Wood’s speech was profane, the circumstances did not create a situation where violence was likely to result. Neither proximity nor Wood’s demeanor and volume provided probable cause for arrest. Because there was no probable cause to arrest Wood for disorderly conduct, and because Wood’s right to be free from arrest was clearly established, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Wood v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

Washington then age 15, claimed that on January 30, 1989, he encountered Chinn, whom he had met a year earlier and only knew by the nickname, “Tony.” According to Washington, Tony had a gun. He and Tony robbed two men, fatally shooting one. A few days later, police arrested Washington, who confessed and named “Tony” as the killer but could not provide Tony’s last name. Washington helped police prepare a composite sketch, which a newspaper printed. Police arrested Chinn and conducted a lineup for Washington and four other witnesses. Three were able to identify Chinn. Chinn’s classmate and instructor testified that Chinn was present for a midterm examination on the night of the murder, and his classmate testified that Chinn rode home on a bus with her. Chinn’s mother testified that he was at home by 9:30 p.m. and stayed home the entire evening. Some witnesses also considered the shooter to be taller than Chinn.Convicted, Chinn was sentenced to death. The district court denied Chinn’s 2002 petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the prosecution suppressed evidence, in violation of “Brady,” that Washington suffered mental disabilities; the court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial testimony concerning Chinn’s alleged visit to a law office before his arrest; and Chinn was denied his right to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer on remand and was sentenced to death without a valid jury recommendation. View "Chinn v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

Officers executing a warrant for Cooper’s arrest on firearms and narcotics charges learned that Cooper was a high-ranking gang member and saw a Facebook photo of Cooper holding a Glock handgun. At the home of Cooper’s girlfriend, Walton, Officer Fox knocked on the door. When Walton answered, Fox saw Cooper inside. Concerned about spooking Cooper, Fox showed Walton a photograph of another individual and asked whether he could come inside to look for the individual. According to Fox, Walton agreed. Fox arrested Cooper while other officers rushed in to conduct a protective sweep. Officer Jensen noticed a lump in the mattress, flipped it, and discovered the Glock handgun depicted in Cooper’s Facebook post. Fox then presented rights-waiver and consent-to-search forms. Walton initialed lines stating that she was consenting freely. Officers then conducted a thorough search but recovered only the hat seen on Facebook.Charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Cooper unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court largely engaged in an attenuation analysis focused on whether Walton’s subsequent consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal protective sweep. That was the wrong analysis The gun was seized during the initial unlawful search, so inevitable discovery is the correct analysis. On remand, the court should focus on whether officers would have sought (and obtained) Walton’s consent to search If the illegal protective sweep had never happened and whether the ensuing consent search would have led to the gun. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In 1985, Manning was convicted of first-degree murder, carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. Manning was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals of Manning’s first and second habeas petitions. Since then, Manning has filed multiple unsuccessful motions for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive habeas petition.Manning, pro se, again sought an order authorizing a second or successive habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The Sixth Circuit again rejected his petition. Manning did not make a prima facie showing that his petition relied on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Manning cited Miller v. Alabama (2012), which held that defendants “under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes” cannot be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Manning sought to extend Miller’s new rule to persons who (like Manning) were 18 years old at the time of their offense. Miller unambiguously applies to only those who were under 18 at the time of their offense; for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, an individual’s eighteenth birthday marks a bright line. View "In re: Manning" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of unlawful imprisonment, assault of a domestic partner by strangulation and suffocation, interstate domestic violence, witness tampering, and assault, 18 U.S.C. 13, 113(a)(8), 113(a)(4), 2261(a), 1512(b). Based on his criminal history, he was sentenced to 864 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Johnson did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The district court erred in allowing Johnson to proceed pro se. During the hearing on defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, the court asked Johnson if he understood the ramifications of his decision to represent himself without knowledge of the law but a review of the record indicates that the court’s questions did not reflect that the requirements of the Bench Book were met. The judge commented that he had already asked the “taxpayers to pay for two of the finest lawyers in the district to represent [him].” Instead of confirming that Johnson knew the maximum potential sentences, as required by the model inquiry, the court downplayed his potential sentence. Stemming from that error, the court likewise should have directed Johnson’s counsel to file subpoenas and witness lists on Johnson’s behalf. The district court did not adequately apply the section 3553(a) factors when determining Johnson's sentence. The court ordered assignment to a different judge on remand. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In Ohio, to place an advertising billboard on a highway, you must apply for a permit from the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT). Under the “compliance rule,” ODOT will not process a permit application if the applicant has outstanding fees, changes his billboard without prior approval from ODOT, or maintains an illegal advertising billboard. ODOT put Kenjoh’s billboard permits on hold under the compliance rule, alleging that Kenjoh was maintaining an illegal billboard.Kenjoh sued, asserting that the compliance rule was an unconstitutional prior restraint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed his claims for damages and injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit vacated. While the case was pending on appeal, the Ohio legislature amended a key definition in the statute, which changes how the regulation applies. Before the amendment, a person needed a permit from ODOT to erect a billboard that was “designed, intended, or used to advertise.” Now, a person needs a permit if he will be paid for placing a message on the billboard, regardless of the message. The court affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to an ODOT supervisor on a claim for damages despite the amendment, based on the law as it existed at the time of the official action. View "Kenjoh Outdoor, LLC v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

Greene was booked into the Crawford County Jail after having his bond revoked for attending a plea hearing while intoxicated. Over the next four days, Greene began hallucinating and exhibiting other symptoms of delirium tremens, a life-threatening complication of alcohol withdrawal that the Sixth Circuit has recognized as an objectively serious medical need. Greene ultimately suffered acute respiratory failure. He died four days later. Crawford County officials did not provide any medical care to Greene before his incapacitation but only sought a mental health evaluation from a Community Mental Health Authority and purportedly relied on that evaluation in deciding not to seek medical assistance.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to Greene’s medical need and that Crawford County is liable for maintaining an unconstitutional policy of not providing medical care to inmates suffering from delirium tremens, the district court denied qualified immunity at summary judgment to some county officials and denied Crawford County summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. Greene experienced a clearly established life-threatening medical condition for at least two days. The defendants did not provide any medical assistance during that time. The court dismissed Crawford County’s interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Greene v. Crawford County" on Justia Law

In 2014, Detroit Police Officers arrested Jones and others as they demonstrated outside a city water contractor’s facility, blocking the building’s entrance. A police bus took the protestors to a police station. Jones could not board it because he uses a wheelchair, which the bus was not equipped to handle. Officers called for a cargo van, which did not have a wheelchair lift, and lifted Jones into the van; the ceiling height made it difficult for him to sit up straight and the van lacked restraints. An officer braced his feet against the chair to prevent it from moving. Jones claims that the entry into the van and the jostling of the ensuing trip exacerbated existing injuries and damaged his spine. The state declined to prosecute Jones for disorderly conduct.Jones sued the city and police officers in their individual capacities under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, with a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the officers used excessive force. The Sixth Circuit previously granted qualified immunity to the officers with respect to the excessive-force claims and later affirmed summary judgment in the city’s favor on Jones’s failure-to-accommodate claims. Neither the Americans with Disabilities Act nor the Rehabilitation Act permits a claim of vicarious liability. View "Jones v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

McCall, who pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015 and was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment, moved for compassionate release. He cited as“extraordinary and compelling circumstances” warranting his release: the COVID-19 pandemic, his rehabilitation efforts, and the Sixth Circuit’s 2019 decision, “Havis” that “attempted” controlled substance offenses do not qualify as predicate offenses for the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career-offender enhancement and a subsequent holding applying the decision to convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. He argued that his prior convictions for drug trafficking and assault no longer qualify as predicate offenses for career-offender status, that he has rehabilitated himself, and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors favored granting compassionate release. The government argued that McCall raised “generalized fears of contracting COVID-19, without more,” that post-sentence legal developments are not extraordinary, and that McCall poses a danger to the community.The district court denied McCall’s motion in a form order. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court suggested that it thought itself unable to rely on nonretroactive changes in sentencing law and abused its discretion by not considering the disparity in McCall’s sentence post-Havis along with his efforts at rehabilitation and the presence of COVID-19. View "United States v. McCall" on Justia Law

The events were recorded by Officer Bierenga’s dashcam and the White Castle surveillance system. Bierenga attempted a traffic stop. After failing to pull over for several blocks, Gordon came upon a red light at a busy intersection and stopped. Bierenga approached Gordon’s car and spoke to him through the window. Bierenga perceived that Gordon was under the influence of something. When the light turned green and the traffic moved forward, Gordon accelerated. Approximately 15 minutes later, Bierenga spotted Gordon's car at the White Castle drive-thru. Bierenga parked in front of Gordon’s car and walked around Gordon’s car with his weapon drawn. Gordon reversed, bumped the car behind him, and drove forward, crashing into Bierenga’s car while Bierenga stood stuck between the cars and the building. As Gordon maneuvered his vehicle. Bierenga approached Gordon’s rolled-down window, pointing his gun. Gordon backed up, turned his wheels away from Bierenga, then attempted to flee. Bierenga yelled “stop,” fired four shots at Gordon, reentered his vehicle, and followed Gordon. Gordon presumably lost consciousness, then crashed into another car. Gordon later died.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Bierenga’s for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed; precedent cited by the district court is not similar enough to this case to define “clearly established” law. The plaintiff is unable to point to a case that would place every reasonable officer in Bierenga’s position on notice that his use of force in this specific situation was unlawful. View "Gordon v. Bierenga" on Justia Law