Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

To control the spread of COVID-19, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) required that all persons five years of age and older wear a mask in indoor public settings, including while attending public and private K–12 schools. A Lansing Catholic elementary school and parents with children enrolled at the school, challenged the mask requirement as a violation of their free exercise of religion, equal protection, and substantive due process rights. Since they filed suit, MDHHS has rescinded almost all COVID-19 pandemic emergency orders, including the challenged mask requirement.The Sixth Circuit held that the challenge to the mask requirement is not moot, and affirmed the denial of the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on the merits. Given the very real possibility that MDHHS may be faced again with escalating COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths, Defendants have not met their “heavy burden” of showing that it is “absolutely clear” that they will not reimpose impose a mask requirement, including for children in grades K–5 receiving in-person instruction. Because the requirement to wear a facial covering applied to students in grades K–5 at both religious and non-religious schools, it was neutral and of general applicability. The MDHHS Orders satisfy rational-basis review. View "Resurrection School v. Hertel" on Justia Law

McNeill was convicted in 1995 and sentenced to death in Ohio state court for aggravated murder. Seeking federal habeas relief, McNeil argued that the prosecution failed to turn over material under Brady v. Maryland and created a false impression in violation of Napue v. Illinois. The alleged Brady material included two police reports, one summarizing an interview with the prosecution’s primary witness, Rushinsky, who initially failed to—but ultimately did—identify McNeill as the killer, and the other detailing a potential suspect who was quickly dismissed as a suspect. It also included three audio recordings, one of the same Rushinsky interview addressed in the report, a second Rushinsky interview, and an interview with a potential alibi witness.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. None of the evidence was material under Brady. The only favorable, undisclosed evidence was the Rushinsky report, which would have given McNeill more material with which to impeach Rushinsky. The wealth of other evidence on which the jury could have relied, plus the fact that Rushinsky did actually identify a photo of McNeill before trial, indicates that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of McNeill’s trial would have been different if the prosecution had turned over the report. The prosecution did not create a false impression by playing the audio recording of Rushinsky identifying McNeill without clarifying that Rushinsky initially failed to identify McNeill. View "McNeill v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Hill’s death penalty sentence was imposed in 1986. Hill brought a habeas petition, arguing that he may not be executed because he is “intellectually disabled,” as defined in subsequent Supreme Court cases. In 2002 the Sixth Circuit remanded for consideration of the Supreme Court’s opinions on the subject. In 2018, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Ohio courts unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s three-part standard. The Supreme Court vacated.On remand, the panel again granted Hill relief on his “Atkins” claim, but, following en banc review, affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. the state court decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” nor “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Ohio court considered evidence of Hill’s past abilities including Hill’s medical history, public school records, and prior standardized test results, and evaluated criteria mentioned in Atkins such as intellectual functioning, adaptive skills, and the onset age of disability. In light of the evidence presented, it was not unreasonable for the Ohio court to rely on the reasoned judgment of two experts over another. Hill’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails on its merits. View "Hill v. Shoop" on Justia Law

In October 2018, the University of Louisville notified Dr. Kaplan, a tenured professor and the Chair of the Department of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences (DOVS), that it was reviewing some of his actions as Chair and considering removing him from that position. These included his signing an unauthorized lease on behalf of DOVS and meeting with private equity firms interested in buying or financing DOVS. One month into the investigation, with no more warning, the University placed him on paid administrative leave and prohibited him from coming to university grounds and communicating with his colleagues. The university also advised Kaplan that he could lose his tenured position.When the investigation ended, Kaplan lost his Chair, and the dean of the medical school recommended termination of his tenure, identifying six grounds for dismissal. On appeal, a faculty committee gave Kaplan a two-day hearing, at which he introduced documents and witnesses supporting his defense. The committee upheld four grounds for dismissal, including Kaplan’s unauthorized lease and his perceived attempt to sell DOVS’s clinical practice to private investors. The University’s Board of Trustees terminated Kaplan’s tenure. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit in which Kaplan claimed that the University terminated him from both positions without due process, violated his Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests in his reputation, and violated his First Amendment right to academic freedom. View "Kaplan v. University of Louisville" on Justia Law

At about 4:30 a.m., an anonymous 911 call reported a break-in at neighboring apartment 103, with screaming, Seven Southfield Police officers responded, entered the building, and heard screaming but could not identify the source; the door to 103 was not broken. The officers determined that the window was not a point of entry; they received no response to intermittent knocking. The dispatcher called the anonymous caller back; the caller said that she “can’t be positive what apartment it was coming from.” After about eight minutes, Mitchell opened the door to 103. She denied that there were any problems. Although none of the officer noticed any injuries on Mitchell or saw any signs of suspicious activity, they pushed their way inside, injuring Mitchell’s knee. Mitchell continued to object to the warrantless entry. The officers arrested Mitchell’s guest, Williams, allegedly employing unnecessary force. The officers found no evidence of illegal activity in the apartment. Charges against Williams for resisting arrest and obstruction of police were dismissed.Mitchell and Williams filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting unlawful entry and excessive force. Williams also asserted false arrest and malicious prosecution. Certain claims were dismissed. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the officers’ appeal of the grant of summary judgment to Williams on his false arrest claim for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of the officers’ qualified immunity motion for summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim and Mitchell’s excessive force claim. View "Williams v. Maurer" on Justia Law

Tennessee Code 39-15-202(a)–(h) requires that women be informed, orally and in-person by the attending physician or by the referring physician that she is pregnant; of the fetus’s probable gestational age; whether the fetus may be viable; of services “available to assist her”; and of “reasonably foreseeable medical benefits, risks, or both of undergoing an abortion or continuing the pregnancy.” There is a 48-hour waiting period, beginning when the woman receives the mandated information, which can be reduced to 24 hours by court order.The district court declared the waiting period unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal but subsequently, “en banc,” reversed. The facial attack fails as a matter of law. Given Tennessee’s strong “interest in protecting the life of the unborn,” there was a rational basis to enact a waiting period, which is not a substantial obstacle to abortion in a large fraction of cases. The plaintiffs claimed that the law—even if facially valid— is unconstitutional as applied to women who will miss the cutoff date for an abortion because of the waiting period; women whose medical conditions increase the risk of delaying the procedure; and women who are survivors of rape, incest, or violence. But, although the law has been in effect for five years, the plaintiffs failed to identify any “discrete and well-defined instances” where women in these groups faced (or were likely to face) a particular burden because of Tennessee’s waiting period. View "Bristol Regional Women's Center, P.C. v. Slatery" on Justia Law

Phillips, then 39, was arrested for driving with a suspended license. At the Lansing City Jail, Phillips said he took Lyrica to treat his epilepsy and would need another dose that night Phillips denied being under the influence of other drugs or alcohol but was sweating. Phillips was taken to his cell at 2:15 p.m. Detainees are monitored through video cameras and cell checks, which involve a “physical inspection” of the cell. Video footage shows Phillips swaying, falling, and struggling. A pool of vomit formed around Phillips’s head at 3:23 p.m. No further movement was detected after 3:46 p.m. Several cell checks were recorded but officers did not follow department policy. At 5:11 p.m., when an officer entered his cell, Phillips was unresponsive, EMS transported Phillips to a hospital where he was officially pronounced dead at 5:44 p.m., most likely of “multiple drug intoxication,” having ingested oxycodone, alprazolam, and pregabalin.The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that alleged deliberate indifference to Phillips’s medical needs and failure to train officers, and gross negligence under Michigan law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. There was insufficient evidence from which to infer that any of the defendants subjectively perceived Phillips was suffering from a serious medical need, inferred he needed treatment, or ignored his medical needs. The court reversed as to one officer, who had the requisite state of mind for liability. View "Burwell v. City of Lansing" on Justia Law

In 1994, Hall murdered his estranged wife by attacking her in her home, dragging her to the backyard swimming pool while at least one of her children looked on, and drowning her. A Tennessee state court jury convicted Hall of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced him to death, finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to cause death. State courts affirmed the conviction and sentence. Hall unsuccessfully pursued state post-conviction relief, then sought federal habeas relief.The district court denied Hall any relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “Brady” claim concerning prison records about the mental illness of a fellow inmate (Dutton) who testified against Hall. Dutton’s prison records were records of the Tennessee Department of Corrections, which was not acting under the prosecutor’s control, so the prosecutor did not know about them, actually or constructively. Brady does not impose an unlimited duty to pursue such an inquiry. Given the initial determination of competence, the opinions of mental health professionals that evaluated Hall throughout his state court proceedings, and no question of mental incompetence being raised during that time, counsel’s performance was not unreasonable in failing to establish that Hall was incompetent to stand trial. The court also rejected an ineffective assistance claim concerning evidence of Hall’s family and social history View "Hall v. Mays" on Justia Law

In 2008, another inmate, Macari, assaulted Himmelreich, who had pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, Himmelreich alleges that Macari was placed in the general population despite making comments about targeting “pedophiles.” Himmelreich filed a Tort Claim Notice with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Himmelreich alleges that Captain Fitzgerald warned him not to complain and threatened to have him transferred. Prison officials subsequently placed Himmelreich in the special housing unit (SHU). Himmelreich claims that Fitzgerald told him it was because of the Tort Claim. Prison officials claim they placed Himmelreich in the SHU for his own protection after he complained of threats from other inmates.Himmelreich’s subsequent lawsuits alleged numerous claims against prison officials, including a “Bivens” claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment based on Fitzgerald’s alleged threats and statements. Fitzgerald unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment only on the ground that there is no Bivens remedy for a First Amendment retaliation claim. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Fitzgerald’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because her appeal concerns neither a final order nor a non-final order entitled to review under the collateral order doctrine. View "Himmelreich v. Federal Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

Michigan attorneys, like those in most other states, must join an integrated bar association in order to practice law. Taylor, a Michigan attorney, argued that requiring her to join the State Bar of Michigan violates her freedom of association and that the State Bar’s use of part of her mandatory membership dues for advocacy activities violates her freedom of speech. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Taylor’s First Amendment claims as foreclosed by two Supreme Court decisions that have not been overruled: Lathrop v. Donohue (1961) Keller v. State Bar of California (1990). The court rejected Taylor's argument that Lathrop and Keller no longer control because of the 2018 decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees where the Court held that First Amendment challenges to similar union laws are to be analyzed under at least the heightened “exacting scrutiny” standard Even where intervening Supreme Court decisions have undermined the reasoning of an earlier decision, courts must continue to follow the earlier case if it “directly controls” until the Court has overruled it. View "Taylor v. Buchanan" on Justia Law