Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wesson was charged with murdering 81-year-old Varhola and attacking (and nearly killing) his 77-year-old wife, after they invited him into their home on February 25, 2008. A three-judge panel convicted Wesson of several charges, including two counts of aggravated murder, and imposed the death penalty. Wesson unsuccessfully sought to suppress his confession to police due to his alleged intoxication and other factors when they questioned him. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court vacated one of Wesson’s aggravated murder convictions but affirmed his remaining convictions and the death sentence; the court rejected Wesson’s claim that his alleged intoxication vitiated his Miranda waiver.Wesson sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that he is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, and the government violated his right against self-incrimination when it introduced his post-Miranda statement. The district court found that Wesson made a credible claim of intellectual disability and dismissed that claim and a related ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without prejudice to allow the state court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief on Wesson’s second claim. The state courts did not unreasonably apply the law or facts with respect to his confession, which occurred when he allegedly was intoxicated. View "Wesson v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Sexton reported to Redford Charter Township to begin five days with the work-release program. Cernuto and Dunn were the program supervisors. Sexton was the only woman among approximately five participants. Township policy prohibited supervisors from driving alone with female probationers but Cernuto insisted that Sexton ride with Dunn in the truck. During those rides, Dunn made sexual comments and threats. Dunn later assaulted Sexton. Dunn explained to her that Cernuto had gotten him the supervisor job and that neither “told on” the other. Sexton reported the incidents to the Michigan State Police within weeks. Dunn initially denied the allegations but later told the police that he and Sexton had consensually kissed. Dunn pleaded no contest to criminal sexual conduct. The Township fired both men.Sexton sued Cernuto, Dunn, and the Township, alleging constitutional (42 U.S.C. 1983) and state-law tort claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Cernuto’s summary judgment motion for qualified immunity. There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Cernuto facilitated the assaults; an active participant in a constitutional violation can be held liable under section 1983. The restrictions on Sexton’s physical movement while in the work program were sufficient to create a special relationship between Cernuto and Sexton, giving him a duty to protect her. Sexton’s right to be free from sexual assault was clearly established. View "Sexton v. Cernuto" on Justia Law

In 2003, Bass, a Michigan “drug kingpin,” was convicted of conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 50 or more grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, and firearms murder during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime 18 U.S.C. 924(j). Bass had murdered a hitman whom Bass had hired to kill Bass’s half-brother. The government sought the death penalty. Bass was ultimately sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. In 2020, Bass moved for compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the pandemic. Bass claimed that as a 51-year-old African-American male suffering from morbid obesity, he faced a higher risk of severe illness.The district court granted Bass’s request in January 2021 and ordered his immediate release. In March, the Sixth Circuit imposed an emergency stay; the court then reversed on the merits. The district court committed legal errors when it compared Bass’s federal sentence to his co-defendant’s state sentence and gave little weight to the concern that Bass’s release might endanger the public. By analogizing its role to that of a parole board, the court framed the legal question in a manner that Congress expressly condemned when it shifted away from the rehabilitation focus of criminal sentencing. On remand, the court must reevaluate the request based on current circumstances, which have materially changed; in April 2021, Bass was offered the COVID-19 vaccine but refused it. View "United States v. Bass" on Justia Law

In 2018, Traylor was convicted of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, 1347; conspiracy to pay and receive healthcare kickbacks, 18 U.S.C. 371; and five counts of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. The district court initially sentenced Traylor to 135 months’ imprisonment, which was reduced to 120 months at her recent resentencing. In a pro se third motion for a sentence reduction, Traylor argued that, due to her various health ailments (e.g., diabetes, sleep apnea, asthma, obesity, being a recent organ transplant recipient, and use of immunosuppressive therapy), she is susceptible to contracting and becoming severely ill from COVID-19 in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Traylor did not demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction because she had received two doses of the Pfizer vaccine, significantly reducing her risk of contracting and becoming severely ill from COVID-19. The district court was not required to address the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion by declining to do so. View "United States v. Traylor" on Justia Law

In 2009, Augustin asked Jordan to “find somebody” who sold cocaine. “Hoss,” subsequently sold Augustin six ounces of cocaine for $5,100. The deal went bad and Augustin kidnapped Jordan at gunpoint. Augustin’s associate released Jordan. Augustin was arrested. From prison, Augustin tried to arrange for a hitman to kill Jordan. The district court ultimately sentenced Augustin to a 380-month term for seven counts of conviction plus a consecutive 120-month term under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using a firearm during a crime of violence. After an unsuccessful appeal, Augustin unsuccessfully moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255.Later, Augustin filed a second or successive section 2255 motion, arguing that his section 924(c) conviction was unlawful under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision. The district court agreed. Rather than resentencing Augustin, the court corrected his sentence by vacating the section 924(c) conviction and its consecutive 120-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Augustin’s section 924(c) sentence played no role in the district court’s calculation of his other sentences. View "United States v. Augustin" on Justia Law

In 1989, Middlebrooks of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to death. His conviction and death sentence were upheld on direct and collateral review. When Middlebrooks was sentenced to death, electrocution was Tennessee’s only method of execution. In 2000, Tennessee adopted lethal injection as the default method of execution. Under current law, electrocution is an option for execution only if an inmate sentenced to death before 1999 chooses execution by electrocution; lethal injection is declared unconstitutional; or the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) certifies that a necessary lethal-injection ingredient is unavailable. Middlebrooks will not choose execution by electrocution. In 2018, TDOC adopted a three-drug protocol of midazolam, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride as an alternative to pentobarbital.Middlebrooks and other death row challenged the constitutionality of the three-drug protocol. Tennessee then eliminated the pentobarbital protocol The state court dismissed their complaint. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that pentobarbital was available as an alternative means of execution, although other states used pentobarbital in executions.The district court dismissed Middlebrooks’ 42 U.S.C. suit, citing res judicata. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Middlebrooks' facial challenge plausibly alleged new facts that allow a reasonable inference that pentobarbital is available to Tennessee for use in executions. Middlebrooks’s as-applied claim does not rest on any newly developed individual condition that would render impermissible the application of res judicata principles. View "Middlebrooks v. Parker" on Justia Law

Canton’s 2006 Tree Ordinance prohibits the unpermitted removal, damage, or destruction of trees of specified sizes, with exceptions for agricultural operations, commercial nurseries, tree farms, and occupied lots smaller than two acres. If Canton issues a permit, the owner must replace removed trees on its own or someone else’s property or pay into Canton’s tree fund. For every landmark tree removed, an owner must replant three trees or pay $450. For every non-landmark tree removed as part of larger-scale tree removal, an owner must replant one tree or pay $300.In 2016, Canton approved the division of F.P.'s undeveloped property, noting the permitting requirement. The parcels were bisected by a county drainage ditch that was clogged with fallen trees and debris. The county refused to clear the ditch. F.P. contracted for the removal of the trees and debris and clearing other trees without a permit. Canton determined that F.P. had removed 14 landmark trees and 145 non-landmark trees. F.P. was required to either replant 187 trees or pay $47,898. F.P. filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for F.P. on its as-applied Fifth Amendment claim; although the ordinance, as applied to F.P., was not unconstitutional as a per se physical taking, it was unconstitutional as a regulatory taking and as an unconstitutional condition. Canton has not made the necessary individualized determination; the ordinance fails the “rough proportionality” required by Supreme Court precedent. View "F.P. Development, LLC. v. Charter Township of Canton" on Justia Law

Before 2013, the Michigan Department of Corrections provided kosher meals with meat and dairy to Jewish prisoners and allowed charitable Jewish organizations to bring in traditional religious foods for Jewish holidays. In 2013, MDOC implemented a universal vegan meal for all prisoners who qualify for a religious diet and stopped allowing Jewish organizations to send food. Prisoners claiming that their religious convictions require them to eat a meal with kosher meat and one with dairy on the Jewish Sabbath and four Jewish holidays brought a class action on behalf of all Jewish MDOC prisoners under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a), arguing that the policy substantially burdens their sincere religious beliefs.The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment in the prisoners’ favor. Because MDOC’s policy completely bars the asserted practice here—eating meat and dairy at mealtime—the prisoners’ failure to buy meat and dairy products at the commissary does not undermine the sincerity of their belief. Even if the prisoners spent every penny on beef sticks and dry milk, prison policy would still bar their religious exercise of eating those items as part of their meals. There was evidence suggesting that these prisoners do in fact sincerely believe that cheesecake is required on Shavuot. View "Ackerman v. Washington" on Justia Law

A Xenia Police dispatcher contacted officer Reed about a double-parked vehicle with the person in the backseat allegedly “shooting up.” Reed observed a vehicle straddling the line between a standard parking spot and a handicap-only space; it was not displaying a handicap placard or license plate and was illegally parked. Prigmore opened the rear passenger door of the vehicle. Reed saw what appeared to be a handgun in the pocket of the door; he activated his body camera, unholstered his firearm, and secured the gun. With Prigmore out of the vehicle, Reed observed another firearm (a BB gun) on the seat where Prigmore had been sitting.Days later, federal agents arrested Prigmore for drug trafficking. The agents did not interview or Mirandize Prigmore immediately because he appeared to be “under the influence.” When he arrived at booking, Prigmore appeared coherent and stated—unprompted—“that gun was mine.” A warranted search of Prigmore’s residence uncovered a box of ammunition. Charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Prigmore had a “volatile relationship” with his attorneys, resulting in two competency hearings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and 120-month sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in finding him competent to stand trial, should have granted his motions to suppress, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Prigmore" on Justia Law

Marc was arrested and taken to the Madison County Detention Center (MCDC). Marc’s wife, Dawn, told the police that her husband had lung cancer and needed immediate medical attention. Marc’s medical records also stated that he had a blood clot in his leg. Dawn alleges that medical staff removed his pain medication patch, placed him on “inappropriate” psychoactive medications, and failed to provide him with his prescriptions. The medical contractor, Correct Care, refused to honor Marc’s scheduled chemotherapy appointments. Marc was transferred to Kentucky State Reformatory (KSR). He arrived with an elevated heart rate, difficulty breathing, and swelling in his leg. Staff withheld his prescribed medication, breathing treatments, and chemotherapy. Marc died less than a month after his arrest. His family was informed two days later. The autopsy revealed fluid accumulated in his lungs. Medical staff would have discovered this fluid if they had administered his prescribed breathing treatments.Dawn’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 Eighth Amendment complaint alleged supervisory liability against Erwin, Acting Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, claiming that Erwin “accepted” Marc’s transfer into KSR and “would have been made aware of [Marc’s] medical conditions” and had promulgated and maintained some of KSR’s allegedly unconstitutional policies. Dawn alleged that Erwin was “specifically aware that Correct Care” had a pattern of failing to provide inmates with adequate health care. The Sixth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the claims against Erwin. Dawn's complaint did not allege any “active unconstitutional behavior” by Erwin nor explain how his behavior proximately caused Marc’s injuries; Erwin is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Crawford v. Tilley" on Justia Law