Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A woman who had been living with a couple in Tennessee returned to their home to collect her belongings after being told she could no longer stay there. A dispute arose over the ownership of a car parked at the residence. The woman alleged that one of the residents, Matthew Howell, pointed a gun at her and refused to let her retrieve the car. She called 911, reporting the incident and stating that Howell was intoxicated and had threatened her. When police arrived, they spoke with the woman, who reiterated her allegations. Officers knocked on the door, and upon Howell opening it, they detected the smell of marijuana. The officers entered the home, arrested Howell for aggravated assault and resisting a frisk, and temporarily handcuffed his girlfriend, Alisha Brown, while conducting a protective sweep. The officers also allowed the woman to access the disputed car.Howell was indicted by a Tennessee grand jury for aggravated assault and resisting arrest. At trial, the jury convicted him of reckless aggravated assault, but the conviction was later amended to simple assault and ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds by an appellate court. Meanwhile, Howell and Brown filed a civil suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, alleging Fourth Amendment violations and state tort claims against the officers and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on all federal claims. It found that the officers’ warrantless entry was not clearly established as unconstitutional under existing precedent, that probable cause supported Howell’s arrest, and that Brown’s temporary detention did not violate clearly established law. The court also found no clearly established law prohibiting the officers’ actions regarding the disputed car and rejected the malicious prosecution claim. The court affirmed summary judgment for the officers and municipality. View "Howell v. McCormick" on Justia Law

A woman who entered the United States illegally as a child was later granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, which rendered her prior removal order unenforceable. She frequently visited a local Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office to post bond for detainees and was well known to the staff. During one such visit, ICE agents detained her without a warrant or probable cause, despite being aware of her DACA status. She was held for eight days and transferred between multiple locations before being released. While detained, she sought habeas relief, but her petition was denied as moot after her release.She subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against the ICE agents, alleging violations of her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court initially dismissed her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that DACA status rendered the removal order non-executable and outside the jurisdiction-stripping provision. The Sixth Circuit also dismissed her First Amendment claim based on Supreme Court precedent. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, finding they constituted new Bivens contexts and that alternative remedies existed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims arose in new Bivens contexts—specifically, immigration enforcement by ICE agents outside the home and outside the federal employment context. The court further found that alternative remedies, such as administrative complaint procedures under the Immigration and Nationality Act and habeas corpus, precluded the extension of Bivens. Thus, no implied damages remedy was available. View "Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman" on Justia Law

A woman identified as E.J. was carjacked by two masked men in a Detroit store parking lot. She observed the men in the store, noting one was light-skinned and the other dark-skinned. After the incident, a store customer who knew the light-skinned man from school provided E.J. with his name and later sent both E.J. and the investigating officer photos and information from his Facebook profile. Before a police-arranged photo lineup, the customer sent E.J. a picture of the suspect, Kyrrah Radaker-Carter, despite police instructions not to do so. E.J. confirmed to the customer that the man in the photo was the carjacker. The next day, E.J. participated in a six-photo lineup and immediately identified Radaker-Carter, who was later arrested while driving the stolen car.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Radaker-Carter’s motion to suppress E.J.’s identification, finding that due process did not require exclusion because the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law enforcement and the photo array itself was not unduly suggestive. Radaker-Carter subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 122 months’ imprisonment, then appealed the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that E.J.’s identification was constitutionally admissible because the suggestive circumstances—E.J. seeing Radaker-Carter’s photo before the lineup—were not orchestrated by law enforcement. The court also found that the police-arranged photo lineup was not unduly suggestive, as the differences in the photos were minor and did not improperly single out Radaker-Carter. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Radaker-Carter" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of possessing a machinegun conversion device, known as a Glock switch, which both parties agreed qualified as a machinegun under federal law. He had pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement but subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute criminalizing possession of machineguns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), violated his Second Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that his plea agreement did not bar his constitutional challenge and rejecting his Second Amendment argument. The defendant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, maintaining that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen had undermined prior circuit precedent upholding § 922(o).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo, as the case involved the constitutionality of a federal statute. The appellate court held that its prior decision in Hamblen v. United States, which relied on District of Columbia v. Heller, remained binding after Bruen. The court explained that Bruen did not overrule Heller or Hamblen, and that the tradition of prohibiting “dangerous and unusual weapons” such as machineguns was reaffirmed. The court concluded that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machineguns covered by § 922(o). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

The defendant was previously convicted of transporting child pornography and, after serving most of his sentence, was released to a halfway house. While there, he engaged in a series of text conversations with his preteen daughter, asking her about his past conviction, her views on sex, and whether she thought there was anything wrong with adults or children engaging in sexual acts, as depicted in pictures or videos. He also instructed her to keep their conversations secret. The defendant’s ex-sister-in-law, who had access to the daughter's phone records, became concerned and forwarded the messages to the FBI. A subsequent investigation of the defendant’s phone, despite his attempts to delete its contents, revealed incriminating text messages, bookmarks to websites with suggestive titles, and 163 images sexualizing children, seven of which were alleged to be child pornography.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to exclude most of the images and the website bookmarks, finding them relevant to knowledge and intent. The court also denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment grounds. At trial, the government presented evidence including the images, text messages, and testimony from the investigating agent and the ex-sister-in-law. The defendant argued that others at the halfway house could have accessed his phone and that he only sought “child erotica,” not child pornography. The jury found him guilty of knowing receipt of child pornography and specifically found the seven images met the statutory definition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and held that a rational jury could find the images constituted child pornography. The court also found no error in admitting the website bookmarks or the text messages with the defendant’s daughter, as they were relevant to intent and not unfairly prejudicial. The court rejected both facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to the statute. The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Mercer-Kinser" on Justia Law

A group of professional auctioneers in Tennessee, including both licensed and unlicensed individuals, challenged a state law requiring auctioneers to obtain a license before conducting extended-time online auctions. The law, originally enacted in 1967 and updated in 2019 to address online auction formats, exempts certain types of online sales, such as fixed-price listings and timed listings that do not extend based on bidding activity. The plaintiffs, who conduct extended-time online auctions, argued that the licensing requirement infringed on their First Amendment rights by restricting their ability to communicate with potential buyers and craft narratives about auction items.Previously, one of the plaintiffs, McLemore, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, challenging the law under both the First Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause. The district court granted summary judgment on the Dormant Commerce Clause claim but did not address the First Amendment issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated that decision for lack of standing and remanded with instructions to dismiss. Subsequently, McLemore and additional plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit, focusing on the First Amendment claim. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the law regulated professional conduct rather than speech and applied rational basis review, relying on the Sixth Circuit’s prior decision in Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Tennessee’s licensing requirement for auctioneers regulates economic activity and professional conduct, not speech, and that any burden on speech is incidental. The court applied rational basis review and concluded that the law is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in preventing fraud and incompetence in auctioneering. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "McLemore v. Gumucio" on Justia Law

Michael and Susan Mockeridge purchased a remote 40-acre property in northern Michigan, where they installed five prefabricated mini-cabins near their main cabin for family use. After neighbors became concerned that the property was being operated as a public campground, they filed complaints with local authorities. In response, three government officials—Harry Harvey, David Schmidt, and Kenneth Gibson—entered the Mockeridges’ property without a warrant or consent, inspected the mini-cabins and their surroundings, and gathered information regarding potential code violations. The officials’ entry was not via the customary driveway but through adjacent private land and dense woods, and at the time, the cabins were unoccupied.The Mockeridges subsequently received a letter from the county classifying their property as a campground and requiring licensing. After applying for permits and being told they would face penalties for prior unpermitted work, the Mockeridges filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Mockeridges on liability, denied qualified immunity to the officials, and found the only remaining issue was damages. The officials appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officials’ warrantless entry into the curtilage of the Mockeridges’ mini-cabins for the purpose of gathering information about code compliance constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The court further held that the right to be free from such a warrantless search was clearly established at the time of the officials’ conduct. The court dismissed the Mockeridges’ cross-appeal and denied as moot a motion by Alcona County. View "Mockeridge v. Harvey" on Justia Law

A man in Michigan was found by sheriff’s deputies shooting a rifle in his backyard while intoxicated and under the influence of marijuana. Upon investigation, deputies discovered multiple firearms, three pipe bombs, and a large amount of ammunition in his home. The man admitted to regularly using marijuana and building the pipe bombs himself. He was convicted under state law for possessing a firearm while intoxicated and later pleaded guilty in federal court to possessing unregistered firearms (the pipe bombs).The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, following the Sentencing Guidelines, determined that the defendant was a “prohibited person” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) due to his unlawful drug use and firearm possession. This resulted in a higher base offense level and a sentencing range of 46 to 57 months; the court imposed a 52-month sentence. The defendant objected, arguing that applying § 922(g)(3) to him violated the Second Amendment, but the district court rejected this argument, finding that he posed a threat to the public.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether § 922(g)(3) could constitutionally be applied to the defendant. The court held that, under its precedent and Supreme Court guidance, Congress may disarm groups it deems dangerous, provided individuals have an opportunity to show they are not actually dangerous. The court found that the defendant’s conduct—firing a rifle while drunk and high in a residential area—demonstrated he was dangerous. Therefore, the application of § 922(g)(3) to him was constitutional, and the district court’s sentence was affirmed. View "United States v. VanOchten" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, while driving in Memphis, Tennessee, nearly collided with a police vehicle. When officers attempted to stop him, he fired several shots at them, with one bullet striking the police car and narrowly missing an officer. After a pursuit that ended in a crash, the defendant was arrested. A search of his vehicle revealed a loaded Glock 23 handgun equipped with a device that converted it into a machinegun, as defined by federal law. The defendant did not have a valid registration for the machinegun and did not dispute that the weapon met the statutory definition.A grand jury indicted the defendant for possessing a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied the motion, holding that § 922(o) was constitutional. The defendant then pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 108 months in prison, after which he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that its prior decision in Hamblen v. United States, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(o) under District of Columbia v. Heller, remained binding after Bruen because Bruen did not alter the relevant aspects of Heller. The court further conducted an independent analysis under the text-and-history methodology set forth in Heller and Bruen, concluding that § 922(o) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of prohibiting private possession of dangerous and unusual weapons. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that § 922(o) is constitutional both on its face and as applied to the defendant. View "United States v. Bridges" on Justia Law

After completing a prison sentence for a prior conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the defendant began a term of supervised release. Less than two months later, he was arrested after police responded to a report that he had threatened someone with a gun. Officers found a firearm at the scene, and the defendant admitted to possessing it. He was initially charged in state court, but the state charges were dismissed after a federal indictment for being a felon in possession of a firearm was issued. The conduct also constituted a violation of the conditions of his supervised release from the earlier federal conviction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio handled both the new substantive offense and the supervised-release violation in joint proceedings. The defendant pleaded guilty to the new firearm charge and, at a subsequent hearing, admitted to the supervised-release violation. The district court sentenced him to 96 months for the new offense and 24 months for the supervised-release violation, to be served consecutively. The defendant appealed, arguing that he did not knowingly waive his right to a revocation hearing, that the district court misapplied sentencing factors for the supervised-release violation, and that his sentence for the substantive offense was based on an improper application of the career-offender enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a revocation hearing and that the district court properly applied the career-offender enhancement for the substantive offense. However, the appellate court held that the district court erred by considering retributive and punishment factors, which are not permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) as clarified by the Supreme Court’s decision in Esteras v. United States, when sentencing for the supervised-release violation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the substantive offense sentence, reversed the revocation sentence, and remanded for resentencing on the supervised-release violation. View "United States v. Hoyle" on Justia Law